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February 27, 2020
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May 26, 1959
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15787441].pdf518.71 KB
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 V Nevi -151CRET 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 26 May 1959 Copy No. C 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NEXT RI_ si! LW DA r E: At_ AUTH DATE. EVIEWER ECRET //77 roved for 2020702/2-1 '6631-63-3557 ZZ, Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 Nue TA ft Ell CT Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 S T 26 MAY 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Indian foreign secretary's views on Tibet. II. ASIA-AFRICA Qasim warns Communists not to engage in political activities. Laos--Army pessimistic about nego- tiations with Pathet Lao; Chinese Com- munist foreign minister requests ICC reconvene immediately. IIL THE WEST De Gaulle and Franco may meet after Geneva conference. 0 Government-owned West German ship- yard extends long-term credit to USSR. 0 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 7"'SMIICOLIEU,?,;,%%,;� Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 merCL",.� 'tow' , 5ke 01� CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 26 May 1969 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Tibet: ale Chinese Communists apparently are hav- ing some success in inducing Tibetans remaining in Lhasa to identify themselves with the regime, II. ASIA-AFRICA Iraq: Qasimis press conference of 23 May contained a stronger warning to the Iraqi Communists and associated ele- ments whose leaders intend to continue their party activities. He declared that obstruction by any group of his plan to suspend political activities would be viewed as aetinn afYainqi- tt thp safety of the republic, even though unintentional." (Page 2) Laos: CI:he Laotian Army staff reportedly is pessimistic about the value of further negotiations with the commander of the escaped Pathet Lao battalion but is still willing to integrate these troops., The local army commander has been instructed to contain this unit--elements of which exchanged fire with Laotian troops on 23 May--and ultimately to attack it if it does not return to its camp on the Plaine des JarreA The 25 May letter of Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi to the Geneva Accords cochairmen�Britain and the USSR-- called on them to reconvene the International Control Commission (ICC) In Laos "immediately." (Page 3) - %Approved for Release: 2020767i1 CO3163335 / A /. -7/ / � :Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 ..�..1...3.1;s1G7LA.L� 1 III. THE WEST France-Spain: A meeting between President de Gaulle and General Franco inc e French Pyrenees is reported planned for sometime after the Geneva conferenc, De Gaulle has been trying to improve relations between Paris and Madrid and now is backing NATO membership for Spain. He probably hopes to ob- tain Spain's political cooperation in North Africa and enlist its support for a greater French role in the NATO command areas adjacent to Spain and in the western Mediterranean. (Page 4) West Germany - USSR: Recent efforts to achieve an un- derstanding among NATO governments against long-term govern- ment-guaranteed credits to the USSR are threatened by contracts concluded by a government-owned West German shipyard. Credits extending for at least five years have been arranged to finance the construction of three merchant vessels costing ten million dollars, and negotiations are continuing for shipbuilding con- tracts involving at least an additional thirty million dollars. Bonn defends the projects as necessary to meet competition from other Western European countries and alleviate serious unemployment in the shipyards. The British have reaffirmed their willingness to give guaranteed credits of just under five ir effort to expand Anglo-Soviet trade. (Page 5) 26 May 59 DAILY BRIEF If ".r/ f4/ *4 -Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335/r Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 THE COMMUNIST BLOC Tibet Situation ripiping is having some success in inducing Tibetans re- maining in Lhasa to identify themselves outwardly with the Communist regime. Tibetan officials there have cut off their pigtails and have shifted from wearing traditional cloaks to Communist-style coats and trousers, Life is returning to "normal," and the sole Lhasa cinema has been reopened as the "People's Cinema House" to show propaganda films. Military operations against the rebels in other areas of Tibet continue.] .piping apparently is seeking to transfer the Dalai Lama's prestige to the tractable Panchen Lama, who is being used to eliminate the Tibetan theocracy's political power. While Pei- ping has not abandoned its claim that the Dalai Lama is in India "under duress," it has sharply curtailed press attacks. The strain in Sino -Indian relations continues, and the Indian ambassador to Peiping states that he feels "isolated" even though treated with "courtesy." The Soviet ambassador, the Indian diplomat reported, felt New Delhi "had gone too far" in criticizing Chinese actions in Tibet] he Indians are attempting to repair the surface damage to relations with Peiping but, as Nehru said, the presence of the Dalai Lama in India will be the subject of continuing strain. India's Foreign Secretary Dutt stated on 21 May that Nehru has no hope the Dalai Lama will ever return to Lhasa in a status comparable to that which he held before his flight. Indian attitudes toward Communist China will also be adversely influenced by the psychological effect of the suppression, of which the 13,000 Tibetan refugees will serve as a remi TOP RET 26 Ma6 59 (Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 Page 1 Approved for 210,422M2L1 C03163335 '41.f IL ASIA-AFRICA Qasim Warns Iraqi Communist Party Iraqi Communist leaders insist that party activity should continue, although they have announced the abandonment of their "educational" campaign for appointment to the cabinet of acknowledged Communist party representatives and have dropped their demand that political parties be given official sanction immediately. In a press conference on 23 May, Prime Minister Qasim warned that "unintentional" obstruction by any group of his plan to suspend partisan political activities would be considered "unintentional action against the safety of the republic." The official Communist newspaper omitted this passage in reporting Qasim's statements, and the follow- ing day it published a long editorial stressing the need for "sincere party activities" to "assure the success of the republic." Elements of the Communist-penetrated left wing of the socia.- ist National Democratic party have denounced the decision of the party's leadership to suspend party activity and have declared, 'We will persist in our party work." There are signs that the Communists' open dispute with Qasim has cost them a measure of their control over Baghdad's press and radio. Three Baghdad newspapers which usually echo the Commu- nist line have veered away on the question of legal sanction for po- litical parties. Director General of Guidance Ayyub has gently criticized the press and radio for unfounded charges against some Iraqi officials. On 24 May, Radio Baghdad broadcast the text of a Canadian journalist's interview with Qasim on 20 May, in which Qasim was more friendly toward the West than previously and indi- cated that the Iraqi people should no longer have reason to hate the Western allies of the old regime. CONEJ19ENTIAL 26 May 59 (Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 la J-4 �14010 Nam, Pathet Lao Battalion Commander Breaks Off Surrender Negotiations he commander of the escaped Pathet Lao battalion broke off his negotiations with Laotian Army representa- tives in the field following an exchange of fire between ad- vance elements on 23 May. The Laotian Army staff, re- portedly pessimistic about the value of any future nego- tiations with the Pathet battalion, nevertheless is still willing to integrate these troops if they return to their camp on the Plaine des Jarres. Laotian Army strategy is to con- tain these troops and to seal off all trails leading to the North Vietnamese frontier. The army is prepared Ultimately to at- tack the Pathet unit but apparently would prefer to effect its surrender through psychological-warfare methods7i /high-ranking Lao Army officer says he has advised Premier Phoui Sananikone to require former Pathet Lao chief Souphannouvong to appeal to-the unit in person. He also said that Crown Prince Savang told Phoui on 23 May that the government should take immediate and drastic re- pressive measures against the Neo Lao Hak Zat--the Com- munist-dominated legal political successor to the Pathet Lao. Phoui reportedly replied he was not yet prepared to do sco__ the 25 May letter from Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi to Geneva Accords cochairmen Britain and the USSR, which called on them to reconvene the Inter- national Control Commission (ICC) in Laos "immediately," is designed to maintain the momentum of the Communist campaign and embarrass the British, who have been active- ly seeking to avoid a reconvening:7 EL. o military officials have received reports from Laotian irregular forces that an estimated 50 Communist Vietnamese soldiers wearing Laotian Army uniforms had crossed into Laos, but this is unconfirmectl 26 May 59 CCkITD AI ikiTci ir-.01.1/^E bIlIIrukI Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 6J %La 1 Nair" LIfT WEST Meeting Between De Gaulle and Franco Planned LPlans for a meeting between President de Gaulle and Gen- eral Franco have been tentatively arranged by high-level French and Spanish officials who met in Madrid in mid-April, The two leaders are somewhere in the French Pyrenees sometime after the Geneva conference-,3 De Gaulle has been trying to improve French-Spanish rela- tions, which have generally been strained since 1936. A series of contacts between French and Spanish officials�mostly mili- tary officers--have occurred over the past year, and Paris now is publicly sponsoring Spain's entry into NATO. De Gaulle has long maintained that Spain's exclusion from Western defense was "ridiculous" and that the character of its political regime was irrelevant. The French President probably hopes, in return, to obtain, a friendly Spanish attitude toward French policy in Africa, particu- larly North Africa. Paris may also be seeking Spanish support for activation, under a French admiral, of the NATO "Iberlant" command�the eastern Atlantic area adjacent to Spain between Brest in the north, 2,nd Dakar in the south--as well as support for changes in defense arrangements for the western Mediterranean. Socialist opposition to Franco in Norway, Denmark, and certain other NATO countries is still a substantial obstacle to Spain's admittance to NATO, but the French Socialist party is no Longer sufficiently strong to block a Paris-Madrid rap- prochement. De Gaulle's most difficult task will probably be to allay Spanish suspicions that France is seeking to expand its influence pain's expense. SE 26 May 59 CCkITC1 Al 16.17E1 I ii�-�rkie�c ni II I r-rik Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 La.-2::nli 1-1 '*404 West German - Soviet Negotiations For Ship Construction Contracts concluded by the West German government- owned Howaldt shipyard threaten to undercut a proposed ban against the participation of NATO governments in long- term credits for the USSR. Credit extending for more than five years has been arranged to finance the construction of three fruit carriers, costing ten million dollars, and nego- tiations are continuing for contracts involving at least thirty million dollars for the construction of five or six floating fish canneries.. Half the payment is to be made on delivery, with the balance to be paid in five annual installments. The time from the beginning of construction to final payment will exceed the five-year limit being sought among NATO .countries for medium-term credits. Bonn officials. argue that their position in NATO op- posing such credits is not affected because the deal is guaranteed by a state government rather than by the Fed- eral Republic and is a "one-time exception" which does not vitiate Bonn's general policy. Bonn officials maintain the projects are necessary to alleviate serious unemployment in the shipbuilding industry. They feel that if West Germany refuses the contracts, other Western nations are sure to fill them. Previous negotiations by a Hamburg shipyard for the construction of passenger ships for the USSR failed be of Soviet insistence on long-term financing. Bonn claims the contracts were later awarded to Dutch shipbuild- ers. West German approval of the contr cts appears likely, and arrangements are pending for an additional 19 ships. These developments coincide with the conclusion of an extensive British-Soviet trade agreement calling for a sub- stantial increase in trade during the next five years. In- creased British exports will, at least in part, be financed through government-guaranteed "intermediate" credits-- for less than five years- -which the British have made available in an attempt to obtain a substantial share of the Soviet program of nurchasina chemical plants CONHfENTIAL 26 May 59 CA�p'p.r1:7\7e'd for 'Release: 2620/02/21 C03163335 Page 5 CONFiLitba Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 Nue THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03163335 VW, Zi Zr ZrZ/ /1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C 1