CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/04/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03156035
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 13, 1959

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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
13 April 1959
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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13 APRIL 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communists in Lhasa report
widespread Tibetan demand for inde-
pendence.
USSR offers UAR liberalized terms
for arms purchases.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Protracted absence of USSR Ambas-
sador Kissilev leads Nasir to keep
UAR's Moscow ambassador in Cairo.
Iraq will explore and develop own oil
resources with foreign technicians,
granting no new concessions.
Iraqi Communists exploit Qasim's
fear of army disloyalty to increase
influence of Popular Resistance Force.
New Iranian ambassad r to Moscow
41)
rii2i;LIIrni-S0
viet record.
0
0 Clandestine Saudi arms shipment may
be destined for Algerian rather than
Omani rebels.
0 Diem, blaming South Vietnam security
problems on Communists in Cambodia,
plans "all-out" propaganda campaign
against Sihanouk.
0
III. THE WEST
France makes proposal to US to share
Laotian military training.
Nicaraguan exiles in Cuba continue to
organize for invasion attempt.
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13 APRIL 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communists in Lhasa report
widespread Tibetan demand for inde-
endence.
USSR offers UAR liberalized terms
for arms purchases.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Protracted absence of ussp, Ambas-
sador Kissilev.leads Nasir to keep
UAR's Moscow ambassador in Cairo.
Iraq will explore and develop own oil
resources with foreign technicians,
granting no new concessions.
Iraqi Communists exploit Qasim's
fear of army disloyalty to increase
Influence of Popular Resistance Force.
New Iranian ambassador to Moscow
has ro- oviet record.
0 Clandestine Saudi arms shipment may
be destined for Algerian rather than
\ N Omani rebels.
Diem, blaming South Vietnam security
problems on Communists in Cambodia,
plans "all-out" propaganda campaign
against Sihanouk.
III. THE WEST
France makes proposal to US to share
Laotian military training.
Nicaraguan exiles in Cuba continue to
organize for invasion attempt.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
13 April 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Tibet*
Iconaitions in the Tibetan capital now are
"very peaceful," Chinese Communists in Lhasa estimate
Tibetan opposition to
told Peiping
itne "whole
Tibetan race" is asking for independence and expects to set
up a "Tibet kingdom" consisthg of Tibet proper and Tibetan-
inhabited areas of West China,
me rebeisi are well organized and
at Khamba guerrillas from former Sikang Province had been
provided with food and ammunition "everywhere they went"
in Tibet. (Page 1)
USSR-UAR:
__Ithe USSR's
willingness to supply arms under even more liberal terms than
J) ' those of the earlier agreement. The USSR continues, however,
il
to refuse Egypt's requests for the inclusion of no7military items
under the arms contract. (Page 3)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-USSR: /asir has decided that UAR Ambassador Kuni
who was called4omeirom Moscow for consultation in early April
will remain in Cairo for the time being, in view of Soviet Ambas
sador Kissilev's extended absence from Cairo. Meanwhile, UA�Rj
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Cpiopaganda has alleged that a second Soviet shipload of "Rus-
sian" Kurds is en route to Iraq in order to carry out a coup
in connivance with Iraqi Communists. Moscow on 11 April
admitted that some 850 Iraqi Kurdish refugees were being
repatriated, but it denied they had been trained in the USSR
for guerrilla warfare. Moscow blamed Western press
agencies, rather than Cairo, for such stories
(Page 4)
Iraqi oil: The Iraqi director of petroleum affairs has
told the US E�bassy that no new oil concessions will be
granted, and that Iraq will henceforth explore and develop
its oil resources using foreign contract technicians. He said
that Iraq will employ Soviet oil technicians on this basis in
the Khanaqin area--some 85 miles northeast of Baghdad near
the Iranian border- wheWhey are already at work, and in
the offshore Persian Gulf.
Iraq: Premier Qasim's fear of further disloyalty in the
army appears to have given the Communist-dominated Pop-
ular Resistance Force (PRF) increased influence at the ex-
ense of the army. The PRF commander claimed
to have been empowered to prevent "illegal interfer-
ence" by the Iraqi Army in PRF activities. The Communist-
controlled "Iraqi Peasant Organization" has petitioned Qasim
for permission to arm for protection against antiregime
tribesmen and to "reinforce the armed government forces:'
The Communists are thus continuing to exploit Iran's inst
Willy to increase their paramilitary strength.
Iran-USSR: Abdol Hosein Masud-Ansari, named Iranian
ambaSSOC)i� to Moscow 1st Decemher left for his pc-It on
1 April, Masud-
Ansari, who has previously served in Moscow and has a long-
standing record of being pro-USSR, played a prominent role
in the recent abortive Iranian-Soviet negotiations in Tehran
and he ma work for their renewal in Moscow.
The Shah may hope a representative with Itilasud-]
DAILY BRIEF ii
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L:Ansari's background can help ease Soviet-Iranian relations,
which remain strained as the result of continuing subversive
ro a anda and economic pressure from the USS3
(Page 5)
A live ria-Saudi Arabia:
the Algerian rebels, rather than the Omani
dissidents as previously believed, may be the intended recipients
of a clandestine shipment of arms and military vehci&beIn
d in late March by the Saudi Government.
The premier of the Algerian provisional governmen
stated earlier this month that "almost all" rebel funds now come
from Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and that the Saudis have become the
"strongest defenders" of the Algerian cause in the Arab world.
Relations between the rebels and Nasir, who has recently been
supplanted as the most vocal public champion of the Algerians
by Iraqi Premier Qasim, appear to be worsening.
(Page 6)
South Vietnam - Cambodia: South Vietnamese President
Diem intends shortly to launch an "all-out" press and radio
campaign to expose the "Communist takeover" in Cambodia un-
der Cambodian Premier Sihanouk. Diem attributes a worsen-
ing security situation in Vietnam in recent months to intensi-
fied activity by Cambodian-based Communist and other hostile
elements who have the "blessing" of the Sihanouk government.
Such a propaganda campaign would only serve to encourage
Sih nouk to move closer to Peiping
(Page 7)
III. THE WEST
France-Laos: President de Gaulle has approved and Am-
bass=Alphand in Washington has presented a proposal ap-
parently designed to end the US-French impasse over training
0 the Laotian Army. The new proposal would center all Laotian
,6\combat training at the Seno base in Laos under French instruc-
tors financed by Paris, but it would allot to the US responsibility
for training in logistical support:1
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Nicaragua: Exiled opponents of Nicaraguan President Somoza
continue to organize for a revolutionary invasion of that country.
Most Nicaraguan revolutionary groups, in Cuba and elsewhere,
ti now have endorsed as their leader and future provisional president
DP Enrique Lacayo, who indicates he will seek to prevent Communist
infiltration of the movement. The exiles do not, however, appear
prepared for action in the immediate future. (Page 9)
13 Apr 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Tibetan Situation
that the Chinese Communists estimate Tibetan opposition to
Chinese rule to be widespread. The unknown official in Lhasa
states that the "thole Tibetan race" is asking for independence
and is expecting to set up a "Tibet kingdom" consisting of Tibet
proper and Tibetan-inhabited areas of west China, including
Szechwan and Yunnan provinces� criticizes
Chang Kuo-hua, Chinese commander of the Tibet Military Dis-
trict, for mishandling the revolt and describes his leadership
as "quite inferior,!'
Conditions in Lhasa are now "very peaceful,"
I The Lhasa speaker
'states there is no rifle fire inside the city or on the outskirts,
and he adds that during the fighting, all personnel of th stal
telecommunications bureau "did not dare" go outdoors.
Despite the reported criticism, Chang Kuo-hua continues to
be the regime's most prominent official in Lhasa. As vice chair-
man of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous liegion,
Chang told the committee's plenum on 8 April that the Tibetan rebels
organized a "volunteer' headquarters for defending Lamaism,"
appointed a "military chief," recruited men between the ages of
16 and 60, and called for establishment of an "YndependenVstate
of Tibet,7' He admitted that Khamba guerrillas from former Sikang
Province had been provided with food and ammunition "everywhere
they went" in Tibet, but he made it clear that he would not let the
lamaseries serve as places of refuge for either Khambas or
Tibetans.
Supplementing Peiping's military countermeasures, the or-
ganization of the Preparatory Committee has been expanded to
include several new departments, of which the Public Security
Department will have the major police role� The Panchen Lama
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has called for the regimentation of ecclesiastical and secular mem-
bers of Tibetan society and requested them "to feed information to
army units engaged in quelling the rebellion, take part in transpor-
tation and supply work,, and organize comfort activities" for the
troops. He announced new criteria for political reliability, sug-
gesting that reluctant acquiescence in regime policies will no
longer be tolerated, as "willingness to follow the path of social-
ism" is now mandatory for all Tibetans.
Maintaining the pose that he is only second choice for the most
prominent Tibetan position, the Panchen Lama insists he is serv-
ing as "acting chairman" of the Preparatory Committee for the
Tibetan Autonomous Region "during the period of the Dalai Lama's
absence under duress." While he expressed "great sympathy and
concern" for the safety of the Tibetan leader, he gave no indica-
tion that the Chinese Communists expect his return from India in
the near future.
In continuing its line that the Dalai Lama has been abducted,
Peiping is directly contradicting Nehru's stated view that he prob-
ably escaped "of his own free This tactic is designed in
part to demonstrate to Tibetans that the Dalai Lama really sup-
ports Peiping and in part to warn Nehru against abetting "kidnap-
ers" by permitting the Dalai Lama to engage in anti-Communist
political activities. On 10 April the Chinese Communists repeated
the charge that the rebels were "directed and supported" by ele-
ments in Kalimpong.
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New Soviet-UAR Arms Agreement
The UAR Embassy in Moscow informed Cairo on 4 April
that the Soviet Government has agreed to sell arms to the UAR
on extremely liberal terms but refuses to include nonmilitary
items under the arms agreement as requested by the UAR on
11 March. In the past, Moscow has advised the UAR that the
Soviet Union distinguishes between arms deals and commercial
agreements, and that nonmilitary goods can be obtained only
under short-term commercial credits without liberal discounts.
Negotiations for additional Soviet military aid have been
under way in Moscow since last July, and a new agreement may be
concluded shortly. The proposed terms of the new agreement are
the most liberal yet extended to a nonbloc country by the Soviet
Union, with the possible exception of a small arms deal concluded
with Yemen in 1956. Under the new agreement, the UAR will ob-
tain Soviet arms at one third of cost, with repayment to be made
in five annual installments beginning in 1967 at a 2-percent rate
of interest.
Since 1955 Egypt and Syria have receiv ,41 mare than A500.000 000
worth of military aid from the Soviet bloc.
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
I Continuing Strains in UAR-USSR Relations
ir has decided that UAR Ambassador Kuni, who
left11oscow for consultations in Cairo in early April, will
not return to his post for the time being,
This
move is in response to the extended absence from Cairo of
Soviet Ambassador Kissilev, who returned to Moscow in Feb-
ruary. Nasir believes that Kissilev had planned to return to
Cairo in order to smooth over current UAR-Soviet friction,
but that Nasir's 30 March speech--a strong criticism of the
USSR for interference in Arab affairs--in the presence of So-
viet military instructors was responsible for changing Soviet
plans for Kissilev's retur-n].
Crhe UAR has continued its propaganda charges regarding
the repatriation of Kurdish refugees from the USSR to Iraq.
Cairo broadcasts on 11 April claimed that a second shipload
of armed "Russian" Kurds is en route to Iraq and that Iraqi
Communists, in connivance with the repatriated Kurds, are
preparing to carry out a coup in Baghdad. A TASS statement
on 11 April, denying that the 850 Kurds who previously re-
turned to Iraq aboard the Gruzia are armed and trained for
guerrilla warfare, accused Western press agencies with orig-
inating such reports, thus sidestepping the issue of UAR author-
shiD
tacks by by Nasir on Soviet policy have scared Soviet officials and
technicians now in the UAR,
If Soviet-UAR tensions and the hostility allegedly being ciisplayeci
by Egyptians toward Soviet personnel continue, Soviet depend-
ents reportedly will be returned to the USSR. The same Soviet
official is reported to have advised the captain of the Argun--a
Russian ship calling at Alexandria in early April--not to permit
shore leave for crew members because of possible hostile ac-
tions by Egyptian
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Pre-Soviet Iranian Ambassador Leaves for Moscow
he new Iranian ambassador-designate to Moscow, Abdol
Hosein Masud-Ansari, long Rnvipt sympathizer. left Tehran
for his new post on 1 April,
Masud-Ansari, who played a prominent role in the recent aJ3or-
tive Iranian-Soviet negotiations in Tehran, may soon try to re-
sume them in an effort to renegotiate the 1921 Soviet-Iranian
Treaty of Friendshila
/-1-V�Iasud-Ansari was appointed to the Moscow post last Decem-
ber after the Russians succeeded in promoting the recall of his
predecessor, Mostafa Samii, on the charge they were unable to
work with him. Masud-Ansari delayed his departure for Moscow
in order to participate in the Tehran negotiations. He alone ac-
companied Soviet Ambassador Pegov to the Tehran airport on 29
January, when the two secretly met the high-rankin oviet del-
egation sent to Iran to negotiate a nonaggression pat
Ghen the negotiations, some of which took place in his home,
were abruptly, and somewhat heatedly, terminated on 10 February,
Masud-Ansari decided to remain in Tehran until he had some
"Iranian concessions in hand" to take to Moscow. Judging from
the official temper in Tehran, however, it seems� doubtful he has
carried with him any substantial "concession
l&sud-Ansari is from an old-line diplomatic family. His
father once served as ambassador to Moscow, and he himself
began his diplomatic career there. Masud-Ansari also has a
record of being at least sympathetic to the Iranian Tudeh (Com-
munist) party during the period from 1945 to 1947, although his
continued diplomatic status suggests that the Shah is convinced
that he now has severed any such ties. The Shah probably hopes,
however, that a representative with Masud-Ansari's backgound
might be able to smooth Soviet-Iranian relation(
elations between the two countries continue to be strained
as a result of subversive Soviet propaganda, especially against
the Shah, and increased economic pressures, such as termina-
tion of lead-ore purchases and failure to enter new trade talks.
The Iranian Senate, in a secret session on 11 April, urged that
"energet* itonnterstens be aken to correct the "improper state
of affair s;
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Saudi Arabia Stepping Up Support of Algerian Rebels
Saudi Arabia, along with Iraq, appears to be becoming an
increasingly important source of support for the Algerian rebel-
lion, while the role of the UAR seems to be diminishing, at least
in relative terms.
the Algerian rebels, and not
Omani dissidents, were the intended recipients of a considerable
quantity of unmarked arms and ammunition and a number of mil-
itaryvehicles which,
were being readied by the Saudi Goveimment for clandestine
shipment abroad. The embassy reported that an Algerian repre-
sentative had conveyed the rebels' thanks for "material,. .being
prepared" in Saudi Arabia and also for financial aid just received
by the rebel office in Damascus.
Subsequently, Algerian rebel premier Ferhat Abbas, in an
off-the-record interview granted annAmerican correspondent on
3 April, stated that the Saudis had become the "strongest defend-
ers" of the Algerian cause in the Arab world and that "almost all"
rebel funds now come from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Abbas, who
visited Saudi Arabia early last month, also indicated that the
Saudis were making available to the rebels licenses originally
granted to the Saudi Government for the purchase of arms in West
Germany.
Meanwhile, relations between the Algerians and UAR Pres-
ident Nasir, their erstwhile chief patron and most vocal public
champion, appear to have deteriorated further in recent weeks,
rebel officials in Tunis
informed Algerian elements in Tripoli that Cairo would no longer
permit Algerians who did not have a valid passport to cross the
Egyptian-Libyan border in either direction, Personnel transport-
ing "materiel" who had travel permits furnished by the Eg )tian
authorities were to be exempted from this regulation.
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South Vietnam Plans to Open Anti-Sihanouk Campaign
aouth Vietnamese President Diem has told American officials
that he is determined to launch an "all-out" press and radio cam-
paign exposing the "Communist takeover" in Cambodia under Pre-
mier Sihanouk. This campaign, which Diem insists will remain
objective, is to have the double purpose of informing the Cambo-
dian masses of the "real" situation in their country, and of con-
fronting the Vietnamese people with the danger they facE'
6iem attributes a worsening security situation in South
Vietnam to increased activity by Cambodian-based Communist
and other hostile elements who have the "blxssing" of the Siha-
nouk government. He points to a sharp rise during the past
three months in Communist-inspired terrorism in the provinces,
highlighted by the assassination of 97 persons most of them lo-
cal officials. There have been independent reports that the
Cambodian Government is encouraging anti-Diem activities by
Vietnamese dissident sect forces in Cambodt,
Diem's projected propaganda campaign probably would serve
only ITo rally additional Cambodian popular support for Sihanouk,
and it might encourage him to seek even closer relations with
the Sino-Soviet bloc on the grounds that the "Saigon-Bangkok plot"
to overthrow him remains a threat. Disaffected Cambodian ele-
ments led by former Royal Councilor Sam Sary and ex-Prexnier
� Son Ngoc Thanb are already engaged in psychological warfare ef-
forts against Sihanouk, apparently with the continued clandestine
support of Vietnam and Thailand. "Radio Free Cambodia," pre-
sumably located in the Thai-Cambodian border region, has been
heard almost daily during the past month Rnd anti-Sihanouk tracts
have been distributed in Cambodi"-a77
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Noire
:-)IIRECTION: Pages 3 and 4 of the Central Intelligence Bulletin
or 11 April, with the back-up item 'Plans for Iraqi Military Oc-
cupation of Kuwait Rumored," should have been classified
because of the final sentence of the article. The last two
paragraphs should reaZil
principal element of Kuwait's armed forces is
the Frontier Force of 900-1,000 men organized into six
infantry companies, one armored car company, one
field artillery battery, ant armored personnel carrier.
company, and a support company. The 1,500-man secu-
rity force and the 1,000-man police force are equipped
only with rifles. (
ere has been no indication of a deployment of Iraqi
forces preparatory to a move against Kuwait. Iraqi
forces in the Basra area consist of an infantry brigade
and a field artillery battalion. These forces are capable
of occupying Kuwait. Another infantry brigade is sta-
tioned at Nasiriya, about 100 miles northwest of Basra,
while the 1st Division headquarters is farther north at
Diwaniya. The main Iraqi troop concentration of three
divisions, including most of the armor, is in central
Iraq, while the 2nd Division is in the north. The north-
ern forces have76-en increasingly occupied with growing
tension on the Syrian-Iraqi borde9
All divisional security units and most Iraqi tank units
were a erted on 4 April, presumably because of indica-
tions that '[JAR-supported tribesmen will step up their
forays into Iraqi territory, and persistent rumors of im-
pending internal disturbance-9
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III. THE WEST
Nicaraguan Exiles Planning Revolution
Nicaraguan revolutionary leader Enrique Lacayo was en-
dorsed as the future provisional president of Nicaragua at a
6 April meeting in Havana of some 30 Nicaraguan exiles and
seven Cuban sympathizers. Lacayo, who escaped from Nicara-
gua early last month after spending over two years in jail for
alleged complicity in the 1956 assassination of Nicaraguan
strongman Somoza, by late March had been selected by oppo-
sition factions inside Nicaragua and in exile in Costa Rica as
their joint leader.
Lacayo's endorsement by those represented at the Havana
meeting, which included the leader of an alleged 200 Nicaraguan
exiles in the New York City area: strengthens his claim to lead-
ership,. It is not known whether he sought or received the backing
of the pro-Communist Nicaraguan groups that have been sympa-
thetically received by Cuban authorities, but prior to his depar-
ture for Cuba he indicated to the US ambassador in Costa Rica
that he was determined to prevent Communist penetration of the
Nicaraguan revolutionary movement. Lacayo is believed to
look to former Costa Rican President Figueres as his revolu-
tionary mentor, and Figueres is known to be strongly opposed
to dealing with the Communists in revolutionary planning.
Manuel Gomez Flores, former Nicaraguan colonel and per-
sistent revolutionary plotter for the past 12 years, apparently
regards himself as qualified to lead the military phase of the
movements Now in Cuba, he claims he has already tentatively
chosen the Man of War Keys--a few miles off the Nicaraguan
Caribbean coast--as the rendezvous point for the invasion and
the nearby Rio Grande estuary as the mainland landing area�
It appears unlikely that a concerted revolutionary invasion
can be launched before the start of the rainy season, which will
come in about a month and would make military operations ex-
ceedingly difficult in the swampy Nicaraguan coastal area. The
exile groups are still subject to strong rivalries, however, and
the possibility of a premature attempt by one faction trying to
beat the others to the draw cannot be eliminated.
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Now
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
I I
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