[SANITIZED]NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN APRIL 27, 1976 - 1976/04/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02996471
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: April 27, 1976

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3.5(c)
USIB
UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE
BOARD
National Intelligence
Bulletin
3.5(c)
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-14)-p4aff� 3.5(c)
April 27, 1976
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 27, 1976
CONTENTS
ARGENTINA: Military
criticizes Videla 18
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I ti.r.......ZtL.Kt I 3.5(c)
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 27, 1976
ARGENTINA
Officers of all three military services are already said to be complaining about
what they view as President Videla's overly conciliatory, indecisive policies. The
dissidents are urging tougher measures against subversives and the Peronist labor
movement.
Videla's military critics believe he has allowed only
halfway measures against the guerrillas, whose attacks have mounted in recent
weeks. The officers want to use any and all means to deal with not only the
guerrillas, but also with individuals accused of other types of crimes. This view,
is said to be gaining favor in the other services as
well.
his authority.
Videla's moderate policies could eventually weaken
there is considerable criticism of the President's
tolerant attitude toward the ousted Peronists. A number of officers, including
the Army III Corps, are of the opinion
t at i.e a s ou inis off t e Peronist movement by jailing all its prominent
leaders and dismantle the Peronist labor movement.
Videla's fellow junta member, navy chief Admiral Massera, reportedly shares
the conviction that the government has thus far acted indecisively. He points to
failures to move against certain labor unions and slowness in replacing many of the
ambassadors removed after the coup. Massera complains that army chief of staff
General Viola, a confidant of Videla's, frequently impedes actions that Massera and
air force chief General Agosti urge on the President.
Videla, as President, is acting in the same deliberate fashion that characterized
his preparations for the coup itself. Faced with a subversive movement that has
flourished since the late 1960s, he is loath to commit his administration to the
unrealistic goal of a rapid solution to the problem. Moreover, he fears that alienating
the Peronists will drive at least some of them into the arms of the terrorists.
Videla, by means of an innovative, wide-ranging economic plan, clearly seeks to
achieve early success in this crucial area. He hopes to gain momentum for his
administration and to undercut those who would have the government become
obsessed with questions of security. For the time bein Videla's cri ics
prepared to go along with him, albeit grudgingly.
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