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September 15, 1960
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Nogg "fteitEafft CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY COPY NO. 55 OC1 NO. 4444/60 15 September 1960 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0 DEtLAS8iPiED Ct-toktiGED TO: T tIViiW DATE; I . 0�41HtA 10-2 4 64kilt MAY vivatA311 Wir 3IA%- NYHb 'SS 10 \ VIO '0 -ss mes0 ON "ON iIkInNr1004 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 IMO qr. THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 7PrthirEWAITIA1 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 4,19kilw N164 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 THE WEEK IN BRIEF PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST KHRUSHCHEV AND THE 15TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY Page 1 Khrushchev's sharp denunciation of US plans to re- strict his movements during his stay in New York sug- gests he is seeking to exploit this issue as a deliberate effort on the part of the United States to create a hos- tile atmosphere. He has also used this issue to renew charges that the US is not interested in settling major International issues at the General Assembly. Moscow's extensive propaganda build-up for this UN session im- plies that Khrushchev will advance ostensibly new pro- posals on disarmament. Along with Eastern European party leaders, Khrushchev can be expected to underline the urgent need for disarmament by citing alleged Western provocations in Berlin and the rearmament of West Germany as major f ntors in the deterioration 7 of East-West relations. CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN . � 6 0 O� �0 00 .0 . Page 3 The first large shipment of arms from the USSR ar- rived in Cuba on 8 September. Communist China is moving rapidly to establish its diplomatic mission in Havana, and Khrushchev is expected in Cuba after taking part in the opening meetings of the UN General Assembly. Fidel Castro is to head Cuba's UN delegation, which is likely to support the Soviet position on all major issues. In the Dominican Republic, the Trujillo re- gime has reacted to mounting international pressures by calling a mass meeting for 24 September to demon- strate its "popular support" and by threatening re- taliation against US businessmen. Continuing tension is evident in Venezuela despite President Betancourt's success in maintaining his three-party coalition fol- lowing the forci resignation of pro-Cuban Foreign Minister Arcaya. REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO Page 5 The struggle for power between Premier Lumumba, President Kasavubu, and Colonel Mobutu in the Congo re- mains unresolved. UN initiatives aimed at combating Lumumba's extremism have been hampered by the concern of African states--exploited by the USSR --that the UN is infringing on the Congo's sovereignty. Meanwhile, Soviet involvement in the Congo situation continues to increase. In td, (b)(3) (b)(3) THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 vvrtII I *I= CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 PART I (continued) addition to expanding the scope of its direct aid to Lumum the USSR has affirmed its inten- tion of bypassing UN channels in supplying aid, and Khrushchev on 13 September strongly attacked Hammer- skjold for "consciously working in the interests of the imperialists" in the Congo. SITUATION IN LAOS . � 0 OOOOO 0 ....... Page 8 The proclamation of a rival government by General Phoumi and Prince Bowl Oum in opposition to the Souvanna Phouma government has brought the situation in Laos into a new and more critical phase. Souvanna has re- acted moderately to this new threat and has sought to keep the door open for a new compromise by refrain- ing from branding Phoumi and Bowl OUm as rebels. The refusal of the King to take sides, in effect a repudia- tion of Souvanna, has dimmed prospects for a recon- ciliation between Souvanna and Phoumi, however, and may lead to Souvanna's early resignation. Captain Kong Le is still in military control of Vientiane. The Communist Pathet Lao continues to exploit the division in Laos' non-Communist ranks, exerting mili- tary pressure in regions ostensibly loyal to Phoumi and waging a vigorous propaganda campaign calling on all Laotians to get behind the Souvanna government and Kong Le in their struzzle against thp tl-raitnrnucti Phoumi clique. PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS ELECTIONS AT THE 15TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY A contest between the Soviet bloc and the West over the election of the president of the 15th UN General Assembly is in prospect when the assembly opens on 20 September. The competition between two rival Western candidates�Frederick Boland of Ire- land and Thor Thors of Iceland�improves the chances of Jiri Nosek of Czechoslovakia. Cuba's intention to seek the Security Council seat relinquished by Argentina--in opposition to Chile, the choice of the Latin American caucus--may induce delegates from other areas. particularly Africa to RAAk this mAnt Page 1 THE WERT( IN RRTRV Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 � Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 � 4V I I LIC111-11:11,___ �ow 441ifilMers CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 PART II (continued) INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY CONFERENCE . � Page 2 The fourth general conference of the UN's Inter- national Atomic Energy Agency, convening in Vienna on the same day the General Assembly opens in New York, will probably be marked by East-West conflicts on several issues, including the perennial one of Chinese representation. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 � Page 3 At the North Vietnamese party congress--the first important bloc forum since the Bucharest meeting in June --Soviet and Chinese spokesmen reaffirmed their posi- tions in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese, who were again criticized for lobbying among other parties and for disrupting international organizations, have in fact continued to press their opposition to Soviet policies in other Communist-controlled international bodies. As to governmental relations, the USSR con- tinues to schedule the delivery of military and other aid to China, but there are several indications of a worsening relationship. BERLIN SITUATION . � . Page 5 . The East German Government continues to extend its restrictions on travel of West German citizens in East Berlin and East Gertany. The Bonn government is reluctant to apply strong countermeasures, such as an embargo on interzonal trade, lest they lead to worse East German retaliation, particularly against West Berlin's large trade with West Germany. East German party boss Ulbricht has disclosed in a mem- orandum to the UN a plan for the phased disarmament of Germany, including provisions for signing a peace treaty with the "two German states," Western troop withdrawal fr7m West Berlin. and a "free city" of West Berlin. EAST GERMAN REFUGEE FLOW CONTINUES DESPITE CONTROL MEASURES 00000 ...... . . Despite intensified East German security measures, the refugee flow to West Berlin and West Germany is continuing at a high rate. More than 3,000 refugees reached West Berlin during the week ending 6 September, although this period included the five-day near- blockade of the East Berlin "escape hatch" to the Western sectors. Some 126,500 East Germans have crossed over in the first eight months of the year-- far above last year's rate--and the 1960 total is likely to be well above last year's total of 143,000. There has also been a decrease in the number of persons going from West to East. � Page 7 (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Iii THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 PART II (continued) POSSIBLE MISSILE RING AROUND BERLIN . � � 0 Berlin by early 1961 will probably be ringed with surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. The ring may eventually contain eight or more launch sites, each with local support facilities. In addition there may be two central support facilities. All of the support facilities were reported under construction this summer, and could be completed, with launch sites installed, in early 1961. The two existing operational SAM sites in East Germany--not a part of the Berlin complex--are manned by Soviet personnel, but there is evidence that the East Germans may eventually participate in thig nr.tiwi+v, Page MOSCOW-TO-HELSINKI COMMUNICATIONS CABLE . A high-capacity underground coaxial cable is being installed between Finland and the USSR. Since the cable will provid a circuit capacity greatly in excess of civil requirements, it could be used for trans- mitting air-defense information into the USSR, under terms of the Finn stance pact of 1947. ALBANIAN PARTY SHUFFLE SETS STAGE FOR GREATER SUPPORT OF MOSCOW 0 . . The ouster from the Albanian party politburo of a leading ideologist and the elevation to the party secretariat of an agitprop specialist suggest that Tirana is preparing to revamp its equivocal propaganda line on basic issues in the Sino-Soviet controversy. The ideologist will probably be a scapegoat in this instance for the regime's "collective error" in past support of the Chines on such matters as the in- evitability of war and the nature of the imperialist threat. Her ouster, probably a direct result of Soviet pressure, will serve to deter others in the Albanian party and elsewhere whn tAnd fn fawn,. +he Chinese view. NORTH VIETNAM HOLDS THIRD PARTY CONGRESS . .... Two themes dominated the sessions of North Viet- nam's third party congress, which met in Hanoi from 5 to 10 September--how best to modernize and in- dustrialize the country in accordance with Communist principles and how to reunify Vietnam. Hanoi, hoping for the overthrow of President Diem, plans to solve the latter problem by forming a coalition government with a "democratic" successor government. The long 8 . Page 10 . Page 11 . Page 13 iv THE WEEK TN RR TVS, Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 003185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 --SEGREL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 PART II (continued) continuity of leadership within the Lao Dong party was again underscored by the continuation of the politburo without changes in membership. It became clear at the congress that Le Duan, an individual closely associated with the direction of subversive activities against South vicitnam iQ alAnnnd in nnwal" tn President Ho Chi Minh. GUINEA STRENGTHENS COMMUNIST BLOC TIES O 0 0 0 � . Page 15 Guinea's economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc have been strengthened further as a result of President Toure's current visit to several Communist bloc countries. In Moscow.Toure secured a Soviet commitment to partici- pate in the proposed Konkouria hydroelectric project-- Guinea's priority development scheme--while Peiping extended a $25,000,000 interest-free credit, its first large-scale economic aid to any Black African country. In addition, Toure endorsed a number of Moscow's policy positions and appears to have moved toward closer alignment with the Communist world. USSR AND IRAN MAKING NEW EFFORT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS . . . Page 16 Both Moscow and Tehran are making new moves to relieve the long-standing tension in their relations. Following the ouster on 28 August of the stanchly anti- Communist Eqbal as Iranian prime minister, Soviet Am- bassador Pegov returned to Tehran, and the Soviet Government diminished its propaganda attacks on the Shah. Sharif Emami, Iran's new prime minister, feels that the immediate task of his government is to im- prove relations with Moscow, but not at the expense of its ties to the West. Iran has halted its counter- propaganda and has begun to display greater coopera- tion in ii1nnv mattnria tnward Rnviof nff1n4sa10 4n Tehran. INDONESIA The confrontation of President Sukarno and the Indonesian Army over the Communist issue appears to have been once more postponed by Sukarno's ban issued on 13 September on the activities of all political parties. The ban frees Sukarno from the necessity of making a direct choice between the army and the Communists; it also obviates an army decision on whether to oppose Sukarno further by extending to other areas the proscription of Communist activity announced last month in three military commands. Page 17 (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) vrekilET, THE WEEK TN IITinlv Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Nese %we CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 PART II (continued) SOUTH KOREAN CABINET RESHUFFLE 0 0 0 0 0 . Page 18 South Korean Prime Minister Chang Myon and his op- ponents within his party agreed on 12 September to a compromise cabinet designed to give Chang a working majority in the National Assembly. Although the new cabinet appears to strengthen Chang's position for the time being by drawing his opponents into sharing re- sponsibility for government policy, the terms of the compromise will make it easy for the anti-Chang fac- tionists to function as a de facto opposition bloc in future tests of strength. CONGO REPERCUSSIONS ON THE BELGIAN DOMESTIC SCENE . The new Belgian coalition cabinet, recently an- nounced by Premier Eyskens in response to public criticism of the government's Congo policy, contains no new influential figures, and may not last through the winter. No major changes in defense and foreign policies are likely; Eyskens' austerity economic pro- gram, however, involves defense cuts ranging between 7 and 13 percent and the drift away from active par- ticipation in NATO will probably continue. . Page 19 EL SALVADOR'S GOVERNMENT SHAKEN BY LEFTIST ATTACKS . The moderately progressive regime of Salvadoran President Lemus has been seriously shaken by persist- ent attacks from leftist student and labor elements, many of whom are pro-Communist and pro-Castro. Ten- sions have subsided somewhat recently as a result of mediating efforts by businessmen and civic leaders; but the state of siege declared on 5 September still continues, and the outlook for government stability remains uncertain. . Page 20 PART III PATTERNS AND. PERSPECTIVES CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS . Although Nationalist China is expected to retain China's seat in the UN throUgh the procedural device of the moratorium at this year's General Assembly, the prospect for maintaining the moratorium beyond 1961 is increasingly uncertain. Taipei, despite its association in African minds with "colonial powers," . . Page 1 vi THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 PART III (continued) may even pick up additional support from newly sover- eign states if they are admitted to the UN before the vote. Many UN members, even among those which have consistently supported the moratorium, have long be- lieved that UN membership with its attendant obliga- tions offers a way of bringing Peiping under some form of international restraint. A strong appeal to this body of opinion may be made in Khrushchev's forthcoming speech to the assembly in which he is expected to call for Communist China's admission while developing his theme of peaceful coexistence. (Secret Noforn) (b)(1 (b)(3 PART IV OTHER INTELLIGENCE ISSUANCES Published during the week of 7 - 13 September 1960 '517,a`LsT-- THF. WF.RIC nizi ivy Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 40.�� Th-EeRET__ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST KHRUSHCHEV AND THE 15TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY Khrushchev has seized on the question of US security precautions during his stay in New York as head of the USSR's delegation to the UN General Assembly as a pretext for de- nouncing the American Govern- ment's attitude toward the UN. In a telegram answering ques- tions of the London Daily Ex- press on 13 September, the�So- Vilf-premier charged that the restrictions on his activities indicate that the United States "does not sympathize with the effort to resolve the major is- sues" to be considered by the UN. Moscow's formal protest note to the US took a similar line, alleging that the purpose of the restrictions was to "worsen in advance the interna- tional climate" when the heads of government meet at the Gen- eral Assembly. The sharp reaction by Khru- shchev, who will arrive on 19 September, suggests that he anticipates a cool public recep- tion and is seeking an issue to charge the US with intentionally creating a hostile atmosphere. Propaganda allegations that Khrushchev has received numer- ous invitations from Americans for visits and public appear- ances also fit into the pattern of creating an impression that Washington is attempting to block Khrushchev's contacts with the American public. The Soviet campaign to persuade free-world leaders to attend the meeting has met with moderate success. Among the heads of government who plan to attend the initial debates during the first weeks of the General Assembly are Nasir, Sukarno, Tito, Sihanouk of Cambodia, Moulay Hassan of Morocco, and Koirala of Nepal. Nehru, U Nu, Sekou Toure, and Nkrumah are apparently planning to attend, but probably not un- til early October. Prime Min- isters Daud of Afghanistan and Abboud of Sudan are apparently still undecided. Prior to Eisenhower's announcement that he intends to address the UN on 22 September, no heads of government coi prime ministers of Western states were planning to come, except Cuba's Castro, who will fully support the So- viet line. Soviet propaganda has rep- resented this turnout as a suc- cess for Soviet diplomacy and a defeat for the West. Moscow's initial reaction to the announce- ment that President Eisenhower would address the UN was to dis- miss it as a "forced concession" to world opinion which TASS claimed strongly supported the initiative of the USSR. Disarmament The extensive Soviet prop- aganda build-up on the UN meet- ing has emphasized disarmament. A Pravda editorial of 10 Sep- tember cited Khrushchev's visit as "new proof" of the USSR's de- termination to break the dead- lock on that issue. Moscow has also suggested that Khrushchev will expand his most recent disarmament proposals. Propa- ganda implies that he will un- veil a new scheme; while staying within the context of complete PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 10 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 � CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 and general disarmament, it will probably be designed to appeal to Afro-Asian neutral states. Such a bid for this sup- port may involve a revised ver- sion of proposals presented on 2 June, with additional emphasis on the economic benefits of disarmament in terms of making funds available for underdevel- oped areas. Previous Soviet plans have stopped short of proposing the establishment of a joint fund which would func- tion as a channel for "savings" from disarmament to be used in aid programs. Moscow may feel, however, that a specific pro- posal at this time will gain widespread Afro-Asian support for its over-all disarmament plan. This approach is re- flected in Khrushchev's joint communiqu�ith Guinea Presi- dent Toure on 8 September, which listed disarmament, and economic security as principal topics for UN discussions. Polish Deputy Foreign Min- ister Naszkowski told American Embassy representatives that Khrushchev would propose an enlargement of the disarmament talks to include some neutrals but not the Chinese Communists. Khrushchev'e immediate aim on disarmament will be to elic- it support in the UN General Assembly for a subsequent reso- lution endorsing "complete and general disarmament" as the prime objective in any future Fast-West negotiations. In his Pravda interview on 9 August, KhrOsliehev foreshadowed such a position by claiming that "the Soviet Union wants the General Assembly to recognize universal and complete disarmament as the crucial question." He added, "It is essential that the Gen- eral Assembly rule that disarm- ament must be complete." Colonialism The reference in the Khru- shchev-Toure communiqu�o the "national independence of peo- ples" as a cardinal issue to be taken up by the General As- sembly also indicates that in his address to the assembly the Soviet premier will stress at- tacks on "colonialism" and West- ern attempts to use the UN ac- tion in the Congo crisis as a "cover for imperialism." Khru- shchev probably anticipates that with the admission of new Af- rican members to the UN and the attendance of some leaders of other Afro-Asian countries, such attacks will garner con- siderable support. Germany and Berlin The Polish deputy foreign minister indicated that Berlin would be raised in connection with disarmament. East German party leader Ulbricht's new plan for phased disarmament for Germany could provide the cue for Khrushchev to stress that the rearmament of Germany and the situation in Berlin are major obstacles to a relaxation of tensions. He can also be ex- pected to use these problems to underline the urgency of dis- armament. It does not seem likely, however, that Khrushchev will advance any new proposals on Berlin, such as presenting an ultimatum to the West demand- ing acceptance of Soviet posi- tions on disarmament, Germany, and Berlin. Although a Soviet diplomat in Vienna told a New York Times reporter that tEri ifalaid be Khrushchev's position, PART I R OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 10 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 003185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 _ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 precipitation of a showdown on these issues would not be in keeping with the general em- phasis on creating an image of the peace-loving Soviet Union in the presence of high-level Afro-Asian delegations. Nevertheless, Khrushchev may clarify his position on Berlin in his informal remarks to the press, while leaving CUBA AND THE The Soviet ship Ilya Mech- nikov arrived at Havana Slith a large cargo on 8 September, the first major bloc arms ship- ment to the Castro regime. The cargo apparently included armored vehicles artillery, and a variety of other weapons and equipment. Jet aircraft also may have been delivered. In July, four or five Soviet MI-4 heliCopters and at least 10,000 Czech rifles and submachine guns had been delivered to Havana. Following Castro's 2 September anouncement that Cuba will establish relations with Peiping, the head of the Havana office of the New Chi- na News Agency has notified the Cuban Foreign Ministry that he had been designated by Peiping to negotiate the exhange of diplomatic Mis- sions. Khrushchev is expected to pay his long-promised visit to formal presentations of bloc charges against Bonn to be made by the satellite leaders, Gomulka declared recently that the Polish delegation would use the UN rostrum to "warn the nations against the dan- ger of German militarism," He added that Czechoslovakia was also entitled to make a similar warning. CARIBBEAN Cuba after his trip to New York for the opening of the UN Gen- eral Assembly, The Cuban Gov- ernment has announced that Fidel Castro himself is to head Cuba's UN General Assembly delegation, which will also include Foreign Minister Roa and Nunez Jimenez, the head of Cuba's Communist- � dominated Agrarian Reform In- stitute. Castro will use the world forum for further attacks on the United States and to hold up his revolution as an ex- ample for all underdeveloped nations and colonial areas. The Cuban delegation is expected to Support the Soviet position on all important issues. Meanwhile, open opposi- tion to Castro inside Cuba is still uncoordinated and lacks effective leadership. The Castro forces apparently have had no success in routing the guerrilla bands that haVe been forming in the Escambray Moun- tains of central Cuba for some PART I --SECREZ.,1 OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 3 of 10 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 months. Castro publicly mini- mized the importance of the guerrillas on 9 September, but the regime actually appears to be taking the threat of a guer- rilla build-up seriously. The Cuban consul in Hong Kong broke with the Castro re- gime on 12 September and wants to come to the United States. Dominican Republic Trujillo has reacted to mounting international pres- sures by announcing a mass meeting for 24 September to demonstrate his regime's "pcip- ular support." Calling a care- fully organized rally for this purpose is a device the regime has used before; in this in- stance it may also provide an occasion for Trujillo to an- nounce his resumption of the presidency in response to "pop- ular demand.," The government-controlled Radio Caribe has warned US businessmen to begin defending Trujillo against US attacks if they want to continue doing business in his country. The US Consulate sees the future of US interests there as "in- creasingly bleak" as long as Trujillo retains control. Radio Caribe's propaganda favorable to Castro and the Soviet bloc showed a marked drop following the USSR's un- successful demand that the UN Security Council endorse the OAS sanctions against the Do- minican Government, Attacks on "US imperialism" continue, however, and on 13 September Radio Caribe lashed out at the United States in a vicious at- tack, calling the US Government "the strongest dictatorship on earth," dominated by "Wall Street and eight capitalists." While Trujillo now is at- tempting to give the impression that he is not personally re- sponsible for the viciously anti-US line of his propaganda outlets, he undoubtedly could control them if he wished. At the same time, his propagandists are active in the United States, where they are attempting to portray the dictator as a stalwart defender against Communism who has been grievously wronged by his great friend, the United States. He is reportedly spend- ing considerable money in the United States to this end. Trujillo's statement of 13 Au- gust declaring that his country is determined to "remain outside the orbit of cannibalistic Com- munism" was undoubtedly made with a view only to its impact in the United States. Venezuela Despite Foreign Minister Arcaya's resignation, President Betancourt is successfully main- taining the three-party coali- tion which has backed his gov- ernment since its inauguration in February 1959. Nevertheless, continuing tension in Venezuela is suggested by rumors of high- level changes in the armed forces--including the army com- mander in chief and the chief of the joint general staff. Other indicators are a Communist- instigated armed battle in a key petroleum labor union meet- ing in which one man was killed and 30 injured, and the brief (b)(1) PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 4 of 10 " Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 seizure of a Caracas radio sta- tion on 12 September by a na- tional guard officer who report- edly hoped to inspire co-con- spirators to fulfill a revo- lutionary plan originally set for 10 September. Arcaya's resignation may have been regarded by anti- government elements as creating a weak point in the united front of Venezuela's three ma- jor parties which have made up the government coalition since President Betancourt's inaugura- tion in February 1959. These left-of-center parties--Betan- court's Democratic Action (AD) group; the Christian Democratic COPEI, and the Republican Demo- REPUBLIC OF The confusion surrounding the Congo situation has been compounded by two coups at- tempted against Premier Lumumba. President Kasavubu's effort to dismiss the premier and appoint moderate Joseph Ile�, the presi- dent of the Senate, in his stead did not receive popular or mil- itary support, and Ile� chose the safety of Brazzaville in President Youlou's Congo Repub- lic instead of the political struggle in Leopoldville. In fact, both Kasavubu and Ileo have moved so slowly that American Embassy officials de- scribe their pace as snail-like, and report that Kasavubu "acts more like a vegetable every day." On 14 September, Colonel Mobutu, newly appointed army commander in chief, announced that the army was taking charge and would enforce a truce until 31 December, thus enabling the cratic Union (URD)--have pre- sented a united civilian front against the recurring threat of a new dictatorship by Vene- zuela's traditionally political armed forces. Little unity has been pos- sible, however, either within or among the parties on the Cuban issue. Betancourt has indicated that he does not want the resignation of the pro- Cuban Arcaya,who is prominent in the URD, to be the cause for breaking the coalition. Betan- court believes that many URD members are disillusioned with their party and could eventu- ally be convinced to leave it. THE CONGO rival political factions to reach an agreement. During the interim a "collect" of Congolese students and technicians would run the Congo in cooperation with the UN. He proposed to stop the Congo's drift toward Communism by closing the Soviet and Czech embassies and consu- lates, placing military guards around the premises, and forcing the diplomats to leave within 48 hours. In the absence of disorders or strong reactions on the part of leading Congolese politicians, it appeared that the coup might be succeeding. However, by mid- morning of 15 September, forces loyal to Lumumba seemed to have regained the initiative. Lumum- ba's claim that Mobutu had been arrested was subsequently denied, however. The situation remains extremely fluid, with the sympa- thies of the bulk of the Congo- lese Army unclear. PART I nr TiviiIrnTArrr INTPRITTIr Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Page 5 of 10 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 --STeffig41__ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 Lumumba, after beating off Kasavubu's effort to dismiss him, called a rump session of the Na- tional Assembly whicl on 13 September votect him undefined "full powers," and backed his attacks on the UN's role in the Con- go. The premier ap- parently hopes to use this action-- challenged by the opposition on the grounds a quorum was lacking--to justify the establishment of a dictatorship. The premier's ability to retain power has made the UN task vastly more dif- ficult. Further trouble for Secretary General Hammarskjold has arisen from several Brazzaville dortk Ocwi CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CONGO REPUBLIC ANGOLA obito 15 SEPTEMBER 1900 0 MILES 200 31341 of the African states which sympathize with Lumumba's proclaimed ef- forts to preserve the unity of the Congo and to combat foreign --notably Belgian and French-- imperialism. Guinea, Ghana, Sudan, and the UAR have all threatened to withdraw troops from the UN Command and implied that they would be put at Lu- mumba's disposal. Within the last few days, however, as the UN relaxed its control of the Leopoldville radio station and airfields, Ghana and Sudan have adopted a more conciliatory pol- icy toward the secretary gen- eral. Nevertheless, Hammarskjold has been handicapped in his ef- forts in the Security Council to get backing for a tough pol- icy in the Congo by the waver- ing of Afro-Asian governments, SUDAN UGANDA Vo UAND MMM egt- ANG NYIKA qie 6pRga0a FEDERATION OF RHOD SIA AND NYASALAND whose fears have been exploited by the USSR. The council ses- sion on 12 September was ad- journed because all contemplated measures would have aided Lu- mumba, not Kasavubu; the ses- sion on 14 September was ad- journed when Tunisia proposed a good-offices commission to mediate between opposing Congo- lese factions--a step which would seem to accord equal rec- ognition to Kasavubu and Lu- mumba. For several days there has been a lessening of bloodshed in the Kasai area, although it is not clear whether this has resulted from the general cease- fire which the UN announced on 10 September had been ordered by the Congolese Army. This easing of the situation was prob- ably in part a result of the UN's prohibition against other PART I CRZ OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 6 of 10 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 air flights in the Congo. This restriction had grounded the ten Soviet IL-14s which had been used to transport some 200 Lu- mumba troops to the Kasai bat- tlefront. With the relaxation of the UN restrictions, Lumumba will probably give new attention to the Kasai secessionist prob- lem in an effort to clean up the area preparatory to an all- out Katanga campaign. Following the small-scale action at two points along the Katanga-Kivu frontier last week, the Katanga border remained quiet until 15 September, when reports reached Elisabethville that 300 Congolese troops loyal to Lumumba were attempting to invade Katanga from Kivu, At the same time, President Tshombes Katanga regime was confronted with an apparehtly.�serious up- rising by Baluba tribesmen at Manono. Tshombe welcomed Ileo's designation as premier and has sent two representatives to meet with Ileo's delegates in Brazzaville to discuss a fed- erated Congo. At the same time, Tshombe continues to make state- ments favoring complete inde- pendence for Katanga. This ap- parent4is largely a bargaining tactic, but also designed to appeal to local advocates of a separate Katanga. Communist-Bloc Moves The Communist bloc is be- coming more involved in the Congo situation. Khrushchev, in the strongest Soviet attack on Hammarskjold to date, charged on 13 September that the UN sec- retary general is "consciously working in the interests of the imperialists" in the Congo and that his actions "dovetail with the policies of the countries which have always espoused the positions of colonialism." Answering questions aboard the Baltika, the Soviet premier denounced Hammarskjold's insist- ence that all aid to the Congo Government be channeled through the UN as a further effort to uphold colonialist interests, and indicated that he may press the Congo issue at the forth- coming UN General Assembly meet- ing. In the fifth Soviet Govern- ment statement on the subject, issued on 9 September, the USSR accused Hammarskjold of failing to show the "minithum of impar- tiality" and of "openly working for the benefit of the colonial- ists, thereby compromising the UN." Moscow demanded that UN forces occupying Congolese air- fields and radio stations be dismissed, and called on the governments whose troops are in the Congo to carry out the "good, correct decisions" of the Se- curity Council, bypassing the UN Command if necessary. The USSR's reply on 10 Sep- tember to a note from Hammar- skjold regarding direct Soviet aid to the Congo indicated Mos- cow's intention to continue its unilateral support for Lumumba. The Soviet note stated that the Security Council resolutions "do not and cannot restrict" the right of the Congolese Gov- ernment to request and receive assistance directly from gov- ernments of other countries and asserted that Soviet aid in the form of civil aircraft and motor vehicles was "fully consistent" with these resolutions. Moscow expressed surprise that the sec- retary general was attempting to control the Congo's relations with other states, specifically the USSR. PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 7 of 10 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 "gripe Eetizg.T, CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 (b)(1) (b)(3) SITUATION IN LAOS The situation in Laos has taken a new and more critical turn with the repudiation of the Souvanna Phouma government by General Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum. Their self-styled "Revolu- tionary Committee" proclaimed over Radio Savannakhet on 10 September that it had temporar- ily set aside the Constitution, "ousted" the Souvanna govern- ment, and decreed martial law throughout Laos. All military commanders, civil servants, and people were requested to rec- ognize the authority of com- mittee Chairman Boun Oum and to disregard Vientiane's orders. Boun Oum is the 50-year- old hereditary ruler of south- ern Laos who renounced his claims in 1946 in favor of a unified Laos under the King of Luang Prabang. Described as an earthy, practical man of ac- tion, Boun Oum is believed to have chafed in recent years over the lack of scope offered for his energies by his sine- cure position as inspector gen- eral of the Kingdom. Boun Oum was an anti-Japanese resistance leader in World War II, and in 1954 he led commando troops against the invading Viet Minh. He was premier in 1949-50. He favors alignment with the West and the imposition of authori- tarian government. While in effect setting up a de facto government in Sa- vannakhet, Boun Oum and Phoumi apparently do not intend this to be a separatist regime, at least at this time. They have pledged support to King Savang and sent emissaries to Luang Prabang to explain their ac- tions to the monarch. The Savannakhet group claims the loyalty of all four military region commanders outside of Vientiane, as well as ten of the country's 12 provincial gov- erhors, but their sustained al- legiance and unity of purpose is open to question. The first military region commander, with headquarters in Luang Prabang, has reversed himself twice and now seems tentatively to be supporting the Souvanna govern- ment. The loyalty of lower echelon military units is even more difficult to assess. Boun Oum and Phoumi will require outside financial and logistic support if they are to carry out their plans. Thus far, Souvanna has reacted to the Boun Oum - Phoumi challenge with moderation, ap- parently still hoping for a compromise. He has declared a state of emergency throughout the country, but has not yet branded Phoumi and Boun Oum as PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Page 8 of 10 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Nor �LTRE MIIIMM111161111111110011111119 BURMA CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 S ptember 1960 CHINA ien Bien Phu Luang Prabang LAOS VIE �ANE AO CHINA OPT VI,ETNA SOUTH VIETNAM MALAYA GAPORS IN DON ES IA TH Al LAND Savannakhet NORTH VIETNAM Pakse CAMBODIA 15 SEPTEMBER 1960 STATUTE MILES GULF OF TONKIN Attopeu 200 31320 rebels. He has also canceled pending negotiations with the Pathet Lao insurgents on the ground that Phoumi's defection has dangerously weakened hiS bargaining position. The pre- mier has flown to Luang Prabang twice, but his failed to get , from the King any deftunciatiOn of the Savannakhet,revolution. He has also been unsuccessfUl In luring Phoumi Or BOun bum to Luang Prabang for fresh peace talks under the royal aegis. In a talk with Ambassador Brown on 13 September, the King said that Souvanna had "full powers" to deal with the revolt and that if he could not settle it, he should resign. The King added that he would then appoint a new premier, prob- ably Boun Oum. The King made it clear that he privately fa- vored the Phoumi group and hoped Souvanna would resign. Souvanna appeared close to do- ing so on 14 Septem- ber, but a Radio Vien- tiane broadcast of 15 September quoting the premier to the effect that the King had "given him a fresh vote of confi- dence" indicates he may try to hold on. The prospects for a compromise solu- tion in Laos appear (b)(3) to be diminishing. Captain Kong Le still, controls Vientiane, and he would probably reject any resolution of the crisis in favor of the Savanna- khett group. For their part, Phoumi and Boun Oum seem to be In no Mood for any kind of com- promise. They appear confi- dent that Souvanna will be forded to resign and seem pre- pared to undertake the reduc- tion Of the Vientiane garrison under song Le. PhouMi's re- ported announcement that he will "never" negotiate with Souvanna would appear to close the door to new peace talks. PART OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 9 of 10 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 SL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 The Pathet Lao insurgents are exploiting the division of Laos' non-Communist elements. They have increased military pressure in Sam Neua, Phong Saly, and Meng Khouang prov- inces in the north and Cham- passak Province in the south. In the propaganda realm, Phoumi's revolt has enabled the Pathet Lao movement to range itself on the side of legitimacy in the current crisis. The clandestine Pathet Lao radio has called on all Laotians to support the legal Souvanna government and the coup d'etat group of Kong Le in the strug- gle against the "traitorous and rebellious Phoumi clique." Hanoi and Peiping have not given events in Laos exceptional attention in their propaganda. North Vietnam has rebroadcast Pathet Lao statements attacking Phoumi and Boun Oum and voicing willingness to cooperate with Souvanna Phouma. Peiping has de- voted very little space to the subject, but on 14 September the Chinese Communist radio did ac- cuse Thailand of plotting to use SEATO as a cover to partition Laos. The paucity of independent commentary in the Communist cap- itals may be due to a desire to picture the matter as purely an internal Laotian affair and forestall accusations of Chinese or Vietnamese intervpntinn PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 10 of 10 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Noe CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM RY 15 September 1960 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS .ELECTIONS AT THE 15TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY A contest between the So- viet bloc and the West over the election of the president of the 15th UN General Assembly is in prospect when the assembly opens on 20 September. Late starter Thor Thors of Iceland has campaigned exten- sively, particularly among Latin American members, despite strong Western urging that he withdraw his candidacy in favor of Fred- erick Boland of Ireland--the West's early choice. Although Thors' chances of election are slim, he has succeeded in si- phoning off some support from Boland, who faces a strong op- ponent in Jiri Nosek of Czech- oslovakia. The Soviet bloc intensi- fied its drive for high elective UN offices two years ago with the announced intention Of get- ting a bloc delegate elected as president of this assembly. Nosek's early campaign, his personal popularity at the UN, and the fact that Eastern Europe has never held the presidency are strong points favoring his candidacy. High-ranking of of the UN secretariat, moreover, believe that granting a high elective UN office to the Soviet bloc is a "matter of equity." Prior to the Congo crisis, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold indicated his pref- erence for an Eastern European for the presidency, which, by common consent, goes to Europe this year. The generally capable Boland has gained a large personal fol- lowing in the relatively few years Ireland has been a member of the United Nations, and his country's formal neutrality may increase his potential appeal among Asian-African bloc mem- bers. As of 9 September, he had approximately 35 firm commit- ments of support--including two or three Arab states and eight Latin American--with 55 votes needed for election. The elections to fill two of the three vacant seats on the Security Council will prob- ably be more or less routine, with the UAR replacing Tunisia in the PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Page 1 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Noe -SEC-REL._ Nu, CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 Middle East seat and Portugal replacing Italy as Western Europe's representative. Ar- gentina's seat is being sought by both Cuba and Chile, Chile being the choice of the Latin American bloc. The Cuban candidacy, although unlikely to gain much support beyond the 12 CommuniSt votes, jeopardizes the "right" to two of the six elective seats on the council which Latin America has enjoyed since 1945. Lack of a single agreed Latin American candi- date probably will encourage others to seek the seat, par- ticularly Asian and African members, who believe their growing numbers are not ade- quately reflected in SeTilri+xy Council representation. F (b)(3) INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY CONFERENCE The fourth general confer- ence of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency, convening in Vienna on the same day the General Assembly opens in New York, will probably be marked by East-West conflicts on sev- eral important issues, includ- ing the perennial one of Chi- nese representation. The first problem confront- ing the 20 September - 7 Octo- ber meeting is the election of a conference president. The Bulgarian scientist Georgi Nadzhakov, is expected to be elected conference president and a Westerner as chairman of the Board of Governors. The Soviet Union will probably make a new attempt to gain consulta- tive status for the World Fed- eration of Trade Unions (WFTU). This effort to enhance the WFTU's prestige was sidetracked at last year's general confer- ence, but a number of pro-West- ern delegations seem cool to the American view that the is- sue should not be raised again. The bloc may find opportu- nities for obstructionism and propaganda on the nuclear weap- ons question in the issue of safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to military uses. A document concerning safeguards, which Moscow has stigmatized as a Western de- vice for preventing underde- veloped countries from gaining a nuclear capability of their own, has been provisionally approved by the Western-con- trolled Board of Governors. The 'United States,, pritain; and Canada will press for a procedural resolution which simply gives it conference ap- proval and returns it to the board for implementation. The West's problem will be to keep discussions limited to the document as a whole and to forestall any attempts by bloc or neutral delegates to debate its seiarterir (b)(3) PART II SIN5REZ, NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 IOW No, CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 SINO-SOVIET Neither Moscow nor Peiping has retreated from its basic positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute. At the North Vietnam- ese party congress that closed this week--the first important international Communist forum since the Bucharest conference in June--the Soviet and Chinese spokesmen each reiterated in strong terms some of his par- ty's central propositions in the long controversy. Li Fu-chun, the Chinese delegate, emphasized "revision- ism"--his country's description of Soviet policy--as the main danger to Communist unity. He warned against using the "fight against dogmatism"--dogmatism being one of the charges leveled at Peiping by Khrushchev--as a "pretext to depart from the fundamental theoretical stand on Marxism-Leninism." Li was the author of the emotional article in the mid-August Red Flag which attacked "modern revisionists," described the Chinese as "real Marxist-Len- inists," and warned that those attempting to isolate China would isolate themselves. Presidium member N. A. Mukhitdinov, the Soviet dele- gate, in one speech extolldd Khrushchev as a "great Lenin- ist" and insisted that his prop- ositions on the noninevitability of war are a continuation of Lenin's policy. In a later speech, he again struck hard at the Chinese. After denounc- ing Yugoslav revisionists, he said: No less harmful to the international Communist movement is the manifesta tion of dogmatism and sec- tarianism. Parading loud revolutionary phrases, hid- ing behind isolated proposi- RELATIONS tions in the works of the � founders of Marxism-Leninism, ...they try to sell their erroneous views as Marxist- Leninist truth and force them on others.... They at times oppose their narrow national interests to the international tasks of the world proletariat or even regard them as superior. Their sectarian activities in international organiza- tions harm the democratic forces of the world and the interests of the socialist camp. As Mukhitdinov implies, the Chinese have continued to press their opposition to Soviet poli- cies in international organiza- tions, despite the fact that such behavior was the immediate cause of the Soviet denuncia- tion of the Chinese party at Bucharest. There now is evi- dence that at the Third World Conference of Teachers, held in Conakry from 27 July to 1 Au- gust, there were the same direct clashes and sharp exchanges be- tween the Soviet and Chinese delegates that occurred at the WFTU meeting in Peiping in early June. The Russian delegate at Conakry, in a relatively moder- ate speech, criticized the West, including the United States, on the grounds that Western educa- tional systems were not as ad- vanced as the "socialist" one, but in general he stressed the need for peaceful coexistence and avoidance of war in the nu- clear age. The Chinese, in a completely political and very violent speech, attacked the United States 15 times by name and much oftener by inference. The Chinese delegate's speech, following the Russian's, was a direct challenge to the Soviet position. PART II -3EcRET, NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 A meeting of theoreticians from Communist parties of de- veloped as well at underdevel,- oped countries is reportedly set for Bucharest this month to discuss the "national libera- tion movement and the agrarian question." Such a forum will almost certainly consider the differences between the Soviet and Chinese views on the pace and forms of the revolution in underdeveloped countries. The Chinese apparently boycotted the last such meeting in Leipzig last fall. While party relations Con- tinue on the downgrade, govern- mental relations between Moscow and Peiping give a mixed impres- sion. The Soviet Union this year made a formal request that a,motion to seat Peiping in the United Nations be4ut on the agenda for the forthcoming Gen- eral Assembly, Both sides have also taken some steps to reduce public manifestations of the dispute. The eight-week blackout of Mos- cow home service commentary on Chinese affairs was lifted on 5 September with a story of progress in a Chinese steel plant. On 1 September two un- dated issues of Kitai,the Rus- sian=language edition of the Chinese pictorial biweekly, were put on sale in Moscow, follow- ing an apparent-suspension of the magazine in July. The Chi- nese, for their part, gave cov- erage to Sino-Soviet friendship meetings in commemoration of the victory over Japan, including a meeting held in Moscow on 2 September which the USSR did not report. On 2 September a 65-man Chinese song-and-dance ensemble left for the Soviet Union. (b)(1) :DevelopmentS,inEasternu Europe cOntinUeitoreflect;Ahe- Sino-SoviptdisputeTheAllba- nian_party,:changeswereappar- ently .the-resultotSovietpres- sure. -on Tirana toend:Ats: qbx1) e uivo at. Recent developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute have led Ambassador Thompson in Moscow and the US consul general at Hong Kong to conclude that while the Russians and Chinese may succeed in "plastering over the cracks" in their relation- ship, they will probably not succeed in actually resolving their differences. Thompson does not expect a complete break in relations--i.e., a break at all levels--but he does not exclude the possibility that the two parties will sever relations. PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 003185654 Page 4 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 mase -Th'reRat_ Noe CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 BERLIN SITUATION The East German Government on 8 September announced that all West German citizens must obtain special permits to enter East Berlin, thereby forcing them to meet the same require- ments to go to East Berlin as to East Germany. The move is a further step toward incor- porating the Soviet sector of the city into East Germany and gives the sector border the character of an East German frontier. By making an East German law directly appli- cable �to East Berlin, the East German regime not only by- passed the normal procedures under which East Berlin munic- ipal authorities have re-en acted any legislatitm applying to the Soviet sector of Berlin but it also,clearly Violated four-power agreements guarantee- ing freedom of moverbent within the city. On the same day, party boss Ulbricht revealed his plan for a phased disarmament of Germany in a memorandum to the United Nations. This plan is a rehash of previous proposals and contains provisions for signing a peace treaty with the "two German states," with- drawal of Western troops from West Berlin, and the transfor- mation of West Berlin into a demilitarized free city at the expiration of the first phase in 1961. Ulbricht warned that Khrushchev's pledge not to take unilateral steps to change the status quo in Berlin before making another attempt at nego- tiations does not mean that West Germans and West Berliners should be permitted to "aggra- vate the anomalous situation in West Berlin." He intimated that his government will con- tinue attempts to weaken West Berlin's ties with West Germany. The regime has sent a letter to Secretary General Hammarskjold requesting per- mission for East German repre- spntatives--presumably includ- ing Ulbricht as new head of state--to present their views on the German and Berlin ques- tions to the General Assembly. This request is obviously in- tended to bolster East German Claims to sovereignty and equality with West Germany-- Which, although not a UN member, maintains observers in New York, The East German statement of 13 September that the regime will refuse to recognize West German passports issued to West Berliners who intend to travel abroad--i.e., to bloc countries --is designed to emphasize the East German contention that West Berlin is not a part of West Germany but is a separate legal entity. In practice, the new regulation probably will cause few difficulties, since the East Germans are continuing--at least for the time being--to accept West Berlin identity documents issued by West Berlin author- ities in lieu of passports. The announcement states that these PART II 'SEeititgr, NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 --SteRET., Noe CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 identity cards will also be ac- cepted from West Berliners trav- eling between the city and West Germany. The announcement does not state whether West Berliners will be required to obtain East German permits to visit East Berlin, as they are required to do to visit East Germany; the regime's an- nouncement of 9 September impos- ing restrictions on West German travel to East Berlin expressly excepted West Berliners. It appears that for the time being there will be no attempt to force West Berliners to acknowl- edge East German "sovereignty" over East Berlin by accepting special documentation. Western Reaction West German and West Berlin officials view the East German harassment as the beginning of a new series of probing actions against West Berlin's ties with West Germany. Chancellor Ade- nauer on vacation in Italy--has sent word to his cabinet in Bonn to avoid "any rash moves" in dealing with the East German harassments and in effect to leave the initiative on counter- measures to the Western Allies. Adenauer sharply criticized Vice Chancellor Erhard's refer- ence on 11 September to West Berlin as "Federal Republic territory" and called on the cab- inet to advise West Berlin Mayor Brandt to stop making demands for Western retaliations, thereby implying that he is speaking for the Bonn government. With fur- ther East German actions expected, Adenauer stressed that counter- measures, including trade sanc- tions, must be used judiciously lest they lead to worse Communist measures, especially against West Berlin's large trade with Bonn. The Bonn government--through Vice Chancellor Erhard--has so far merely called on German busi- nessmen not to subject themselves to the new East German entry re- quirements and to avoid travel to East Germany as long as the restrictions continue. Bonn is still unwilling to suspend in- terzonal trade with East Ger- many. There are fears in Bonn and in industrial circles that East Germany might retaliate against an embargo of trade with East Ger- many by cutting off West Berlin's . supply lines to West Germany, over which more than one and a half billion dollars' worth of goods were brought to the city in 1959. These shipments dwarf West German exports to East Germany, which amounted to less than 2 percent of West Germany's total exports during the last three years, reaching a peak value in 1959 of $256,800,000.. American Ambassador Dowling in Bonn feels that the Western Allies should urge Bonn to cut interzonal trade, and fears that the'principal Allied 00913 WEST GERMAN TRADE (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS EXPORTS 1957 WITH WEST BERLIN WITH EAST GERMANY 1958 1959 15 SEPTEMBER 1960 (b)(3) �sreRET__ PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 003185654 Page 6 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Nur' CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 counteraction thus far taken-- the refusal of travel permits to selected categories of East Ger- mans--is not likely to have much effect on the Ulbricht regime. Allied officials have ex- pressed concern over Mayor Brandt's plans to go ahead with establishment of a 4,000-man auxiliary police force by in- itiating training of 115 members of the regular police force to act as instructors. Although the new force would be used primarily for static guard duties, it would be available to support the regular 13,500-man police force in time of crisis and civil disturbance. EAST GERMAN REFUGEE FLOW CONTINUES DESPITE CONTROL MEASURES The East German populace continues to "vote with its feet" against the Ulbricht re- gime. In the week ending 6 September, more than 3,000 ref- ugees escaped to West Berlin, despite a five-day near-blockade by East German authorities against travel to Berlin, long the principal escape hatch from East Germany. The total for the previous week had been more than 4,500. Monthly figures have risen steadily, both absolutely and In comparison with last year. Almost 21,500 refugees escaped to the West in August of this year, compared with only 13,610 in August 1959, according to the West German Ministry of Refu- gees. Of the 21,500, more than 18,000 fled to West Berlin. This exceeds the flow of 16,189 in May in the wake of the forced collectivization and is far above the 10,857 who fled to West Ber- lin following the uprising in June 1953. The total of flights to West Germany and West Berlin was almost identical with that of 21,595 in August 1958, when mass flights of intellectuals were at their height. During the first eight months of 1960 more than 126,500 persons applied for refu- gee status in West Germany and West Berlin, compared with ap- proximately 98,000 during the corresponding period in 1959. The escapees, niore thah half of whom belong to the labor force, include large numbers of farmers, technicians, and MKENDM' SJAN 12 JAN 19 JAN 26 JAN 2 MB 9 FEB 16 FEB 23 FEB 1 MAR 8 MAR 15 MAR 22 MAR 29 MAR 5 APR 12 APR 19 APR 26 APR 3 MAY 10 MAY 17 MAY 21 MAY 31 MAY 7 JUN 14 JUN 21 JUN 28 JUN 5 JUL 12 JUL 19 JUL 26 JUL 1 AUG 9 AUG 16 AUG 23 AUG 30 AUG 6 SEPT 00912 3A REFUGEES ESCAPING TO WEST BERLIN 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 1481,rm198.3 PART II -3TERET-__ NOTES AND COMMENTS Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Page 7 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Neal CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 NUMBER APPLYING FOR REFUGEE STATUS TO WEST GERMANY AND WEST BERLIN 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 100,000 200,000 300 000 350 000 FIGURES ON APPLICANTS WERE FIRST KEPT BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 1949 THE FIGURE FOR THE LAST FOUR MONTHS OF 1949 WAS 59,245 00912 3B 15 SEPTEMBER 1960 professional men, whose services are badly needed by the Ulbricht regime. Indications point to a total considerably in excess of last year's 144,000, despite in- tensified East German security precautions. Reflecting increased inter- national tension and unsettled conditions in East Germany, the number of persons returning from West to East Germany or drawn there by hope of better jobs has fallen this year in comparison with 1959. Refugees reaching West Berlin in July who had pre- viously resettled from West to East Germany told British author- ities in Berlin that there was a sharp drop in the number of individuals asking for admission this spring and that East German officials were being much more careful in their security proc- essing of such individuals. Whereas last year the East Germans frequently boasted of the high return flow, this year they have been reticent. Their claim that 26,000 persons asked for "asylum" during the first six months contrasts with the claimed figure of 62,000 for the whole of 1959. The East Germans are likely to continue their harassment of West Berlin, with the aim of reducing its importance as an escape route, and probably will also continue to enforce special controls to limit travel by East Germans to East Berlin. Secu- rity precautions on the East - West German frontier are already at a high point and are likely to be maintained at this level. The strict measures now in effect, however, may well cause many East Germans to try to es- cape at this time if possible, out of fear that all es- cape routes may soon be closed. POSSIBLE MISSILE RING AROUND BERLIN Berlin by early 1961 prob- ably will be ringed with sur- face-to-air missile (SAM) sites. The complex apparently will con- tain at least eight launch sites, each with local logistic support facilities, and may be connected to two central support facili- ties. The local support facili- ties are located about 25 miles from the center of the city and are 16 to 22 miles apart. German Army is under way at some ten locations around Berlin, one adjacent to a missile launch site under construction near Rauen, these ten include eight SAM launch and two central sup- ort facilities. PART II rcRE-T, NOTES AND COMMENTS Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Page 8 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 -44.0/ Nimir CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 surveying, possibly tor a SAM launch site, at another of the ten locations. Since all of these projects were reported under way during the summer of 1960, completion is possible during the first quarter of 1961. Hamburg WEST GERMANY,�./ � Confirmed surface-to-air missile site 0 Construction project - - Railroad Figures indicate project number MILES 15 SEPTEMBER 1960 31332 (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) All evidence indicates that the Glau and Jueterbog sites are (b)(1) manned by Soviet personnel. There are indications, however, that the East Germans themselves with eventually participate in SAM operations. These include participation of the East German Army in the construction of the SAM launch site at Rauen and in the survey for another possible launch site, the extension of contracts for work on these sites to civilian concerns by the East Possible Missile-Associated Construction Projects Wittenberge Si Elbe Gross Elehnitz� 287 110't Lehnin 0 808 Breech� (East 41rmar, I raining area)/ ( Pinnow GERMANY ef.�, o ster;eAl 106 cbtaloebourg 101 BERLIN � heerbog 0 102 ProetM Frankfurt lomessowilWari (b)(3) PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Page 9 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 SE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY summARy 15 September 1960 German Army, the reported es- tablishment at Pinnow--also near Berlin but outside the SAM com- plex--of an East German anti- aircraft artillery unit possibly equipped with missiles, and re- ports of possible SAM training of East German Army personnel. MOSCOW-TO-HELSINKI COMMUNICATIONS CABLE A high-capacity, under- ground hardened coaxial cable is being installed between Fin- land and the USSR. When com- pleted; the cable will extend from Moscow via Leningrad and intermediate points in Finland to Helsinki and will provide a circuit capacity double that needed for envisioned civil re- Coaxial Cable Lines in the USSR and Finland �1960 Fsr ARK ) EAST -� GERMANY RERLIN AUSTRIA "51 FINLAND Vaasa Tam here I4meeniinn _ oc,p. Turkul� '400" ....... POLAND WARGA9 ......... (**** Brest lyvaskyla Lahti *Pee !Ott7rt>'- zZybor Lorre 7�I/Ko N / koo r Nenningrad � � Novgorod_ Relogoye in operation under construction planned *Minsk Rom ** ..... ahmir Brmsk Gomel Kiev 15 SEPTEMBER 1960 sTanITEWLEs quirementS. The installation of the cable may lead to closer political, economic, and cul- tural cooperation between the two countries. (b)(3) (b)(1) Finland has a radar net- work of rather low technical level which could, however, augment the Soviet air-defense system. According to the Finnish-Soviet mutual assistance pact concluded in 1947, Finland might be obliged to pass such data to the So- viet Union in the event Moscow consider- ed itself threatened with an attack via Finland. Three years ago the Russians made the first proposal for an underground cable to connect Leningrad and Helsinki, and final agreement was reached in early 1960. Com- pletion of the line is scheduled for 1962, with both countries financing their own portion of the work and providing their own equipment. Finland has placed orders with Western firms for (b)(3) coaxial cable and carrier equipment which reportedly will be used on their portion of the circuit. Finland already has two four-tube coaxial cables on separate routes from Helsinki to Kouvala. Beginning in Sep- tember 1960, one cable with a (b)(1) PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 10 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 -ewe' Nwe 5.6E614F.,.L CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 (b)(1 capacity of 1,920 telephone channels will be extended to Vyborg in the USSR. The Finnish section will probably be laid in a manner similar to the recently complet- ed cable out of Moscow to Kiev and the extension under con- struction from Moscow to Vyborg. This type of cable, laid under- ground about 100 feet from the edge of the highway, has unique, underground repeater stations approximately four miles apart. This mode of underground con- struction, also employed in the US and elsewhere, is more costly than wire and overhead cable lines or high-capacity microwave radio relay lines, but offers greater protection against natural and man-made damage, including bomb blast. The stated reason for the new coaxial cable to Helsinki is to increase telephone service between the USSR and Finland. However, there are no known plans for increases in either telephone or television services which would require such a large number of channels. Present plans call for only 960 channels to be used for civil require- ments; this would leave a sur- plus of 960 channels which could be used for military pur- poses, including the trans- mittal of air-defense data (b)3) ALBANIAN PARTY SHUFFLE, SETS STAGE FOR GREATER SUPPORT OF MOSCOW The ouster of a leading Albanian Communist ideologist-- announced on 9 September--and the elevation to the party sec- retariat of an agitprop special- ist suggest that the regime is preparing to revamp its equivo- cal propaganda line on the basic issues in the Sino-Soviet con- troversy. Politburo member and party secretary Liri Belishova, the fifth-ranking party leader, was removed from her party posi- tions by a central committee plenum for committing "grave errors in the party line." A report on her activities was made by the politburo and delivered htftkic.T, PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Page 11 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 4100' Nimor CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SIMMARy 15 September 1960 to the central committee by politburo member Rita Marko, who returned a few months ago from extensive training in the USSR, and probably represented the Soviet interest in the af- fair. The central committee also ousted from party membership the head of the Central Audit- ing Commission for "activities hostile to the party." No elu- cidation on the charges was made in the central committee's communiqu�nor has there been any further comment by the regime. Long-standing Albanian preference for the Chinese Communist position on certain issues in the Sino-Soviet dis- pute was evident at the Rumanian party congress in June. Party boss Enver Hoxha was the only East European party leader who did not attend, and the chief Albanian delegate, politburo member Hysni Kapo, was the only East European who failed spe- cifically to endorse Khrushchev's speech and the only one who favored the Chinese position on war and the nature of the im- perialist threat. �The Alba- nian central committee later endorsed Kapo'S statements in a plenary 13 July. session on Albanian propaganda, pre- sumably in the face of Soviet pressure, has subsequently made limited adjustments, subscribed in general terms to "peaceful coexistence," and acknowledged the "leading role of the USSR," but it has not followed the other East European satellites in criticizing "dogmatism." While Belishova was one of three important regime of- ficials to visit China this summer and has in the past made statements favorable to PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 12 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 � e CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 the Chinese, it is unlikely that she alone was responsible for the Albanian positions. It is true that her main responsibility was for ideology, but all the leaders at one time or another have been committed to a hard- line, Chinese type of outlook. Use of her as a scapegoat for what is presumably a " collective error" suggests that the regime le ders are preparing to revamp the agitprop apparatus and to move into closer conformity with Moscow's line. Ramiz Alija, 34-year-old politburo candidate member and propaganda specialist who is considered to be pro-Soviet, was elected by the plenum to the party secretariat, ap- parently replacing Belisho- va. NORTH VIETNAM HOLDS Two themes dominated the sessions of North Vietnam's third party congress, which met in H noi from 5 to 10 Septem- ber: how best to modernize and industrialize the country in accordance with Communist prin- ciples and how to reunify Viet- nam. H noi plans to solve the latter problem by forming a coalition government with a "democratic" southern regime once President Diem has been overthrown. Prior to this congress, the Lao Dong party had never issued a list of its central committee members, although 31 individuals had been identified as members. Eleven of these also sat on the politburo and The continued espousal of pro-Chinese views despite Soviet imstructions to the contrary ,bstrS. probably given rise to faction- alism among the party leaders, and the Belishova ouster may be the first indication ; that the position of other top(.: leaders Will be challenged in coming months. Whilea purge of Hoxha, who has led the Party since 1943, is not likely, he will probably be under pressure to "clean up" his party prior to the scheduled fourthparty congress in November. The removal of Belishova will assist other East European party leaders in keeping dogmatic elements repressed in their own parties. These elements, now in the background, could weaken satel- lite support for Moscow at some fUture time. (b)(3) THIRD PARTY CONGRESS six on the secretariat. The congress elected 43 persons to the central committee plus 28 alternates, but all members of the previous central committee and politburo retained their positions, including Minister of National Defense Vo Nguyen Giap, who has been out of the public view much of the last six months. Two alternates, the minister of public security and the army chief of staff, were added to the 11-man polit- buro. Changes were also made in the party secretariat and the order of precedence with the politburo, Party .Chairman Ho Chi Minh relinquished his con- current post of secretary PART II REZ NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 13 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 general; the position was re- titled "first secretary" and conferred on Le Duan, who until 1957 was responsible for direct- ing subversion in South Vietnam and thus was out of the lime- light. Two of the new individ- uals named to the party secre- tariat served with Le Duan in South Vietnam: Pham Hung, who in July was given over-all con- trol of the government's agri- cultural programs, and Le Duc Tho, who now may be in charge of party organization. They are the only two to be elevated in the politburo order of prece- dence. Thus, a "southern clique" may exist within the Lao Dopg party, which has been increas- ing its power since early 1958. The power held by this clique may do much to explain Hanoi's "activist" policy toward South Vietnam--a policy which excludes overt invasion of the south but implies that almost every other tactic to achieve reunification is legitimate. Duan, apparently second in power to Ho, noted that "the balance of forces, .is gradually changing in favor of a revolution" in South Vietnam. Hanoi has dropped its customary formulation that "reunification will be a long, arduous, and complicated task" and now states that the "immediate task" is to overthrow Diem and for a "democratic coa- lition government" with. Which the north can do business: Hanoi's Five-Year Plan for 1961-65 as outlined by Le Duan indicates that Hanoi will hence- forth pursue a long-range eco- nomic program of industrial- ization, with emphasis on the development of heavy industry. This formulation is more in line with normal Communist practice than was Hanoi's past practice of emphasizing agriculture. However, the economic realities of North Vietnam's limited in- dustrial base, the serious shortage of technical and mana- gerial skills, and the basic importance of agriculture in the economy will keep, the regime from moving rapidly toward its goal of industrialization. No specific plan targets for individual commodities have been released, but the scope of the regime's ambitions is indi- cated by the general goal of in- creasing the value of industrial production by 20 percent a year and that of agricultural pro- duction by 10 percent a year during the plan. PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 14 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 Another subject with which the congress dealt at length was the "peasant problem"--a euphemism for continued peasant opposition to cooperativization. The party has committed itself to the "basic completion"--i.e., 75 percent--of agricultural co- operativization by the end of the year. At a rural cadres conference held earlier this summer it was noted that the program was lagging behind, with only 55 percent of peasant households in cooperatives, just 10 percent more thaft at the end of 1959. Cooperativization remains the most explosive issue facing the regime. Concerted opposi- tion of a stubborn peasantry forced the regime to back down on socialization in 1956 when the "correction of errors" pro- gram was instituted, and earlier this year the original Three- Year Plan (1958-60) goal of 100 percent of peasant house- holds in cooperatives was re- vised downward to 75 percent in the face of peasant opposition. The new party statutes approved by the congress incor- porate more stringent qualifi- cations for party membership. Hanoi conducted its first major party membership campaign since the 1954 cease-fire early this year when it increased the mem- bership 25 percent, bringing the total to 500,000. In reviewing the qualifications of its 100,000 new members, the party now may feel that not enough care was taken in their selection, and, by strengthening the qualifi- cations for membership, it may hope to avoid similar laxity in the future. (b)(3) GUINEA STRENGTHENS BLOC TIES Guinea's economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc have been strengthened further as a re- sult of President Sekou Tourd's current visit to several bloc countries. In addition, Tout* who claims to follow a policy of "positive neutrality," ap- pears to have moved toward clos- er propaganda and ideological alignment with the Communist world. In Moscow, his first for- mal stop on a three-week trip which also included state visits to Ulan Bator, Peiping, and Hanoi, Tourd secured a Soviet commitment to participate in Guinea's proposed Konkourd hydro- electric project. As developed by French planners before Guinea became independent in 1958, this scheme envisaged the con- struction on the Konkour4 River of a dam and power plant capable of furnishing up to 3.2 billion kilowatt-hours of cheap elec- tricity a year. The energy would be used primarily to establish an alu- minum 'industry based on Guinea's large bauxite deposits, some of which are already being exploited by private Western interests. The project, for which the Toure regime has been actively solicit- ing foreign support since last spring, has highest priority in the Three-Year Plan for economic development launched by Guinea in July. Although the joint Soviet- Guinean communiqu�f 8 Septem- ber did not announce the extent of the Soviet commitment to "the planned complex of projects on the Konkoure River," Moscow PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Page 15 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SVMMARY 15 September 1960 presumably is prepared to make additional long-term credits available to Conakry. The USSRb, present economic aid program in Guinea is covered by a $35,000,- 000 credit extended in August 1959. For his part, Tour d abetted Soviet policy objectives by com- mitting himself to a personal appearance at the forthcoming UN General Assembly session, as well as by formally endorsing the Soviet propaganda line on the nonpolitical character of the USSR's African activities and on the cause--"imperialist aggression"--of the Congo crisis. Moreover, the Soviet press (voted the Guinean leader as having acknowledged in a Kremlin speech that "progress" made by the bloc was "decisive in the liberation of African peoples"--a point Moscow has been attempting to make in its propaganda to under- developed countries. Tour d also reportedly called on newly independent African countries to carry on "class warfare," a concept which Tour, while Marxist-trained, has here- tofore maintained was not appli- cableto Africa in its present stage of development. During a brief stop at Budapest airport en route to MO$CQW, Tour d stated that GUinean-Hungarian relatiam-- which have not yet been estab- lished on a formal basis--rested on an "affinity of political orientation." In Peiping the Chinese marked the visit of Tour--the first head of an African state to come to Communist China--by announcing an agreement provid- ing for the extension to Guinea over the next three years of a $25,000,000 interest,-free cred- it. This first large-scale economic aid arrangement to be concluded by the Chinese with any country in Black Africa points up the importance Peiping attaches to its intense competi- tion with Taipei for recognition in that area. Presumably the agreement will bring in addi- tional Chinese personnel to join the approximately 60 "agricul- turalists" who have been working on rice cultivation projects in Guinea since last spring. In addition, a friendship treaty was signed. Tour's trip has also pro- duced new five-year trade pacts with both the USSR and Communist China. The agreement with Pei- ping--Guinea's first with that regime--calls for an annual ex- change of almost $10,000,000 worth of goods, a level which, if reached, would boost Guinea's presently negligible trade with the Chinese to perhaps 10 per- cent of its total annual foreign trade. In any event, the new trade pacts are likely to accel- erate the diversion from the West to the bloc of the bulk of Guinea's foreign trade. Based largely on barter arrangements, thig new pattern of trade is resulting in the mortgaging to bloc countries of future as well as current Guinean exports. (b)(3) USSR ANDO /RAN MAKING NEW EPPORT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS 8oth the USSR and Iran re making new moves to relieve the long-standing tension in their relations. Soviet Ambassador Pegov returned to his post in Tehran on 14 September after a "diplomatic" absence of about nine months. His return there last September, after a similar extended absence, coincided with PART II -SEeiREE,_ NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 16 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 RET �41.0 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 Soviet efforts to induce the Shah, who had offered to ex- clude foreign missile bases from Iranian soil, to expand his proposed guarantee to ex- clude foreign military bases of all types. Despite many sub- sequent diplomatic exchanges involving leading figures on both sides, the Shah continued to resist the Soviet demands. The USSR has also modi- fied its propaganda line on Iran, as it did during the brief thaw in Soviet-Iranian relations in September 1959. Although the "National Voice of Iran"--a clandestine station in the' So- viet Caucasus--and the Tudeh (Communist) party broadcasts from East Berlin continue to criticize the Shah and Iran's policies, Radio Moscow on 31 August halted its attacks on the Iranian ruler and began to blame ousted Prime Minister Eqbal-- the Shah's scapegoat for the election fiasco--for all dif- ferences with Iran. Soviet leaders, who have alternated pressure moves with blandishments in the hope of undercutting Iran's close po- litical cooperation and military defense ties with Western powers, probably have been encouraged by developments in Tehran. The Shah noted at his 27 August press conference--in which he precipitated the resignation of the stanchly anti-Communist Eqbal as prime minister by criticizing the conduct of the elections-- that Iran was ready to have friendly relations with the USSR and would give serious con- sideration to Soviet aid offers. Although the Iranian ruler has in the past made similar , statements for the record, the quick endorsement by most Tehran newspapers may have been viewed in Moscow as a sign that the Shah--who is gravely concerned over the future of Iran and his regime--is again ready to try to better relations. The new prime minister, Sharif Emami, told Ambassador Wailes on 4 September that.the immediate task of his govern- ment in the foreign policy field is to improve relations with Moscow, but he asserted that this would not be done at the expense of Iran's ties with the West. As a step in this direction, Tehran on 4 September ceased its counterpropaganda aimed at blunting the Communist bloc's radio attacks on the Shah and Iran's foreian and domestic policies. INDONESIA The confrontation of Pres- ident Sukarno and the Indonesi- an Army over the Communist is- sue appears to have been once more postponed by President Su- karno's ban, issued on 13 Sep- tember, on the activities of all political parties. He will decide before 30 November which parties may function legally thereafter. The ban reportedly was drafted by the army at Sukarno's request and serves as a compro- mise solution to the problem PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 17 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 posed by the army last month in proscribing Communist activity in three military commands. The army's move was a direct chal- lenge to Sukarno, who has per- sistently conciliated the Com- munists and who, on 17 August, had dissolved the anti-Communist Masjumi and Socialist parties. The ban frees Sukarno from the necessity of choosing between the army and the Communists and obviates an army decision on whether to oppose Sukarno fur,. therbyextending its anti-Commu- nist ban to other areas. The army, however, continues to be concerned over President Su- karno's insistence on forging a united political effort in In- donesia with considerable reli- ance on the Communists. Sukarno's ban will permit him to proceed more easily with his Na- tional Front,a mass organization in which he expects all parties and groups to cooperate. He in- stalled the 63-member central board of the National Front on 8 Sep- tember; at least 18 of its members are susceptible to Communist di- rection. Should the front become a viable organization, it could be a considerable asset to the Communists by providing them a protected government organization within which to work. Colonel Basuki, a high-rank- ing officer in the office adminis- tering Indonesia's martial law, says that among the army's diffi- culties with Sukarno are the lat- ter's closest advisers. These in- clude Ruslan Abdulgani who, as vice chairman of the Supreme Ad- visory Council, is very close to the President, is antiarmy, and tries to manipulate government activities and issues so that they are detrimental to army interests. The so-called palace clique con- sists mostly of leftists�andarmy efforts to breakup this group have been unsuccessful. SOUTH KOREAN CABINET South Korean Prime Minister Chang Myon and his opponents, the majority Democratic party, agreed on 12 September to a compromise cabinet designed to give Chang a working majority in the Na- tional Assembly. The party has over two thirds of the 233 seats in the powerful House of Repre- sentatives, but these are about evenly divided between support- ers and opponents of the prime minister. Although the new cab- inet appears to strengthen Chang's position for the time being by drawing his opponents into shar- RESHUFFLE (b)(1) (b)(3) ing responsibility for government policy, the terms of the compro- mise will make it easy for the anti-Chang factionists to func- tion as a de facto opposition bloc in future tests of strength. The balance of power be- tween the Democratic factions has rested with about 40 inde- pendent and minor party legisla- tors. On 7 September four of Chang's ministers submitted their resignations to open the way for the formation of a cabi- net based on broader party PART II -srefigx, vnmPQ avn nnimumvmc Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Page 18 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 ET Nor CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 representation. After consider- able negotiation, the anti-Chang faction agreed to enter the cab- inet. The new cabinet is made up of seven Chang supporters, four adherents of and one defector from the opposition faction, and two independents. The Com- munications Ministry post, as- signed to the anti-Chang faction, has not yet been filled. The four opposition faction ministers named are Defense Minister Kwon Chong-ton, Reconstruction Min- ister Kim U-pyong, Transportation Minister Pak Hae-chong, and Health and Social Affairs Minis- ter Na Yong-kyun. At least three of these men are believed to oppose an open party split, and three of them reportedly had been selected for possible cabinet positions under Chang's CONGO REPERCUSSIONS ON THE The new Belgian coalition cabinet, recently announced by Premier Eyskens in response to public criticism of the govern- ment's Congo policy, contains no new influential figures, and may not last through the winter. No major changes in defense and foreign policies are likely; Eyskens' austerity economic program, however, involves de- fense cuts ranging between 7 and 13 percent. Three newly appointed ministers--two Social Christians and one Liberal--are to sit as a kind of supercabinet with the premier, Foreign Minister Wigny, and possibly Defense Minister Gilson to handle major policy questions--primarily Eyskens' proposed new program of social progress through "economic ex- pansion based on financial fe- formi.t9 opponent for the premiership, Kim To-yun. None of the four is among the top ten of the oppa- sition faction. The opposition faction ex- acted--as the price of its partic- ipation in the cabinet--Chang's recognition of it as an independ- ent "negotiating group" in the legislature with the right to re- call its men from the cabinet at any time. However, while the an- ti-Chang faction retains a strong bargaining position, it is likely to be restrained at least for the time being by current public op- position to a party split, by its lack of a working majority in the legislature, and, most important- ly, by the likelihood that a no- confidence vote would lead to dissolution of the lower house and new elections. (b)(3) BELGIAN DOMESTIC SCENE The austerity program is basically aimed at offsetting economic losses as a result of the Congo situation. The Congo was estimated last spring to contribute about 6 percent of Belgium's gross national prod- uct of $9.5 billion. The new program calls for a reduction of all current expenditures in the 1961 extraordinary budg- et and for $120,000,000 in new taxes. Cuts amounting to $200,000,000 are to be made in national defense, education, and social benefits such as unemployment and sickness in- surance and pensions. Defense cuts, variously reported as ranging from $30,- 000,000 to $50,000,000--or 7 to 13 percent of the proposed defense budget for 1961--would be made by cutting out some 25,000 military and civilian PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS ?age 19 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Ataire *or CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 positions in the armed forces and by economies in maintaining Belgian troops in West Germany. The defense minister insists, however, that Belgium will carry out contracts for building F-104G fighter planes, provided the United States contributes finan- cial support. The American Em- bassy in Brussels foresees a continuation of the drift away from active participation in NATO. Eyskens' program may en- counter a stormy reception when presented to Parliament on 27 September. Business interests are opposed to tax increases, while the Socialists and Catholic labor groups are hostile to measures to reduce social bene- fits. The government will also be hard put to convince public opinion that it intends to give a "new look" to its African policy, in view of the appoint- ment of Count d'Aspremont Lynden as minister of African affairs. His choice is attributed to pressure from the King, and his public association recently with Katanga Province as chief of the Belgian technical mission there may make it difficult for Belgium to improve its position with the independent African states. (b)(3) EL SALVADOR'S GOVERNMENT SHAKEN The moderately progressive regime of Salvadoran President Lemus has been seriously shaken by persistent attacks from left- ist student and labor elements, many of whom are pro-Communist and pro-Castro. The small and densely populated country is particularly vulnerable to left- ist agitation because of the unusually wide economic gap between the peasants and the few wealthy landowning families After a student and labor demonstration on 2 September in which one youth was killed and many people were seriously injured' as a result of police action, Lemus on 5 September decreed a 30-day state of siege-- El Salvador's first since 1952. The President, himself a mili- tary man, took this action under pressure from officers of the armed forces BY LEFTIST ATTACKS (b)(1) The state of siege, al- though removing the immediate threat to the administration from the military, did not halt leftists from exploiting the strong public indignation over the security police's indis- criminate use of force in the 2 September disorders. New dis- orders were averted when bus- iness and community leaders, including the the archbishop of San Salvador, held separate conciliatory meetings with student leaders and the Presi- dent immediately prior to the leftist demonstration of 9 September, which then was carried out peacefully. Communists and pro-Castro elements, however, will' probably be quick to en- courage new demonstrations as opportunity offers in an attempt (b)(1) to undermine the government. PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Page 20 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 %obi CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 The US Embassy has ex- pressed the belief that most responsible leaders recognize the necessity to support the President through the current crisis. Nevertheless, the gen- eral popularity Lemus enjoyed at the time of his election in 1956 has been on the decline for almost a year, and the Pres- ident's increasingly aloof manner has even alienated many of his working associates. His hesitance in taking resolute action to curb Communist and pro- Castro subversive activity has prompted many moderate and con- servative elements to look to his immediate predecessor, ex- President Oserie, for more ef- fective leadership. Oserio probably would be reluctant to promote a coup against Lemus, but his less scrupulous follow- ers might seek to use future leftist disorders as an excuge to seize ower themselves. PART II -L-eREAL NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 21 of 21 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Nome CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 PART- III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS Peiping's claim to China's ,UNAseat'is()expedted to� be 'IAA off once more through the pro- cedural device of the annual moratorium at this year's UN General Assembly, which opens on 20 September. The newly sov- ereign African states, although assocating Taipei with "colo- nial powers," may support it if admitted to the UN before the expected moratorium vote. The prospect of maintaining this device beyond 1961, how- ever, is increasingly uncertain. Moratorium The General As- sembly at each of its past nine sessions has voted a moratorium on consideration of the Chinese representation question. This pro- cedural device for de- laying a decision re- quires only a simple majority of votes. Any vote on substance, such as an ouster of Taipei or admittance of Peiping, requires a two-thirds majori- ty to pass; neither government seems to have sufficient support at this time, For the first five years, Nationalist China commanded a majority of over two thirds in favor of the moratorium. How- ever, since the admission of 22 new members, mostly from Asia and Africa, it has mus- tered only a simple majority. This fact has encouraged the nations which advocate Peiping's admission to insist on substan- tive discussion of the Chinese representation question. For the first time since 1956, India decided against in- troducing an agenda /ten calling for substantive consideration of the issue. New Delhi's bor- der troubles with Peipipg are � probably the reason for this de- cision. However, on 30 August the Indian deputy foreign min- ister publicly reaffirmed his government's conviction that CommUnist China must be admitted to the UN. The USSR early this month requested inscription of the item. 15th_General Assembly Of the 82 members of the UN, 31 recognize Peiping--most MORATORIUM ON CHINESE UN REPRESENTATION VOTES OF UN MEMBERS FOR VOTES NOT TOTAL AGAINST ABSTENTIONS RECORDED MEMBERSHIP 1951 37 11 4 8 60 1952 42 7 11 - - 60 1953 44 10 2 4 60 1954 43 11 6 - - 60 1955 42 12 6 60 1956 47 24 8 79 1957 48 27 6 82 1958 44 28 9 81 1959 44 29 9 82 00912 2 15 SEPTEMBER 1960 recently Guinea and Cuba. Forty- three recognize Taipei, and five acknowledge neither gov- ernment; the remaining three UN members are Nationalist Chi- na and the two constituent re- publics of the USSR which have UN membership. Partly as a result of good- will missions to Africa, includ- ing private trade missions and technical training offers, Na- tionalist China has picked u15 considerable support from newly independent African nations. The Nationalists have estab- lished diplomatic relations this year with Cameroun, Togo, and the Malagasy Republic and are negotiating with nine other (b)(3) PART III ThTeR. PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 6 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 September 1960 Recognition of China by UN Members and new African states not yet members CANADA UNITED STATES ATLANTIC /Intended recognition announced Af MEXICO 2 September 1960 cusa Dom REn stief.�1.90. PACIFIC OCEAN Li Recognizes Communist China I I Recognizes Nationalist China Recognizes neither 15 SEPTEMBER 1960 I I 31340 ECLIADOR,,, _1 BRAZIL PERU L-� AsoLiv_!.4,1� CHILE; 'URUGUAY / /ARGENTINA ICELAND IRELAND siiertAnt NORWAY, aro P.TR 0E4 FRANCE', PORT4 ErA. GREECE D0 Dccc ALGERIA LIBYA SAUDI ARABIA ,RAN t) A INDIA 0�PON) REhiEL,c 1 .,Jurcorip so-4141.k. KALAPAMV meruruc CHINA INDIAN OCEAN JAPAN untim PNIEJPPINES MALAYA , - -046*-664MA. , AUSTRALIA PACIFIC OCEAN NEW ZEALAND (b)(3) former French territories--Mali, Congo, Dahomey, Chad, Niger, Up- per Volta, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and the Central African Repub- lic. These nations will prob- ably support Taipei if they are admitted to the UN before the vote on the moratorium. Havana's recognition of Peiping on 2 September marks the first definite break in western hemisphere support for Taipei. Cuba abstained last year and is expected to oppose the moratorium this year. There is a possibility that the Do- minican Republic will vote a- gainst the moratorium in reac- tion to the condemnation by the other American republics. Most other members of the Latin American bloc probably will continue to support Nationalist China. As in the past, National- ist China probably will have the support of the Western and Asian nations allied with the United States in defense treat- ies. Last year Taipei lost the support of Ethiopia, which ab- stained; this year it may lose that of Tunisia, which is re- portedly considering aligning itself with the other Afro- Asians on this issue. Nationalist China's chief UN delegate estimates that with- out the new members, this year's vote would be close to last year's, when 44 members sup- ported the moratorium, 29 voted against it, and 9 abstained. Peiping's Attitude The Chinese Communists do not expect to become a member of the UN this year. Their re- cent propaganda has ignored the subject, and the regime con- tinues to depict the UN as a "tool of American aggressive policy." PARTIII rtAMIWITVIM'el Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Page of Z 7 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 NINIO �L=LeRE.L CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY -.15 September 1960 Khrushchev's Appearance Khrushchev, scheduled to appear at the opening of this assembly along with satellite party chieftains, is expected to develop his theme of peace- full coexistence and thereby underscore Peiping's isolation within the bloc. At the same time, he will probably call for the immediate admission of Com- munist China to the UN. In this context his arguments will probably appeal to many UN members who, although ready to vote for the moratorium this year, have long held the be- lief that the obligations of UN membership offer a way of bringing Peiping under some form of international restraint. Such members as Japan are particularly desirous of ensur- ing that Communist China be a party to any big-power agree- ment on banning nuclear tests or on other forms of disarma- ment. They point out that since any such agreement will be accepted by the UN as a whole, Peiping as a member would automatically be bound by the terms of the treaty. Outlook The present Sino-Soviet controversy may enlist support for Peiping's entry from those UN members who are eager to see Peiping exposed to the rough- and-tumble of UN debates and voting line-ups. These members, which include Britain and Pak- istan, believe that possible differences between Communist China and the USSR could be ex- ploited to the fullest at the UN. The prospects for maintain- ing a favorable UN vote on the moratorium in future years are becoming increasingly uncertain There is some possibility that a shift in the voting balance might result not from a gradual erosion of Taipei's position but from a sudden "breakthrough." If it appeared that the vote would be close and that in any event Peiping's admission in the near future was inevitable, a bandwagon situation could de- velop which would result in a defeat of the moratorium; or Should Peiping demand admittance to the UN as its price for ad- hering to any disarmament or nuclear test ban agreement, Taipei's position might become even more precarious. It is likely'that a UN vote against the moratorium would be fol- lowed by a vote in ,favor of admitting Cotmunist china to the UN and giving it a perma- ment seat on the Security Coun� cil. (b)(1) '(p)(3) PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 6 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654 (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654