PROPOSED OUTLINE OF MAP LIBRARY DIVISION HISTORY

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03188558
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 137
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-00852
• Publication Date: June 24, 1970

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SU BJECT
A
2. When
to present the
I Historical Officer.
eats: ais
: eroposed
notary
24 Juan 1970
Inn of Map Library Division
her th OBGV. proposed outline for the
in Map Reference Services, 1945 to the
together with \and
IMO
and Staff views
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Mr. Moberg
- OD/CRS
WJMoberg :fjc
i.VALTEit J. MOBlinG
DD1 Historical officer
Chairman, DD1 Historical Board
SEAT
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70
NUMORAflW4
�T
1. The aubJect
Taank you.
Attachment: ais
: Outline of "Dove
lawmen
Et Map
Services, 1246 to the 1- r int" by
1
tline1 rcula review and
Oa V
WALTER J. MtBQ
DI Histories!. Officer
Chairman, EID1 Historical P.oerd
Distribution:
1 - Addressees
1 - Mr. Moberg
2 - OD/CRS
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
b)(3)
S7CRET
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CI ?fin MET
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Draft
Cartographic Support to Clandestine Qporations
1947 through 1970
A DDI Historical Monograph
OBGI CD/R
April 1971
CEPpl:T
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Contents
Page
I. Introduction . . . � 0 � OOOOOOOOOOO 1
II. Early OSS Experience with Cartographic
Field Support
A. The OSS Cartographic Organization
B. The Formation of Map Division Outposts
C. Cartographic Support at the Outposts .
III. Transition Period from OSS to CIA
� � �
� �
A. Relative Little Support Between 1945
and Early 1950's
B. Early Contacts and.Compartmentation
Problems
4
14.
14.
5
7
7
8
IV. Guatemala Operations, 1954 11
A
B. Headquarters Support
C. Assistance at the Task Force Field
Headquarters 12
D. Other Support Recommended 13
I 0 � S � 0 OOOOOOOOO 0
V. The Tibetan Operation
A. Background -
p.
1. The Tibetan Situation in 1959 � . . . .
2. The CIA Role
B. Training Support
1. Training TDY's
2. The Nature of the Training
C. Headquarters Support
1.
2.
3.
The 1:1,000,000 Map Series
The 1:r00 00 Map Series
OOO000 .0 0
11
11
14
4
15
16
16
17
19
19
20
21
F fl
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VI.
D.
Cuban
Feedback
Operations, 126071963
Page
21
23
A.
Support Through Geography Division
23
B.
Support to the Task Force Situation Room . .
24
C.
Other Support
25
1. The Electronic Facilities Atlas
25
2. The Grid Problem
26
VII.
Saigon Station Support
27
A:
Station Buildup 1964-1966
27
B.
The Station's Attempt to Produce
Its Own Maps
28
C.
Recognition of the Need for Cartographic
Support
29
D.
TDY's to Saigon in 1966 and 1967
32
1. Survey of Station's Requiremerts and
Interim Recommendations 32
n du
4-.0 Aothitico aild Negoiidons 35
3. Follow up Response at Headquarters � � � 37
I. A Second TDY 39
E. Map Specialist Position in Saigon, 1967-1970 4o
F. Personnel Reduction and the Declire of
the Program, 1970 . . . .
VIII. Conclusions
Appendixes
-A. List of Persons Interviewed
n. Source References
42
45
49
50
Figure 1. Tibetan
a.
Illustrations
18
Trainees at Colorado Base Site
Classroom Training Using Maps and
Models
18
b.
Field Training
(W(1 )
18
(10)(3)
Field Exercise
c.
18
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Attachments
1:1,000,000 Tibetan Map Series Sample. (Roman)
1:1,000,000 Tibetan Map Series Sample (Tibetan)
Final Report on Cartographic Support for the Saigon Station
South Vietnam - Provincial LAps, Septathber 1967
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I. Introduction
This monograph will attempt to describe the type of cartographic
support provided the Clandestine Services in their operations which
was different from support provided to other Agency components. It
will not attempt to explain every map produced in support of operations,
but through the selection of several key operations, it will trace the
development of this support.
Although it precedes the period covered by this monograph, the
early experiences in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during
World War II are mentioned to provide the background for a comparison
with later operational support. Compartmentation problems will be
discussed in the transition period between OSS and CIA, since this is
the period where they were the most serious. Support to the Guatemala
operations is described because it represents support in response to
a direct contact and support via a liaison-type unit. Support for
Tibetan operations, which began as training support, developed into
the first large scale operation involving use of all cartographic
assets.. Support to Cuba continued the close working relationships
that were developing between the DDP and DDI components, but didn't
involve Cartography as much as Tibet. Support to Saigon Station is
the last major activity discussed. Cartographic support to Saigon
1
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Station will be treated in its broad sense, i.e., support not only
served operations, but served the research, analysis, reporting, and
overt collection activities of the Agency.
Several programs that werq designed to provide long term
assistance in operational planning should be mentioned, but will
not be treated as a part of this monograph, because the cartographic
contributions were not unique to the Clandestine Services. Besides,
they have been adequately covered in Geography Division history.*
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
gere all supported
between 1957 and 1970. Nap contributions to these series varied
from the reproduction of existing maps to the compilation of
custom-made _naps for each topic. Maps in these series were very
similar, corering topics such as: climate, vegetation, physiographic
regions, transportation, airfields, population, ethnic groups,
telecommunications, administrative divisions, economic activity, or
any other subject peculiar to the particular region or country.
The support to operational planning through the production of
(W(1)
was considerable(pp)
See the monograph "Geographic Research in Support of Operational
Planning 1950 - 1970" by
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This support,
It will be
There
operations
involved
which has been similar to and closely associated with
(b)(1)
has had a long and fruitful history,O*3)
covered in
a separate Cartography Division monograph.*
have been many other instances of support to clandestine
and to operational related programs. Some of these have
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The difficulty that the author encountered in digging up
information on support to Clandestine Services points up one of the
problems inh !rent in maintaining closely-held, sensitive, covert
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
activities and yet requiring timely and professional support from
non-covert sJurces. Many of the records are lacking in information
and detail and had to be supplemented largely through personal
experience or through personal interviews. Where detail is adequate,
it is due to the author's participation in the support or the
excellent memories of other participants. Where detail seems inade-
quate, the available participants are few and the documentation is
sparse.
See "Cartographic Support
1953-1967" by
3
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
'
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ILLY SAA IV ....al 1,
II. Early OSS Experience with Cartographic Field Support
A. The OSS Cartograllhic Organization
The present Cartography Division had its early beginnings in
October of 1941 as one of three sections of the Geography Division,
-,
Research and Analysis Branchj,
Between October 1941 and January 1942
the Coordinator of Information (COI).
and his
staff were occupied with the organization of the Cartography Section. (b)(3)
Staffing, equipment, training, and the establishment of procedures
were necessary before the Section could begin to operate. Most of
the procedures developed in this period, with some refinements added
pdicll, formed the basic philosophy of the pzeseni, Division. i /
A review or the minutes of the Cartographic Section's meetings
would show a great deal of similarity in content to minutes from
meetings held thirty years later. /
B. The Formation of Man Division Outposts
In January 19113, the Geography Division was replaced by the
'Map Division with little
first field support
effect on the Cartography Section. The
of the Map Division was undertaken in the
summer of 1943 when
was assigned to New Delhi,
(b)(3)
and then to
Kandy,
under General Wedameyer.
Later in 1943, Captain
was assigned to Cairo and
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
was sent to establish a map outpost in Algiers. In early 1944,
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Map Division personnel began arriving in London where the major field.
activity was to be centered. By October 1944 the London outpost had
reached a strength of
The Map Division outposts were established to support military
and OSS field operations by supplying maps map information, and 17
constructing naps and models. Collecting foreign maps and map intell-
igence was also a part of this responsibility. The outposts varied
from one or two man operations, to large contingents, such as London.
Their work varied in scope, nature, and duration. Outposts existed
at one time or another, in North Africa at Algiers and Cairo; in
Europe at Bari, Caserta, Berne, London, Paris, Rome, and Weisbaden;
in Asia at Chungking, Kiun-mlng, New Delhi, and Kandy; and also one
at Honolulu. LI/
In the Map Information Section (MAPIS) of the Map Division, an
Outpost Desk was established to perform the following functions:
"(1) to maintain administrative and professional relationships
between the Map Division, Washingtoniand its several field operations
and outposts; and (2) to indoctrinate Map Division employees going
abroad in their duties and (3) to serve as a channel between the out-
post and the home office. S /
C. CartograT.hic Support at the Outposts
In theory, each outpost was a Map Division in microcoLm, using
methods identical to those in Washington. Some of the small outposts
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had to eollibine the variety of functions of the Map Division in
one individual. It was necessary that the outposts improvise and
make do with whatever equipment was available. They were trained
to perform all the skills, professional as well as sub-professional,
necessary to complete a map from beginning to end. The on-the-spot
cartographic support provided by the outpost officers was an early
example of how cartographers with professional geographic backgrounds
and cartographic skills could provide close support to operational
planning. The outpost officers worked closely with the operations
officers. For example, in Kandy,
assisted OSS detachments
in planning clandestine operations in Southeast Asia by locating
Lcld:beLs, debriefing local assets, and prz.?aring maps. Maps were also
constructed in the field to accompany re2orts which were produced as
part of the Map Division's reporting and analysis function. 6 /
6
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III. Transition Period from OSS to CIA
A. Relatively Little Supkort Between 1945 and Early 1950ts
After the end of World War II, OSS was abolished and demobil-
ization took place at a rapid rate. Many of the military personnel
returned to academic or to other peacetime pursuits. The carto-
graphy component and its related components remained in operation
under the Interim Research Intelligence Service (IRIS). The Depart-
ment of State offered another temporary home for the cartographers
and geographers, and they remained there until their transfer into
the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) and to the Central Intelligence
-t n
V
.... .
... ,
aduJ.J. pe.ciuu iiere were
five physical relocations. '7 /
Because a considerable core of OSS personnel remained with
the cartography unit through this unsettled transition period, a
fair amount of continuity was maintained. This was not necessarily
the case for other OSS components.
If it were not for the demand for maps especially in the Far
East, and_by, the predecessor to the National Intelligence Survey
(NIS), the Joint Army Navy Intelligence Survey (JANIS), very little
other intelligence work would have been done. Operations support
would also have been nonexistent if there had not been the early
personal contact between OSS operations officers and the cartographers.
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After the establishment of CIA in the fall of 1947 the cartography
unit found a permanent home and the opportunity to build a foundation
for a lasting intelligence mission. The late 19402s and early 1950's
were a period of NIS and other base map development. There were the
individual country maps which formed the base for building intelligence
themes for the NIS and for a11 other production components in the
Agency. The early 1950's marked the turning point from little to
considerable support to the early Clandestine Services.* E./
6,4E,N.A1s V102.)
Most of this early support took the form of )map reques4no different
crip,",-CIAJoYC
4aari:that provided all the operating offices of the Agency. Operational
support was given under extreme compartmentation restrictions.
B. Early C)ntacts and Compartmentation Problems
Many of the contacts with the ClandeStine Services in the early
1950's were in the form of requests for large scale map series on
operational target areas. In some cases support was needed to
reproduce map sheets or to print map sheets
Most of the
operational officers were unaware of the existence of a cartographic
unit and thought only in terms of using existing maps produced by
the Army Map Service or reproducing foreign map series found in the
Map Library.
of
When requests for maps to be specially prepared, such as a study
(b)(1)
for possible operational use, the request from 0/PC (b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
.kt At this time the Office of Special Operations (0/S0) and the
Office of Policy Coordination (0/PC).
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in June 1951 came through the Geography Division. 9 / All questions
pertaining to the request were channeled through Geography Division
personnel in order to restrict the contact with the requester. This
procedure was employed throughout the early years of contact and
probably developed for several reasons. The Clandestine Services
wanted to limit their contacts to 4s few people as possible, and the
geographers were usually contacted first where geographic studies
were involved that required supporting maps. The geographers levied
the requests for the supporting maps and often became the sole contact
with the requester.
This approach by the Clandestine Services developed an internal
compartmentation reaction in the Cartography Division. Individual
won--; limitcd
a few i;tixi,u6rupher6. Since many of tne
requests involved support by the Geography Division, cartographic
research and compilation of data was done by the geographers and
only the construction of the maps was left for the Cartography Division.
This, in effect, cut out any contribution by the compilation units.
As a result, Cartography Division construction personnel became the
sole contact with the operations officers. Areas were closed off and
individuals isolated while working on the projects. Monthly report
reference to titles, nature of support, and requesting personnel
revealed little information.
Some of the early requests for geographic or cartographic support
were disguised by asking for support on several areas when only one was
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required. Occasionally, attempts were made to by-pass supervisors
to further limit the number of people involved.
Relaxation of compartmentabion was dealt a further setback
during the Senator McCarthy era when everyone was led to believe
that there were communists or fellow travelers throughout the
Federal government. It was even more difficult to develop a
close support relationship under conditions of mutual distrust.
A few partial breakthroughs occurred, but it wasn't until the
late 1950's that the full assets of the Division were used to
support clandestine operations.
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IV. Guatemala Operation b 1954
A. Background
In early 1954, due to the rapidly developing communist threat
in Guatemala, CIA became involved in the opposition to the communist-cis
backed regime of jacobo Arbenz Guzman. The opposition was led by
an army colonel, Carlos Castillo Armas; The planning and execution
of the operation took place in the first six months of 1954. In
June 1954 Arbenz was overthrown and replaced by a military junta
led by Armas.
B. Headquarters Sup2prt
The Foreign Intelligence Staff of DD U had a unit, established
in 1952, that was responsible for obtainiig operational support from
other Agency components. This unit, known as RQM/OIS for Requirements
and Operational Intelligence Support, provided the liaison function
between DDI components and the operationg Divisions. In early 1954( HAA401(-)
�-\,-,contact
walsamith
Chief of the Western Hemisphere (b)(3)
' Branch of the Geography
in search. of available map
Division, ORB,
coverage of Guatemala.
Map coverage
at that time was extremely
inadequate aS well as
_La/
inaccurate. One
of the most
useful small
scale
maps was the Esso road map. The approach taken by
of
(b)(3)
RQM/OIS was to request raw data and to divulge only the information
necessary to obtain the data. As a result, very little of the evaluating
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or analytical ability of the geographers was used. Because of the
inaccuracy of much of the data, this would have been an important
function. Much of the geographic and map support was handled in this.
manner. Fortunately, there was some direct contact between the
.11 I
chief operations, officer and the Cartography Division.
C. Assistance at the Task Force Field: Headquarters
In January of 1954
contacted the Cartography
Division in search of support for his Guatemala Task Force field head-
quarters located
had been involved in operations
(W(1)
in Korea during the Korean War where he had developed an appreciatiolom3)
of close cartographic and photo intelligence support. No
nap and grid prepared for his situation room at his Task Force
headquarters. _IL/ Arrangements were made for
Deputy Chief of the Development and Construction Branch to visit the
base and construct the map.
After
arrived at the base and was given a briefing
of the operation and the purpose of the map, he immediately realized
...that this would be a major undertaking. Because of the urgent need
for the map, he worked long hours and was able to condense a several
week job into one week. Using small scale source maps the map was
enlarged block by block and painted on. Homosote board and mounted
on the wall. The map contained all the basic features, with a terrain
shaded background and an arbitrary reporting grid. This grid was used
for recording data supplied by radio from teams in Guatemala. Field
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units were supplied wit' maps that contained a matching grid.
The map and its overlay data became the focal point for following
the progress of the entire Guatemala operation. .13/ After the
successful conclusion of the operation the map was dismantled and
used in a White House briefing given by CIA for President Eisenhower
and the National Security Council. Hi
D. Other Support Recommended
While was at the base he was approached by members
of the Task Force who were working with aerial photography and needed
assistance in its use. He suggested that they contact the photo
Intelligence Division for support. Subsequently, the photo interprp-hpinq
and geographers were able to update many of the features; especially
roads, on the existing maps.
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V. The Tibetan Operation
A. Background
1. The Tibetan Situation in 1959
Since the Chinese Communist occupation of Tibet in 1950,
relations between the Chinese and Tibetans were tense and potentially
explosive. In the Seventeen-point Agreement of 1951, China was to
have suzerainty over Tibet, but Tibet would retain control over its
internal government, religion, and customs. Events proved that the
Chinese Communistylever intended to provide real autonomy for Tibet.
At first, they exercised restraint with the Tibetans, but gradually
as they consolidated their position and began to tighten their grip
on all controls, Tibetan discontent grew.
In 1955 and 1956 fighting had broken out in Kham and Amdo areas
of eastern Tibet. Guer lla uprisings were met with increased military
action against the villages and monasteries. By 1959 gueAlla activity
had spread to central Tibet and relations between Chinese and Tibetans
became openly strained. Tibetan fears for the safety of the Dalai Lama
in March 1959 created an air of confusion and distrust in Lhasa, which
led to the shelling of the Norbu Lingka, the Dalai Lama's summer
palace. On 17 March the Dalai Lama and his entourage slipped out of
Lhasa. They were joined by a protective force of gue 'llas and made
their way toward India. On 18 April the Dali Lama arrived in Tezpur,
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India after an arduous journey through difficult terrain.
After the excape of the Dalai Lama the Chinese lost no time in
abolishing all Tibetan government and establishing a military
dictatorship. Chinese troops were quartered in all major towns
and sought out guer llas throughout the countryside and along the
frontiers of India.
2. The CIA Role
The United States Government contacts with the Dalai Lama,
and the encouragement of Tibetan anti-communist resistance date back
to 1950. In 1951 a major committment to support the Dalai Lama and
his entourage was made on the condition that he leave Tibet. He
decided to return to Lhasa and try to woxk for his people under the
Chine.se Communists. in 19)6 he visited nadia and again contacted the
U.S. representative to seek a renewal of the commitment, as his
position was growing untenable. At this time the U.S. representative
urged him to return to his country where it was believed that he
would be more effective, but should he not return assistance would be
given in obtaining asylum. zij
CIA began supporting the Tibetan resistance in the autumn of 1957
after discussions with the Dalai Lama's representatives in India in
1956.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
IL/
One part of the program was to "train leaders and cadres who are
parachuted into Tibet to instruct and advise the resistance forces
in how to use their men and the, air dropped supplies in guerilla
action against the Chinese Communists. Some of these men are trained
as radio operators and thus become agents providing a communication
link between the resistance forces and the United States source of
their supplies".
training program
relocated to
/ The Far East Division of DDP began the
.L L'
B. Training Support
1. Training TDY's
(b)(1)
covert(b)(3)
in 1957. In late 1958 the training was
and in the fall of 1959 to a high altitude
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
The initial contact for cartographic support came soon after(b)(3)
the training site was moved tc
of FE/DDP approached the Cartography Division looking for
In March 1959,
In the training program at
made the first of a series of trips to
for a course
In July 1959,
accompanied him on another trip tc
assistance
to develop procedures
deputy,
In the interim at
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Headquarters, work had begun on a series of operational maps. Also (b)(3)
several maps were prepared to assist in 2ield exercises. In Aug fus.omi
(b)(3)
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during another training exercise, these maps were used by Messrs.
and found extremely useful.
In the fall of 1959, field training was moved to th
base, a site
February/March
more comparable
and July/August
conducted
to terrain conditions
of 1960, Messrs
in Tibet.
In
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
In
(b)(3)
was trained
by a two-man cartography
March 1963 another
group
team,
but this time
Deputy Chief
(b)(3)
of the Special Support
Branch (CD/X)
replaced
The final TDY was made by (b)(3)
(b)(3)
when the last Tibetan
in July of 1964
group was trained.
The training base was closed in November 1964. 242
2. The Nature of the Training
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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(b)(
(b)(
Since the instruction was conducted through interpreters, and
the trainees were semi-literate, it was necessary to keep all
instruction at a very simple level. Whether a concept was understood
could be determined only through the classroom or field exercises.
In spite of their low levels of education and lack of familiarity
with modern technology, the trainees were remarkably alert, intelligent,
and eager to learn.
C. Headquarters Supsort
1. The 1:1,000,000 Map Series
After the initial training TDY in early 1959, it was evident
that a set of operational maps would be needed in Roman and in Tibetan
script. Map sourceon this area were extremely limited and based on
early exploration. There were many inaccuracies, but these would have
to be accepted initially and revised when information became available.
The 11,000,000 International Map of the 'world series produced by the �
Army Map Service was used as the first base. These maps (11) were
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updated with all of the intelligence data available. New Chinese
roads, airfields, and a shaded relief background were added. Shaded
relief was vital, because contours were a difficult concept for the
Tibetans. Monasteries were also vital, since these were features
as familiar to the Tibetans as any feature on the map, and were ideal
points for orientation. Tibetan script was prepared
The script was used on the versions to
printed on cloth and paper for field use. A reporting grid was
added and templates were made for use with the grid. The basic
research for this first map series was done by the Divisionts Far
East Branch, and marks one of the first times that the total Division's
assets were brought to bear on an operational problem.
2. The 1:500,000 Map Series
The 1:1 COO 000 map series was a useful series, but was
lacking in positional as well as relative accuracy. In 1960 the
use of the U-2 overhead photography was extremely restricted. The
Cartography Division had only a limited number of people cleared for
working with this material. It became evident that this material offered
.the quickest solution to providing the most accurate operational naps.
The Aeronautical Chart and Information Center (ACIC) in St. Louis,
Missouri was requested to provide a series of these maps (10) at
the scale of 1:500,000. a3/ By September 1960 most of the map
series had been completed with partial coverage by U-2 photography.
be(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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It pointed up cross errors in the original map series, but lacked
the detail in cultural features, since many of these could not
be identified from the air. A closer working relationship between
the research cartographers and the ACIC photo interpreters would
have provided an even more useful set of operational maps. A new
type of compartmentation had prevented the best possible cartographic
support.
3.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
D. Feedback
Feedback from cartographic support to operations is usually
infrequent. For the Tibetan operation it came fairly soon and for
several years proved extremely useful.
-
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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VI. Cuban Operations 1960-1963 *
A. Support Through Geography Division
The Western Hemisphere Branch of the. Geography Division was
abolished in August 1957. Fortimately, while
branch,
the Branch became active again.**
assigned to another
had been maintaining the files, and in 1959
One of the first projects after
becoming active was a series of operation planning studies on
Cuba for WE/DDP. Cartographic support for. the studies included
maps on airfields, transportation, physiographic regions, vegetation,
coastal characteristics. There were also maps on the cities of
Ealiuna, Santiago and selected areas such as the Isle of Pines and
the Zapata Swamp. These studies were a part of a contingency series
on selected Latin American countries. One of the first needs at the
start of the Cuba operations was for the bast large scale maps. In
response to this need 222 sheets of the 1:50,000 map series on Cuba
was reproduced. Cartographic support in reproducing this series was
.primarily in the preparation of the maps for printing. ZL/
The Cuba operations had several different names between 1960
and 1966-- WH-4, Task Force W, Special Affairs Staff, WE/Special
Affairs, WH/Cuba, and WH/Cuban Operations Croup. The major carto-
graphic support activity took place in the 1960-1963 period.
The Branch wasn't officialre-established until 23 June 1961.
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During this period
became the principal intelligence
Research
officer for Cuban operational support in the Geographic
(b)(3)
Area
(GRA).
Her Branch eventually was enlarged to
people and
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
most requests for support were funneled through her.
It wasn't until
January 1963 that the Cartography Division formed a Western Hemisphere
Branch by removing that area from the responsibility of the Far East
Branch.
became the Chief of the new Branch, but by then
most of the Cuban activity had declined.
B. Support to the Task Force Situation Room
- WI(
&Its tif
In 1960 a situation room was organized for the Cuba operation. (b)(3)
(b)(3)
The operations offinpr
n nhay.rr,,
r,.a.vtAwka1L,L1 4LAJ1U ViCtZi
a fcamer member of the Cartography Section in OSS.
OSS background experience and contacts in the Cartography
Division provided the Task Force with a valuable asset. He was
able to breat -hrough the DDI/DDP communication barrier.
The demands on Cartography by the situation room were consid-
erable. Three hundred and nineteen sheets of the 1:50,000 map series
were laminated and also reproduced in black and white. Seven hundred
sheets of 145 symbol cuts were also prepared for use on the situation
room maps. _LL/ Many special maps were prepared for the situation
room. One wa,.; a map with a detailed grid for use in plotting all
naval, maritime, and small boat activity in Cuban waters. During
the Cuban missile crisis/the situation room became the main center
,�5c,1 el Z
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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mat
.-t
of activity in the Intelligence Community. A close working
arrangement had developed with all the DDI components, and many
ideas were generated in the support of the effort. The study and
map of the Cuban caves where missiles could possibly be hidden,
was an example. Another project was the detailed target folders
providing all the available data on strategic installations
throughout Cuba.
In 1963, Task Force W became the Special Affairs Staff (SAS)
and became the Chief of the Intelligence Branch.
The Intelligence Branch not only maintained the situation room,
but handled many of the broad intelligence activities, and
provided the bridge between the operational side and the policy
planners. It supported the paramilitary activity by supplying
research, graphic, and other backstopping.
C. Other Support
1. The Electronic Facilities Atlas
In conjunction with the Economic Research Area of Office of
Research and Reports (ORR) Cartography Division prepared 52 maps for
--
inclusion in an atlas,The atlas covered all aspects of telecommun-
ications in Cuba and was based on all the intelligence available
from U.S. commercial sources as well as the Special Center sources.
The atlas was completed in May 1960 after two months of concentrated
effort. / In October 1962, during the missile crisis, additional
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copies had to be collated and supplementary maps added. .1.1/
2. The Grid Problem
In 1960 a problem arose over the use of the 1:50,000 map
series in operational reporting. The field was using copies of
early series of maps with the Lambert grid. Headquarters was
using the series that the Army Map Service had reprinted with a
Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid. Information relayed
to the field based or. the 13TH grid, references were incompatable
with the Lambert grid. The consequences could be disastcrous
to the agents in the field. The operational people were made
aware of this problem, but it wasn't until 1962 that action was
1".nlr" to chow graphically the mue,nitude ol tne problem. The
problem was worhed out mathematically by tae Cartography and
-Geography Divisions, and an index map produced with both grids.
In some areas a difference of 15 kilometers was noted. (7./
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aLWALI
VII. Saigon Station &wort
A. Station Buildup 1964-1966
The Saigon Station grew in the mid-1960'5 as the U.S. military
increased its commitment to South Vietnam. Personnel
the Station grew from approximately
Its personnel was significantly different
strength in
by late 1966.
from the usual overseas
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
station contingent, since FE/DDP could not supply enough people
from the normal channels and had to draw personnel from other
Divisions of the DDP, other Directorates, and from contract sources.
Most of the employees in Saigon were aware of the DDI type Headquarters
support, but were -u:afauallal.- will how Lo get this support in the riela,
graphic support. They were also unfamiliar
in U.S. agenc:les in Vietnam or in the
especially cartographic and
with cartographic resources
Vietnamese Government,
In November 1964,
Chief of the Far East Branch
of CD/ER visited Saigon for three days on the way to a U.N. carto-
graphic conference in Manila. 301 He held discussions with
the DDI representative and the chief of the newly
This was to be the component that would
formed
be staffed by DDI personnel. In company with a member of
made a quick survey of the available Saigon cartographic and
graphic assets. He uncovered a _number of sources that could prove
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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helpful and left a list of all these assets with
On returning to Headquarters
looked into the map
distribution problem with the Map Library and suggested an automatic
distribution procedure that would get maps to the people that wanted
them. Heretofore, maps sent out to the Saigon Station ended up with
the first person who happened to see them or were never distributed.
There was also confusion over the different State and Agency
distribution channels
down again later.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
which was clarified, but broke(b0)
B. The Station's Attempt to Produce Its Own Maps
In the 1965-1966 nerind;
the Station was, charged with the responsibility of supervising
the Revolutionary Development Cadre Program (RDC). In this capacity,
provided field officers in charge of RDC teams in each
province. Provincial maps were needed so that each officer could
record his tean2whereabouts, their performance, and progress;
who was at the time without
knowledge of cartographic support available at Headquarters, launched
a program to produce provincial maps. He procured ozalid copies of
the 1:200,000 map series produced by the Vietnamese General
Directorate of Land Surveys (Tong Nha Dien Dia) and then took this (b)(1)
material to the
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ZIAALIA
have maps made of
each province.
TSD was assigned
of each of the
(b)(3)
the task of compiling, drafting
provinces (43 at that time). The
and printing
maps
personnel
were highly skilled
(b)(3)
artists and reproduction experts,
but map design was not their special'cy. The results were a usable
series of maps, but they lacked the professional cartographic touch.
The maps all had fractional scale errors that would have been picked
up by a cartographer.
In early
1966, on being
assigned to
at (b)(3)
Headquarters,
learned of the
(b)(3)
Cartography
Division and
its capabilities.
After discussions
with
and members of
(b)(3)
-no Par RPRi". PI,P1-Inh2 4- 1 T,Too
-
Station was needed. 31/
support to Oal6oii
C. Recognition of the Need for Cartographic Sumort
In Novelyber of 1965,
home leave and met with
size maps of South Vietnam
and agreed witl
returned to Headquarters on
He requested a number of page
to be used in reports produced by
that closer liaison between
was necessary. n./
the Station and Cartography Division
of the Director's newly created Vietnam
Affairs Staff (VAS) also visited the Far East Branch during November
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1965 and was extremely interested in the cartographic problems
in the Vietnam area. He was concerned that the Cartography
Division was not getting the latest information which was available
in the field and should be used in compiling the maps on Vietnam.
He wrote a memo to his Chief, Mr. Peer de Silva, who was the
Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs (SAVA), outlining the problem
and quoting from trip report of November 1964.
proposal was:
I am of the opinion that :this Agency can do better economic
and political mapping of Vietnam than is currently available
and that information is available in Vietnam which will make
it improve the mapping. It may be that some or all of this
information has been sent to Washington but, .if so, it has
not reached the cartographer. my personal view is that it
takes a cartographer in Vietnam with the responsibility of
visiting from timc�to time the -piuvi.O.eub and updating the
mapping, but this is a question that can best be decided by
the DDI. It may be possible for to under-
take work in the geographic area utilizing either the
geographer or cartographer currently scheduled to leave in
December or through the TDY of a cartographer from here. I
propose that we present this problem to the DDI for solution.
Mr. de Silva never passed the proposal on to the DDI, but
wrote the following note tc "The Station is just not
able to absorb any new tasks now - they're stretched much too thin
already in doing what they are - might discuss with
before he returns."
The two individual
mentioned as potentially able
to help relieve some of this problem- when they reported to Saigon
were
of the Cartography Division and
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of the Geography Division. Both ended up as acting regionnl reports
officers in the field assigned from
; neither
was given an opportunity to devote any time to the Station's map
problems.*
In early 1966 with -interest expressed by VAS, the
and.
decided that the time had arrived to
(b)(3)
propose some cartographic
encouragement from
support
to the Saigon Station.
he prepared a memo to
With
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Chief of CD, outlining the assistance that a carto-
grapher could provide the Station and suggesting an initial TDY
of 30 to 6o days to survey the situation and make recommendations
for
continud suppoit. On 20 July 1966 a meeting
was called
by
acting for James A. Brammell as
Director of
(b)(3)
the
Office of Basic and
Geographic Intelligence (OBGI), at which
it was proposed that a cartographer be sent TDY to Saigon for
three months, and the Chief of FE Division notify the
DDP and the DDI
of
the proposal. IL/
After approval of the proposal
(b)(3)
suggested
(b)(3)
that
be the initial cartographer to
make the TDY
'and on 29 August an itinerary was prepared with an
in Saigon of 24 September 1966. ?,9/ A stop over
arrival date
(b)(1)
was (b)(3)
Later in the 1967-1g6q period a similar sit.untinn pyiRfd
with two cartographers,
assigned to the field.
the location of Communist
both
was able to devote some time to
administrative units.
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(b)(3)
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included to review the province map series, which had been prepared
by TSB, and return the reproduction materials to Headquarters.
D. TDY's to Saigon in 1966 and 1967
1. Survey of Station's Requirements and Interim Recommendations
first order of business on reaching Saigon Station
was to make a quick survey of the map situation. Because of the
dispersed nature of the Station facilities and the different Station
components that required support, he decided to divide the major
part of his time between
At the end of one month an interim .report
was prepared. MV This report became the basis for a cable back
to Headquarters prepared by
and also the senior DDI
ndicated that the
In the report
representative. /
Station's principal
map collection consisted of out-dated map stock inconveniently
located under a staircase. He further indicated that there was no
-mechanism for keeping current on Headquarters cartographic programs
or production, and a distribution system was lacking. He recommended
that a facility be located in the main embassy building to be used
by Station and State personnel, that it be stocked with the latest
series of large scale maps for Vietnam and the surrounding countries,
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and that there be gazetteers, atlases, and other related items
available. The room could be the focal point for receiving, filing,
ordering, and distributing all CIA and military cartographic
productions.
described
where there was
supporting the
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
RDC program. It had graphic capability, but needed cartographic support.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The Vietnamese were developing a filing system for maps that was
impractical and was based on obsolete map series. He recommended
a redirection of this program to avoid wasting additional manpower
and money.
Concerning special cartographic services, soggested
that maps, charts, and briefing aidS be prepared at the nation for
VIP briefings or conferences. He pointed out that an in-house
cartographer could provide help in the use of large-scale topographic
maps and the associated Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid
reference system. Assistance could be provided for any other peculiar
cartographic problems at the Station, and those involving extensive
support could be referred back to Headquarters. He referred to a
visit to two regional headquarters, Nhatrang and Danang, where the
field officers had expressed an enthusiastic desire for nap support
and had already levied heavy requests for maps. He noted that the
field also needed assistance in selecting, mounting, and overlaying
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maps, and they needed a special series of maps for use with their
reports going back to Saigon0
also showed concern for the Agency's collection require-
ments.by describing the type of information that was needed back at
Headquarters to make accurate intelligence maps. He mentioned the
inadequate coverage by th
who had to procure maps for the entire Far East. He suggested
that a qualified cartographic officer could supplement the
duties of collection and evaluation of cartographic data for the
South Vietnam area.
At the conclusion of the report romised to report
additional findings and make final recommendations to the Chief
of Station at the end of the TDY. (See Attachment E)
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OLAntEl
2. Activities and Negotiations
After
explained the need for a map reference room
to Station support personnel, an old storeroom on the
of the EMbassy was renovated. The situation began to
rapidly. Rapport was established by
ground floor
improve
with the personnel of
U.S. Army Map Depot and much of red tape eliminated in procuring
topographic maps. Personal contacts were established with other
U.S. agencies in Saigon that could provide valuable assistance and
also be recipients of Agency produced maps. Current maps and
related items ordered from Headquarters earlier began to arrive at
the Station,
the
had a Station notice circulated, announcing
of the map refereneu room and the presence or a
temporary "cartographic advisor". He also sent packages of maps
to all of the provinces through the regional offices. Many private
map collections were gathered up from closets and corners throughout
the Station and were dumped on the new mnI) reference room. All of
the pent up desires and frustrations of the Station personnel
concerning maps and cartographic needs inundated the new "cartographic
'advisor".
It was apparent to when he was preparing the final
recommendations for
the Chief of Station, that there
Was a strong demand at the working level for continued cartographic
support.
the DDI rep, knew the value of having current
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CILL3litLi
Cartography Division products as "trade goods" in his liaison
work with MACV.
did not fully appreciate the usefulness of the material,
but saw that, it was a logical part of his branch and wanted the
new map room. Unfortunately, he was not inclined to assign
anyone but the lowest graded individual (GS-7) to maintain the
room, even though there was a volunteer at the GS-12 level.
Deputy Chief of Station, was very sympathetic to
after the final
the problem and suggested a talk with
recommendations were made.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
After conversations with Messrs
(b)(3)
and other Station officers,
job would be to sel
was convinced that the toughest
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
on the
program. After
read
the final recommendations, he met briefly with lnd remarked
(b)(3)
that they were very cogent, but indicated that he had just as cogent
(b)(3)
a reason for wanting to keep down personnel levels at the Station.
(b)(3)
With this limitation in mind the other more favorably inclined
individuals felt that all the work done during
- not be wasted, but be continued temporarily.
to assio
TDY must
decided
his assistant, the task of receiving
all new map shipments.
of his
Branch the task of keeping the room in order and giving out naps.
Possibly one of the
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(b)(3)
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the new responsibility when the next group of replacements came
from Headquarters.
3. Follow- up Response at Headquarters
On returning to Headquarters in December 1966,
had a number of meetings with personnel of his office. A meeting
was held with Messrs.
to brief them
on the TOY. These men representing office management were interested
in the Saigon Station's cartographic problems but were not too
optimistic about getting any professional cartographic support for (b)(3)
the Station, especially in view of
attitude,
not to get any hopes up because probably
nothing would come of the recommendations0
also met with
of the Map Library to insure the
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
continued flow of maps to Saigon, and to alert
Attach in Bangkok, of some of the procurement
leads uncovered.
lso held a meeting witl
Df the
DDI's office in which he described the requirements and duties of
a position to man the map room and provide cartographic support.
The subsequent development of this position will be explained later.
He also contacted )f OTR's Vietnam orientation course
to offer some briefing support on maps as a tool for the field officer,
but
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
felt that there wasn't enough time to include any (b)(3)
training of this type in his course.,
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� Wiliti
During
TDY, production of several map series was already
' underway in the Far East Branch of Cartography. One was the
revision of the South Vietnam province
This series was being produced from
sent
changes.
difficult
with format changes as well
The plate separation prepared
to design the maps effectively, but
series produced originally (b)(1)
(b)(3)
the negatives
(b)(1)
as substantive
(b)(3)
made it
(b)(1)
a compromise rnethod(b)(3)
was worked out to make two versions of the series. One version
had basic and administrative data in a light grey and brown so
that the maps could_ be overlaid with red, blue, or green symbols.
The other version had red administrative boundaries for use as a
(b)(3)
reference
map. The former maps
would be used by province offices
and by
in Saigon, in reporting progress of
(b)(3)
the RDC
proeyam. The latter
version, where the boundaries were
(b)(3)
highlighted, were to be used by everyone interested in locating
administrative units in Vietnam down to the village level. A
limited number of this latter version was to be bound. Yo/ This
was the only map series of its kind and was in great demand.
Eventually it was revised and copied by the Vietnamese Government,
completing the cycle.
The second series was a regional version of the administrative
maps, one for each of the four military regions (corps). This
series was produced at 1:500,000 and served to consolidate infor-
mation from each of the province maps into a single sheet by region.
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,o.
Of course, an administrative map of the entire country in one
sheet was also produced. 4a/
In March 1967 another series of maps was initiated as an
outgrowth of both Station and Headquarters needs. It consisted
of a page size map of each province and each corps to be bound
in a handy notebook form. Copies were also printed in loose form.
The purpose was to provide a convenient notebook size atlas for
training, orientation, and reference, and to have base plates
available to the intelligence production facilities on which
additional data could be portrayed. Province officers in the
field could also use the individual maps to illustrate their
reporting. These maps proved to be popular items and 5000 copies
had been dit;tributed by the end of 1970. (See AttachMent v)
4. A Second TDY
was scheduled for Deputy
Chief CD/F, in early 1967, with a three week stop in Saigon to
continue the work started in late 1966 by .143/ When he
arrived in Saigon,
found that cartographic support was
in great demand and he cabled back to Headquarters for a number
of items. He was swamped with the same kind of requests from
Station personnel seeking cartographic advice that
had
experienced. He wrote back "Came into the map room and got stuck
for about 5 hours concerning a particular problem. I don't know
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i
who these people will go to when there isn't a cartographer here,
more than likely they'll just fumble around in the dark and do
the best they can." 44/
TDY was another holding effort until some more . (b)(3)
permanent solution could be devised to continue the Station's
cartographic support.
ON,
E. Map Specialist Position in Saigon 1967-3970
A DDI vacancy notice WR2 'ssued on 20 January 1967 which
(b)(3)
described du�s as running a miniature kap reference
library. 2"-L/ The grade GS-7, did not attract any qualified
C:50-A-A"
rayirii(ln�pg t() FITpTy m c
,+1,4", T.rn!
upgrading this position until later. The position was filled
by
of NPIC who
(b)(3)
merely used the opportunity as a (b)(3)
means to got to Saigon where he eventually transferred to a
photo interpretation job.
In February 1968 the job was advertised again, this time
at the grade of GS-09 to GS-11 and as a map specialist position.
The description read:
Incumbent is responsible
facility of
the Viotram Station. Duties involve providing
map support to Station elements includini the distribubion
nnd nroonromont of nens.
for maintaining the map reference
14(1 /
Special Assistant to the Director of
MGT., had replaced
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
and having more knowledge of (b)(3)
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description.
(b)(3)
had arrived
in Saigon in November 1967.
of the Publication
(b)(3)
Division also of OBGI, was accepted
for the
nap
specialist
position
and reported to Saigon in April of 1968.
was a GS-08 (b)(3)
map/graphics editor with some military experience
in
cartography
with the U.S. Army
in Tokyo. He was a significant improvement
over
(b)(3)
and provided the Station with some graphic
production capability as well as maintenance of the map room.
He had no experience as a research cartographer and could only
supply limited support in this area.
Communications always seem to be insufficient between the
field and Headquarters, and during this period there was the
usual confusion. The Map Library was concerned over the lack
of contact and tried to get some sort of progress report. Its
efforts were never too successful and most contact had to wait
until periods of home leave for Station personnel. Even though
the map specialist had as part of his designated duties the
running of a map library, the DDI had always made it clear that
DDI personnel in Station positions were there primarily to lend
support to the COS. Unfortunately, the quarterly reports pre-
pared by which could
have shed some light on the activities of the map specialist,
were never routed to the Map Library or the Cartography Division
after they were sent back to Headquarters. H7/
-
(b)(3)
"17 N!,
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qL
I
Some of the cartographic problems that the map specialist
had to wrestle with were, in some cases, difficult assignments
which could have used the experience of a professional carto-
grapher. Maps were produced by Cor briefing the
Mission Council on inClltratio-A routes used by the Viet Cong
during the Tot offensive. Keeping track of the VC infrastructure
and the Liberation Committees was another difficult research
problem. In addition the map specialist provided maps and
related material to organizations outside the Station such as:
USAID, National War College, MAW, and the National Training
Center. From July through September 196?, following the Tet
offensive an average ov 1000 maps were Listributed per week.
This was one of the highest demand periocls. The demand dropped
to an average of 4o0 naps per week durin the next quarter. Ligl
As a comparison, the Headquarters Map LiJrary facility average�
distribution is only slightly higher.
. F. Personnel Reduction and the Decline of the Program 1970
Because of the reduction of overseas personnel, the map
specialist position was not renewed at the end of
tour in December 1969. After that,
nrcunrT
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WAitl
took over the duties of the map reference facility. She
shared these duties with two others in the section.
was a member of the Cartography Division who had been sent to
Saigon in an assignment other than cartography. With her profess-
ional cartographic backg:roluld and grade level, GS-13, she knew
the value of maps as tools to the field officer. Her fight to
maintain service was a losing battle against forces out of her
control,
personnel
in 1970.
In response to Federal and Agency budget cuts, additional
cutbacks were ordered at Saigon and all overseas stations
looked on the map reference
facility as marginal, and planned to close out the business.
insist(.a un vury basic map items as a minimum, but
when shc went on home leave in November 1969 more of the map cases
were climin:Aed than had been planned. Later in June 1970 while 51'e
on emergency leave quite a number of maps were given to MACV. Many
of these were vital and had to be retrieved when she returned.
Regardless of this action, the Station's demands remained as strong
as ever.
411
After the final departure of
in June 1970
asked
to take over the remains of the map reference facility from
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
riry
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11),Inr,i1E
If this could not be done, then the map orders would have to be
referred back to Headquarters. MACV already had been told that
they would have to service their requests for CIA maps through
their own channels. felt that cutting back any
further would be impractical and decided to maintain a limited
number of essential maps. He assigned the switchboard operator
to watch over the map room as one of her duties,
replacement, took over and the map responsi-
bility at the end of 1970.
Close cartographic and related map support to the Saigon
Station has apparently returned to a situation similar to 1966,
but he fLaal ouLeome depends on the direction ana requirements
of different Station personnel as the U.S. military commitment
winds down.
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VIII. Conclusions
The early experience with OSS in supplying cartographic and
related support in the field no doubt gave the early CIA carto-
graphers expectations for a continued close relationship with
the new Clandestine Services that were forming in the postwar
intelligence organization. These expectations were soon proved
in vain as compartmentation created a barrier to communicatdon.
At the same time the cartographers were busy developing programs
to build a base for making cartographic support a vital part of the
overall intelligence production activity of the Agency. When
support became necessary, the Clandestine Services (CS) attempted
to provide most of it internally through organizations such as
RWOIS. They were charged with getting information within the
Agency as well as outside in response to the requirements of the
operating divisions. Occasionally, someone would make direct
contact with cartography or another DDI component, and receive
close support. Of course, a little more exposure of the operational
mission became necessary to insure the best support. This was against
policy and took some courage on the part of operational officers.
in the Guatemala operation, is an example of an officer (b)(3)
who felt that close support was vital to the planning and execution
of any operation.
In 1959, as a result of a study by the Inspector General, WOIS
-
fr
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OWUnL1
was abolished. The period between 1959 and 1963 proved, coincidentally,
to be one of the most productive and one of the closests supporting
periods in Cartography's relationship with the CS. Two major
operations were running concurrently, Tibet and Cuba. Tibet became
the first really broad support given to any operation. Cuba was
an operation supported through the situation room and Geography
Division, it never involved the full assets of Cartography because
those assets were already spread thin with support to Tibet. This
period was not without its problems. Since there was no coordinating
unit, Cartography personnel often had to provide continuity in DDP
programs in order to prevent duplicate requests from other operations
officers. Most of tllis wnq due to the rotation of DDP personnel
overseas. In September 1960, Cartography suggested a liaison
position between ORR and DDP for the coordination of geographic and
cartographic information. 6o/
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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" fit
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� The Vietnam War and the build-up of the Saigon Station presented
many opportunities for a wide range of close support activity, but
unfortunately these never reached their full potential. With a few
notable exceptions, the Vietnam War did not bring out the best in
American motivations and. performance. The same could be said of the
Station personnel. Agency personnel were drawn to the Vietnam
assignments, not by a sense of duty, but more for personal reasons.
Family problems, stagnation problems, promotion problems, financial
gain, and adventurism, all were factors in their decisions. The
DDP had to draft personnel from other area divisions, which also
crbated a deterrent of motivation. The DDI provided its quota of
personnel, but never encouraged its top analyst to take any assign-
ments beyond short TDY's. Senior DDP officers were continually
frustrated by the lack of sufficient ease officers and the necessity
to rely on the constant turnover of personnel, with which there
was no effective means of coritrol, i.e., from other career services
not under the direction of the DDP. All new DDI personnel had to
prove themselves before they were accepted as part of the team.
These and many other factors led to the erratic cartographic and
map support activity. The Vietnam War did not bring about the
opportunity for a full and close support role that was experienced
in OSS. The Saigon Station cartographic support activity may improve
as personnel and ddrection change.
In light of past experience with support to the CS, what ha been.
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learned, and how should onGI, and CD respond to CS support require-
ments in the 1970's? Certainly, compartmentation is not the problem
it used to be, although it could reoccur. Support characterized by
internal OBGI or CD compartmentation has proved to be an overly
reactionary response and has never been an efficient way to use
office assets. Training programs such as the Midcareer Executive
Deelopment Course, where middle level officers from all Directorates
have dome together in a frank review and appraisal of the total Agency,
has done a considerable amount in breaking down communication barriers.
The Agency has been emphasizing the need for an environment more Cond-
ucive to communication, the necessity of maintaining a unity of
function and purpose, and the discouragement of tribalism.
OBGI must maintain closer liaison with the CS, using the offices
s much as possible. Cartography's support of the CS has
had many high periods, but its support has only represented a small
percentage of its total effort. Geography Division, on the other
hand, must be careful that it does not become the exclusive research
arm of the CS.
The 1970's may see a directional change in the activities and
cover status of the CS, which could have a significant bearing on
the nature of future support. Regardless, if operation-91 support
is required, it must be approached in OBGT as a team effort with the
entire office's assets used in the most efficient and effective
manner.
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Appendix A.. List of Persons Interviewed arranged. by chapter)
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iNL,Q5M.
Appendix B. Source References
1. OSS, Research and Analysis Branch. 5ranch Historic
History of the Map Division 1941744, n,d., p.1, OSS, folder 46,
box 32, RC Job No. 62-271, RID Archives. S.
2. Minutes, Cartography Section Conference July 18, ]942 07=R 0/Ch
"
files, folder: Conferences, box 5, job No. 52-7, CIA Records
Center. U.
3. Map Division History, op. cit. pp. 36-37 (1 above)
4. L7
Data Sheet, Sept 45, Receipts from Outposts/Transmittal to
Outposts, OSS, R and A. Map Div, ORR 0/Ch files, folder: Outpost
Transmittals and Receipts, Box 5, job No. 52-7, CIA Records Center. U.
5. Nap Division history, op.
6. Interview,
cit. p. 39 (1 above)
with author, 5 April 1971. U.
7. Monthly Report �21:12, March 1947, ORR 0/C1 files, folder: Cartography
Monthly Reports - Begin. Jan 1947 thru Dec 1947, box 2, Job No.
62-360, CIA Records Center. S.
3. Memo, Chief CD for Chief GP, 26 July 195, Sub: History statemen:,
Cartography Division November 1950-July 1954, ORR files, folder:
Organization & Management Surveys, box J, Job No. 63-314, CIA
Records Center. S. (b)(1)
(b)(3)
9.
10. Interview,
11. Interview,
12. Interview,
13. Interview,
14. Interview,
15.
with author, 2 April 1971. S
with author, 5 April 1971. S
(b)(3)
with author, 13 April 1971. S.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
with author, 6 April 1971. S.
with author (12 above)
-50-
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
Ibid., p.l.
1959, CD/R OBGI files, folder: D/GC
S.
(b)(1)
Monthly (b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
S.
'1971. S. (b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Monthly Repors,
Reports 1959-1960.
Ibid.
with
author, 21 'April
with author 20
(13 above)
1971.
April
Interview,
Interview,
Monthly Report,
Mar 1960, Op. cit.
Monthly Report, Mar 1960, 2E.
Monthly Report;, Sept 1960, 2E.
Monthly Report, Mar 1960, 22.
Monthly Report, Oct 1962, op.
cit. (18 above)
cit. (18 above)
cit. (18 above)
cit. (18 above)
29. Map 36643, October 1960, Cuba - UTM and Lambert Grids. C., NFD.
30. Memo,
for Assistant Director, Research and
31.
Reports, _L9 Jan , Sub:
and Eastern Asia from 25
files, folder: UN Cartographic
Branch Monthly Reports,
folder: Branch Monthly
Report on Overseas TDY to Southern
Oct 1964 to 24 Dec 1964, CD/R OBGI
Conference (Manila). S.
June 1966, F Desk, CD/R OBGI files,
Reports - 1966. S.
32.
Ibid., November 1965.
33.
Peer de Silva, 16 Nov 1965, sub: Current
Memo, for
Mapping of Vietnam, CD/R
Support - Saigon. S.
()DOI files, folder:
Need for Cartographic
34.
Memo, Peer de Silva for
16 Nov 1965 note on
form 101 attached to memo
33 above). Ti,
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sErT
35.
Memo, Chief,
Support to Overseas
Cartographic
CD/F for Chief, CD/BGI, 16 June
Stations, CD/R OBGI files,
Support - Saigon. S.
1966, sub: Cartographic
folder: Need for
36.
Memo, Chief,
FE/DDP
for Acting Chief, (b)(3)
FE/DDP, 21 July
1966, sub: TDY Cartographer
for Saigon Station,
CD/R files, folder: Need for, Cartographic Support, - Saigon. S.
37,
Memo, Chief, CD/F for Chief, CD/DGI, 29 Aug 1966, sub: Tat to
Saigon, Vietnam, CD/R OBGI files, folder: Need. for Cartographic
Support
- Saigon. S.
(b)(3)
33.
Memo,
for Chief,aigon
Station, 15 Oct 1966, (b)(3)
sub:
Station Cartographic Support -
Interim Report, CD/R OBGI
files, folder: MKL Saigon TDY. C. (b)(1)
(b)(3)
39.
ron Station for Headquarters, 16-17 Oct 1966, Saigon
CD/R OBGI files, folder: Saigon Cartographic Support. C.
40.
Bound Naps,
January
1967, South Vietnam - Provincial Administrative
Naps.
41.
Naps
55582 thru 55585, September 1967,
South Vietnam - Administrative
11-L, and IV corps A.ilitary
Region2i, CD/R ODGI
TfTE7. U.
42.
Maps 56080-1, Apr 1967, South Vietnam
- Administrative Divisions
and Military Regions CD/R OBGI files.
U.
43.
Memo,
3 Nay 1967, sub: Report (b)(3)
for Director OBI,
on Foreign
CD/R OBGI filPR_
(b)(1)
Travel to
the Far East
folder: Far East Trip
Reports. S.
(b)(3)
44.
Letter,
2 Mar 1967, personal
file of
auunor. U.
(b)(3)
-.45.
Vacancy
Notice Chic Administrative
Staff, 0/DDI, 20 Jan 1967,
sub:
Positions - Saigon,
CD/R OBGI files, Colder: (b)(3)
1,ap Specialist
Position - Saigon. S.
46.
Vacancy Notice, Chief, Administrative Staff, 0/DDI, 56b 196_87,
sub: Nap Specialist, CD/R OBGI files, folder: Map Specialist
Position - Saigon.
S.
47.
Quarterly Reports,
-quarters 1968,
for DDI, 3rd and 4th
(b)(3� ;
sub: Report of
Activity, CD/R 0130I files, folder: Map
Specialist Position - Saigon. S.
(b)(3)
�(b)(3)
. -52-
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)18.
Ibid.
1.9
Interview,
-with author, 15 Oct 1970.
C.
50. Monthly Report, Sept 1960, op. cit. (18 above)
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Foreword
There are several agencies in the United States Government which
are engaged in the production of maps and charts. Their product char-
acteristically presents the various physical and cultural features of
the earth's surface in detail, at large scale, and is produced in large
quantity. The market for such maps and charts is varied and extensive.
A specialized category of maps the thematic map is produced infrequently
and only under special circumstances.
One agency of the United States Government is unique in that it
is a significant producer of this specialized category of maps. The
mission of the Central Intelligence Agency is to supply finished in-
telligence to the White House and to the Intelligence Community. The
flee
for accurate, concise, rapid communication of finished intelligence
requires the use of specially designed graphic materials; the thematic
map (sometimes called the special subject map or topical map) is a
vital element in the communication. Furthermore, in the process of
fulfilling its obligations, the C.I.A. has a need for unique maps to
be utilized in meeting its own peculiar analytical and operational
requirements.
The C.I.A. has had to rely on its own resources in order to meet
its peculiar map needs. While the products of other mappers are select-
ively utilized in the process of thematic mapping, the need for speed,
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accuracy, relevance, clarity of communication, and security maintenance
has made it necessary to develop the best possible thematic mapping
capability entirely within its own structure. The result has been
that the C.I.A. is a leading producer of thematic maps of high quality
covering a wide range of topics.
It is the development of intelligence thematic mapping in the
C.I.A. which is the subject of this history. The organizational
development began immediately prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor in
1941 and was nurtured in the Coordinator of Information (C.O.I.), the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Department of State and since
1947 in the Central Intelligence Agency where it is now known as
Cartography Division, Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence.
The writer of this paper has been continuously associated with this
activity in a modest capacity since the latter days of the C.O.I.
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I. Introduction
A. The Role of Cartography in Support of Intelligence
A wide variety of maps are part of the experience of most people.
They range from the large scale, small area encyclopedic detail of the
topographic quadrangles through medium scaled, larger area, more selective
content of the aeronautical and hydrographic chart to the very small scale
relatively large area coverage, and minimum content of the newspaper map
with its large X showing yesterdays earthquake location in Turkey and
little else.
Naps are used extensively in the planning of intelligence operations,
in the analysis of collected intelligence, and in the final reporting of
finished intelligence. In the first phase it is frequently possible to
utilize existing maps produced by other agencies, especially when
detailed geographic information is required, but in the latter phases
special maps are needed.
The role of cartography in intelligence is to produce appropriate
maps for use in the various phases of intelligence. Events of intelli-
gence interest take place on the earth's surface and it is necessary to
locate and describe them on the earth's surface in relation to each
other and in relation to pertinent geographic features. This require-
ment is most often and most effectively met by the use of appropriate
maps either by themselves or in coordination with textual presentation.
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B. The Thematic Map is a Valuable Tool in Intelligence Support
While the CIA makes frequent use of all kinds of maps it has
found that the special kind of map known as the thematic nap is a
most useful tool or medium for intelligence support. The use of
thematic maps enables the IX. to give clear, concise graphic
treatment in map form to the pertinent elements involved in an
intelligence problem or event. The elements of what it is, and where
it is, are laid out clearly in relationship to the basic geographic
factors involved in the event. In the situation when several intell-
igence items are shown their spatial relationship are also clearly
shown.
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The CIA mission to supply the White House and the ,Intelligence
Community with finished intelligence involves the use of many kinds
of maps from many sources in the collection and analysis of intelli-
gence but the finished intelligence product requires the extensive use
of the thematic map in communicating intelligence to the recipient or
consumer. The essential properties of the thematic map make it
most useful in the support of intelligence.
The principal characteristic of a thematic map is that it tells
a story, it has a central theme. It never tells all about everything
in the area mapped. It may tell all or little about a topic or
selected number of topics in an area but is always limited to a
theme as it's Objective. The thematic map is designed to present
information clearly, concisely, free from distracting superflous
material. The thematic map is tailored specifically to the immediate
intelligence objective and to get its message across to the reader
quickly without causing him to ponder the meaning. In each case
only that underlying geographic data required to support the map
Qbjective and to enhance the reader's appreciation of the subject
will be included in the map; i.e. selected streams, Significant
bridges, towns figuring in the presentation of the theme, relief
features involved, etc.
Naps showing roads, administrative divisions, soils, population
distribution, housing types, unfolding events, or current events of
intelligence interest are among the wide variety of maps which are
classified as thematic maps. The intelligence requirement may call
for the presentation of one or more topics on a single map, it may
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C. Definition of the Thematic Map
The objective of a map is to show a phenomenon or group of
phenomenon in relationship to the earth's surface and to each other.
The phenomena shown may be natural or man-made features or events.
A familiar map type, the general reference map, primarily
shows a large number of things in their geographic positional
relationship (to the earth's surface) at moderate and small scales,
but any intcrelationship are alluded to or implied. The number of
items shown on such maps varies with the scales selected for such
maps. Common examples of such maps ar tlases, and wall maps.
The topographic map presents a detailed pattern of various
cultural features existing in an area against a detailed background
of the physical features of an area. Here again the relationship
between items on the map are left to inference by the reader. This
kind of map is usually produced at large scale covering a limited
area. The topographic map sheets produced by the United States
Geological Survey and other official mapping agencies in the United
States and abroad are a well known examples of this type of map.
These two general types of maps are used by the intelligence
officer as sources of information. The mission of the CIA does
not require that this kind of map be produced by it and the established
producers of these maps generally meet the needs of the CIA from normal
production programs.
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call for treatment of them in depth or only very lightly. As long
as it tells a specific story it is a thematic map.
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D. The Thematic Map as an Intelligence Document
The thematic map is generally used (designed) to support textual'.
presentation of intelligence. It is not, in its full development,
supported by text; it is a complete intelligence document in and of
itself. Thematic maps contain all the information necessary to
make a complete presentation of intelligence, and frequently are
used as such. Thematic maps used with written documents serve as
summary statements to give emphasis and focus to intelligence.
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E. Basic Assumptions in the Development of Thematic Naps
Several basic initial assumptions or principles have been made in
the development of thematic map production. These principles were taken
in the beginning (1941) and have been followed through the succeeding
years.
them in
The
No attempt has been made to discard or significantly modify
this period.
first of these assumptions has already been dealt with. It
is the principle that a thematic map is a complete intelligence
document not, needing a body of supporting text to communicate its
message.
The second principle is that thematic map production should be
divided into three basic phases: compilation, construction, and
reproduction.
Compilation is the research process in which data is selected,
evaluated, and presented in the form of a manuscript map.
Construction (frequently called drafting) is that series of
technical/mechanical operations by which finished map drawings are
prepared ready for reporduction.
Reproduction is that phase which, utilizing the finished
drawings, produces the required number of copies of the map in a
usable form.
A third principle is that the three production phases in
thematic mapping should be organized as separate tasks: Compilation
should be handled by one person or unit, construction should be
done by a different person or unit, and reproduction should be
performed by a third unit. Earlier thematic mapping often combined
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these phases to varying degrees in one person or unit but it was felt
that more and better work could be accomplished if each phase were
carried out by different individuals.
In order to further facilitate the production of quality
thematic maps a fourth principle was adopted: Individuals engaged
in each of the production phases would be specialists in the operation
involved in those phases. Cartographic draftsmen would be employed
in the construction of maps. Research geographers with cartographic
experience would do the compilation. Reproduction would be done
by trained photographers and printers. It was recognized that
while personnel engaged in either of these areas might have facility
in one or the other that it would be best to utilize the individuals'
major skill in the most appropriate area. It was also recognized that
each individual should have some understanding of the other phases
so that he could do his task in a manner that would facilitate the
work of the other specialists involved in the production of thematic
maps.
A fifth assumption in the development of thematic mapping was
that it should be performed essentially in the role of support to
intelligence production. This position was taken in ordeylto focus
the efforts of a small and new group on a phase of the oeverall
intelligence mission that it could handle effectively on a continuing
basis. It does not preclude the production of individual maps projects
outside of the normal support role under special circumstances.
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F. Thematic mapping did not originate in the CIA. It has, however,
reached a much higher level of development in the last three decades
and the CIA has been and is in the forefront of that development.
This history is confined to the development of thematic mapping
as it has occurred in the CIA and its predecessors from 1941 through
1970..
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II Thematic Map Production
The production of thematic maps in the C.I.A. is accomplished
largely in the Cartography Division of the Office of Basic Intell-
igence; (CD/BGI) one of the three basic phases of production,
heretofore noted, that of reproduction, is carried out in and by
the Printing Services Division (PSD) of the Office of Logistics
in DDS. While a limited number of rudimentary maps and cartograms
are produced in graphics units outside of CD/BGI they are exceptions
and are not included in this discussion. It is the development of
thematic mapping practiced in CD/BGI today, which is
of quality for such mapping, with which this history
A brief expansion of the phases of production of
the Standard
is concerned.
thematic maps,
including some subsidiary activities, is presented here before
going into the more typically historical presentation of the
subject.
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II A. Compilation
There are several different activities in the compilation phase
and they are all characteristically performed by one I.O. (Cartographer),
hereafter referred to as a compiler, for each map project. This one
aspect is enough to make thematic mapping in C.I.A. unique as other
producers of such maps usually divide this phase among several
individuals. Compilation is performed in the Cartographic Research
Branch (CD/R) of the Cartography Division.
As CD/BCI performs mostly in a support role it reacts to
requests for maps placed on it by other units in the C.I.A. or other
U. S. Government Offices. Requests are evaluated by the CD/R and
the appropriate response determined.
In some cases the request is presented in a complete package
and little work is needed on the part of the compiler, in other
cases the request is quite nebulous and the compiler is faced with
a much more extensive problem . In any event the compiler conducts
the necessary research, often in a wide range of source materials, to
enable him to prepare a map to meet the needs of the requester. This
may involve little more than the development of basic map data to pro-
vide a suitable background for the requestors subject matter, or it
may involve the compiler's developing the requester's subject matter
as well.
The compiler is responsible for designing the map to achieve the
most effective presentation of the subject or theme, the most
efficient means of construction, and reproduction.
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The compilation phase culminates in the preparation of a hand-drawn
map (a manuscript map or worksheet) which contains all the data that
is to be included in the final printed maps. The compiler prepares
written instruction (specifications) to the Technical Support Branch
(CD/T) for the construction (drafting) of the various drawings which
make up the map and from which the printed map will be made.
After the map is drafted the compiler is responsible for the
review and edit of the drawings to be sure that the specifications
have been adhered to and that it will fulfill it designed objective.
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11 B. Construction
The construction (drafting) phase is performed in the Technical
Support Branch of the Cartography Division (CD/T). This phase
consists of those technical/mechanical operations which are conducted
to make final drawings of the map from the manuscript map and speci-
fications prepared by CD/R. After editing in CD/T to determine that
it meets CD quality standards. The subject of construction is given
detailed treatment, in a separate history.
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11 C. Editing
Editing of the map prior to reproduction is necessary to assure
substantial and technical accuracy of the map and that it will meet
the objectives of the intelligence project for which it is being
prepared. Editing of the drafting aspects of the map is done in
CD/T. CD/11 edits the map for 'substantial accuracy, and adherence to
drafting specifications, and the design of the map; the requester is
also drawn into the editing operation.
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II D. Reproduction
In order for thematic maps to be utilized in intelligence, they
need to be reproduced (printed) in suitable form, and in a sufficient
number of copies to satisfy the consumers of the intelligence. A
number of different reproduction systems are utilized depending on
the number of copies needed and the complexity of the map. The
reproduction method to be used is selected by CD/R, frequently in
consultation with CD/T and PSD, and instructions for reproduction
are prepared in CD/R.
The principal reproduction facility used by CD is PSD. Some
special jobs have been done in other U.S. Government Agencies
which have capabilities not found in PSD. CD presently has no
reproduction facilities of its own which would permit the printing
of finished maps.
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II E. Special Units
Some request placed on CD do not require that the usual production
phases be retained. Special units ad hoc task forces have been
established to facilitate the production of such projects.
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11 F. Training
All personnel in CD/BC-1 have related training and usually some
significant experience prior to joining the Division. Compilers
have geographic research and cartography training. Draftsmen are
trained in drafting, usually cartographic drafting. An extensive
program of training is carried out for all personnel after entering
on duty in order to fit them into the Division Program. Additional
training is conducted to keep CD personnel abreast: of new develop-
ments in their resPective specialized fields.
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II G. Relationships with Other Offices
CD/BGI maintains active working and consultative relationships
with other offices in C.I.A., other U. S. Government Offices, and
with private mapping organizations. Products are exchanged, Services
rendered, and Consultations are conducted concerning new methods,
materials, and techniques.
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III. A Page 1
:III. A. Laying The Foundations 1941-45
Thematic Mapping as presently known in the CIA had its origin in
the Coordinator of Information (C.O.I.) in July 1941. The need for a
coordinated intelligence service in the United States Government was
recognized amidst the gathering clouds of World War II.in the later 1930's.
The eventual result was a Presidential Order establishing the C.O.I.
0
under the direction of Col. William J. Donavan who had been largely
responsible for recognizing the need and for recommending ways to meet it.
0
Col. Donavan, a well known figure from World War I, was a prominent
lawyer with extensive contacts in academic circles In staffing the new
kind of Agency, Col. Donavan drew heavily upon established scholars with
varying disciplinary and regional specialties.
was the first geographer to be recruited. He in
turn recommended another prominent geographer;
to develop what became the
in the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) of the C.O.I.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
Geography Division
(b)(3)
a geographer who was especially interested in cartography was
invited to join the group and became the first chief of the Cartography
Section in October 1941. Others who joined the Section in this early
period were
The latter was to become the Chief of Cartography Section at
the end of World War II and continue in that function as thematic mapping
developed through successive organizations until 1965.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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M. A. Page 2
The Cartography Section was founded for the purpose of compiling,
designing and drafting maps and charts for the use of the Coordinator of
Information. The idea that the C.O.I. would need maps and charts was
perhaps a reflex action. The presence of professional geographers
(voracious and critical consumers of maps) in the especially in
the Geography Division and in the Cartography Section,would, however,
insure that the maps produced would be geographically soundiand accurate,
and of a high level of technical excellence. Early in 1942 the Section's
products began to circulate widely in the War and Navy Departments,
resulting in requests for thematic maps from various branches of the
military Services. Other agencies learned of the maps produced in C.O.I.
and began to ask for this kind of map. So, the purpose was expanded to
include production for other appropriate U.S. Government agencies as it
lay within the capability of the Cartography Section to do so.
The basic approach to thematic mapping and its organization for
production were established by early 1942 under the leadership of
In addition, many of the personnel who helped carry thematic
mapping to its present level of development in the C.I.A. were brought
into the new organization early durin eadership (1941-1945).
A few of these are on duty today and others have recently retired. Many
others contributed significantly during this period and returned to more
academic pursuits upon the termination of World War II.
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III. A. Page 3
The Cartography Section was organized for the purpose of compiling,
designing, and drafting custom-made intelligence maps, for which there
was a definite need. In the first weeks of its existence the Section
was faced with two major tasks. One task was to handle the large flow
of requests for presentation materials for Col. Donovan and for maps
to illustrate Geography Division reports. About two-thirds of the time eF
the Geographic Reports Section was devoted to the compilation of maps
which the Cartography Section had to draft. The result of this flow of
work was to cause the poorly organized Section to become a custom drafting
unit before it could get its breath and decide what it would become. The
original members of this Section were too well trained trained in geography,
too imaginative,to be satisfied with drafting maps others had compiled.
The urgency of the second task, that of establishing policies and procedures
and organizing for efficient production of intelligence maw, was made very
clear by the undesirable trend toward becoming a service organization. The
second task consisted of the definition of the relationship of the Cartography
Section to the rest of C.O.I. and other offices, determination of it's role
in supplying intelligence maps in support of the war effort, dIvision of
the mapping function into appropriate phases for accurate and efficient
production, the recruitment of appropriate personnel, and it's training,
the acquisition of space and equipment. These two major tasks, production,
and organization had to be undertaken more or less simultaneously; under
the pressure of wartime emergency and with the dedication of all hands
they were accomplished.
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III. A. Page II
The Cartography Section was organized on a basic principle; that
of the complete separation of map compilation (research) and map construction
(drafting). No.other mapping organization had ever existed based on the
principle of separation of the basic phases of map construction. There
was also a national lack of cartographic training especially in the area
of thematic mapping. Consequently there was no source to which the
Cartography Section could look for personnel for staffing or guidance
in the detailed establishment of policies and procedures.
The organizers of this new activity were professional geographers
who were familiar with established mapping operations and of the short
comings of many existing maps in conveying information. They had individual
experience in making maps to support their own geographic research activities,
maps which were special subject or thematic maps. Lacking precedent for
the kind of mapping organization that was being organized they decided
to avoid the defects in established napping organization which were in-
efficient or utilized poorly trained personnel.* The separation of the
compilation and construction phases permitted the focus of professional
(research) and technical (construction) personnel on the respective phases,
which they were best qualified to do. Consequently professional personnel
were recruited for their geographic knowledge and research ability, and
technical personnel were recruited for their ability to use drafting tools
and hopefully some design ability. After recruitment it was also necessary
to train these individuals (!) in their respective phases of production
to produce intell5r-ence maps which were c::og;raDhically and visually sound.
4c.The Map Division Branch of Research and Analysis September 1943 pll
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III. A. Page 5
Another basic principle adopted in these first months was that
the intelligence map should be a self sustaining or complete intelligence
document in itself. When removed from any document which it supported
it would tell a story by itself; while the intelligence map would support
a documentary presentation, and be a part of it, it would not need the
document to support it as it would tell a whole story by itself.
IY(-e
The adoption of this principles coupled with the professional and
technical competence of Cartography Section personnel prevented the
Section from becoming a strictly service unit, and enabled it to take
its place as a contributing partner in the production of intelligence
and lead to the initiation of intelligence contributions in map form by
the Cartography Section throughout its history.
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III. B. 1 Page 1
%
III. B. The Evolution of the Basic Organization
- 1. The Coordinator of Information
With the establishment of the Cartography Section in October
1942 and the immediate requests made on it for cartographic service it
was necessary to set policies, to organize for production, and to pro-
duce almost simultaneously. As stated earlier, two basic decisions
made at this time largely set the pattern for the subsequent practice
and development of thematic mapping in the C.O.I. and its successor
organizations to the present time in the C.I.A. The decision to divide
the two basic. operation in map making and to perform them in distinctly
separate units is the one..to be considered here.
Prior to the establishment of the Cartography Section relatively
little thought had been given to the organization of intelligence carto-
graphy. In fact the whole problem of intelligence, at least in the
United States, was not well understood. There were three general
methods of producing maps in practice at that time. The commercial
method of mapping utilized highly supervised compilation by relatively
poor personnel. The academic practice was to have a professional research
man and a draftsman working shoulder to shoulder. A third method of mapping
was that in which the professionally trained cartographer compiled, designed,
and drafted his own map. The first method lacks the quality of personnel
that is necessary for intelligence cartography (thematic mapping); it was,
however, s'Ated to such more routine operations as the Army 1.18:0 Service
and the Hydrographic Office. The academic method is inefficient and is
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III. B. 1 Page 2
subject to inconsistency of accuracy and presentation. The third method
was very little practiced in the United States and was ruled out.
It was necessary then to evolve a system of cartography for
the 0.0.1. which could operate in the field of intelligence. It would
need to produce maps which were geographically and visually sound, and
to produce them rapidly on a wide variety of topics. The two basic
operations in map making were recognized as(beinecompilation, and
construction; the first of these is largely a professional research pro-
cess and the other is more a technical/mechanical process. It was de-
cided to separate these processes into two distinct units staffed by
appropriately qualified personnel. This would enable personnel to
focus on those parts of the process which they could do best, and pro-
duction should be more efficiently controlled with a resultant high
level of accuracy, consistency of presentation, and production.
The compilation operation was assigned to the compilation unit.
The personnel of this unit were recruited for their geographic knowledge
and research ability. The mission of this unit was to compile, design,
and prepare drafting specifications for a wide range of special subject
maps for intelligence purposes. The compilation unit was organized in
C c h
sub-units, or teams, consisting of
imilarly qualified cartographers
under the direct supervision of a Sr. 6artographer. This was done in
order to establish close personal supervision and to insure consistency
in work and product. Eb attempt was made to orcanize the sub-units on
a topical or regional basis. AssiGnments of projects were made on the
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III. B. 1 Page 3
basis of workload, complexity of the projects, and the relative experience
and ability of the individual cartographer. The three compilation sub-
n
units* reported directly to the Section Chief; there was no chief of
compilation subordinate to the chief of the Cartography Section.
The second major operation in the map making process was
� 1 Ceer�flls:,.-'0x.1,;.1
concurrently organized as the Construction Unit. It's mission was to
perform those technical/mechanical tasks necessary to prepare finished
map drawings (fair drawings) from work sheets and specifications produced
by the compilation unit(s). The larger part of it's personnel were
designated as cartographic draftsman and were grouped in a drafting
sub-unit which produced fair drawings ready for reproduction. The
cartographic draftsman had varied experience and training; a few were
draftsman, some had been artists, all had some familiarity with the
usual drafting tools, and all were flexible.
A second sub-unit in the Construction Unit was the Composing
Room which was established in the Spring of 1942 when a small letter
press was procured. This unit was staffed by experienced printers and
An organization chart of 1 July 1944 shows three units although
they are referred to a- sub-unit in accompanying text. The relationship
to the Chief of the Cartography Sectio