CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/01/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03015526
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 12, 1959

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12 January 1959
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TELLIGENCE
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its treaty proposal on Germany.
12 January 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow probably expects rejection of
0
Netherlands apparently accepts Molo-
tov as ambassador.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq- Nasir approves Iraqi military
plot against Qasim; no date set.
Chinese Communists reportedly offer-
ing military assistance to Cambodia
In face of Vietnamese and Thai plots.�
III. THE WEST
Belgian Congo - Belgium will offer new
liberal policy on 13 January, but Congo-
lese will continue restive. 0
Cuban Communist movement to operate
legally.
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SP.CRIZT
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
12 January 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: The Soviet note of 10 January calling for a con-
ference in Warsaw or Prague within two months to conclude
a German peace treaty and to discuss the Berlin question are
elaborations of the basic points made in Mikoyan's aide-
memoire to Secretary Dunes. The Soviet leaders probably
believe the West will reject a conference on these terms and
that this reaction could be used to justify a subsequent Soviet
move transferring to-the East Germans control of Allied ac-
cess to West Berlin. The harshly restrictive nature of the
military and territorial provisions of the Soviet proposal is
likely to antagonize West German elements hitherto favorable
to peace treaty negotiations leading to reunification.
(Page 1)
USSR- Netherlands: The Hague has apparently agreed to
accept Vyacheslav Molotov as Soviet ambassador to the Neth-
erlands. If carried out, Molotov% appointment would remove
him from an area important in Sino-Soviet relations, and
would indicate that he has temporarily escaped any further
punishment for his "antiparty" activities. It would also place
one of the USSR's most experienced diplomats near the center
of NATO activity in Europe. (Page 3)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq- UAR: "Iraqi divi-
sion commanders" had on 9 January nearly completed plans for.
the overthrow of Premier Qasim and are now believed to have
received Nasir's approval and advice; the source may be used
by Nasir as a channel of information to the United States, 110
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ca_ate for the move was mentioned. The commanders were re-
ported confident of success, apparently in spite of Qasimcs
recent moves to improve the security of his regime, includ-
ing the formation of a new army division subservient to hii_29
(Page 4)
Thailand- Cambodia - South Vietnam: Tambodian Premier
-as been informed
that Thai
and South Vietnamese are plotting his overthrow. Peiping is
reportedly urging Sihanouk to accept military assistance from
Communist China. Sihanouk allegedly has not yet decided
whether to accept the off erg
Thai and South
Vietnamese agents expect to have a force of 1,200 men "ready
to go into action" by the end of January. This force, probably
recruited from Cambodian dissidents in the Thai-Cambodian
border area is being assembled in Thalia:119
(Page 5)
III. THE WEST
Belgium - Belgian Congo: he new policy for the Congo to be
announced by Brussels on 13 January is said to be liberal in
scope and envisages Congolese independence in "a few years.
African political leaders, however, will probably distrust Bel-
gian promised and will continue restive. The reported new
policy could also provoke the European settler minority in the
eastern Cong2:1 (Page 7)
Cuba: Fidel Castro and other leaders of the politically dim-
inant-ICOf July Movement have declared that the Popular Social-
ist (Communist) party (PSP) will now be permitted to operate as
a legal party "since freedom of political action is guaranteed by
the constitution." (Page 8)
12 Jan 59
DAILY BRIEF Ii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Calls for Conference on German Peace Treaty
The Soviet notes to the Western powers calling for a con-
ference in Warsaw or Prague within two months to conclude a
German peace treaty and to discuss the Berlin question are
intended as a major demonstration of Soviet flegibility and de-
sire to negotiate. The Soviet leaders probably believe the
West will reject a conference on these terms but that this
Initiative, combined with possible future "concessions," such
as including East Berlin in the free-city proposal, will make
It more difficult for the West to react firmly to subsequent
Soviet action to transfer control over Allied access to West
Berlin to the East Germans.
The Soviet draft treaty is essentially a formula for the
neutralization of Germany. The central theme of the Soviet
draft is that Western recognition of the existence of two Ger-
man states is the indispensable precondition for any progress
toward a German settlement. According to the draft treaty,
representatives of both German states would participate in
the negotiation and signing of a treaty, as well as representa-
tives of a German confederation if this should be formed by
the time a treaty is ready for signature.
The proposal for a peace conference within two months is
intended to place Moscow in the most advantageous position to
exploit growing pressures, particularly in West Germany and
Britain, for a general review of the West's policy on German
reunification and European security. The draft treaty provides
for such key "disengagement" features as the withdrawal of
foreign troops from Germany, a ban on German possession and
production of nuclear weapons and other instruments of mass
destruction, as well as bomber aircraft and submarines, and
a prohibition on German participation in any military alliances
directed against any of the signatory powers.
The Soviet proposals on Berlin are made an integral part
of the draft treaty. The Soviet notes again warn that Western
refusal to negotiate will not prevent the USSR from "renounc-
ing its functions in Berlin" and transferring control over Allied
access to the East Germans.
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East German party boss Walter Ulbricht has already called
for preparatory discussions between Bonn and his regime con-
cerning the Soviet proposals. East German official statements
are even more uncompromising than Moscow's irtes and appear
to be setting the stage for advancing the claim that East Germany
is the only legitimate German state and the East Berlin municipal
council, the only legitimate government for the whole city.
The treaty's emphasis on restrictive military, territorial,
and political provisions, which would reduce a reunified Ger-
many to the status of a satellite, will probably antagonize even
those West German elements who have supported peace treaty
negotiations as a means of expediting reunification. Bonn cir-
cles have already pointed out that denial of political asylum and
prohibitions on "revanchist" activities would enable the Soviet
Union to interfere at will on the pretext of a treaty violation. A
weak German confederation within present boundaries will be un-
acceptable to all West German political parties, although oppo-
sition parties will probably insist on accepting the principle of
negotiations, in the hope of bargaining for better terms.
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Netherlands Agrees to Molotov as Soviet Ambassador
The Hague has apparently agreed to accept Vyacheslav
Molotov as Soviet ambassador to the Netherlands. The
Kremlin proposed the appointment several weeks ago, pre-
sumably before Khrushchev's latest attack against the "anti=
party group" at the Soviet party central committee plenum
last month. If now carried out, this assignment would ef-
fectively end any contacts with Peiping Molotov may have
made during his tour as ambassador to Outer Mongolia. It
had been rumored that he and the Chinese Communists have
been conspiring to force Khrushchev to adopt a hard line in
Soviet foreign affairs. It would also place one of the USSR's
most experienced diplomats near the center of NATO activity
in Europe.
A new diplomatic post for Molotov would indicate that he
has escaped, at least temporarily, any further punishment
for his antiparty activittes. This would not necessarily be
true for the other members of the anti-Khrushchev faction.
There have been several recent indications that further action--
perhaps expulsion from the party--is being planned for some
of its members.
Actually, Molotov has always received favored treatment
as compared with other members of the group, even though he
has been under verbal attack almost as much as has Malenkov.
Molotov has been able to spend more time in Moscow and prob-
ably received a better job in comparison with those given Mal-
enkov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, and Shepilov. Molotov as a sym-
bol of the link with Stalin and Lenin continues to have consid-
erable prestige within the party, which may inhibit Khrushchev
from removing him completely from the public scene.
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraqi Division Commanders Plan Qasim Overthrow
Iraq's ambassador in Cairo stated on 9 January that the
anti-Qasim army division commanders had nearly completed
plans to overthrow the Iraqi premier, according to an Egyp-
tian source who may be used by Nasir as a channel of infor-
mation to the United States. The commanders had requested
Nasir's advice, which was to be forwarded to them on 11 Jan-
uaryA
CIr.i his reply, Nasir reportedly refrained from suggesting
a date for their move, but urged that it be carried out swiftly,
in the belief that the USSR would do nothing if taken by surprise.
Nasir advised limiting bloodshed, although he recommended
the execution of Qasim and "about 20 key leftists." He was said
to be against the commanders' reported desire to join Iraq to
the UAR following the coup, feeling that the United States,
Britain, and the Soviet Union would all oppose such a move)
Lilt does not appear that Nasir has committed himself or
UAR assets as fully as in the abortive December plot. He is
probably uncertain of the will and capabilities of the command-
ers, who are reported "confident of success," however, in spite
of the failure in December and Qasim's subsequent efforts to in-
crease his regime's security, including the recent formation of
a new division personally loyal to him.
The commanders had been referred to as "hypocrites"
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Plotting Against Cambodian Premier
an extraordinary meeting of Premier Sihanouk's close
advisers was called by the premier on 9 January
to discuss
how to counter the plot against the regime by former royal
councilor Sam Sary abetted by Thailand and South Vietnam.
The session was allegedly provoked by a joint letter from the
Soviet and Chinese Communist embassies informing Sihanouk
of the plot and claiming that the United States was giving tacit
suppor.g,
&eneral Dap Chhuon, military commander of western Cam-
bodia, was assigned to investigate the charges and, if they were
true, he was to find Sam Sary, who is now actually in Saigon,
and either jail or assassinate him. Dap Chhoun himself recently
expressed a desire to remove Sihanouk and the Thais and South
Vietnamese plan to approach him for help later in staging their
planned coup;
Peiping has been urging Sihanouk
to accept an agreement to provide for the stationing of Chinese
soldiers in Cambodia to discourage any external threats from
South Vietnam or Thailand. Sihanouk is said to have not yet
made up his mind. He told American Embassy officials after
his trip to Peiping last August, however, that he had rejected
an offer of military aid from Chou En-lai but that Communist
China would come to his aid if Cambodia were attacked from the
outside. Peiping is probably aware of Sihanouk's reluctance to
accept Chinese military aid offers and would be well pleased if
circumstances should compel him to do so. Should Cambodia re-
quest assistance from Communist China, Peiping would probably
take pains to assure an appearance of legitimacy and correctness
in its responsg
aleanwhile, Thai and South Vietnamese agents working against
Sihanouk are accelerating their activity,
the assembly of a force of 1,200 men began on 7 Jan-
uary in Thailand at three places and was to be completed in five
days. These men, probably Cambodian dissidents from the Thai
Cambodian border area, were to undergo training for 15 day,sj
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ff).y Thai "technicians" and be ready "to go into action" by the
end of January. A psychological warfare plan has been written
and includes the distribution of leaflets all over Cambodia at
"Hotel hour." Also, a "plan of aid addressed to the President
of the USA" has been prepare,Eg
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IIL THE WEST
New Belgian Policy Toward Congo
&he Belgian Government's new policy toward the Congo,
which will be announced on 13 January as originally drafted
without reference to the recent riots in Leopoldville, is to be
liberal in scope, Pur-
portedly, it will grant limited autonomy preparatory to full
independence in "a few years." Specifically it calls for full
equality between Belgians and Congolese and for elections
this year by universal male suffrage. Territorial councils
will be set up to consider local matters, and "subsequently,"
a deliberative assembly with legislative powers will be estab-
lished. Economically the Congolese will be treated on the
same basis as the Europeans, with equal access to schools
and public institutions;)
although the new policy is quite forward-looking, it is un-
likely to ease appreciably the present nationalist and economic
unrest in the Congo. African political leaders are likely to be
suspicious, and in view of the sharp break with Belgium's
"paternal" policies and desires for a Belgo-Congolese federa-
tion, they may distrust the Belgians' desire to implement such
a revised policy. The leaders in the Leopoldville area are
aroused at the Belgian wholesale arrest of leading Africans,
particularly Joseph Ka,sa-Nrubu, the president of Abako, ,the
leading nationalist organization. Most of the African mayors
of Leopoldville districts have reportedly threatened to resign
in protest;]
'd_lhe new policy may provoke reactions from other sections
of the Congo which have not been affected directly by the Leo-
poldville rioting. The European settler minority, particularly
In the eastern Congo, has on occasion expressed apprehension
about proposed reforms to increase native participation. Any
European agitation against the proposed policy could provoke
an African reaction in the highly developed and mineral-rich
Katanga area beyond that attributable to the present nationalism
In the area which has spread from Rhodesp,
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New Cuban Government Will Apparently Permit Communists
Considerable Freedom
Communists will probably be excluded from most offices of
the new Cuban Government, but it is doubtful that the Communist!
will be repressed
nearly all officials of the government of Provisional President
Urrutia are anti-Communists, but seem completely unaware of
the Communist threat. Leaders of the Montecristi group, a
small organization of respected business readers which actively
opposed the ousted Batista regime, are concerned over the
emergence since the fall of Batista of the Communists' Popular
Socialist party (PSP) and intend to encourage the government to
take a stand against the Communists.
Fidel Castro and other leaders of the politically dominant
26 of July Movement have declared that the PSP will now be per-
mitted to operate as a legal political party, "since freedom of
political action is guaranteed by the constitution." The PSP, with
a membership last reported at 8,000 to 12,000, has already
gained a recognized minority voice in organized labor since
Batista's fall, although there are some indications that labor
groups loyal to Fidel Castro may actively oppose it in labor.
On 10 January, the Communists in Havana held their first pub-
lic rally since Batista outlawed their party in 1953. The Com-
munist daily newspaper, Hoy� has resumed publication, and the
party has opened offices in Havana and Santiago.
Top Communist labor leader Lazaro Pena is reported by the
Cuban press to have returned from exile on 9 January. He is a
dynamic, intelligent Negro who has probably retained much of the
considerable popularity he enjoyed when last in the country. In
exile since 1954, he is an official of both the Communist Confed-
eration of Latin American Workers and the World Federation of
Trade Unions and has made frequent trips to Prague and Moscow
during the last four years.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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