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April 26, 2019
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April 30, 2019
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Publication Date: 
December 19, 1967
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602407].pdf411.43 KB
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 Nape kid"' DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE 3.5(c) central Intelligence Bulletin Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 C 1 S' ';:;J 19 December 1967 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 TiNFSegret (:oqtroiled Dissem The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart- ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro- duced by CIA and marked with an asterisk. Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may he designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis. WARNING This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) v.i INAL:i 19 December 1967 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1) Communist China: Efforts to reopen the schools are breaking down in many areas. (Page 3) Rumania-USSR: Ceausescu visit does nothing to improve relations. (Page 6) Yemen: Premier's resignation may reflect Egyptian pressure. (Page 7) USSR - Eastern Europe: Support of Arabs (Page 8) Dahomey: Weak new government (Page 8) TOP RET Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 THAILAND 0�111 1. 111,11.1 Q1101. NORTH VIETNAM Dernilitenzed Zone �4 � � Con Thien F � � 7 _ang Tri Khe Sanh-"\ 1' ' � .. c ) Hue 0'�I JA HIEN . .. ilt I ! , A Shau. ' .;. , ---' �btuang. Valley ..--/ . (1) ( Ol I A NG NAM CAMBODIA PHNOM PENH , , FN PI-10 n EQ 1 A NG," N 1JVFN,A1 1 � Tri-Thi en-Hue. MR r NG TIN "A.. QUA NO NGAI MR-5 ) RINH DINH= PLEIKU A LA C HON - .. % (-�.�_. ,,,._",, )1tHANH H OA c ,... , PHU YEN A -IyEN CORPS C SOUTH VIETNAM 2,5 50 7,5 190 Miles I I.% 0 25 5.0 75 PO K. lometers 68996 12-67 CIA 19 Dec 67 C A T TATIT1 T TrIVNT laTTT .T .P.TIN map Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.3(h)(2) -���� Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) I Nor *South Vietnam: A captured enemy document indi- cates that the North Vietnamese may undertake a ma- jor military effort this winter in the heavily populated coastal sections of I and II Corps. The enemy document also suggests that the North Vietnamese may launch diversionary attacks in the Con Thien area; however, the principal thrust will occur farther south in the enemy's Military Region 5 and the Tri-Thien-Hue military region. A recent build-up of enemy units south of Quang Tri city, the movement of elements of the 304th North Vietnamese Division into the Laos panhandle west of Khe Sanh, and the movement of the 31st North Vietnam- ese Regiment into the A Shau Valley southeast of Hue, lends some credence to the strategy alluded to in the captured document. If such is the enemy intention, the design would be to bring the war closer to South Vietnam's popula- tion centers and to create yet another battle sector in which to pin down allied forces and disrupt pacification efforts. Diversionary military activity in the Demilitarized Zone area probably would consist for the most part of rocket and artillery fire against allied strongpoints as the weather improves in January and February. In the highlands area at least two elements of the Nortt , Vietnamese B-3 Front have moved southward to Darlac and Phuoc Long provinces near the Cambodian border. The units involved have not yet been identified. They could be logistics units sent to help infiltrate men and materials to points farther south, or they could be 19 Dec 67 1 TO' :CRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) .m. LI I 4IG fighting units shifting from the western highlands to northern III Corps. The North Vietnamese 88th Regi- ment moved to III Corps from the highlands late last summer. 19 Dec 67 2 TO RET 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) --X-C-, I L) J._1'._) J_N. 1.1 -L SOIV Communist China: The regime's recent efforts to reopen schools have broken down in many areas.] With few exceptions, schools at all levels were cicAed in June 1966 to release students for full time participation in the Cultural Revolution. In Septem- ber and October 1967 the regime tried a variety of programs to get students to curb their disorderly "re- volutionary" activities and return to school. few schools actually have resumed classes. '.Some major institutions, such as the large elite universities in Peking, show no signs of even attempt- ing to resume classes. Many schools which did try to reopen were soon forced to close because of fighting among Red Guard factions. For example, the important Huanan Tech- nical College in Canton opened on 28 November, but was closed nine days later when army troops were called in to stop student clashes. The same thing hap- pened at the Wuhsi College of Light Industry in East China in mid-November. 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) It is now apparent that Peking, in ordering schools to reopen, failed to provide specific guidance on cur- riculum, textbooks, qualifications for new students, and authority of teachers. There has not even been an at- tempt to restore vandalized school facilities in many areas. As a result, the real situation contrasts sharply with Peking's propaganda, which tries to convey the im- _ pression that classes are gradually resuming everywhere., 19 Dec 67 3 '1042--SECIZET (continued) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) - L-7 1.1%-o. 1,1..1.-/ 14100V The chances are slim that the Peking leadership can impel warring student factions to resume class- work before settling its own problems. The regime's failure to follow through on last fall's educational pro- gram suggests that top leaders are fully occupied with more pressing issues. 3.5(c) 19 Dec 67 4 TSIP--gEeRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) g*Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.3(h)(2) 19 Dec 67 CFNTR AT. TNTFT,T,TGENCF, BULLETIN Photo Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) Noy' ..1-4444-'etrCall., 1 sraid 19 Dec 67 5 p s RE Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) E. 1 Rumania-USSR: Major differences remain be- tween the two countries in the wake of the official visit to Moscow on 14-15 December of Rumanian party and state chief Ceausescu. The communique' ending the visit noted that the two merely "exchanged opinions" on the implementa- tion of existing economic and trade agreements, one of the major issues believed to be dividing them. At the Rumanian national party conference on 6 Decem- ber, Ceausescu, alluding to the USSR, charged that long-term economic agreements are sometimes not fully carried out in practice. On other topics, such as Vietnam and Germany, the communique's language did not commit the Ruma- nians to support specific Soviet positions. In addition, the communique failed to mention the Middle East or an international Communist meeting, suggesting dif- ferences continue on these matters. The only agreement apparently reached was that a Soviet party and government delegation will pay an official visit to Rumania "in 1968." 19 Dec 67 T-0-12-8LECIZET Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) Yemen: Premier al-Aini, who had been absent from the country for some weeks, is reported to have resigned yesterday. He has recommended that General Hasan al-Amri, the chief of staff, be asked to form a new cabinet. The resignation may reflect Egyptian pressure, since Nasir has long disliked al-Aini. A former ambassador to Washington, al-Aini is considered a liberal as well as an intellectual in Yemeni circles. His resignation will give conservative military and tribal elements a freer hand in the republican government. Meanwhile, there has been little change in the mili- tary situation, and sporadic royalist pressure on a number of republican positions continues. 19 Dec 67 7 DaP�FrEletrET Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C031750705(c) *tappv '14-44-z�hSr:GK.E1 k NOTES USSR - Eastern Europe: The meeting of European Communist foreign ministers in Warsaw today is the fourth such attempt to put on a show of unified Commu- nist support for the Arabs since the June war. The Soviets, who welcome any such opportunity to draw their European allies together, probably arranged the gather- ing. Moscow may want to stiffen the resolve of some of the European states who are only lukewarm toward backing the Arabs, particularly with material support. Soviet involvement in Yemen, a new element in the pic- ture since the last meeting in September, will be the most topical of the current issues under discussion. Dahomey: The new provisional government headed by Major Kouandete seems likely to be weak and inef- fectual. The eight military men who dominate it have no political experience and probably will soon split along regional lines. Lt. Col. Alley, who was detained briefly, probably remains a power and may continue as chief of staff. 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) ilaP--gReitter 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070 "*4109 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070