WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03012546
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2023
• Case Number: F-2022-01252
• Publication Date: September 13, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
'Seeret
43
13 September 1968
No. 0037/68
�.2-26/K35.
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ECILL
The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
quently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research,
and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requir-
ing more comprehensive treatment and therefore published sep-
arately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.
WARNING
The WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classified information af-
fecting the national security of the United States, within the
meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
deciattification
Approved
-
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C ONTENTS
(Information as of noon EDT, 12 September 1968)
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
SOVIETS AND CZECHOSLOVAKS STRUGGLE OVER "NORMALIZATION"
Moscow is pressing for "normalization"--a term
subject to varying interpretations--of the polit-
ical situation in the country in accordance with
the agreement reached in Moscow in late August.
The Czechoslovaks have partially met some of the
reported Soviet demands, but have procrastinated
on others.
RUMANIA CAUTIOUSLY ASSESSES COMMITMENTS AND PROSPECTS
Rumanian leader Ceausescu is tailoring his regime's
contacts with the Communist and non-Communist worlds
to reflect the "new realities" stemming from the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia.
NATO CONTINUES TO SEEK PROPER RESPONSE TO SOVIET THRUST
Alliance members are considering an accelerated
schedule of ministerial meetings as well as substan-
tive steps designed to adjust to the new situation
arising from the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.
DE GAULLE OUTLINES FRENCH REFORMS
The social and political reforms outlined by De Gaulle
in his press conference of 9 September will have im-
portant long-range consequences, but at present there
is little public enthusiasm for them.
Page i
WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Sep 68
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-greP6441.
Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 9
VIETNAM
The pace of enemy military activity generally slack-
ened this week, but it is apparent that the Com-
munists have not abandoned their intentions to carry
out some further offensives. To encourage a uni-
lateral US move on the bombing issue, Hanoi is again
manipulating the language of its negotiating position.
In Saigon, South Vietnamese officials and politicians
are looking ahead to a post cease-fire period.
PHILIPPINE-MALAYSIAN RELATIONS AGAIN GROW WORSE
The "cooling-off period" between the two countries
has been abruptly ended by Philippine actions to bring
the Sabah issue before two international forums.
10
13
NEW STRAINS APPEAR IN SINO - NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONS 14
Chinese displeasure with North Vietnam was displayed
most recently in Peking's treatment of the North Viet-
namese National Day celebrations and by an angry out-
burst from Chou En-lai against Hanoi's public support
for Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia.
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 15
NEW FLARE-UP SEEMS LIKELY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The Israelis may be cranking up for another reprisal
strike against either Egypt or Jordan in the wake of
this week's heavy firefight along the Suez Canal.
EGYPT CONTINUES AS A MAJOR SOVIET AID RECIPIENT
Moscow is now concentrating on completing development
projects under construction and on raising production
levels at existing plants in Egypt.
Page ii
WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Sep 68
16
17
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-STeRZ.Z.
NIGERIAN FEDERAL TROOPS SLOWLY ADVANCE INTO BIAFRA
The secessionist army, still largely intact, contin-
ues to fight back hard against the superior federal
troops, but it also appears to be making definite
plans for protracted guerrilla warfare.
MOBUTU SEEKS TO IMPROVE CONGOLESE EFFICIENCY
Congo (Kinshasa) President Joseph Mobutu has made
several major changes and appointments in recent
months aimed at improving the over-all efficiency of
his regime.
Western Hemisphere
18
20
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 21
GUATEMALAN SITUATION REMAINS TENSE
Action by both the terrorists and the Guatemalan
security forces has raised the level of violence in
urban and rural areas over the past week, but the
three accused assassins of Ambassador Mein are still
at large.
VENEZUELA TIGHTENS SECURITY PRECAUTIONS FOR ELECTIONS
The minister of interior met with state governors to
discuss the security problem and to coordinate plans
for countering terrorist activity, which in the past
few months has included bank robberies and attacks on
electoral registration boards.
MEXICAN STUDENTS STILL SPAR WITH GOVERNMENT
Mexican students have rejected the government's re-
sponse to their demands and are threatening to con-
tinue their movement in the streets.
Page iii
WEEKLY SUMMARY
SUMMARY
13 Sep 68
22
23
25
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EUROPE
Attention in Eastern Europe and the USSR still focused this week
almost exclusively on Czechoslovakia and the consequences of the Soviet
invasion for both the Prague regime and the rest of the Communist world.
There is still no meeting of minds i n Prague and Moscow on interpreting
the vague phrase "normalization" as applied to Czechoslovak domestic
developments. Moscow clearly has in mind tighter party control in Czecho-
slovakia as well as closer military and foreign policy coordination between
Prague and the USSR. It is unclear, however, how determined Moscow is to
enforce its liews.
Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov has been in Prague for
a week, apparently to assess the prospects of those Czechoslovaks whom
Moscow would like to see in power. Clearly East Berlin and Warsaw�and
probably also the USSR's other Eastern European allies�would like to see
Dubcek and his supporters ousted.
The Rumanians are adjusting their contacts with the Communist and
non-Communist worlds, and have retrenched a bit until the storm stirred by
the invasion blows over. Rumanian leader Ceausescu, however, apparently
contemplates no basic retreat from his nationalistic policies.
The Yugoslays continue to move aggressively to broaden their commer-
cial and political contacts in the West. They apparently remain on a military
alert status, as do the Rumanians.
Elsewhere, several key nonbloc Communist parties continue to express
their distaste for the Soviet invasion. This may spell doom for such pet
Moscow projects as the international Communist conference scheduled for
November.
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Sep 68
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SOVIETS AND CZECHOSLOVAKS STRUGGLE OVER "NORMALIZATION"
Moscow is pressing for "nor-
malization"--a term subject to
varying interpretation by the
Soviets and the Czechoslovaks--
of the political situation in
the country in accordance with
the agreement reached in Moscow
in late August. The Czechoslo-
vaks have partially met some of
the reported Soviet demands, but
have procrastinated on others.
Moscow has not failed to note
this procrastination. Czechoslo-
vak efforts to preserve some
parts of their action program
have nettled the Soviets to the
point where they are now char-
acterizing this "quiet counter-
revolution" as no less dangerous
than the more violent brand shown
by the Hungarians in 1956.
A possible indication that
some of the five Warsaw Pact
hard liners would like to see
Dubcek ousted was contained in a
Polish newspaper on 4 September.
In its appraisal of the Czech-
oslovak central committee meeting
of 31 August--the session that
brought additional liberals into
the party presidium--the Warsaw
paper cited unnamed Czechoslovak
sources as characterizing Dubcek
as well-meaning but weak and
politically naive. Such a line
about Dubcek could become the
tack taken by the occupiers
should a decision be made to
ease him from power.
Soviet First Deputy Foreign
Minister Kuznetsov arrived in
Czechoslovakia on 6 September
for meetings with the Czecho-
Page 3
slovak leadership, and Premier
Cernik held a one-day meeting
in Moscow with the three top
Soviet leaders. Moscow appar-
ently is still trying to work
through the present Prague lead-
ers and hopes to gain at least
grudging acquiescence in re-
vamping the present government.
Czechoslovak efforts so
far to accommodate the Soviets
have been showy, but they do
not, from a Soviet point of view,
deal with the heart of the prob-
lem. For example, two non-Com-
munist political organizations
that had been bitterly attacked
by the Soviets--the Club of
Committed Non-Party People and
the K-231, an association of
rehabilitated political pris-
oners--have been banned. A few
days later, however, the Czech-
oslovak cabinet approved draft
legislation that would not ex-
clude at some future date the
addition of similar organizations
to the Communist-controlled
National Front. Moreover, per-
sonal freedom and security were
guaranteed by Czechoslovakia's
leaders in a proclamation issued
on 10 September.
Government officals have
continued to discuss censorship
lirtNk.&L
WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 Sep 68
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requirements in the wake of the
formal re-establishment of cen-
sor's offices in Prague and
Bratislava. Two editors of
liberal journals have been re-
placed. On 8 September, the
Prague censor confirmed on tele-
vision that his two guiding
principles were to avoid overt
criticism of the occupying states
and to prohibit publication of
anything detracting from the
leading role of the Communist
Party. Czechoslovak news media,
however, are filled with count-
less thinly disguised criticisms
of the occupiers. During the
week, newspapers, radio and
television stations, and the
Czechoslovak News Agency were
returned to Czechoslovak control.
They are returning to normal
operations, despite the damaged
condition in which their quarters
were left by Soviet troops.
The government is also mak-
ing plans to restrict public
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Alois lndra
FIRST SECRETARY
Alexander Dubcek
SECRETARIES
Zdenek Mlynar
*Josef Spacek
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECRETARIAT
*Lubomir Kovalcik *Jiri Sekera Vaclav Slavik
Vasil Bilak
Oldrich Cernik
Alexander Dubcek
*Ewen Erban
*Jaromir Hettes
*Libuse Hrdinova
*Gustav Husak
MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDIUM
*Vladimir Kabrna
*Zdenek Mlynar
*Vaclav Neubert
Jan Piller
*Josef Pinkeye
*Stefan Sadovsky
Vaclav Simecek
*Bohumil Simon
*Vaclav Slavik
Josef Smrkovsky
Josef Spacek
Oldrich Svestka
*Ludvik Svoboda (Honorary)
*Anton Tazky
*Jozef Zrak
CANDIDATE MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDIUM
*Frantisek Barbirek Jozef Lenart *Karel Polacek
91979 9-68
Page 4
WEEKLY SUMMARY
New members since the invasion
13 Sep 68
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-grefl4a._
assembly and foreign travel.
Until such laws are enacted by
the National Assembly, it will
consider extraordinary measures
to limit public assemblies and
the imposition of temporary re-
strictions on the issuance of
exit passes for travel to West-
ern countries. There are uncon-
firmed reports that Soviet troops
are monitoring the performance
of Czechoslovak border guards.
At the same time, however,
measures are being considered for
compensation of individuals and
corporations for damages suffered
during periods of illegality,
an obvious reference to the in-
vasion and occupation. A plaque
has been mounted on Bratislava's
main post office commemorating
those citizens killed or wounded
during the invasion on 21 August.
Political rehabilitation of
victims of Stalinism will begin
in late September or early Octo-
ber. Work continues under the
terms of the liberal action
program for weakening the In-
terior Ministry by transferring
its jurisdiction over prisons
to the Justice Ministry.
Meanwhile, the unrecon-
structed Czechoslovaks and their
Rumanian, Yugoslav, and Italian
Page 5
allies are still under consider-
able fire from their Eastern
European neighbors.
Although the disposition
of occupation forces remains
essentially unchanged, troops
are withdrawing from within towns
and major cites. The US military
attache in Prague says that the
estimated 7,500 Soviet troops
that began bivouacking at Prague's
Ruzyne airport last week--pre-
sumably for rotation home--were
still encamped there on 10 Sep-
tember.
The ending on 6 September of
a Bulgarian military exercise near
the Rumanian frontier probably
has contributed to a relaxation
of tensions in Bucharest.
Neither Rumania nor Yugo-
slavia have reduced the alert
status of their armed forces,
however. As of 10 September,
the Yugoslav call-up of individ-
uals with special skills was
still under way, and contingency
plans were being implemented to
disperse television and radio
facilities to permit clandestine
operations--as the Czechoslovaks
had done with the assistance of
their armed forces--in the event
of an occupation.
WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Sep 68
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RUMANIA CAUTIOUSLY ASSESSES COMMITMENTS AND PROSPECTS
Rumanian leader Ceausescu is
tailoring his regime's contacts
with the Communist and non-Commu-
nist worlds to reflect the "new
realities" stemming from the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia.
Since 26 August Bucharest
has refrained from further polem-
ics directed against the five War-
saw Pact invaders of Czechoslo-
vakia. The regime has retrenched
in this manner in the past follow-
ing strong public differences with
its allies. Bucharest has not
shown itself any less determined,
however, to pursue its independent
foreign policy.
This stance is reflected in
the arrival in Bucharest on 8 Sep-
tember of British Foreign Secre-
tary Stewart and in the planned
visit by Belgian Foreign Minister
Harmel, slated to start on 13 Sep-
tember. Each visit comes at the
insistence of the Rumanians, and
demonstrates Western support for
Ceausescu's ticklish anti-invasion
stand.
Rumania has been quietly do-
ing as much as it can to focus at-
tention on the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia while saying as little
as possible about it. This policy
will face a severe test at the up-
coming session of the UN General
Assembly (UNGA). Rumania's For-
eign Minister Manescu is president
of the UNGA and faces the dilemma
of addressing himself to this is-
Page 6
sue without incurring Moscow's
criticism. He may opt to use his
UN office to issue a plea for
reason and for the self-determina-
tion of peoples without specifi-
cally naming Czechoslovakia. He
may also make some broadly stated
proposals for nonintervention or
try to have the UNGA define ag-
gression.
Rumanian relations with other
Communist parties also will be
subject to change. It is still
uncertain whether Bucharest will
send representatives to the inter-
national Communist conference
scheduled for November in Moscow.
Bilateral party contacts with the
Warsaw Five can be expected to be
proper, however, and perhaps even
more closely spaced.
Rumanian contacts with the
Yugoslav and Western European Com-
munist parties probably will gain
in substance and cordiality in
coming months as Bucharest seeks
abroad the support that it is un-
likely to find among its nominal
allies. The visit to Bucharest
from 6 to 9 September of Giancarlo-
Pajetta, a high-level Italian Com-
munist Party official, is a case
in point.
The politically shrewd and
realistic Ceausescu probably will
strive for a modus vivendi with
the Warsaw Five while continuing
to pursue Rumania's national in-
His success will depend,
on the attitude of the
and their hard-core al-
terests.
however,
Russians
lies.
WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Sep 68
AmaammummilmolamignimPlimomm"
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NATO CONTINUES TO SEEK PROPER RESPONSE TO SOVIET THRUST
Alliance members are con-
sidering an accelerated schedule
of ministerial meetings as well
as substantive steps designed to
adjust to the new situation aris-
ing from the Soviet occupation
of Czechoslovakia.
The North Atlantic Council
approved on 4 September the ex-
tensive work program developed
by NATO Secretary General Brosio
since the Czechoslovak crisis.
A number of studies will be
undertaken, aimed at providing
a political-military assessment
of the new situation. Certain
to come under review are the
warning time concept, force
levels in relation to the Warsaw
Pact, and crisis management pro-
cedures.
In meetings so far of the
permanent representatives, the
West Germans have sought to stress
the need for military prepared-
ness and to de-emphasize the
detente theme featured in the
1967 Harmel Report on the future
tasks of the Alliance. The
French, who originally were
reluctant to accept the Harmel
Report, now are defending it be-
cause they wish to continue to
promote detente. They urge that
the report be promptly reaffirmed
as the charter of Alliance policy.
The members have agreed, however,
that the projected studies should
not anticipate policy decisions,
such as a revision of the Harmel
Report.
The members are continuing
to review the question of na-
tional military contributions.
In a statement on 4 September,
the Defense Planning Committee--
which does not include France, a
nonparticipant in the integrated
military command--called upon
members to take into account
"the implications of recent
developments in Eastern Europe
in the planning of their national
forces." The statement also
referred to the need to maintain
an effective Alliance military
capability, phraseology designed
to cloak a dispute over qualita-
tive versus quantitative strength.
Belgium has already announced it
will postpone plans to withdraw
its forces from West Germany
and will deploy additional ele-
ments there.
All Alliance members appear
to agree that the ministerial
meetings, now scheduled for
December, should be shifted to
an earlier date, although there
are differing intentions regard-
ing the scope and timing of such
sessions. The British oppose
a ministerial meeting in September
as too "demonstrative," but they
favor considering Brosio's work
program. The West Germans hope
that the ministers will discuss
a proposal that member states
declare that they do not intend MG9
to withdraw from the Alliance
for a certain number of years.
-57;e4W.I.
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 Sep 68
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DE GAULLE OUTLINES FRENCH REFORMS
The response in France to Gen-
eral de Gaulle's press conference
on 9 September, his first since
the May student-labor crisis, was
one of general disappointment.
De Gaulle devoted only a small
portion of his time to foreign
affairs, and was largely preoccu-
pied with domestic politics.
Many French observers de-
scribed the general's performance
as lackluster, uninspiring, and
unresponsive to the needs of a
country so recently torn by wide-
spread social unrest. Left-wing
Gaullists described De Gaulle's
stance as a "step back" from ear-
lier reform proposals, and even
conservative journals decried the
vagueness of his comments.
De Gaulle announced that a
referendum would be held to obtain
national approval for reforms in-
tended to decentralize the admin-
istration of the country by estab-
lishing regional councils, and to
end the present Senate's political
power. The reformed Senate would
be an advisory group charged with
making recommendations on budget
and economic planning. The Na-
tional Assembly would therefore
become the sole legislative body.
The regional councils would pos-
sess considerably more power than
any previous local government
bodies in modern France, primarily
because they would have the power
to tax and raise funds.
De Gaulle's comments on worker
participation at the plant level
were aimed primarily at reassuring
the business community that man-
agement's prerogatives would not
be infringed. Worker participation
would be limited to a profit-shar-
ing scheme already in effect, and
to opening channels of information
between labor and management. La-
bor leaders categorically con-
demned these proposals as a veiled
attempt to undercut the power of
organized unions.
There is at present little
public enthusiasm for Gaullist
projects for social and political
reform, even though these will
have important long-range conse-
quences. According to recent
opinion polls, the general public
is more interested in bread and
butter issues, and De Gaulle may
have trouble drumming up popular
interest in the forthcoming refer-
endum.
By contrast, plans for uni-
versity reform have generated
heated debate. Minister of Educa-
tion Edgar Faure has attacked the
problems directly, outlining a
program of change that would go
far toward dealing with the condi-
tions that led to the explosion
in May. Although Faure has en-
countered opposition from within
the Gaullist party, he appears to
have the President's backing.
Neither public disinterest
in the referendum nor Gaullist
party opposition to Faure's pro-
gram will deter De Gaulle, however.
Recent polls show that a clear ma-
jority of the public still supports
the general, and there is no po-
litical leader in any party capable
of challenging him at this time.
7gIttffR4
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13 Sep 68
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FAR EAST
Bad weather and allied spoiling operations were among the factors
limiting Communist military activity this week. Major enemy elements,
however, are continuing to maneuver themselves into position for possible
new offensive thrusts in key areas.
Hanoi spokesmen, meanwhile, are calling attention to certain portions
of Premier Pham Van Dong's National Day speech on 2 September which
seemed intended to show greater flexibility on certain key issues. These
commentators give special emphasis to Dor g's promise that a bombing halt
would have a "positive effect" on attempts to reach a political settlement, a
somewhat less rigorous formulation than Hanoi's usual position that talks
cannot move on to other issues until the bombing is stopped. The North
Vietnamese are also pointing to Dong's omission, reported last week, of
several conditions Hanoi usually attaches to US negotiations with the Libera-
tion Front.
Although these semantic games are a familiar part of Hanoi's stock in
trade, the play given to Dong's formulations suggests they have at least
temporarily replaced earlier authoritative positions.
The Saigon government is focusing more and more on the problems to
be faced when and if a political settlement is reached. Most of its initial
planning centers on the development of a viable politico-administrative
apparatus in the countryside. The lack of this has been a serious impediment
to the successful prosecution of the war, and it will be essential if the
government is to compete effectively with the Communists in the intense
political scrambling that would follow a settlement.
Contrasting performances by Chou En-lai and Mao's wife, Chiang
Ching, at a mass rally in Peking on 7 September mirrored continued disagree-
ment among top leaders over the course of the Cultural Revolution. Chou,
the main speaker, exuded confidence in reiterating the moderate approach
he has always taken and spoke sternly of sending off "youths"�primarily
members of Red Guard organizations�to work in factories, mines, and rural
areas. Chiang Ching by contrast appeared defensive, urging that the Red
Guards be "protected," stressing the "tremendous contribution" of the Red
Guards despite their admitted errors, and warning of more struggle to
come.
Page 9
WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 Sep 68
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VIETNAM
The pace of Communist mili-
tary activity generally slackened
throughout most of South Vietnam
this week, in part because of ad-
verse weather in the northern
provinces but also because of
vigorous, country-wide allied
PHNOM
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190
Page 10
S
spoiling actions targeted against
enemy troop concentrations, stag-
ing areas, and base camps. A
notable exception was an upsurge
in enemy hostilities in the north-
ern provinces of III Corps, where
the Communists penetrated Tay
Ninh city in mid-week and staged
a series of attacks against al-
lied positions.
It is apparent that Commu-
nist main force units have not
abandoned their intention to
carry out further offensive thrusts
in certain key areas. Major Com-
munist forces continue to prepare
for combat south of the Demili-
tarized Zone and near the major
coastal cities of I Corps. Up
to three eneny regiments con-
tinue to pose -a threat to Duc Lap
and to the provincial capital of Ban
Me Thuot in southwestern II Corps.
Furthermore, most of the enemy's
forces in northern III Corps are
still in position to strike at key
targets north and northwest of Sai-
gon with multiregimental assaults.
At present, there appears
to be no imminent threat to Sai-
gon. Communist subregion forces,
however, could stage small-scale
probes against selected targets
in the capital city and renewed
mortar and rocket fire could come
at any time.
Terrorism has risen sharply
in Saigon as well as in some of
the rural areas of the country.
This tactic is probably the least
expensive in terms of personnel
WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Sep 68
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and materiel in maintaining pres-
sure and making the enemy's pres-
ence felt.
Since 18 August, when the
Communists began a series of at-
tacks throughout South Vietnam,
it has become clear that the major
country-wide campaign forecast in
captured documents, prisoner in-
terrogations, and intelligence re-
ports has fallen short of its
intended goals. Although evidence
of the enemy's over-all inten-
tions varies from region to re-
gion, the Communists have not been
able to seize and hold the initia-
tive, and have failed to score a
single major military victory
with any of their big units.
On the other hand, although
certain enemy forces were mauled
in offensive actions in recent
weeks and others were forced
away from their primary objec-
tives, many of the Communists'
major combat units are still
capable of mounting extensive
attacks, especially in III Corps,
the Demilitarized Zone area, and
along the coastal areas of the
northern provinces. These at-
tacks could include attempts to
overrun South Vietnamese outposts
and remote Special Forces camps.
Assaults on key urban centers
along the lines of the Tay Ninh
attack, are also possible.
Communist strategy during
the coming weeks will probably
continue to stress economy-of-
force tactics, increased shelling
and ground probes against out-
posts and district towns, and in-
tensified terrorism and sabotage
activities. At the same time,
enemy main force units will prob-
ably attempt to harass allied
forces with small-scale attacks
and interdiction of lines of com-
munication. In certain key
areas, first-line enemy troops
may attempt to inflict heavy
casualties on allied forces with
large-scale bombardments and
limited ground assaults. An in-
creasing number of prisoner in-
terrogations, captured documents,
and other reports suggest that
intensified enemy activity is to
continue at least through Octo-
ber in an effort to influence
the US elections.
North Vietnamese on
Negotiations Issues
Hanoi is again manipulating
the language of its negotiating
position in an effort to encour-
age a unilateral US move on the
bombing issue. Responsible North
Vietnamese spokesmen and state-
ments in the past week have
pointed to Premier Pham Van Dong's
National Day speech on 2 Septem-
ber as the latest and most au-
thoritative Communist statement
on two sticky negotiations is-
sues: reciprocity for a bombing
halt, and the role of the Libera-
tion Front in postbombing talks.
Although the premier added
nothing new to the substance of
well-known Hanoi positions, he
employed some semantic varia-
tions that put a more attrac-
tive gloss on them. He promised,
for example, that a bombing halt
would have a "positive effect"
on the problem of reaching a
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political solution. The usual
Hanoi formulation is simply a
flat assertion that the bombing
must be stopped before other
questions can be discussed.
The premier also omitted
several conditions that are fre-
quently attached to Hanoi's de-
mands regarding the Liberation
Front. Stating only that the
US must recognize and talk with
the Front about South Vietnamese
matters, he avoided earlier cate-
gorical formulations that the
Front along represents the South,
that the Front must have a "de-
cisive" say in a settlement, and
that a settlement had to conform
to the Front's political program.
The premier's language does not
rule out participation by the
Saigon government in postbomb-
ing negotiations.
Although this kind of ma-
neuvering is a familiar device,
the propaganda play given Pham
Van Dong's words suggests they
have at least temporarily re-
placed earlier authoritative
positions.
South Vietnamese Political
Developments
South Vietnamese officials
and political leaders are look-
ing Ahead with increasing serious-
ness to a post cease-fire period.
They often build their cases
for new political or administra-
tive schemes in terms of strength-
ening the ability of national-
ist elements to cope with the
Communists in any future politi-
cal competition.
In an example of this trend,
opposition Senator Nguyen Van
Ngai is arguing for his latest
pet project--combining his Revo-
lutionary Dai Viet party with
other groups to form a larger
party--by emphasizing the need
for several broadly based parties
to confront the Communists.
Top government leaders are
giving increased attention to the
Communist political challenge in
the countryside. President Thieu
and Prime Minister Huong have
made numerous visits to the prov-
inces in recent weeks. Moreover,
Huong has assigned a number of
special assistants to keep him
informed on the situation in the
countryside.
Huong's cabinet showed its
concern when it voted on 15 Au-
gust to establish an "inner cabi-
net" to consider ways of coping
with Viet Cong political activity
after a cease-fire. Particular
attention reportedly is to be
given to competing at the village
level.
The government is also mak-
ing an effort to win the support
of segments of the population
that have often been largely ig-
nored. In addition to support-
ing the Lien Minh, a new pro-
government front, President Thieu
is promoting a new women's mass
organization and is making new
overtures to student groups cur-
rently under leftist influence.
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PHILIPPINE-MALAYSIAN RELATIONS AGAIN GROW WORSE
The "cooling-off period" be-
tween the two countries has been
abruptly ended by Philippine ac-
tions to bring the Sabah issue
before two international forums.
Passage by the Philippine
Congress of a bill on territorial
seas, which reserves Manila's
claim to most of Sabah, prompted
a sharp response from Malaysia.
On 4 September, Kuala Lumpur
warned Manila that a break in
relations may result if the bill
becomes law. President Marcos
has deferred immediate action
by referring the bill to his
Foreign Policy Council for rec-
ommendation, but has stated he
will sign it if the council ap-
proves.
All indications point to
the probability of Marcos' af-
firmative action. Upon becoming
law, the bill will be deposited
with the UN Secretary General.
Manila apparently anticipates
that Malaysia will protest the
section dealing with Sabah and
thus enable the Philippines to
bring the dispute before the UN,
a development Malaysia has sought
to avoid.
Concurrently, a separate
Philippine move to introduce the
Sabah issue into the Asia Pacific
Council has further antagonized
Kuala Lumpur and momentarily
irritated Malaysia's relations
with Japan.
-SPEC-R-F4-1.
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7ch-eft-Et_
NEW STRAINS APPEAR IN SINO - NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONS
There are new indications
of friction in relations between
Peking and Hanoi. Chinese dis-
pleasure with North Vietnam was
displayed most recently in Pe-
king's treatment of the North
Vietnamese National Day celebra-
tions and by an angry outburst
from Chou En-lai against Hanoi's
public support for Soviet actions
in Czechoslovakia.
A congratulatory message
from Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-
lai to Ho Chi Minh on 1 September
contained a perfunctory offer of
"support and aid" but underscored
Peking's opposition to Vietnam
negotiations. The message warned
of US-Soviet "peace schemes" and
urged the Vietnamese to "persist
in protracted war."
In a bitter denunciation of
Moscow at the North Vietnamese
Embassy's National Day celebra-
tion in Peking, Chou charged that
Soviet intervention in Czechoslo-
vakia is evidence of a Soviet-US
bargain on "spheres of influence"
that gives Moscow a free hand
in Eastern Europe in return for
awarding "Vietnam and the rest
of Southeast Asia" to the US.
In a blunt reference to the North
Vietnamese, Chou declared, "It is
high time that all those who cher-
ish illusions about Soviet revi-
sionism wake up." At the root of:
this thinly veiled attack lies
Chinese sensitivity to what Peking
considers to be signs of weakness
and flexibility in Hanoi. The
Chinese have long been convinced
that Moscow is encouraging Hanoi
to seek a negotiated settlement.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Attention in the Middle East this week turned to the likely possibility
of a strong Israeli retaliatory strike against Egypt. Two incidents along the
canal are the most recent provocations. If another major clash takes place, it
could involve the Jordanian front as well as Suez.
In its economic aid program in Egypi , Moscow has begun to concen-
trate on completing development projects under construction and on raising
production levels at existing plants.
The Shah of Iran plans to visit the USSR late this month despite the
Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, which the Iranians have deplored.
Whatever the disadvantages of a visit at this time, the Shah probably wants
to avoid disrupting the growing Soviet-Iranian rapprochement.
In Cyprus, the intercommunal talks have encountered their first major
stumbling block. The Greek Cypriot negotiator claims that the Turkish
Cypriot proposals for local autonomy and representation in the national
government are unacceptable. He sees little chance for agreement unless the
Turkish Cypriots are willing to compromise.
In Congo (Brazzaville), army strong man Ngouabi, in alliance with
civilian ultraleftists, appears to be consolidating his position at the expense
of rival military leaders. Policy statements issued thus far have been moder-
ate in tone, emphasizing cooperation with France and neighboring African
states. The future course of the regime, however, remains unclear.
The continued detention in Algiers of former premier Moise Tshombe
of Congo (Kinshasa) has become a matter of much speculation as the
meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) opens. Kinshasa has
emphatically denied an Algiers press report that the release of Tshombe�
with Congolese Government approval�is imminent, and insists the issue is
not appropriate for OAU discussion.
Somali-Ethiopian relations have taken a turn for the better following
Addis Ababa's agreement to end the harsh emergency regulations in the
Somali-inhabited Ogaden area of Ethiopia on 16 September.
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NEW FLARE-UP SEEMS LIKELY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Another major Israeli re-
prisal strike seems imminent in
the wake of last week's firefight
across the Suez Canal, although
the Israelis will probably delay
such action until the present
UN Security Council session is
over.
The Suez clash took place
after the Israelis had blown up
a landmine on their side of the
canal. It is uncertain, as
usual, which side initiated the
firing, but approximately ten
Israelis were killed and a number
of civilian casualties were in-
flicted in the Egyptian town of
Suez. This sort of encounter
resembles those that have
provoked reprisals in the past,
Comments from Lebanese
Foreign Minister Boutros re-
garding the recent Arab foreign
ministers' conference. in Cairo
are gloomy. He was concerned
over what he termed a general
air of pessimism and indecision,
and a unanimous feeling that
UN mediator Jarring's mission
had no chance of success. Al-
though there was a tacit agree-
ment at the meeting to avoid
handing out an inflammatory en-
dorsement of terrorist activity,
no one apparently made any real
effort to initiate efforts to
curtail such actions. Jordan's
King Husayn had probably hoped
to achieve some sort of general
decision to restrict support for
the terrorists, but such an agree-i
ment does not seem to be forth-
coming.
If another major clash
takes place, it could involve
the Jordanian front as well as
Suez. An attack along the
Jordanian frontier would be
likely to involve the Iraqi
troops stationed there.
_
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EGYPT CONTINUES AS A MAJOR SOVIET AID RECIPIENT
Following the review last
December of its economic aid pro-
gram in Egypt, Moscow has con-
centrated on completing develop-
ment projects under construction
and on raising production levels
at existing plants. Work was
started on only one new major
industrial project, the Helwan
iron and steel complex.
As in the case of India, its
other major aid recipient, the
USSR has taken steps to help
spur production in Soviet-built
factories by agreeing to purchase
products in excess of Egyptian
requirements.
local factories will process
50,000 tons of heavy equipment,
thousands of tons of metallurgi-
cal equipment, and 5,000 tons of
parts for agricultural equipment
and tractor factories in the USSR.
Similarly, the USSR is help-
ing Egypt to utilize the expanded
production capacity of the Soviet-
designed and -built shipyard at
Alexandria. Moscow last year
agreed to provide specifications,
materials, and technical assist-
ance for the construction of a
12,880-ton dry-cargo ship. Fur-
ther negotiations were held this
July for Soviet assistance, in-
cluding the assignment of an ad-
ditional 40 engineers and tech-
nicians, for the construction
of a 30,000-ton tanker and five
other cargo vessels. This re-
cent flurry of activity may have
led to the recent report that
the Soviets are to assume con-
trol of ship construction and
repair facilities in Egypt.
Moscow also is moving ahead
with its plans for helping Egypt
develop its petroleum industry,
one of Cairo's most promising
economic sectors. Soviet experts
began an aerial survey of the
Siwa Oasis area in Egypt's west-
ern desert in June. A seismic
and geological survey is sched-
uled to begin this month and to
end in December, at which time a
two-well exploration drilling
program will begin. In addition,
another group of Soviet advisory
personnel is in Cairo working on
over-all Egyptian petroleum plans.
The Cairo press in mid-July,
quoting its Yugoslav correspond-
ent, reported that a new wheat
deal had been concluded with the
USSR, but no details were given.
There is no other evidence, how-
ever, that Moscow has contracted
to supply additional quantities
of wheat. Between January 1967
and June 1968, Moscow supplied
Egypt with 1.1 million tons of
wheat, a significant share of
its annual import requirements.
Since June, no shipments of Sov-
iet wheat have been noted.
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 Sep 68
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7TrrtfigaL
NIGERIAN FEDERAL TROOPS SLOWLY ADVANCE INTO BIAFRA
Federal military forces are
slowly forcing their way toward
the few major towns and airstrips
remaining under Biafran control.
Although the secessionist army,
still largely intact, continues to
fight back hard against the su-
perior federal troops, it also
appears to be making definite
SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA
plans for protracted guerrilla
warfare.
General Gowon's timetable
calls for completing the occupa-
tion of the rest of Biafra by
the middle of September, a task
that appears unrealistic even
to Gowon. Federal forces have
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Makurdi'.
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Federal advancy
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EQUATORIAL GU,INEA
FERNANDO POI
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CAMEROON
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suffered large numbers of casual-
ties in recent weeks as Biafran
resistance at times has been al-
most fanatical. Frequently, how-
ever, the rebel army has chosen
to retreat and counterattack
rather than to meet the much bet-
ter equipped federal army head on.
The Biafrans, too, have suf-
fered sizable casualties, but
have yet to resort to conscription
to obtain replacement troops.
The Biafrans have also trained
and organized several guerrilla
units, some of which have been
operating west of the Niger River
and northwest of Enugu. In ad-
dition, the Biafrans reportedly
have cached quantities of arms
for a prolonged guerrilla cam-
paign after most key towns and
installations have been occupied
by federal troops.
In the southern sector, the
federal 3rd Division now holds
Aba, taken on 4 September, and
intends to push on toward Umuahia,
the Biafran capital and head-
quarters of Biafran leader Ojukwu.
Other elements of the division
are within a few miles of
Owerri and Oguta, and threaten the
two airstrips that are used by
Biafra for munitions imports. An-
other airstrip near Okigwi is
the object of a two-pronged drive
from Awgu and Afikpo by the 1st
Division. The 2nd Division
remains stalled just south of
Onitsha and Awka.
The Biafrans have managed
to maintain a slim flow of mu-
nitions via their air shuttle
services. Besides the continu-
Page 19
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ing flights from Lisbon, a five-
or six-plane shuttle from Libre-
ville, Gabon, has been set up with
French assistance.
Gabon is not believed to have
sufficient stocks for this pur-
pose. France apparently intends
to continue supporting Biafra to
some extent. President de Gaulle,
in a press conference on 9 Sep-
tember, said that France may at
some future date recognize Bi-
afra, a statement that appears to
go one step further than his
earlier expression of support
for Biafran "self-determination."
The French also apparently
intend to facilitate the passage
of Biafran representatives to
the summit conference of the
Organization of African Unity
(OAU), which begins in Algiers
on 13 September. Emperor Haile
Selassie is due to report to the
OAU on the results of the Nige-
rian-Biafran negotiations that
have been taking place in Addis
Ababa under the auspices of the
OAU. These talks, initially be-
gun in the framework of achieving
a political settlement and cease-
fire, bogged down over the details
of getting relief supplies into Bi-
afra. The talks were inconclusively
adjourned on 9 September, with the
Biafrans hopeful of presenting
their case in Algiers to get more
international attention. Lagos,
however, has been lobbying hard
around Africa and has lined up
considerable support for its actions
to end Biafran secession.
WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Sep 68
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fL
MOBUTU SEEKS TO IMPROVE
Congo (Kinshasa) President
Joseph Mobutu has made several
major changes and appointments in
recent months aimed at improving
the over-all efficiency of his
regime.
Mobutu spent most of July
palavering with almost every seg-
ment of Congolese society. He
appeared at these sometimes lengthy
sessions with only one assistant
and invited open discussion and
criticism of his regime. Most
groups responded with enthusiasm.
Complaints about inflation, min-
isterial incompetence, or neglected
projects were frequently voiced.
Mobutu was equally frank, explain-
ing why some problems were cur-
rently insoluble and promising to
look into others. Often, however,
he was amazed to learn for the
first time of some major ministe-
rial failings.
Mobutu apparently then con-
sulted with his closest advisers
and with selected members of the
political bureau. His first major
act was a cabinet shuffle in mid-
August. In general, those min-
isters who had proved themselves
efficient were promoted to posi-
tions of greater status while
incompetent ministers were either
demoted or removed. Victor Nen-
daka, Mobutu's trusted adviser
and an extremely capable admin-
istrator, was named to the impor-
tant Finance Ministry, and Joseph
N'Singa, an intelligent and dy-
namic young comer, was named in-
terior minister. The appointment
Page 20
CONGOLESE EFFICIENCY
of two vice ministers to assist
Foreign Minister Bomboko presum-
ably is intended to improve ef-
ficiency at the ministry, where
decisions often must wait on Bom-
boko's extracurricular social ac-
tivities.
In late August the governors
of the Congo's eight provinces
were reassigned and, once again,
proven administrators were ap-
pointed to the most important or
difficult areas. Additionally,
four former governors were ap-
pointed state inspectors under a
new -system created to assure pro-
vincial compliance with central gov-
ernment directives.
In mid-August, Mobutu also
announced a full-scale reorganiza-
tion of the judicial system and ,
finally appointed a Supreme Court.
In early September he named Da-
mien Kandolo, a close associate
and capable administrator, to
head Gecomin, the Congolese-owned
successor to Union Miniere.
The changes may not yet be
over: an army reorganization
would be desirable and could be in
the offing. In the meantime, Congo
now boasts the semblance of an effi-
cient regime. Whether the new ap-
pointees can do anything toward
overcoming the Congo's enormous
problems, however, depends upon
Mobutu's willingness to support
their ideas and his ability to pro-
vide them with substantial finan-
cial support.
-S7E7tR4-a
WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 Sep 68
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Mexico's volatile but divided students were generally quiet this week.
They plan to hold a "silent mourning" march on 13 September, however,
which could result in violence. The leftist extremists who control the strike
committees have refused to accept the government's offers for talks.
Uruguayan students continued to stage sporadic demonstrations
throughout the week, but security forces were able to prevent them from
getting out of hand.
In Guatemala, the search for the killers of Ambassador Mein continues
as the terrorists show signs of resuming their activities.
Panama's President-elect Arnulfo Arias ended his two-week trip to
Europe last weekend and is now in the US talking to government and
business officials about additional prival e investment and economic aid.
France reportedly has promised to give some economic assistance and to
expand cultural ties, the details of which may be included in a future
Franco-Panamanian commercial treaty.
Chilean President Frei visited Brazilian President Costa e Silva last
week. A joint communique was undramatic, but their stress on Latin
American unity can be interpreted as a desire for greater independence with
respect to the United States.
Officials in the Dominican Republic are concerned that US intervention
in their country in 1965 will be dragged into the debate if the UN General
Assembly takes up the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Domini-
can UN ambassador has said his country will have to respond that while
there is no real comparison between the two cases, the US action also
violated the principle of nonintervention even though taken as a result of the
"chaos" then prevailing. The ambassador has implied that President Balaguer
has approved this position.
Haitian President Duvalier has commuted the death sentence of British
subject David Knox, who had been convicted of complicity in the abortive
exile invasion last May. Duvalier is, nevertheless, still preoccupied with exiles
who might be planning to launch subversive movements against him.
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art,e-RST
GUATEMALAN SITUATION REMAINS TENSE
Action by both the terror-
ists and the Guatemalan security
forces has raised the level of
violence in urban and rural areas
over the past week. Communist
terrorists continue to threaten
prominent Guatemalans and US
personnel, and have engaged in
some bombing attacks and fire-
fights with government forces.
A Guatemalan Army patrol
killed three guerrillas and lost
one officer in a clash on 7 Sep-
tember in southeastern Guatemala.
One of the dead guerrillas has
been identified as a leader of
the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR).
In Guatemala City, security
forces killed one FAR member
while two suspected subversives,
one of whom was a woman, com-
mitted suicide to avoid capture.
The woman may have been impli-
cated in the assassination of
Ambassador Mein on 28 August.
Incriminating evidence found
with the body is still being
-analyzed.
On 6 September, Guatemalan
police captured a FAR insurgent
Page 22
who later admitted to being a
lookout during the ambassador's
assassination. The captured
terrorist named eight other in-
dividuals who participated in
the slaying. Although several
known members of Communist in-
surgent groups and other pre-
sumed guerrillas have been
killed in the last two weeks,
the three publicly identified
by the government as leading
the assassination are still at
large.
The government has flooded
the country with photographs of
these three attached to posters
offering a $10,000 reward for
information leading to their
capture.
On 5 September, the
offices of the Chamber of
Industry and the Guatemalan
Agriculturalists Association
were bombed but there were no
injuries.
5,Vre-F
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VENEZUELA TIGHTENS SECURITY
The Venezuelan Government
is increasing its security pre-
cautions in anticipation of ex-
tremists' attempts to interfere
with the presidential and con-
gressional elections in December.
The Ministry of Defense has
instituted Plan Republica II to
coordinate military security for
registration and polling sites
as well as election materials.
The Plan, like one implemented
prior to the general election
in 1963, designates military
zone commanders and provides for
rapid deployment of troops in
the event of disturbances.
Interior Minister Leandro
Moro has met with state gover-
nors to discuss the security
problem and to coordinate plans
for countering terrorist activ-
ity.
some Colom-
bian guerrillas may have joined
bands operating in western
Venezuela. Although this claim
has not been substantiated, it
is likely that some Colombian
guerrillas operating in the
border area have provided sup-
port and assistance.
Government security precau-
tions have been hastened by an
increase in guerrilla-terrorist
activities, including bank rob-
beries and attacks on electoral
registration boards.
PRECAUTIONS FOR ELECTIONS
Efforts by the group to re-
build its terrorist capability
and finance its operations may
have received a sharp setback
from recent developments. The
police in Caracas this week cap-
tured eight members of the band
responsible for a series of bank
robberies since last January
which netted more than $200,000.
Earlier, police in central Vene-
zuela arrested four other ter-
rorists trying to rob a bank.
C.
91976 9-60
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ALCON
CARACAS
VENEZUELA
13 Sep 68
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A proposal to grant amnesty
to all political prisoners, in-
cluding those involved in past
guerrilla activities, may have
received a serious setback as
well. On 29 August, Defense
Minister Gomez bluntly told the
press that some political prison-
ers would not be freed, amnesty
or no amnesty. He fears that
many would return to terrorist
activities and provide the move-
ment with needed leadership and
experience. In effect, his
statement was a clear reminder
to President Leoni and the po-
litical parties that the mili-
tary is still a political factor
and that the armed forces oppose
excessive leniency toward ex-
tremists.
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itslEg�L
MEXICAN STUDENTS STILL SPAR WITH GOVERNMENT
Mexican students have re-
jected the government's response
to their demands and are threat-
ening to continue their movement
in the streets. They plan a
silent "mourning" march on 13
September, which if carried out
will indicate how cohesive the
movement still is and will show
also the extent of the govern-
ment's determination to use force.
The latest official reply
to the students amounted to a
reiteration of the stern position
taken by President Diaz Ordaz in
his state of the union message
on 1 September and probably un-
dermined tentative negotiations
that had been under way. The
government appears to believe
that its behind-the-scenes ma-
neuvering to divide the students
has been effective enough to
risk provoking the strikers.
An officially inspired "com-
mittee of the authentic student
body" has publicly opposed the
strike, and other government-
influenced sectors have voiced
their support for the President.
The press has reported the stag-
ing of a progovernment, anti-
Communist demonstration on 8
September in the capital.
The government may, however,
continue to underestimate the
students, whose recently found
ability to rattle the authorities
has been a heady experience that
could play into the hands of ex-
tremist leaders who have most
to gain in a prolongation of the
unrest.
The embassy estimates that
these radicals have only a lim-
ited ability to cause serious
disruption at the Olympics start-
ing on 12 October and notes no
suggestion yet of any moves
growing out of the student pro-
test that might affect US par-
ticipation.
(b)(3)
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