CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/02/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03177884
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: February 27, 1960

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27 February 1960
Copy No.
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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27 FEBRUARY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Klirushchev told Nehru that he was not
optimistic about achieving "practical re-
sults" at summit meeting.
USSR may make some spectacular offer
to exploit Greece's present economic dif-
ficulties.
Czechs offer $30,000,000 credit to Iraq. 0
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Nasir aide says poor management of UAR
mobilization caused unanticipated war
scare in Egypt.
South Vietnam--Captured documents said
to reveal Communist plans for intensi-
fied terrorist activities.
III. THE WEST
� UK's hardening attitude toward West
Germany reflected in reluctance to al-
low exceptions to treaty restrictions on
West German military power.
0 Castro plans to register complaint
against US in UN if US reduces Cuba's
sugar quota.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
27 February 1960
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Germany-India: gdirushchev told Nehru on 12 Feb-
ruary that although he is not optimistic over achieving "prac-
tical results" at the summit meeting, he has not given un on
reaching an understanding with the West.
Khrushchev told Nehru that Adenauer was re-
sponsible for forcing an "unaccommodating" position on the
West. The Soviet premier emphasized that in the event of an
impasse on the German and Berlin problems, the USSR would
have no choice but to sign a separate peace treaty with East
Germany. Soviet propaganda, including an official TASS state-
ment, has seized upon the announcement of the West German
and Spanish military talks to further the campaign to isolate
and discredit the Adenauer government alleging that Bonn's
policies closely parallel HitlerN
(Page 1)
USSR-Greece: Soviet Ambassador Sergeyev, since return-
ing to Athens in early February from home leave, has been con-
tacting various ministers of the Greek Government to repeat
MOSCOW'S desire for closer political, cultural, and economic
relations. In a recent meeting with Foreign Minister Averoff,
Sergeyev complained of Athens' "indifference" to Moscow's ef-
forts for an international detente and the unwillingness of top
Greek leaders to accept an invitation to visit the USSR. Ambas-
sador Briggs believes that Moscow is planning to exploit Greece's
present economic difficulties with "some spectacular offer" at the
opportune moment. (Page 2)
Bloc-Iraq: Czechoslovakia has offered Iraq an aid credit
of about $30,000,000. Iraq will probably accept this additional
bloc assistance and may use the credit for a series of quick-
impact projects designed to impress the populace.
(Page 3)
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-Israel: Sabri,
FOor management of the UAR mobilization--
was ordered as preparation against an expected Israeli
attack on Syria--had created an unanticipated war scare in Egyp
Sabri said that the mobilization had caused panic buying and a
shortage of food stuffs, that hospitals had been stripped of their
doctors, and that the stock market had broken.
steps were being taken to ease the s1tuati0n4 Since 24 Febru-
ary� UAR officials and the press and radid-have played down
the possibility of hostilities. There is no sign that the UAR
armed forces have lowered their state of alert.
(Page 4)
South Vietnam: he Diem government reports that, accord-
ing to recently captured documents, the Vietnamese Communists
plan intensified terrorist activities in Saigon and the countryside
1,4- in the immediate future. American personnel in South Vietnam�
9' � who are likely targets, have been advised to increase their nor-
'mal vigilance. While the reported Communist intentions may
be exaggerated, the security situation in South Vietnam has de-
teriorated in recent months. The estimated 3,000 terrorists
6114
have become bolder
III. THE WEST
Britain - West Germany: ElLhe British Government's attitude
has recently hardened against strengthening of West German mil-
itary power above the 1954 Western European treaty restrictions.
Britain has been stalling for some weeks on a German request to
raise displacement limits on combat ships, and a Foreign� Office
official on 25 February predicted increased difficulties for the re-
quest in view_pf public indignation over the West German - SP anish
military talksi
zi teb bU
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Cuba: The Castro government evidently plans to raise
a complaint in the UN against the US if the US reduces Cuba's
sugar quota. Foreign Minister Roa has asked the UAR and
Yugoslav ambassadors for their governments' opinions on
such a complaint, and probably will try to obtain support from
the Asian-African 'neutralist and Soviet bloc countries with
which Cuba has increasingly closer relations. The UAR am-
bassador in Havana has reported to Cairo that,
Castro hopes to visit the USSR, UAR, Yugoslavia, Italy,uli .na, and Guinea in June. (Page 7)
27 Feb 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Igor' Swirl
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev Discusses Sovide Policy on Germany 'With Nehru
Khrushchev told Nehru
that he expected no "practical results" on disarma-
ment or the German question at the summit meeting in May,
The Soviet
premier added, however, that he had not given up his effort
to reach an understanding with the West. Khrushchev em-
phasized that the USSR's only alternative, in the event of an
impasse on the German and Berlin problems, would be to
sign a separate peace treaty with East Germansy)
gthrushchev's effort to discredit Adenauer in his talks
with Rehm has been reflected in an official TASS statement
on 25 February which seized upon the announcement of West
Germany's military talks with Spain to allege that Bonn's
policies "involuntarily bring to mind the military alliance
of Hitler and Franco." Stressing that the Soviet Government
has constantly warned about the "sinister danger" of Ger-
man militarism, TASS claimed that Bonn is no longer con-
tent with NATO as a military alliance and is seeking collabora-
tion with the "offspring of Hitlerite Nazism and Italian Fascism."
The statement concluded by declaring that this collusion,
aimed at obstructing an East-West agreement, "again under-
lines the urgent need for a peace settlement with GermanyA
Nehru recently has shown growing impatience with Bonn,
apparently because he feels that Adenauer personally is ob-
structing progress toward an East-West detente. West Ger-
man Foreign Minister Brentano appears to have gained great-
er appreciation for Bonn's views, however, as a result of
his talks in New Delhi with Nehru and tdian officials from
19 to 24 February]
SECRET
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1111,
Renewed Soviet Overtures to Greece
Soviet Ambassador Sergeyev, just back from home leave,
has continued to emphasize to Greek government ministers
Moscow's desire for closer political, cultural, and economic
relations. In a recent meeting with Foreign Minister Averoff,
Sergeyev complained of Athens "indifference" to Soviet efforts
for an international detente and the unwillingness of top Greek
leaders to accept an invitation to visit the USSR. He assured
Averoff that the Soviet leaders' desire for friendly, peaceful,
and warm relations with all countries was not just a matter of
current or temporary policy and cited as evidence of their good
faith the recent decision to reduce Soviet armed forces by one
third.
Similar arguments last November failed to win Greek ap-
proval for Soviet requests for expanded cultural exchanges and
air service routes through Athens. Sergeyev also suggested at
that time that Averoff and Prime Minister Karamanlis visit the
USSR, and angled for an invitation to Khrushchev to stop over
for talks in Athens on his Paris trip in March.
While Greek officials have shown little enthusiasm for Mos-
cow's overtures, growing agricultural surpluses, increasing
unemployment, and inability to secure admission to the European
Common Market make bloc offers increasingly difficult for Athens
to reject. In their recent conversation, Averoff told Sergeyev
that further trade expansion was difficult, as the USSR insisted
on barter agreements but produced few goods that Greece could
use. Subsequently, Averoff admitted to Ambassador Briggs that
while Greece actually could use many Soviet-produced items, the
government had no intention of allowing the USSR to "dig itself
into the Greek market."
Ambassador Briggs believes that the Soviet leaders are
"playing their cards carefully" and are planning to exploit Greece's
economic difficulties with "some spectacular offer."
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� Czech Economic Aid Offer to Iraq
Czechoslovakia's offer of a $30,000,000 credit to Iraq
will make it possible for Baghdad to carry out quickly sev-
eral small projects having immediate domestic propaganda
value. Sensitive to public disillusionment, Baghdad needs
to fulfill soon at least some of its public promises of eco-
nomic development, and will probably accept the offer. Prague,
under the bloc's aid program for underdeveloped countries, has
displayed an ability to carry out projects of a light industrial
nature quickly and efficiently.
Iraqi economic conditions have deteriorated steadily
since Qasim came to power, and long-range projects--fi-
nanced primarily by the Soviet $137,500,000 line of credit--
are still in the early stages of implementation. Iraq has re-
cently been attempting to induce Western contractors who have
been active in Iraq in the past to undertake a number of projects
on which it wants quick reliable performance. (
27 Feb 60
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-Israeli Situation
[Although there has been no indication that the UAR armed
force�s have lowered their state of alert, UAR officials may be
attempting to lessen the tensions created by the recent military
movements. All Sabri, Nasir's chief aide, stated that on his
return to Cairo on 23 February from accompanying Nasir in
Syria he was astonished by the effect the mobilization had had
on Egypt. Commandeering of civilian trucks had led to a food
shortage and "panic buying," hospitals were inoperative because
of the call-up of doctors, and the stock market had broken. Sabri
blamed these results on mismanagement by junior officers, since
the senior officers responsible for mobilization were out of the
country:]
aabri took the line consistently maintained by other UAR of-
ficials that the UAR military preparations were purely defensive
and had followed receipt of information that Israel planned to at-
tack Syria as a follow-up to the incidents which had occurred in
the Israeli-Syrian demilitarized zone. He said that steps would
now be taken to ease the situation in Egypt and assure the UAR
populace that an outbreak of hostilities was not imminent. UAR
officials and the press and radio since 24 February have been
dyi
playing down the possibility of war.
UARthe to -
take the necessary measures to avoid "provocations." There ha-"
been no indication of Cairo's respons_ej
In Israel, Foreign Minister Meir has conducted a series of
interviews with members of the diplomatic corps,setting forth
Israel's position with regard to the UAR build-up. There is still
no indication of a large-scale Israeli counter-mobilization. An
Israeli Army spokesman has admitted, however, that approxi-
mately 5,000 individual reservists have been called up as a pre-
cautionary measure. Knits of the Israeli Navy--a destroyer,
submarine chaser, and two torpedo boats--were reported leav-
ing Haifa harbor on 26 February and the submarine Tanin is al]
sea.
27 Feb 60
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Niue
_ Israel recently
received from France assembled sections of Mystere jet
fighters by air transport. The total number of aircraft re-
ceived was not specified, but six have already been assem-
bled.)
27 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 5
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Communist Terrorism in South Vietnam
Ec_ommunist plans for an early increase of terrorism in
South Vietnam are allegedly revealed in a Communist direc-
tive captured recently in a raid on a dissident command post
in the southwestern border area. The Diem government ap-
parently is convinced that the document is genuine. Three
Communist agents captured subsequently have reportedly con-
firmed a Communist intent to stage some kind of dramatic in-
cident in Saigolg
although the document refers to an "armed coup" to take
place sometime in the early future, South Vietnamese officials
interpret this to mean a show of force, possibly involving co-
ordinated attacks in widespread areas. Vietnamese Commu-
nist guerrilla forces in South Vietnam, augmented in recent
months by personnel infiltrated from North Vietnam, are be-
lieved to number only about 3,000. There are no specific indi-
cations that American personnel are intended targets, but pre-
cautions are being taken in view of past Communist attacks on
members of the American Military Aid and Advisory Group in
1957 and 19517
"Eyhile the report of Communist intentions may be exaggerated,
the security situation�particularly in the southwest-- has deteri-
orated during the past six months, and Communist terrorists have
become bolder. Assassinations and kidnappings of local officials
and villagers have increased to between 20 and 35 per month, and
large Communist bands have been attacking government patrols
and security installations:7
27 Feb 60
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III, THE WEST
Cuba May Seek Neutralist Support in United Nations Against
United States
The Castro government evidently plans to raise com-
plaints in the UN against the US if Cuba's share of the US
sugar quota is reduced0
because the United States
is trying to isolate Cuba politically from the rest of Latin
America, a complaint to the Organization of American
States (OAS) over a lowered quota would be useless.
asked the envoys for their governments opinions on the
projected UN appeal and probably will also solicit support
from other Asian-African neutralist and Soviet bloc coun-
tries, with which Cuba is seeking to establish close rela-
tions.
The Castro regime probably sees the coming UN Gen-
eral Assembly session as an opportunity to cause trouble
for the United States and to demonstrate its proclaimed
neutralism. Castro's intention to cooperate with the USSR
in the UN was expressed in the communiqu�ssued follow-
ing Mikoyan's visit to Havana earlier this month. The
Cuban UN delegate is campaigning for a seat on the Securi-
ty Council without first obtaining the customary endorse-
ment of the Latin American caucus. Castro officials fre-
quently belittle the OAS as "US dominated."
Castro wants to visit the USSR, the UAR, Yugoslavia,
Italy, Ghana, and Guinea and had asked him to arrange
such a trip for this June. Castro previously has evinced
interest in visiting those countries, but no date hadbeen
mentioned.
27 Feb 60
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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rnrirrtn-r-4..7-r,r A
THE PRESIDENT Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177884
The Vice President I P4
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director CONFIDENTIAL
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