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March 23, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 or lwr ZCI6ICIC I 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 23 March 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN -TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 TOP SECRET -1N11)-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 �.../1 XL. ttle 23 March 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Situation in Laos. (Page t) 2. Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow scheduled for 28 March, day after SEATO Council of Ministers meeting opens in Bangkok. (Page t) 3. Congo: Tshombd begins trip today to Leopoldville, Brazza- ville, Abidjan, and Monrovia; hopes to gain support for concept of loose confederation. (Page tt) 4. Vietnam: Oorth Vietnamese - directed guerrillas gives timetable for acts of violence to sabotage 9 April election to South. (TOP (Page it) 5. Communist China: Foreign Minister Chen Yi says � Peiping will not enter UN until US ends "occupation" of Taiwan. (Page tit) 6. Afghanistan: Daud to visit Moscow: will probably discuss Soviet aid. (Page iit) 7. Ethiopia: Troops in Addis Ababa protest against low pay; Emperor promises investigation to rectify inequities. (Page iv) 8. Morocco: King Hassan II exploiting recent capture and release of foreign oil technicians to further his claims to Spanish Sahara. (Page iv) 9. Watch Committee conclusions. Page v) Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 "Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Pm! Phong Sal y PHONG SALY N AdiTH A Miuong SaiANI ��1, I A BURMA s LUANG1 PRABANG Luang Prabang SAYAB OU R Y Phru Khoun Muon Kass I. / Sam'Neua \I. / .....? AM .41 'N, ,...^... -. XIENG KHOUANGN, Muong'Soui an Ban V\ Plain Jarres 1 Vang Vie'ng . 13 VIENTIANE Pak Sane � Vientia e NORTHERN LAOS Forces in 40 KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS 0 1032 GOVERNMENT ROAD � TRAIL 0 ROUTE NUMBER 50 illit STATUTE MILES 100 am Bac ieng Kho ringBan Ta Viang Tha Thom AND NI EU A Kam Keut KHAMM UANE 11- T akhek avannaktiii 23 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 z 4Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Nod CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 23 March 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: sie ports indicate that the government's explo- 6 ration of possible political solutions is centering on acceptance of Sihanouk's 14-nation conference proposal. The cabinet apparently is also considering the idea of a commission to follow the conference comprised of Cam- If' "t- bodLa Burma, Malaya, India, Poland, and Canada3,. L...there are tentative indications of a Kong Le - Pathet Lao effort to outflank government forces blocking the ap- proach to Luang Prabang along Route .13. Some government troops have been deployed to counter this threat. Other government forces are being sent to reinforce the Kam Keut area, �where skirmishing apparently continues :Backup, Page 1) (Map) *Warsaw Pact: The chief purpose of the Warsaw Pact meeting announced for 28 March in Moscow is to create a forum from which to respond to Western moves on the Lao- tian situation. This meeting of the Pact's Political Consult- ative Committee is timed to follow the current meeting in Bangkok of SEATO military advisers and the opening on 27 March of the meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers. Moscow probably feels that the Laotian situation is moving Into a new and decisive phase which may require high-level coordination of future bloc steps and which in any event makes desirable a new demonstration of bloc solidarity. Yester- day's TASS announcement refers, as did the announcement prior to a similar session last year, to a meeting at the "top level." This suggests that Eastern European party leaders and premiers may again attend along with the foreign and defense ministers, who are specifically mentioned in the vfi TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 rix , 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO3/007385 *id 1 announcement. Such a meeting could provide an occasion for Khrushchev to break his long public silence on foreign affairs. It is probable that next week's session will cover the Berlin question, at least on a pro forma basis. and possibly in a more threatening context. (Backup, Page 2) Congo: Tshombd is to leave Elisabethville today for a trip which reportedly will include stops at Leopoldville, Brazzaville, Monrovia, and Abidjan in the Ivory Coast. In his talks with Leopoldville officials he apparently will push his plans for a round of conferences to follow up those at Tananarive. In his international travels he probably hopes to obtain support for his concept of a Congo confederation. He plans to attend the conference of Independent African states tentatively scheduled for early April in Monrovia. Tshombe reportedly believes that if he can gain the confi- dence of Liberia's President Tubman, he will have the sup- port of the African leader best able to influence United States policy and can thereby counteract what he considers the un= sympathetic American attitude toward Katanga. (Backup, Page 3) Vietnam: North Vietnamese directed guerrillas in at least one area of South Vietnam have been given a timetable for acts of violence to sabotage the South viptnAmpsp nrAR- idential elections scheduled for 9 April. the following timetable to guerrillas in Kien Giang Province, southwest of Saigon on the Cambodian border: 2 April: Attacks on official buildings; assassination of "wicked people"--presumably village of- ficials; posting of anti-Diem slogans; meet- ings to organize popular support. Attacks to disrupt road travel; continuation of attacks on official buildings; and apparently, 4 April 23 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRET VIA VA 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 V/ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 14�14 ur efforts to surround military and civil guard posts. 8 April: Bridges to be destroyed; waterways blocked; large-scale demonstrations to be organized In towns. Instructions for this date also specify: "Bring out the armed forces and have them break the enemy's grip on the outside areas." 9 April: (election day): A general strike to be organized in towns and villages. 10-15 April: Instructions for this period call for launching "a struggle opposing the fraudulent election," and a "fierce frontal struggle principally aimed at the vile authorities." I Communist China: Foreign Minister Chen Yl, in an inter- 0 view published in Hungary's party newspaper, has said that it , will not be possible for Peiping to enter the UN until the US ends, e.41-.---t its "occupation" of Taiwan and withdraws its armed forces from?' the area. Heretofore, Peiping's public statements on UN repr sentat ion have not gone beyond insistence on the ouster from thge ,it UN of the Chinese Nationalists. While Peiping has not issued" an official policy statement along these lines, the Chinese Communists may believe that international pressures for their participation in the UN have reached a point that encourages them to press their demands for a US withdrawal from Taiwan with new vigor. (Backup, Page 4) Afghanistan-USSR: Afghan Prime Minister Daud, now in� Rome for medical treatment. Plans to leave for Moscow on 4 April, He made similar trips to Moscow while returning home from visits to Europe in 1959 and 1960. Daud probably intends to discuss Soviet assistance programs under Afghan- istan's Seennd Five-Year plan, which is to begin in September. , paud suggested that the Afghan deputy minister of planning come to Rome to discuss possible Italian 23 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF iii =4. II TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 / . Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Ifild I UI . i:,(:HL i aid for the' Second Five-Year Plan. "Then he can go to Moscow with me." Daud will also probably try to learn how the recent limited improvement in Soviet rela- tions with Pakistan might affect Moscow's suPport for Afghan- stan in the Pushtoonistan dispute. ;)4 Ethiopia: The Emperor on 21 March filet a deputation of 500 unarmed enlisted men representing all army units in the Addis Ababa area, following peaceful demonstrations by these troops who were protesting against low pay scales. The troops � dispersed peacefully after the Emperor promised to institute a full probe to rectify inequities in army pay scales. They, re- portedly remained dissatisfied, however, and reconvened into smaller groups to discuss further moves. The Emperor ap- pears reluctant to yield to the soldiers' demands despite warn- ings from senior army leaders that they will be unable to control z , / the troops unless concessions are forthcoming. The populace In the capital is apparently becoming more sympathetic to demands fl for reform. (Backup, Page 6) / A -4;-, Morocco-Spanish Sahara: King Hassan Ills exploiting 0 k - the capture and release of the 11 foreign oil technicians--in-, 7 eluding three Americans--to further Morocco's claims to /Ai Spanish Sahara, in the opinion of the American charge d'af-1 faires and the British ambassador in Rabat. These officials fP -1-- believe that the King's communiqu�issued simultaneously ,6-0- with his theatrical release of the captured men to their re- spective embassies, contains a clear threat that other oil pros-4...t.v.i7 pectors in northern Spanish Sahara will get similar treatment. /7--- / 4 At thQ same time, Hassan indicated he was willing to negotiate ,- -% Morocco's claim to the Sahara with Spain and France. The Spanish command in the Canary islands claims that Spanish forces in northeastern Spanish Sahara have surrounded an invadin Moroccan group and are attacking it from land and air. (Backup, Page 8) - A 23 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO3007385 thid I 01-1 5tA..:Kt.. I Nemo WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United States Intelligence Board concludes that: A. No change from last week. B. No change from last week. C. LAOS Communist forces, supported by undiminished bloc material assistance by air and road, continue pressure on discouraged Lao Army forces which are in a generally defensive posture on the approaches to Luang Prabang, yang Vieng, and Tha Thom. Communist forces are probably consolidating their recent advances in the Route 13 area between Vientiane and Luang Prabang in preparation to exploit further opportunities. The Communist attacks in the vicinity of Kham Keut probably are intended to cause further dispersion of Lao Army forces and to extend the areas under Communist control; they probably will be followed by similar attacks in other areas of southern Laos. Members of the Boun Oum government, discouraged by the continuing improvement in the Communist military position, are tending to desire an early political settle- ment, perhaps even involving adverse terms. The Bloc nations charge increasing intervention by the US, Thailand, and South Vietnam, but have not embarked on a major cam- paign stressing threats to their own security; this, com- bined with a lack of urgency in their diplomatic approaches, may reflect confidence in continued enhancement of the Communist position in Laos. SOUTH VIETNAM Viet Cong (Communist) guerrilla groups in South Vietnam will probably engage in a vigorous extensive campaign of 23 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF � TOP SECRET 22< Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 � Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C0300745 1100 I JEUKL I NIS sabotage and political terrorism in connection with and prior to the 9 April South Vietnamese presidential elections. The Vietnamese security forces are already heavily committed, which will facilitate Viet Cong efforts to undermine govern- mental authority in the countryside to create widespread chaos and unrest. CONGO Continuing efforts by the Stanleyville regime to obtain de- livery of promised material assistance from Bloc and Radical African sources have been unsuccessful and, in effective quantities, will remain so as long as the Sudan refuses transit. The continued control of the Matadi area by Congolese troops and the indications by the Government that only non-military cargoes will be allowed to enter suggests that any effort to disembark UN troops at Matadi under these circumstances may create a serious incident, particularly as the first troop ship to arrive will be carrying Indian troops. Dayalts return as UN representative would worsen relations between the UN and the Leopoldville government. k 23 Mar 61 14 DAILY BRIEF vi II Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 ',00? Ntiof Situation in Laos request for maps showing the various towns between the junction and Luang Prabang. maps for this area were unavailable, but that an inquiry was being sent to Hanoi. leaflets be prepared for the purpose of inducing the rallying of former Kong Le para- troopers, now in Luang Prabang, who had gone over to Phoumi's side when Vientiane was recaptured last December. these former comrades might desire to return to the Kong Le side if they were sure they would not be shot as deserters. Kong Le - Pathet Lao personnel are going to Hanoi for jump training and other specialized instructions. all Luang Prabang province east of that city is now under Pathet Lao con- trol. Llri the tense atmosphere of Vientiane, the possibility of an anti-government coup cannot be excluded. Communist agents are spreading rumors and anti-American propaganda among the population. A morale problem exists among civil servants and garrison troops; recent defections from both groups have been reported. Additionally, there is a growing body of feeling against the continuation and possible expansion of hostilities. While Phoumi maintains in Vientiane several units considered by him to be among his most reliable troops, a determined ef- fort against the government by a relatively small armed group could gain rapid momentu_nE SECRET 23 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 1..A.1.11fl'IL/LJAY 1 UAL. Warsaw Pact Meeting On intra-bRic matter, the Soviet leaders could use next week's meeting as an opportunity to apply new pressures de signed to bring Albania babk-litito line with thel USSR. In the military field, discussion of A-possible reduction in Soviet forces in Hungary might be on the agenda, as might also be plans for Warsaw pact combined-training excercises later this year. Meetings of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Com- mittee have been used since the Pact's formation in 1955 as a forum for discussion of a wide range of pressing political matters by Soviet bloc leaders. These meetings have been attended4337 observers from Communist China; last year's session was at- tended also by observers from North Vietnam and North Korea. The final communique � of these various meetings have annount4d a unified bloc position on the questions at issue. Thus the meeting in February 1960, although marredlyy sharp Sino-Soviet differences, issued a statement which fully restated the Soviet position on the Berlin and German Issues and outlined those topics the USSR intended to discuss at the then-forthcoming Big Four "summit" meeting. 'The coin- muniqud following the April 1959 meeting was directed toward the issues to be considered at the Big Four foreign ministers' conference that spring. The May 1958 meeting was used to attack the theses issued a month earlier by a congress of the Yugoslav party and to widen the break in party relations between the bloc and Belgrade. The meetings in 1958 and 1960, though riot the one in 1959, were attended by Soviet bloc party leaders and chiefs of state, in addition to the foreign and defense min- isters. CONFIDENTIAL 23 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 SECRLT- NNW Situation in the Congo During his Leopoldville visit Tshombd reportedly hopes to be briefed on the status of negotiations with Gizenga and Lundula. Leopoldville officials were authorized at the Tananarive co erence to make secret contacts with the Stanleyville re- gime. There have been persistent reports of such contacts and Leopoldville is at least attempting to maintain com- mumcations contact with Stanleyville; however, there is no firm evidence of any negotiations. Tshombd apparently will attempt to convene a meeting in April which would be attended by the Tananarive conferees. He hopes to follow this with a large-scale round-table confer- ence in Elisabethville. ale seems to believe that the Tananarive resolution provided for the complete abolition of the central gov- ernment machinery- a position at variance with that of most Leopoldville officials, who hope to retain elements of a federal structure; Ileo and other leaders in Leopoldville expect to per- suade Tshombe to modify his proposals at the forthcoming con- ferences, but their conciliatory posture may be compromised by Mobutu, who has stated that he considers the Tal- nanarive conference idiotic. The security situation in outlying areas of the Congo con- tinues to deteriorate intimidation by Congolese armed bands is increasing. As a re- sult, the senior WHO official in Leopoldville has told his head- quarters in Geneva that work may soon become impossible in many areas. SECRET 23 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 'Nog Peiping Expands Conditions for UN Seat aieiping's reported new demand is a logical expansion of its thesis that "imperialism--especially US imperialism--" is the greatest danger in the world and that the Communist bloc's efforts must be devoted to a no-holds-barred struggle against it. This attitude is reflected in Peiping's current in- sistence on the withdrawal of US forces and the recognition of its claim to Taiwan as a necessary preliminary to the set- tlement of all Sino-US prob.bems3. Li'ollowing the 103rd Sino-US ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw on 7 March, Peiping said it would be difficult to reach agreement with the US on any matter until the US ends its "occupation" of Taiwan. Peiping now may be seeking to take the issue outside the field of bilateral Sib-US relations and force its consideration in the UN. The Chinese Commu- nists may also intend through this maneuver to make it more difficult for any consideration in the UNof a "two Chinas" solutionj /he new condition may not reflect a firm policy position. Peiping may be employing the familiar tactic of setting a high price in preparation for bargaining later. Chou En-lai may have been hinting at the nature of a compromise accept- able to Peiping when he told Edgar Snow last November that the US must agree to withdraw its forces but added that as to the specific steps on when and how to withdraw, "they are matters for subsequent thscussion.7 Many UN members which now support Peiping's entry into the UN would probably be unwilling to attempt to accom- modate the Chinese Communists beyond voting to seat Pei- ping's representative. These members believe that UN mem- bership is a privilege as well as a right and therefore would consider Peiping's demands demeaning to the organization. Britain's recent announcement that Communist China should be seated in the United Nations has subsequently been am- plified by a Foreign Office private view that no conditiolas7 CONFIDENTIAL 23 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Niro [jould be attached by Taipei's supporters to the seating of Peiping. On the other hand, the Foreign Office would oppose the Chinese Communists if Peiping advanced such conditions as UN recognition that Taiwan belonged to China or that charges of aggression against Communist China be expunged from UN recordsi CONFIDENTIAL 23 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 NIS Army Dissidence Threatens Ethiopia Ambassador Richards indicated on 22 March that while an uneasy calm has returned to Addis Ababa, trouble could break out again unless the Emperor acts quickly to accom- modate the army dissidents' demands. The Emperor's attempts to date to reduce the growing criticism of his regime appear to have failed. He sought to alleviate army discontent on 14 March by announcing a mod- est increase in its pay scales and to quell dissension among junior and middle-level officers the next day by promoting 73 army officers. The pay increase, however, which is to come from the present army budget, falls considerably short of that promised by the rebel leadership last December. Moreover, air force, police, and navy personnel will be aroused over be- ing denied a pay raise equal to that given the army, while army officers are likely to regard their promotions simply as a counterbalance to those given air force officers last month. Po- lice officials are also displeased because the Emperor recently appointed an army officer instead of a career police official as commissioner of police. Government officials are sufficiently alarmed to have or- dered precautionary measures, including the construction of breastworks around at least one army installation and the po- sitions of heavy weapons and additional guards at other key placesT7 Handbills, which may have originated in the Ministry of Defense, were circulated in the capital on 20 March setting forth the demands of the dissidents. These included�in addi- tion to the pay raise--the dismissal of Chief. of Staff Kebede and other, high government officials, threatening direct action if they are not complied with. The American army attache notes that the dissidents ap- parently have succeeded in establishing organizational ties through several if not all local army units. A leader capable of directing action against the regime is not yet known to have emerged, however. Although army officers reportedly have SECRET 23 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 SECRET Nome secured all arms in unit armories, the troops could recover these weapons through mass action if the situation were to get out of hand. 23 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 NNW Moroccan Claims to Saharan Territories Soon after Spain published regulations on 15 June 1959 for the exploitation of petroleum resources in the Spanish Sahara, the Moroccan Embassy in Madrid made known Mo- rocco's claims of sovereignty over the region. The Moroccan economic counselor in Madrid indicated at that time that he thought American oil companies should be advised this was a contested area and that they might subsequently have to rene- gotiate their status with another government. The following year, nine American firms obtained concessions from the Spanish Government, and by January 1961,38 American teams were engaged in exploratory work. Emphasis was placed on �the northwestern part of the Spanish Sahara because of the availability of supply lines and water. The United Oil Company, whose 11 employees were captured�apparently by Moroccan irregulars at the direction of the Moroccan Army--on 11 March, had recently ceased operations in Latin America to concentrate on exploratory work in Spanish Sahara and Australia. ibanish Army Minister Barroso continues to view Moroccan troop movements near the Spanish Saharan border as menacing, and claimed on 21 March that Spanish troops had the previous day captured "300 Moroccan camels" in the Spanish Sahar.2,..7 Spanish officials in Paris are reported to have proposed that France join forces with Spain for a systematic cleanup of Mo- roccan irregulars operating in Spanish Sahara and Mauritania. Such a joint operation early in 1.958 suppressed Moroccan irregu- lar activities in the region. Paris purportedly has not responded to this request and is not anxious to become involved in such an expedition. The Moroccan press, meanwhile, continues to play up charges of Spain's aggressive intentions, reporting on 21 March the arrival of Spanish reinforcements not only in Spanish Sahara but also in the Spanish-held presidios of Ceuta and Melilla on Morocco's Mediterranean coast. It also claims that Spanish mil- itary aircraft created havoc among the population by flying low over the southern Moroccan town of Tarfaya on 20 March, and 23 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Ntoori Noose continues to charge Spanish authorities with kidnaping a team of four Italian oil prospectors operating in the Tarfaya area. SECRET 23 Mar. 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 Nisoi THE PRESIDENT The Vice President -Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Deprtment of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investi-gation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385 /7/ -TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03007385