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Document Creation Date: 
March 16, 2022
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March 29, 2016
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Publication Date: 
June 24, 1970
Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 SU BJECT A 2. When to present the I Historical Officer. eats: ais : eroposed notary 24 Juan 1970 Inn of Map Library Division her th OBGV. proposed outline for the in Map Reference Services, 1945 to the together with \and IMO and Staff views Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee 1 - Mr. Moberg - OD/CRS WJMoberg :fjc i.VALTEit J. MOBlinG DD1 Historical officer Chairman, DD1 Historical Board SEAT Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 Crni 31524g o Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 fv7'rvIT' 70 NUMORAflW4 �T 1. The aubJect Taank you. Attachment: ais : Outline of "Dove lawmen Et Map Services, 1246 to the 1- r int" by 1 tline1 rcula review and Oa V WALTER J. MtBQ DI Histories!. Officer Chairman, EID1 Historical P.oerd Distribution: 1 - Addressees 1 - Mr. Moberg 2 - OD/CRS (b)(3) (b)(3) b)(3) S7CRET Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 CI ?fin MET Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Draft Cartographic Support to Clandestine Qporations 1947 through 1970 A DDI Historical Monograph OBGI CD/R April 1971 CEPpl:T Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C0318855 8 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 ar.1.0:1 Contents Page I. Introduction . . . � 0 � OOOOOOOOOOO 1 II. Early OSS Experience with Cartographic Field Support A. The OSS Cartographic Organization B. The Formation of Map Division Outposts C. Cartographic Support at the Outposts . III. Transition Period from OSS to CIA � � � � � A. Relative Little Support Between 1945 and Early 1950's B. Early Contacts and.Compartmentation Problems 4 14. 14. 5 7 7 8 IV. Guatemala Operations, 1954 11 A B. Headquarters Support C. Assistance at the Task Force Field Headquarters 12 D. Other Support Recommended 13 I 0 � S � 0 OOOOOOOOO 0 V. The Tibetan Operation A. Background - p. 1. The Tibetan Situation in 1959 � . . . . 2. The CIA Role B. Training Support 1. Training TDY's 2. The Nature of the Training C. Headquarters Support 1. 2. 3. The 1:1,000,000 Map Series The 1:r00 00 Map Series OOO000 .0 0 11 11 14 4 15 16 16 17 19 19 20 21 F fl � Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 rkm7,1 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 VI. D. Cuban Feedback Operations, 126071963 Page 21 23 A. Support Through Geography Division 23 B. Support to the Task Force Situation Room . . 24 C. Other Support 25 1. The Electronic Facilities Atlas 25 2. The Grid Problem 26 VII. Saigon Station Support 27 A: Station Buildup 1964-1966 27 B. The Station's Attempt to Produce Its Own Maps 28 C. Recognition of the Need for Cartographic Support 29 D. TDY's to Saigon in 1966 and 1967 32 1. Survey of Station's Requiremerts and Interim Recommendations 32 n du 4-.0 Aothitico aild Negoiidons 35 3. Follow up Response at Headquarters � � � 37 I. A Second TDY 39 E. Map Specialist Position in Saigon, 1967-1970 4o F. Personnel Reduction and the Declire of the Program, 1970 . . . . VIII. Conclusions Appendixes -A. List of Persons Interviewed n. Source References 42 45 49 50 Figure 1. Tibetan a. Illustrations 18 Trainees at Colorado Base Site Classroom Training Using Maps and Models 18 b. Field Training (W(1 ) 18 (10)(3) Field Exercise c. 18 - iv - Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 etraRZ7 Attachments 1:1,000,000 Tibetan Map Series Sample. (Roman) 1:1,000,000 Tibetan Map Series Sample (Tibetan) Final Report on Cartographic Support for the Saigon Station South Vietnam - Provincial LAps, Septathber 1967 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 ornelo�r Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 I. Introduction This monograph will attempt to describe the type of cartographic support provided the Clandestine Services in their operations which was different from support provided to other Agency components. It will not attempt to explain every map produced in support of operations, but through the selection of several key operations, it will trace the development of this support. Although it precedes the period covered by this monograph, the early experiences in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II are mentioned to provide the background for a comparison with later operational support. Compartmentation problems will be discussed in the transition period between OSS and CIA, since this is the period where they were the most serious. Support to the Guatemala operations is described because it represents support in response to a direct contact and support via a liaison-type unit. Support for Tibetan operations, which began as training support, developed into the first large scale operation involving use of all cartographic assets.. Support to Cuba continued the close working relationships that were developing between the DDP and DDI components, but didn't involve Cartography as much as Tibet. Support to Saigon Station is the last major activity discussed. Cartographic support to Saigon 1 erg-0,t-v�r ' al-LP Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Station will be treated in its broad sense, i.e., support not only served operations, but served the research, analysis, reporting, and overt collection activities of the Agency. Several programs that werq designed to provide long term assistance in operational planning should be mentioned, but will not be treated as a part of this monograph, because the cartographic contributions were not unique to the Clandestine Services. Besides, they have been adequately covered in Geography Division history.* (b)(1) (b)(3) gere all supported between 1957 and 1970. Nap contributions to these series varied from the reproduction of existing maps to the compilation of custom-made _naps for each topic. Maps in these series were very similar, corering topics such as: climate, vegetation, physiographic regions, transportation, airfields, population, ethnic groups, telecommunications, administrative divisions, economic activity, or any other subject peculiar to the particular region or country. The support to operational planning through the production of (W(1) was considerable(pp) See the monograph "Geographic Research in Support of Operational Planning 1950 - 1970" by -2 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 en PM tio nrs Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 This support, It will be There operations involved which has been similar to and closely associated with (b)(1) has had a long and fruitful history,O*3) covered in a separate Cartography Division monograph.* have been many other instances of support to clandestine and to operational related programs. Some of these have (b)(1) (b)(3) The difficulty that the author encountered in digging up information on support to Clandestine Services points up one of the problems inh !rent in maintaining closely-held, sensitive, covert (b)(1) (b)(3) activities and yet requiring timely and professional support from non-covert sJurces. Many of the records are lacking in information and detail and had to be supplemented largely through personal experience or through personal interviews. Where detail is adequate, it is due to the author's participation in the support or the excellent memories of other participants. Where detail seems inade- quate, the available participants are few and the documentation is sparse. See "Cartographic Support 1953-1967" by 3 (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) ' Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 ra Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 ILLY SAA IV 1, II. Early OSS Experience with Cartographic Field Support A. The OSS Cartograllhic Organization The present Cartography Division had its early beginnings in October of 1941 as one of three sections of the Geography Division, -, Research and Analysis Branchj, Between October 1941 and January 1942 the Coordinator of Information (COI). and his staff were occupied with the organization of the Cartography Section. (b)(3) Staffing, equipment, training, and the establishment of procedures were necessary before the Section could begin to operate. Most of the procedures developed in this period, with some refinements added pdicll, formed the basic philosophy of the pzeseni, Division. i / A review or the minutes of the Cartographic Section's meetings would show a great deal of similarity in content to minutes from meetings held thirty years later. / B. The Formation of Man Division Outposts In January 19113, the Geography Division was replaced by the 'Map Division with little first field support effect on the Cartography Section. The of the Map Division was undertaken in the summer of 1943 when was assigned to New Delhi, (b)(3) and then to Kandy, under General Wedameyer. Later in 1943, Captain was assigned to Cairo and (b)(3) (b)(3) was sent to establish a map outpost in Algiers. In early 1944, E17-1r Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Alb ETC r WAS Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 %V&A kl Map Division personnel began arriving in London where the major field. activity was to be centered. By October 1944 the London outpost had reached a strength of The Map Division outposts were established to support military and OSS field operations by supplying maps map information, and 17 constructing naps and models. Collecting foreign maps and map intell- igence was also a part of this responsibility. The outposts varied from one or two man operations, to large contingents, such as London. Their work varied in scope, nature, and duration. Outposts existed at one time or another, in North Africa at Algiers and Cairo; in Europe at Bari, Caserta, Berne, London, Paris, Rome, and Weisbaden; in Asia at Chungking, Kiun-mlng, New Delhi, and Kandy; and also one at Honolulu. LI/ In the Map Information Section (MAPIS) of the Map Division, an Outpost Desk was established to perform the following functions: "(1) to maintain administrative and professional relationships between the Map Division, Washingtoniand its several field operations and outposts; and (2) to indoctrinate Map Division employees going abroad in their duties and (3) to serve as a channel between the out- post and the home office. S / C. CartograT.hic Support at the Outposts In theory, each outpost was a Map Division in microcoLm, using methods identical to those in Washington. Some of the small outposts 5 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 er:PPE:11 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 had to eollibine the variety of functions of the Map Division in one individual. It was necessary that the outposts improvise and make do with whatever equipment was available. They were trained to perform all the skills, professional as well as sub-professional, necessary to complete a map from beginning to end. The on-the-spot cartographic support provided by the outpost officers was an early example of how cartographers with professional geographic backgrounds and cartographic skills could provide close support to operational planning. The outpost officers worked closely with the operations officers. For example, in Kandy, assisted OSS detachments in planning clandestine operations in Southeast Asia by locating Lcld:beLs, debriefing local assets, and prz.?aring maps. Maps were also constructed in the field to accompany re2orts which were produced as part of the Map Division's reporting and analysis function. 6 / 6 erririrr (1S.:AnWi Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 VEPPKI Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 III. Transition Period from OSS to CIA A. Relatively Little Supkort Between 1945 and Early 1950ts After the end of World War II, OSS was abolished and demobil- ization took place at a rapid rate. Many of the military personnel returned to academic or to other peacetime pursuits. The carto- graphy component and its related components remained in operation under the Interim Research Intelligence Service (IRIS). The Depart- ment of State offered another temporary home for the cartographers and geographers, and they remained there until their transfer into the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) and to the Central Intelligence -t n V .... . ... , aduJ.J. pe.ciuu iiere were five physical relocations. '7 / Because a considerable core of OSS personnel remained with the cartography unit through this unsettled transition period, a fair amount of continuity was maintained. This was not necessarily the case for other OSS components. If it were not for the demand for maps especially in the Far East, and_by, the predecessor to the National Intelligence Survey (NIS), the Joint Army Navy Intelligence Survey (JANIS), very little other intelligence work would have been done. Operations support would also have been nonexistent if there had not been the early personal contact between OSS operations officers and the cartographers. - 7 - Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 repix,..#4u,�.., After the establishment of CIA in the fall of 1947 the cartography unit found a permanent home and the opportunity to build a foundation for a lasting intelligence mission. The late 19402s and early 1950's were a period of NIS and other base map development. There were the individual country maps which formed the base for building intelligence themes for the NIS and for a11 other production components in the Agency. The early 1950's marked the turning point from little to considerable support to the early Clandestine Services.* E./ 6,4E,N.A1s V102.) Most of this early support took the form of )map reques4no different crip,",-CIAJoYC 4aari:that provided all the operating offices of the Agency. Operational support was given under extreme compartmentation restrictions. B. Early C)ntacts and Compartmentation Problems Many of the contacts with the ClandeStine Services in the early 1950's were in the form of requests for large scale map series on operational target areas. In some cases support was needed to reproduce map sheets or to print map sheets Most of the operational officers were unaware of the existence of a cartographic unit and thought only in terms of using existing maps produced by the Army Map Service or reproducing foreign map series found in the Map Library. of When requests for maps to be specially prepared, such as a study (b)(1) for possible operational use, the request from 0/PC (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) .kt At this time the Office of Special Operations (0/S0) and the Office of Policy Coordination (0/PC). - 8 " Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 si7$.1nr12 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 in June 1951 came through the Geography Division. 9 / All questions pertaining to the request were channeled through Geography Division personnel in order to restrict the contact with the requester. This procedure was employed throughout the early years of contact and probably developed for several reasons. The Clandestine Services wanted to limit their contacts to 4s few people as possible, and the geographers were usually contacted first where geographic studies were involved that required supporting maps. The geographers levied the requests for the supporting maps and often became the sole contact with the requester. This approach by the Clandestine Services developed an internal compartmentation reaction in the Cartography Division. Individual won--; limitcd a few i;tixi,u6rupher6. Since many of tne requests involved support by the Geography Division, cartographic research and compilation of data was done by the geographers and only the construction of the maps was left for the Cartography Division. This, in effect, cut out any contribution by the compilation units. As a result, Cartography Division construction personnel became the sole contact with the operations officers. Areas were closed off and individuals isolated while working on the projects. Monthly report reference to titles, nature of support, and requesting personnel revealed little information. Some of the early requests for geographic or cartographic support were disguised by asking for support on several areas when only one was -9- � Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 1 required. Occasionally, attempts were made to by-pass supervisors to further limit the number of people involved. Relaxation of compartmentabion was dealt a further setback during the Senator McCarthy era when everyone was led to believe that there were communists or fellow travelers throughout the Federal government. It was even more difficult to develop a close support relationship under conditions of mutual distrust. A few partial breakthroughs occurred, but it wasn't until the late 1950's that the full assets of the Division were used to support clandestine operations. -10- or.9771. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 "r.mnr"a� Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 IV. Guatemala Operation b 1954 A. Background In early 1954, due to the rapidly developing communist threat in Guatemala, CIA became involved in the opposition to the communist-cis backed regime of jacobo Arbenz Guzman. The opposition was led by an army colonel, Carlos Castillo Armas; The planning and execution of the operation took place in the first six months of 1954. In June 1954 Arbenz was overthrown and replaced by a military junta led by Armas. B. Headquarters Sup2prt The Foreign Intelligence Staff of DD U had a unit, established in 1952, that was responsible for obtainiig operational support from other Agency components. This unit, known as RQM/OIS for Requirements and Operational Intelligence Support, provided the liaison function between DDI components and the operationg Divisions. In early 1954( HAA401(-) �-\,-,contact walsamith Chief of the Western Hemisphere (b)(3) ' Branch of the Geography in search. of available map Division, ORB, coverage of Guatemala. Map coverage at that time was extremely inadequate aS well as _La/ inaccurate. One of the most useful small scale maps was the Esso road map. The approach taken by of (b)(3) RQM/OIS was to request raw data and to divulge only the information necessary to obtain the data. As a result, very little of the evaluating - 11 e:11.0 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 OL.U112..1 or analytical ability of the geographers was used. Because of the inaccuracy of much of the data, this would have been an important function. Much of the geographic and map support was handled in this. manner. Fortunately, there was some direct contact between the .11 I chief operations, officer and the Cartography Division. C. Assistance at the Task Force Field: Headquarters In January of 1954 contacted the Cartography Division in search of support for his Guatemala Task Force field head- quarters located had been involved in operations (W(1) in Korea during the Korean War where he had developed an appreciatiolom3) of close cartographic and photo intelligence support. No nap and grid prepared for his situation room at his Task Force headquarters. _IL/ Arrangements were made for Deputy Chief of the Development and Construction Branch to visit the base and construct the map. After arrived at the base and was given a briefing of the operation and the purpose of the map, he immediately realized ...that this would be a major undertaking. Because of the urgent need for the map, he worked long hours and was able to condense a several week job into one week. Using small scale source maps the map was enlarged block by block and painted on. Homosote board and mounted on the wall. The map contained all the basic features, with a terrain shaded background and an arbitrary reporting grid. This grid was used for recording data supplied by radio from teams in Guatemala. Field - 12 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 Nrn 711" Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 units were supplied wit' maps that contained a matching grid. The map and its overlay data became the focal point for following the progress of the entire Guatemala operation. .13/ After the successful conclusion of the operation the map was dismantled and used in a White House briefing given by CIA for President Eisenhower and the National Security Council. Hi D. Other Support Recommended While was at the base he was approached by members of the Task Force who were working with aerial photography and needed assistance in its use. He suggested that they contact the photo Intelligence Division for support. Subsequently, the photo interprp-hpinq and geographers were able to update many of the features; especially roads, on the existing maps. - 13 - Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 V. The Tibetan Operation A. Background 1. The Tibetan Situation in 1959 Since the Chinese Communist occupation of Tibet in 1950, relations between the Chinese and Tibetans were tense and potentially explosive. In the Seventeen-point Agreement of 1951, China was to have suzerainty over Tibet, but Tibet would retain control over its internal government, religion, and customs. Events proved that the Chinese Communistylever intended to provide real autonomy for Tibet. At first, they exercised restraint with the Tibetans, but gradually as they consolidated their position and began to tighten their grip on all controls, Tibetan discontent grew. In 1955 and 1956 fighting had broken out in Kham and Amdo areas of eastern Tibet. Guer lla uprisings were met with increased military action against the villages and monasteries. By 1959 gueAlla activity had spread to central Tibet and relations between Chinese and Tibetans became openly strained. Tibetan fears for the safety of the Dalai Lama in March 1959 created an air of confusion and distrust in Lhasa, which led to the shelling of the Norbu Lingka, the Dalai Lama's summer palace. On 17 March the Dalai Lama and his entourage slipped out of Lhasa. They were joined by a protective force of gue 'llas and made their way toward India. On 18 April the Dali Lama arrived in Tezpur, � Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 India after an arduous journey through difficult terrain. After the excape of the Dalai Lama the Chinese lost no time in abolishing all Tibetan government and establishing a military dictatorship. Chinese troops were quartered in all major towns and sought out guer llas throughout the countryside and along the frontiers of India. 2. The CIA Role The United States Government contacts with the Dalai Lama, and the encouragement of Tibetan anti-communist resistance date back to 1950. In 1951 a major committment to support the Dalai Lama and his entourage was made on the condition that he leave Tibet. He decided to return to Lhasa and try to woxk for his people under the Communists. in 19)6 he visited nadia and again contacted the U.S. representative to seek a renewal of the commitment, as his position was growing untenable. At this time the U.S. representative urged him to return to his country where it was believed that he would be more effective, but should he not return assistance would be given in obtaining asylum. zij CIA began supporting the Tibetan resistance in the autumn of 1957 after discussions with the Dalai Lama's representatives in India in 1956. -15- epLUltk Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 STMI1511 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 (b)(1) (b)(3) IL/ One part of the program was to "train leaders and cadres who are parachuted into Tibet to instruct and advise the resistance forces in how to use their men and the, air dropped supplies in guerilla action against the Chinese Communists. Some of these men are trained as radio operators and thus become agents providing a communication link between the resistance forces and the United States source of their supplies". training program relocated to / The Far East Division of DDP began the .L L' B. Training Support 1. Training TDY's (b)(1) covert(b)(3) in 1957. In late 1958 the training was and in the fall of 1959 to a high altitude (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) The initial contact for cartographic support came soon after(b)(3) the training site was moved tc of FE/DDP approached the Cartography Division looking for In March 1959, In the training program at made the first of a series of trips to for a course In July 1959, accompanied him on another trip tc assistance to develop procedures deputy, In the interim at (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) Headquarters, work had begun on a series of operational maps. Also (b)(3) several maps were prepared to assist in 2ield exercises. In Aug fus.omi (b)(3) t,-t= Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 r,,:64Z4t1 during another training exercise, these maps were used by Messrs. and found extremely useful. In the fall of 1959, field training was moved to th base, a site February/March more comparable and July/August conducted to terrain conditions of 1960, Messrs in Tibet. In (b)(3) (b)(1) In (b)(3) was trained by a two-man cartography March 1963 another group team, but this time Deputy Chief (b)(3) of the Special Support Branch (CD/X) replaced The final TDY was made by (b)(3) (b)(3) when the last Tibetan in July of 1964 group was trained. The training base was closed in November 1964. 242 2. The Nature of the Training (b)(1) (b)(3) - 17 - , Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 ornn Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 (b)( (b)( Since the instruction was conducted through interpreters, and the trainees were semi-literate, it was necessary to keep all instruction at a very simple level. Whether a concept was understood could be determined only through the classroom or field exercises. In spite of their low levels of education and lack of familiarity with modern technology, the trainees were remarkably alert, intelligent, and eager to learn. C. Headquarters Supsort 1. The 1:1,000,000 Map Series After the initial training TDY in early 1959, it was evident that a set of operational maps would be needed in Roman and in Tibetan script. Map sourceon this area were extremely limited and based on early exploration. There were many inaccuracies, but these would have to be accepted initially and revised when information became available. The 11,000,000 International Map of the 'world series produced by the � Army Map Service was used as the first base. These maps (11) were - 19 7".1T4 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 ornprT Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 updated with all of the intelligence data available. New Chinese roads, airfields, and a shaded relief background were added. Shaded relief was vital, because contours were a difficult concept for the Tibetans. Monasteries were also vital, since these were features as familiar to the Tibetans as any feature on the map, and were ideal points for orientation. Tibetan script was prepared The script was used on the versions to printed on cloth and paper for field use. A reporting grid was added and templates were made for use with the grid. The basic research for this first map series was done by the Divisionts Far East Branch, and marks one of the first times that the total Division's assets were brought to bear on an operational problem. 2. The 1:500,000 Map Series The 1:1 COO 000 map series was a useful series, but was lacking in positional as well as relative accuracy. In 1960 the use of the U-2 overhead photography was extremely restricted. The Cartography Division had only a limited number of people cleared for working with this material. It became evident that this material offered .the quickest solution to providing the most accurate operational naps. The Aeronautical Chart and Information Center (ACIC) in St. Louis, Missouri was requested to provide a series of these maps (10) at the scale of 1:500,000. a3/ By September 1960 most of the map series had been completed with partial coverage by U-2 photography. be(b)(1) (b)(3) - 20 'orNt" Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Or,PPICT Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 It pointed up cross errors in the original map series, but lacked the detail in cultural features, since many of these could not be identified from the air. A closer working relationship between the research cartographers and the ACIC photo interpreters would have provided an even more useful set of operational maps. A new type of compartmentation had prevented the best possible cartographic support. 3. (b)(1) (b)(3) D. Feedback Feedback from cartographic support to operations is usually infrequent. For the Tibetan operation it came fairly soon and for several years proved extremely useful. - (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) � Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 errAnry, Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 - 22 - OLiAa.1 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 corinnri� Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 VI. Cuban Operations 1960-1963 * A. Support Through Geography Division The Western Hemisphere Branch of the. Geography Division was abolished in August 1957. Fortimately, while branch, the Branch became active again.** assigned to another had been maintaining the files, and in 1959 One of the first projects after becoming active was a series of operation planning studies on Cuba for WE/DDP. Cartographic support for. the studies included maps on airfields, transportation, physiographic regions, vegetation, coastal characteristics. There were also maps on the cities of Ealiuna, Santiago and selected areas such as the Isle of Pines and the Zapata Swamp. These studies were a part of a contingency series on selected Latin American countries. One of the first needs at the start of the Cuba operations was for the bast large scale maps. In response to this need 222 sheets of the 1:50,000 map series on Cuba was reproduced. Cartographic support in reproducing this series was .primarily in the preparation of the maps for printing. ZL/ The Cuba operations had several different names between 1960 and 1966-- WH-4, Task Force W, Special Affairs Staff, WE/Special Affairs, WH/Cuba, and WH/Cuban Operations Croup. The major carto- graphic support activity took place in the 1960-1963 period. The Branch wasn't officialre-established until 23 June 1961. -23- Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 r. et n Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 During this period became the principal intelligence Research officer for Cuban operational support in the Geographic (b)(3) Area (GRA). Her Branch eventually was enlarged to people and (b)(1) (b)(3) most requests for support were funneled through her. It wasn't until January 1963 that the Cartography Division formed a Western Hemisphere Branch by removing that area from the responsibility of the Far East Branch. became the Chief of the new Branch, but by then most of the Cuban activity had declined. B. Support to the Task Force Situation Room - WI( &Its tif In 1960 a situation room was organized for the Cuba operation. (b)(3) (b)(3) The operations offinpr n nhay.rr,, r,.a.vtAwka1L,L1 4LAJ1U ViCtZi a fcamer member of the Cartography Section in OSS. OSS background experience and contacts in the Cartography Division provided the Task Force with a valuable asset. He was able to breat -hrough the DDI/DDP communication barrier. The demands on Cartography by the situation room were consid- erable. Three hundred and nineteen sheets of the 1:50,000 map series were laminated and also reproduced in black and white. Seven hundred sheets of 145 symbol cuts were also prepared for use on the situation room maps. _LL/ Many special maps were prepared for the situation room. One wa,.; a map with a detailed grid for use in plotting all naval, maritime, and small boat activity in Cuban waters. During the Cuban missile crisis/the situation room became the main center ,�5c,1 el Z (b)(3) (b)(3) - 24 - %:N11:1 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 mat .-t of activity in the Intelligence Community. A close working arrangement had developed with all the DDI components, and many ideas were generated in the support of the effort. The study and map of the Cuban caves where missiles could possibly be hidden, was an example. Another project was the detailed target folders providing all the available data on strategic installations throughout Cuba. In 1963, Task Force W became the Special Affairs Staff (SAS) and became the Chief of the Intelligence Branch. The Intelligence Branch not only maintained the situation room, but handled many of the broad intelligence activities, and provided the bridge between the operational side and the policy planners. It supported the paramilitary activity by supplying research, graphic, and other backstopping. C. Other Support 1. The Electronic Facilities Atlas In conjunction with the Economic Research Area of Office of Research and Reports (ORR) Cartography Division prepared 52 maps for -- inclusion in an atlas,The atlas covered all aspects of telecommun- ications in Cuba and was based on all the intelligence available from U.S. commercial sources as well as the Special Center sources. The atlas was completed in May 1960 after two months of concentrated effort. / In October 1962, during the missile crisis, additional -25- SIIM,11;T Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 copies had to be collated and supplementary maps added. .1.1/ 2. The Grid Problem In 1960 a problem arose over the use of the 1:50,000 map series in operational reporting. The field was using copies of early series of maps with the Lambert grid. Headquarters was using the series that the Army Map Service had reprinted with a Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid. Information relayed to the field based or. the 13TH grid, references were incompatable with the Lambert grid. The consequences could be disastcrous to the agents in the field. The operational people were made aware of this problem, but it wasn't until 1962 that action was 1".nlr" to chow graphically the mue,nitude ol tne problem. The problem was worhed out mathematically by tae Cartography and -Geography Divisions, and an index map produced with both grids. In some areas a difference of 15 kilometers was noted. (7./ -26- >-' Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 aLWALI VII. Saigon Station &wort A. Station Buildup 1964-1966 The Saigon Station grew in the mid-1960'5 as the U.S. military increased its commitment to South Vietnam. Personnel the Station grew from approximately Its personnel was significantly different strength in by late 1966. from the usual overseas (b)(1) (b)(3) station contingent, since FE/DDP could not supply enough people from the normal channels and had to draw personnel from other Divisions of the DDP, other Directorates, and from contract sources. Most of the employees in Saigon were aware of the DDI type Headquarters support, but were -u:afauallal.- will how Lo get this support in the riela, graphic support. They were also unfamiliar in U.S. agenc:les in Vietnam or in the especially cartographic and with cartographic resources Vietnamese Government, In November 1964, Chief of the Far East Branch of CD/ER visited Saigon for three days on the way to a U.N. carto- graphic conference in Manila. 301 He held discussions with the DDI representative and the chief of the newly This was to be the component that would formed be staffed by DDI personnel. In company with a member of made a quick survey of the available Saigon cartographic and graphic assets. He uncovered a _number of sources that could prove - 27- (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) p rir:r Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 helpful and left a list of all these assets with On returning to Headquarters looked into the map distribution problem with the Map Library and suggested an automatic distribution procedure that would get maps to the people that wanted them. Heretofore, maps sent out to the Saigon Station ended up with the first person who happened to see them or were never distributed. There was also confusion over the different State and Agency distribution channels down again later. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(1) which was clarified, but broke(b0) B. The Station's Attempt to Produce Its Own Maps In the 1965-1966 nerind; the Station was, charged with the responsibility of supervising the Revolutionary Development Cadre Program (RDC). In this capacity, provided field officers in charge of RDC teams in each province. Provincial maps were needed so that each officer could record his tean2whereabouts, their performance, and progress; who was at the time without knowledge of cartographic support available at Headquarters, launched a program to produce provincial maps. He procured ozalid copies of the 1:200,000 map series produced by the Vietnamese General Directorate of Land Surveys (Tong Nha Dien Dia) and then took this (b)(1) material to the -23- to (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 ZIAALIA have maps made of each province. TSD was assigned of each of the (b)(3) the task of compiling, drafting provinces (43 at that time). The and printing maps personnel were highly skilled (b)(3) artists and reproduction experts, but map design was not their special'cy. The results were a usable series of maps, but they lacked the professional cartographic touch. The maps all had fractional scale errors that would have been picked up by a cartographer. In early 1966, on being assigned to at (b)(3) Headquarters, learned of the (b)(3) Cartography Division and its capabilities. After discussions with and members of (b)(3) -no Par RPRi". PI,P1-Inh2 4- 1 T,Too - Station was needed. 31/ support to Oal6oii C. Recognition of the Need for Cartographic Sumort In Novelyber of 1965, home leave and met with size maps of South Vietnam and agreed witl returned to Headquarters on He requested a number of page to be used in reports produced by that closer liaison between was necessary. n./ the Station and Cartography Division of the Director's newly created Vietnam Affairs Staff (VAS) also visited the Far East Branch during November - 29 - SEUET (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 earrinr7 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 1965 and was extremely interested in the cartographic problems in the Vietnam area. He was concerned that the Cartography Division was not getting the latest information which was available in the field and should be used in compiling the maps on Vietnam. He wrote a memo to his Chief, Mr. Peer de Silva, who was the Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs (SAVA), outlining the problem and quoting from trip report of November 1964. proposal was: I am of the opinion that :this Agency can do better economic and political mapping of Vietnam than is currently available and that information is available in Vietnam which will make it improve the mapping. It may be that some or all of this information has been sent to Washington but, .if so, it has not reached the cartographer. my personal view is that it takes a cartographer in Vietnam with the responsibility of visiting from timc�to time the -piuvi.O.eub and updating the mapping, but this is a question that can best be decided by the DDI. It may be possible for to under- take work in the geographic area utilizing either the geographer or cartographer currently scheduled to leave in December or through the TDY of a cartographer from here. I propose that we present this problem to the DDI for solution. Mr. de Silva never passed the proposal on to the DDI, but wrote the following note tc "The Station is just not able to absorb any new tasks now - they're stretched much too thin already in doing what they are - might discuss with before he returns." The two individual mentioned as potentially able to help relieve some of this problem- when they reported to Saigon were of the Cartography Division and 1,1 � J Ch, Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 of the Geography Division. Both ended up as acting regionnl reports officers in the field assigned from ; neither was given an opportunity to devote any time to the Station's map problems.* In early 1966 with -interest expressed by VAS, the and. decided that the time had arrived to (b)(3) propose some cartographic encouragement from support to the Saigon Station. he prepared a memo to With (b)(3) (b)(3) Chief of CD, outlining the assistance that a carto- grapher could provide the Station and suggesting an initial TDY of 30 to 6o days to survey the situation and make recommendations for continud suppoit. On 20 July 1966 a meeting was called by acting for James A. Brammell as Director of (b)(3) the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence (OBGI), at which it was proposed that a cartographer be sent TDY to Saigon for three months, and the Chief of FE Division notify the DDP and the DDI of the proposal. IL/ After approval of the proposal (b)(3) suggested (b)(3) that be the initial cartographer to make the TDY 'and on 29 August an itinerary was prepared with an in Saigon of 24 September 1966. ?,9/ A stop over arrival date (b)(1) was (b)(3) Later in the 1967-1g6q period a similar sit.untinn pyiRfd with two cartographers, assigned to the field. the location of Communist both was able to devote some time to administrative units. -31- (b)(3) (b)(3) fnPIET cluhLi Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 included to review the province map series, which had been prepared by TSB, and return the reproduction materials to Headquarters. D. TDY's to Saigon in 1966 and 1967 1. Survey of Station's Requirements and Interim Recommendations first order of business on reaching Saigon Station was to make a quick survey of the map situation. Because of the dispersed nature of the Station facilities and the different Station components that required support, he decided to divide the major part of his time between At the end of one month an interim .report was prepared. MV This report became the basis for a cable back to Headquarters prepared by and also the senior DDI ndicated that the In the report representative. / Station's principal map collection consisted of out-dated map stock inconveniently located under a staircase. He further indicated that there was no -mechanism for keeping current on Headquarters cartographic programs or production, and a distribution system was lacking. He recommended that a facility be located in the main embassy building to be used by Station and State personnel, that it be stocked with the latest series of large scale maps for Vietnam and the surrounding countries, -'32- (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 nrnrPrT Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 and that there be gazetteers, atlases, and other related items available. The room could be the focal point for receiving, filing, ordering, and distributing all CIA and military cartographic productions. described where there was supporting the (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) RDC program. It had graphic capability, but needed cartographic support. (b)(1) (b)(3) The Vietnamese were developing a filing system for maps that was impractical and was based on obsolete map series. He recommended a redirection of this program to avoid wasting additional manpower and money. Concerning special cartographic services, soggested that maps, charts, and briefing aidS be prepared at the nation for VIP briefings or conferences. He pointed out that an in-house cartographer could provide help in the use of large-scale topographic maps and the associated Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid reference system. Assistance could be provided for any other peculiar cartographic problems at the Station, and those involving extensive support could be referred back to Headquarters. He referred to a visit to two regional headquarters, Nhatrang and Danang, where the field officers had expressed an enthusiastic desire for nap support and had already levied heavy requests for maps. He noted that the field also needed assistance in selecting, mounting, and overlaying -33- (b)(3) SECO Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 e&rnir,,V Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 maps, and they needed a special series of maps for use with their reports going back to Saigon0 also showed concern for the Agency's collection require- describing the type of information that was needed back at Headquarters to make accurate intelligence maps. He mentioned the inadequate coverage by th who had to procure maps for the entire Far East. He suggested that a qualified cartographic officer could supplement the duties of collection and evaluation of cartographic data for the South Vietnam area. At the conclusion of the report romised to report additional findings and make final recommendations to the Chief of Station at the end of the TDY. (See Attachment E) - 34 c;TUFT , Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 OLAntEl 2. Activities and Negotiations After explained the need for a map reference room to Station support personnel, an old storeroom on the of the EMbassy was renovated. The situation began to rapidly. Rapport was established by ground floor improve with the personnel of U.S. Army Map Depot and much of red tape eliminated in procuring topographic maps. Personal contacts were established with other U.S. agencies in Saigon that could provide valuable assistance and also be recipients of Agency produced maps. Current maps and related items ordered from Headquarters earlier began to arrive at the Station, the had a Station notice circulated, announcing of the map refereneu room and the presence or a temporary "cartographic advisor". He also sent packages of maps to all of the provinces through the regional offices. Many private map collections were gathered up from closets and corners throughout the Station and were dumped on the new mnI) reference room. All of the pent up desires and frustrations of the Station personnel concerning maps and cartographic needs inundated the new "cartographic 'advisor". It was apparent to when he was preparing the final recommendations for the Chief of Station, that there Was a strong demand at the working level for continued cartographic support. the DDI rep, knew the value of having current -35- � Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 CILL3litLi Cartography Division products as "trade goods" in his liaison work with MACV. did not fully appreciate the usefulness of the material, but saw that, it was a logical part of his branch and wanted the new map room. Unfortunately, he was not inclined to assign anyone but the lowest graded individual (GS-7) to maintain the room, even though there was a volunteer at the GS-12 level. Deputy Chief of Station, was very sympathetic to after the final the problem and suggested a talk with recommendations were made. (b)(3) (b)(3) After conversations with Messrs (b)(3) and other Station officers, job would be to sel was convinced that the toughest (b)(3) (b)(3) on the program. After read the final recommendations, he met briefly with lnd remarked (b)(3) that they were very cogent, but indicated that he had just as cogent (b)(3) a reason for wanting to keep down personnel levels at the Station. (b)(3) With this limitation in mind the other more favorably inclined individuals felt that all the work done during - not be wasted, but be continued temporarily. to assio TDY must decided his assistant, the task of receiving all new map shipments. of his Branch the task of keeping the room in order and giving out naps. Possibly one of the -36- slots could be made to accommodate. (b)(3) c971" ki 'LZIL. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 ViliAjka.1 the new responsibility when the next group of replacements came from Headquarters. 3. Follow- up Response at Headquarters On returning to Headquarters in December 1966, had a number of meetings with personnel of his office. A meeting was held with Messrs. to brief them on the TOY. These men representing office management were interested in the Saigon Station's cartographic problems but were not too optimistic about getting any professional cartographic support for (b)(3) the Station, especially in view of attitude, not to get any hopes up because probably nothing would come of the recommendations0 also met with of the Map Library to insure the (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) continued flow of maps to Saigon, and to alert Attach in Bangkok, of some of the procurement leads uncovered. lso held a meeting witl Df the DDI's office in which he described the requirements and duties of a position to man the map room and provide cartographic support. The subsequent development of this position will be explained later. He also contacted )f OTR's Vietnam orientation course to offer some briefing support on maps as a tool for the field officer, but (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) felt that there wasn't enough time to include any (b)(3) training of this type in his course., -37- SECET Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 � Wiliti During TDY, production of several map series was already ' underway in the Far East Branch of Cartography. One was the revision of the South Vietnam province This series was being produced from sent changes. difficult with format changes as well The plate separation prepared to design the maps effectively, but series produced originally (b)(1) (b)(3) the negatives (b)(1) as substantive (b)(3) made it (b)(1) a compromise rnethod(b)(3) was worked out to make two versions of the series. One version had basic and administrative data in a light grey and brown so that the maps could_ be overlaid with red, blue, or green symbols. The other version had red administrative boundaries for use as a (b)(3) reference map. The former maps would be used by province offices and by in Saigon, in reporting progress of (b)(3) the RDC proeyam. The latter version, where the boundaries were (b)(3) highlighted, were to be used by everyone interested in locating administrative units in Vietnam down to the village level. A limited number of this latter version was to be bound. Yo/ This was the only map series of its kind and was in great demand. Eventually it was revised and copied by the Vietnamese Government, completing the cycle. The second series was a regional version of the administrative maps, one for each of the four military regions (corps). This series was produced at 1:500,000 and served to consolidate infor- mation from each of the province maps into a single sheet by region. -38- Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 W-1FT ,o. Of course, an administrative map of the entire country in one sheet was also produced. 4a/ In March 1967 another series of maps was initiated as an outgrowth of both Station and Headquarters needs. It consisted of a page size map of each province and each corps to be bound in a handy notebook form. Copies were also printed in loose form. The purpose was to provide a convenient notebook size atlas for training, orientation, and reference, and to have base plates available to the intelligence production facilities on which additional data could be portrayed. Province officers in the field could also use the individual maps to illustrate their reporting. These maps proved to be popular items and 5000 copies had been dit;tributed by the end of 1970. (See AttachMent v) 4. A Second TDY was scheduled for Deputy Chief CD/F, in early 1967, with a three week stop in Saigon to continue the work started in late 1966 by .143/ When he arrived in Saigon, found that cartographic support was in great demand and he cabled back to Headquarters for a number of items. He was swamped with the same kind of requests from Station personnel seeking cartographic advice that had experienced. He wrote back "Came into the map room and got stuck for about 5 hours concerning a particular problem. I don't know -39- �CIPionr-r Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 i who these people will go to when there isn't a cartographer here, more than likely they'll just fumble around in the dark and do the best they can." 44/ TDY was another holding effort until some more . (b)(3) permanent solution could be devised to continue the Station's cartographic support. ON, E. Map Specialist Position in Saigon 1967-3970 A DDI vacancy notice WR2 'ssued on 20 January 1967 which (b)(3) described du�s as running a miniature kap reference library. 2"-L/ The grade GS-7, did not attract any qualified C:50-A-A" rayirii(ln�pg t() FITpTy m c ,+1,4", T.rn! upgrading this position until later. The position was filled by of NPIC who (b)(3) merely used the opportunity as a (b)(3) means to got to Saigon where he eventually transferred to a photo interpretation job. In February 1968 the job was advertised again, this time at the grade of GS-09 to GS-11 and as a map specialist position. The description read: Incumbent is responsible facility of the Viotram Station. Duties involve providing map support to Station elements includini the distribubion nnd nroonromont of nens. for maintaining the map reference 14(1 / Special Assistant to the Director of MGT., had replaced (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) and having more knowledge of (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: kLL,WiL map problems, rewrote the job 2016/03/07 C03188558 description. (b)(3) had arrived in Saigon in November 1967. of the Publication (b)(3) Division also of OBGI, was accepted for the nap specialist position and reported to Saigon in April of 1968. was a GS-08 (b)(3) map/graphics editor with some military experience in cartography with the U.S. Army in Tokyo. He was a significant improvement over (b)(3) and provided the Station with some graphic production capability as well as maintenance of the map room. He had no experience as a research cartographer and could only supply limited support in this area. Communications always seem to be insufficient between the field and Headquarters, and during this period there was the usual confusion. The Map Library was concerned over the lack of contact and tried to get some sort of progress report. Its efforts were never too successful and most contact had to wait until periods of home leave for Station personnel. Even though the map specialist had as part of his designated duties the running of a map library, the DDI had always made it clear that DDI personnel in Station positions were there primarily to lend support to the COS. Unfortunately, the quarterly reports pre- pared by which could have shed some light on the activities of the map specialist, were never routed to the Map Library or the Cartography Division after they were sent back to Headquarters. H7/ - (b)(3) "17 N!, Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 qL I Some of the cartographic problems that the map specialist had to wrestle with were, in some cases, difficult assignments which could have used the experience of a professional carto- grapher. Maps were produced by Cor briefing the Mission Council on inClltratio-A routes used by the Viet Cong during the Tot offensive. Keeping track of the VC infrastructure and the Liberation Committees was another difficult research problem. In addition the map specialist provided maps and related material to organizations outside the Station such as: USAID, National War College, MAW, and the National Training Center. From July through September 196?, following the Tet offensive an average ov 1000 maps were Listributed per week. This was one of the highest demand periocls. The demand dropped to an average of 4o0 naps per week durin the next quarter. Ligl As a comparison, the Headquarters Map LiJrary facility average� distribution is only slightly higher. . F. Personnel Reduction and the Decline of the Program 1970 Because of the reduction of overseas personnel, the map specialist position was not renewed at the end of tour in December 1969. After that, nrcunrT Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 WAitl took over the duties of the map reference facility. She shared these duties with two others in the section. was a member of the Cartography Division who had been sent to Saigon in an assignment other than cartography. With her profess- ional cartographic backg:roluld and grade level, GS-13, she knew the value of maps as tools to the field officer. Her fight to maintain service was a losing battle against forces out of her control, personnel in 1970. In response to Federal and Agency budget cuts, additional cutbacks were ordered at Saigon and all overseas stations looked on the map reference facility as marginal, and planned to close out the business. insist(.a un vury basic map items as a minimum, but when shc went on home leave in November 1969 more of the map cases were climin:Aed than had been planned. Later in June 1970 while 51'e on emergency leave quite a number of maps were given to MACV. Many of these were vital and had to be retrieved when she returned. Regardless of this action, the Station's demands remained as strong as ever. 411 After the final departure of in June 1970 asked to take over the remains of the map reference facility from (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) riry Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 11),Inr,i1E If this could not be done, then the map orders would have to be referred back to Headquarters. MACV already had been told that they would have to service their requests for CIA maps through their own channels. felt that cutting back any further would be impractical and decided to maintain a limited number of essential maps. He assigned the switchboard operator to watch over the map room as one of her duties, replacement, took over and the map responsi- bility at the end of 1970. Close cartographic and related map support to the Saigon Station has apparently returned to a situation similar to 1966, but he fLaal ouLeome depends on the direction ana requirements of different Station personnel as the U.S. military commitment winds down. - 44 7 - Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 ertrrine-r Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 VIII. Conclusions The early experience with OSS in supplying cartographic and related support in the field no doubt gave the early CIA carto- graphers expectations for a continued close relationship with the new Clandestine Services that were forming in the postwar intelligence organization. These expectations were soon proved in vain as compartmentation created a barrier to communicatdon. At the same time the cartographers were busy developing programs to build a base for making cartographic support a vital part of the overall intelligence production activity of the Agency. When support became necessary, the Clandestine Services (CS) attempted to provide most of it internally through organizations such as RWOIS. They were charged with getting information within the Agency as well as outside in response to the requirements of the operating divisions. Occasionally, someone would make direct contact with cartography or another DDI component, and receive close support. Of course, a little more exposure of the operational mission became necessary to insure the best support. This was against policy and took some courage on the part of operational officers. in the Guatemala operation, is an example of an officer (b)(3) who felt that close support was vital to the planning and execution of any operation. In 1959, as a result of a study by the Inspector General, WOIS - fr Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 OWUnL1 was abolished. The period between 1959 and 1963 proved, coincidentally, to be one of the most productive and one of the closests supporting periods in Cartography's relationship with the CS. Two major operations were running concurrently, Tibet and Cuba. Tibet became the first really broad support given to any operation. Cuba was an operation supported through the situation room and Geography Division, it never involved the full assets of Cartography because those assets were already spread thin with support to Tibet. This period was not without its problems. Since there was no coordinating unit, Cartography personnel often had to provide continuity in DDP programs in order to prevent duplicate requests from other operations officers. Most of tllis wnq due to the rotation of DDP personnel overseas. In September 1960, Cartography suggested a liaison position between ORR and DDP for the coordination of geographic and cartographic information. 6o/ (b)(1) (b)(3) - 46 r " fit Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 ro Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 � The Vietnam War and the build-up of the Saigon Station presented many opportunities for a wide range of close support activity, but unfortunately these never reached their full potential. With a few notable exceptions, the Vietnam War did not bring out the best in American motivations and. performance. The same could be said of the Station personnel. Agency personnel were drawn to the Vietnam assignments, not by a sense of duty, but more for personal reasons. Family problems, stagnation problems, promotion problems, financial gain, and adventurism, all were factors in their decisions. The DDP had to draft personnel from other area divisions, which also crbated a deterrent of motivation. The DDI provided its quota of personnel, but never encouraged its top analyst to take any assign- ments beyond short TDY's. Senior DDP officers were continually frustrated by the lack of sufficient ease officers and the necessity to rely on the constant turnover of personnel, with which there was no effective means of coritrol, i.e., from other career services not under the direction of the DDP. All new DDI personnel had to prove themselves before they were accepted as part of the team. These and many other factors led to the erratic cartographic and map support activity. The Vietnam War did not bring about the opportunity for a full and close support role that was experienced in OSS. The Saigon Station cartographic support activity may improve as personnel and ddrection change. In light of past experience with support to the CS, what ha been. - 47 0701-07-r Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 learned, and how should onGI, and CD respond to CS support require- ments in the 1970's? Certainly, compartmentation is not the problem it used to be, although it could reoccur. Support characterized by internal OBGI or CD compartmentation has proved to be an overly reactionary response and has never been an efficient way to use office assets. Training programs such as the Midcareer Executive Deelopment Course, where middle level officers from all Directorates have dome together in a frank review and appraisal of the total Agency, has done a considerable amount in breaking down communication barriers. The Agency has been emphasizing the need for an environment more Cond- ucive to communication, the necessity of maintaining a unity of function and purpose, and the discouragement of tribalism. OBGI must maintain closer liaison with the CS, using the offices s much as possible. Cartography's support of the CS has had many high periods, but its support has only represented a small percentage of its total effort. Geography Division, on the other hand, must be careful that it does not become the exclusive research arm of the CS. The 1970's may see a directional change in the activities and cover status of the CS, which could have a significant bearing on the nature of future support. Regardless, if operation-91 support is required, it must be approached in OBGT as a team effort with the entire office's assets used in the most efficient and effective manner. - - Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 ----- Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Appendix A.. List of Persons Interviewed arranged. by chapter) Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 iNL,Q5M. Appendix B. Source References 1. OSS, Research and Analysis Branch. 5ranch Historic History of the Map Division 1941744, n,d., p.1, OSS, folder 46, box 32, RC Job No. 62-271, RID Archives. S. 2. Minutes, Cartography Section Conference July 18, ]942 07=R 0/Ch " files, folder: Conferences, box 5, job No. 52-7, CIA Records Center. U. 3. Map Division History, op. cit. pp. 36-37 (1 above) 4. L7 Data Sheet, Sept 45, Receipts from Outposts/Transmittal to Outposts, OSS, R and A. Map Div, ORR 0/Ch files, folder: Outpost Transmittals and Receipts, Box 5, job No. 52-7, CIA Records Center. U. 5. Nap Division history, op. 6. Interview, cit. p. 39 (1 above) with author, 5 April 1971. U. 7. Monthly Report �21:12, March 1947, ORR 0/C1 files, folder: Cartography Monthly Reports - Begin. Jan 1947 thru Dec 1947, box 2, Job No. 62-360, CIA Records Center. S. 3. Memo, Chief CD for Chief GP, 26 July 195, Sub: History statemen:, Cartography Division November 1950-July 1954, ORR files, folder: Organization & Management Surveys, box J, Job No. 63-314, CIA Records Center. S. (b)(1) (b)(3) 9. 10. Interview, 11. Interview, 12. Interview, 13. Interview, 14. Interview, 15. with author, 2 April 1971. S with author, 5 April 1971. S (b)(3) with author, 13 April 1971. S. (b)(3) (b)(3) with author, 6 April 1971. S. with author (12 above) -50- (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. Ibid., p.l. 1959, CD/R OBGI files, folder: D/GC S. (b)(1) Monthly (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) S. '1971. S. (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) Monthly Repors, Reports 1959-1960. Ibid. with author, 21 'April with author 20 (13 above) 1971. April Interview, Interview, Monthly Report, Mar 1960, Op. cit. Monthly Report, Mar 1960, 2E. Monthly Report;, Sept 1960, 2E. Monthly Report, Mar 1960, 22. Monthly Report, Oct 1962, op. cit. (18 above) cit. (18 above) cit. (18 above) cit. (18 above) 29. Map 36643, October 1960, Cuba - UTM and Lambert Grids. C., NFD. 30. Memo, for Assistant Director, Research and 31. Reports, _L9 Jan , Sub: and Eastern Asia from 25 files, folder: UN Cartographic Branch Monthly Reports, folder: Branch Monthly Report on Overseas TDY to Southern Oct 1964 to 24 Dec 1964, CD/R OBGI Conference (Manila). S. June 1966, F Desk, CD/R OBGI files, Reports - 1966. S. 32. Ibid., November 1965. 33. Peer de Silva, 16 Nov 1965, sub: Current Memo, for Mapping of Vietnam, CD/R Support - Saigon. S. ()DOI files, folder: Need for Cartographic 34. Memo, Peer de Silva for 16 Nov 1965 note on form 101 attached to memo 33 above). Ti, Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 sErT 35. Memo, Chief, Support to Overseas Cartographic CD/F for Chief, CD/BGI, 16 June Stations, CD/R OBGI files, Support - Saigon. S. 1966, sub: Cartographic folder: Need for 36. Memo, Chief, FE/DDP for Acting Chief, (b)(3) FE/DDP, 21 July 1966, sub: TDY Cartographer for Saigon Station, CD/R files, folder: Need for, Cartographic Support, - Saigon. S. 37, Memo, Chief, CD/F for Chief, CD/DGI, 29 Aug 1966, sub: Tat to Saigon, Vietnam, CD/R OBGI files, folder: Need. for Cartographic Support - Saigon. S. (b)(3) 33. Memo, for Chief,aigon Station, 15 Oct 1966, (b)(3) sub: Station Cartographic Support - Interim Report, CD/R OBGI files, folder: MKL Saigon TDY. C. (b)(1) (b)(3) 39. ron Station for Headquarters, 16-17 Oct 1966, Saigon CD/R OBGI files, folder: Saigon Cartographic Support. C. 40. Bound Naps, January 1967, South Vietnam - Provincial Administrative Naps. 41. Naps 55582 thru 55585, September 1967, South Vietnam - Administrative 11-L, and IV corps A.ilitary Region2i, CD/R ODGI TfTE7. U. 42. Maps 56080-1, Apr 1967, South Vietnam - Administrative Divisions and Military Regions CD/R OBGI files. U. 43. Memo, 3 Nay 1967, sub: Report (b)(3) for Director OBI, on Foreign CD/R OBGI filPR_ (b)(1) Travel to the Far East folder: Far East Trip Reports. S. (b)(3) 44. Letter, 2 Mar 1967, personal file of auunor. U. (b)(3) -.45. Vacancy Notice Chic Administrative Staff, 0/DDI, 20 Jan 1967, sub: Positions - Saigon, CD/R OBGI files, Colder: (b)(3) 1,ap Specialist Position - Saigon. S. 46. Vacancy Notice, Chief, Administrative Staff, 0/DDI, 56b 196_87, sub: Nap Specialist, CD/R OBGI files, folder: Map Specialist Position - Saigon. S. 47. Quarterly Reports, -quarters 1968, for DDI, 3rd and 4th (b)(3� ; sub: Report of Activity, CD/R 0130I files, folder: Map Specialist Position - Saigon. S. (b)(3) �(b)(3) . -52- Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 orrmrT Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 )18. Ibid. 1.9 Interview, -with author, 15 Oct 1970. C. 50. Monthly Report, Sept 1960, op. cit. (18 above) - 53 - 'Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Foreword There are several agencies in the United States Government which are engaged in the production of maps and charts. Their product char- acteristically presents the various physical and cultural features of the earth's surface in detail, at large scale, and is produced in large quantity. The market for such maps and charts is varied and extensive. A specialized category of maps the thematic map is produced infrequently and only under special circumstances. One agency of the United States Government is unique in that it is a significant producer of this specialized category of maps. The mission of the Central Intelligence Agency is to supply finished in- telligence to the White House and to the Intelligence Community. The flee for accurate, concise, rapid communication of finished intelligence requires the use of specially designed graphic materials; the thematic map (sometimes called the special subject map or topical map) is a vital element in the communication. Furthermore, in the process of fulfilling its obligations, the C.I.A. has a need for unique maps to be utilized in meeting its own peculiar analytical and operational requirements. The C.I.A. has had to rely on its own resources in order to meet its peculiar map needs. While the products of other mappers are select- ively utilized in the process of thematic mapping, the need for speed, Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 accuracy, relevance, clarity of communication, and security maintenance has made it necessary to develop the best possible thematic mapping capability entirely within its own structure. The result has been that the C.I.A. is a leading producer of thematic maps of high quality covering a wide range of topics. It is the development of intelligence thematic mapping in the C.I.A. which is the subject of this history. The organizational development began immediately prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and was nurtured in the Coordinator of Information (C.O.I.), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Department of State and since 1947 in the Central Intelligence Agency where it is now known as Cartography Division, Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence. The writer of this paper has been continuously associated with this activity in a modest capacity since the latter days of the C.O.I. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 I. Introduction A. The Role of Cartography in Support of Intelligence A wide variety of maps are part of the experience of most people. They range from the large scale, small area encyclopedic detail of the topographic quadrangles through medium scaled, larger area, more selective content of the aeronautical and hydrographic chart to the very small scale relatively large area coverage, and minimum content of the newspaper map with its large X showing yesterdays earthquake location in Turkey and little else. Naps are used extensively in the planning of intelligence operations, in the analysis of collected intelligence, and in the final reporting of finished intelligence. In the first phase it is frequently possible to utilize existing maps produced by other agencies, especially when detailed geographic information is required, but in the latter phases special maps are needed. The role of cartography in intelligence is to produce appropriate maps for use in the various phases of intelligence. Events of intelli- gence interest take place on the earth's surface and it is necessary to locate and describe them on the earth's surface in relation to each other and in relation to pertinent geographic features. This require- ment is most often and most effectively met by the use of appropriate maps either by themselves or in coordination with textual presentation. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 B. The Thematic Map is a Valuable Tool in Intelligence Support While the CIA makes frequent use of all kinds of maps it has found that the special kind of map known as the thematic nap is a most useful tool or medium for intelligence support. The use of thematic maps enables the IX. to give clear, concise graphic treatment in map form to the pertinent elements involved in an intelligence problem or event. The elements of what it is, and where it is, are laid out clearly in relationship to the basic geographic factors involved in the event. In the situation when several intell- igence items are shown their spatial relationship are also clearly shown. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 The CIA mission to supply the White House and the ,Intelligence Community with finished intelligence involves the use of many kinds of maps from many sources in the collection and analysis of intelli- gence but the finished intelligence product requires the extensive use of the thematic map in communicating intelligence to the recipient or consumer. The essential properties of the thematic map make it most useful in the support of intelligence. The principal characteristic of a thematic map is that it tells a story, it has a central theme. It never tells all about everything in the area mapped. It may tell all or little about a topic or selected number of topics in an area but is always limited to a theme as it's Objective. The thematic map is designed to present information clearly, concisely, free from distracting superflous material. The thematic map is tailored specifically to the immediate intelligence objective and to get its message across to the reader quickly without causing him to ponder the meaning. In each case only that underlying geographic data required to support the map Qbjective and to enhance the reader's appreciation of the subject will be included in the map; i.e. selected streams, Significant bridges, towns figuring in the presentation of the theme, relief features involved, etc. Naps showing roads, administrative divisions, soils, population distribution, housing types, unfolding events, or current events of intelligence interest are among the wide variety of maps which are classified as thematic maps. The intelligence requirement may call for the presentation of one or more topics on a single map, it may Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 C. Definition of the Thematic Map The objective of a map is to show a phenomenon or group of phenomenon in relationship to the earth's surface and to each other. The phenomena shown may be natural or man-made features or events. A familiar map type, the general reference map, primarily shows a large number of things in their geographic positional relationship (to the earth's surface) at moderate and small scales, but any intcrelationship are alluded to or implied. The number of items shown on such maps varies with the scales selected for such maps. Common examples of such maps ar tlases, and wall maps. The topographic map presents a detailed pattern of various cultural features existing in an area against a detailed background of the physical features of an area. Here again the relationship between items on the map are left to inference by the reader. This kind of map is usually produced at large scale covering a limited area. The topographic map sheets produced by the United States Geological Survey and other official mapping agencies in the United States and abroad are a well known examples of this type of map. These two general types of maps are used by the intelligence officer as sources of information. The mission of the CIA does not require that this kind of map be produced by it and the established producers of these maps generally meet the needs of the CIA from normal production programs. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 call for treatment of them in depth or only very lightly. As long as it tells a specific story it is a thematic map. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 D. The Thematic Map as an Intelligence Document The thematic map is generally used (designed) to support textual'. presentation of intelligence. It is not, in its full development, supported by text; it is a complete intelligence document in and of itself. Thematic maps contain all the information necessary to make a complete presentation of intelligence, and frequently are used as such. Thematic maps used with written documents serve as summary statements to give emphasis and focus to intelligence. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 E. Basic Assumptions in the Development of Thematic Naps Several basic initial assumptions or principles have been made in the development of thematic map production. These principles were taken in the beginning (1941) and have been followed through the succeeding years. them in The No attempt has been made to discard or significantly modify this period. first of these assumptions has already been dealt with. It is the principle that a thematic map is a complete intelligence document not, needing a body of supporting text to communicate its message. The second principle is that thematic map production should be divided into three basic phases: compilation, construction, and reproduction. Compilation is the research process in which data is selected, evaluated, and presented in the form of a manuscript map. Construction (frequently called drafting) is that series of technical/mechanical operations by which finished map drawings are prepared ready for reporduction. Reproduction is that phase which, utilizing the finished drawings, produces the required number of copies of the map in a usable form. A third principle is that the three production phases in thematic mapping should be organized as separate tasks: Compilation should be handled by one person or unit, construction should be done by a different person or unit, and reproduction should be performed by a third unit. Earlier thematic mapping often combined Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 � Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 these phases to varying degrees in one person or unit but it was felt that more and better work could be accomplished if each phase were carried out by different individuals. In order to further facilitate the production of quality thematic maps a fourth principle was adopted: Individuals engaged in each of the production phases would be specialists in the operation involved in those phases. Cartographic draftsmen would be employed in the construction of maps. Research geographers with cartographic experience would do the compilation. Reproduction would be done by trained photographers and printers. It was recognized that while personnel engaged in either of these areas might have facility in one or the other that it would be best to utilize the individuals' major skill in the most appropriate area. It was also recognized that each individual should have some understanding of the other phases so that he could do his task in a manner that would facilitate the work of the other specialists involved in the production of thematic maps. A fifth assumption in the development of thematic mapping was that it should be performed essentially in the role of support to intelligence production. This position was taken in ordeylto focus the efforts of a small and new group on a phase of the oeverall intelligence mission that it could handle effectively on a continuing basis. It does not preclude the production of individual maps projects outside of the normal support role under special circumstances. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 F. Thematic mapping did not originate in the CIA. It has, however, reached a much higher level of development in the last three decades and the CIA has been and is in the forefront of that development. This history is confined to the development of thematic mapping as it has occurred in the CIA and its predecessors from 1941 through 1970.. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 II Thematic Map Production The production of thematic maps in the C.I.A. is accomplished largely in the Cartography Division of the Office of Basic Intell- igence; (CD/BGI) one of the three basic phases of production, heretofore noted, that of reproduction, is carried out in and by the Printing Services Division (PSD) of the Office of Logistics in DDS. While a limited number of rudimentary maps and cartograms are produced in graphics units outside of CD/BGI they are exceptions and are not included in this discussion. It is the development of thematic mapping practiced in CD/BGI today, which is of quality for such mapping, with which this history A brief expansion of the phases of production of the Standard is concerned. thematic maps, including some subsidiary activities, is presented here before going into the more typically historical presentation of the subject. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 II A. Compilation There are several different activities in the compilation phase and they are all characteristically performed by one I.O. (Cartographer), hereafter referred to as a compiler, for each map project. This one aspect is enough to make thematic mapping in C.I.A. unique as other producers of such maps usually divide this phase among several individuals. Compilation is performed in the Cartographic Research Branch (CD/R) of the Cartography Division. As CD/BCI performs mostly in a support role it reacts to requests for maps placed on it by other units in the C.I.A. or other U. S. Government Offices. Requests are evaluated by the CD/R and the appropriate response determined. In some cases the request is presented in a complete package and little work is needed on the part of the compiler, in other cases the request is quite nebulous and the compiler is faced with a much more extensive problem . In any event the compiler conducts the necessary research, often in a wide range of source materials, to enable him to prepare a map to meet the needs of the requester. This may involve little more than the development of basic map data to pro- vide a suitable background for the requestors subject matter, or it may involve the compiler's developing the requester's subject matter as well. The compiler is responsible for designing the map to achieve the most effective presentation of the subject or theme, the most efficient means of construction, and reproduction. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 The compilation phase culminates in the preparation of a hand-drawn map (a manuscript map or worksheet) which contains all the data that is to be included in the final printed maps. The compiler prepares written instruction (specifications) to the Technical Support Branch (CD/T) for the construction (drafting) of the various drawings which make up the map and from which the printed map will be made. After the map is drafted the compiler is responsible for the review and edit of the drawings to be sure that the specifications have been adhered to and that it will fulfill it designed objective. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 11 B. Construction The construction (drafting) phase is performed in the Technical Support Branch of the Cartography Division (CD/T). This phase consists of those technical/mechanical operations which are conducted to make final drawings of the map from the manuscript map and speci- fications prepared by CD/R. After editing in CD/T to determine that it meets CD quality standards. The subject of construction is given detailed treatment, in a separate history. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 11 C. Editing Editing of the map prior to reproduction is necessary to assure substantial and technical accuracy of the map and that it will meet the objectives of the intelligence project for which it is being prepared. Editing of the drafting aspects of the map is done in CD/T. CD/11 edits the map for 'substantial accuracy, and adherence to drafting specifications, and the design of the map; the requester is also drawn into the editing operation. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 II D. Reproduction In order for thematic maps to be utilized in intelligence, they need to be reproduced (printed) in suitable form, and in a sufficient number of copies to satisfy the consumers of the intelligence. A number of different reproduction systems are utilized depending on the number of copies needed and the complexity of the map. The reproduction method to be used is selected by CD/R, frequently in consultation with CD/T and PSD, and instructions for reproduction are prepared in CD/R. The principal reproduction facility used by CD is PSD. Some special jobs have been done in other U.S. Government Agencies which have capabilities not found in PSD. CD presently has no reproduction facilities of its own which would permit the printing of finished maps. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 II E. Special Units Some request placed on CD do not require that the usual production phases be retained. Special units ad hoc task forces have been established to facilitate the production of such projects. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 11 F. Training All personnel in CD/BC-1 have related training and usually some significant experience prior to joining the Division. Compilers have geographic research and cartography training. Draftsmen are trained in drafting, usually cartographic drafting. An extensive program of training is carried out for all personnel after entering on duty in order to fit them into the Division Program. Additional training is conducted to keep CD personnel abreast: of new develop- ments in their resPective specialized fields. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 II G. Relationships with Other Offices CD/BGI maintains active working and consultative relationships with other offices in C.I.A., other U. S. Government Offices, and with private mapping organizations. Products are exchanged, Services rendered, and Consultations are conducted concerning new methods, materials, and techniques. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 III. A Page 1 :III. A. Laying The Foundations 1941-45 Thematic Mapping as presently known in the CIA had its origin in the Coordinator of Information (C.O.I.) in July 1941. The need for a coordinated intelligence service in the United States Government was recognized amidst the gathering clouds of World War the later 1930's. The eventual result was a Presidential Order establishing the C.O.I. 0 under the direction of Col. William J. Donavan who had been largely responsible for recognizing the need and for recommending ways to meet it. 0 Col. Donavan, a well known figure from World War I, was a prominent lawyer with extensive contacts in academic circles In staffing the new kind of Agency, Col. Donavan drew heavily upon established scholars with varying disciplinary and regional specialties. was the first geographer to be recruited. He in turn recommended another prominent geographer; to develop what became the in the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) of the C.O.I. (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) Geography Division (b)(3) a geographer who was especially interested in cartography was invited to join the group and became the first chief of the Cartography Section in October 1941. Others who joined the Section in this early period were The latter was to become the Chief of Cartography Section at the end of World War II and continue in that function as thematic mapping developed through successive organizations until 1965. (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 M. A. Page 2 The Cartography Section was founded for the purpose of compiling, designing and drafting maps and charts for the use of the Coordinator of Information. The idea that the C.O.I. would need maps and charts was perhaps a reflex action. The presence of professional geographers (voracious and critical consumers of maps) in the especially in the Geography Division and in the Cartography Section,would, however, insure that the maps produced would be geographically soundiand accurate, and of a high level of technical excellence. Early in 1942 the Section's products began to circulate widely in the War and Navy Departments, resulting in requests for thematic maps from various branches of the military Services. Other agencies learned of the maps produced in C.O.I. and began to ask for this kind of map. So, the purpose was expanded to include production for other appropriate U.S. Government agencies as it lay within the capability of the Cartography Section to do so. The basic approach to thematic mapping and its organization for production were established by early 1942 under the leadership of In addition, many of the personnel who helped carry thematic mapping to its present level of development in the C.I.A. were brought into the new organization early durin eadership (1941-1945). A few of these are on duty today and others have recently retired. Many others contributed significantly during this period and returned to more academic pursuits upon the termination of World War II. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 III. A. Page 3 The Cartography Section was organized for the purpose of compiling, designing, and drafting custom-made intelligence maps, for which there was a definite need. In the first weeks of its existence the Section was faced with two major tasks. One task was to handle the large flow of requests for presentation materials for Col. Donovan and for maps to illustrate Geography Division reports. About two-thirds of the time eF the Geographic Reports Section was devoted to the compilation of maps which the Cartography Section had to draft. The result of this flow of work was to cause the poorly organized Section to become a custom drafting unit before it could get its breath and decide what it would become. The original members of this Section were too well trained trained in geography, too imaginative,to be satisfied with drafting maps others had compiled. The urgency of the second task, that of establishing policies and procedures and organizing for efficient production of intelligence maw, was made very clear by the undesirable trend toward becoming a service organization. The second task consisted of the definition of the relationship of the Cartography Section to the rest of C.O.I. and other offices, determination of it's role in supplying intelligence maps in support of the war effort, dIvision of the mapping function into appropriate phases for accurate and efficient production, the recruitment of appropriate personnel, and it's training, the acquisition of space and equipment. These two major tasks, production, and organization had to be undertaken more or less simultaneously; under the pressure of wartime emergency and with the dedication of all hands they were accomplished. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 III. A. Page II The Cartography Section was organized on a basic principle; that of the complete separation of map compilation (research) and map construction (drafting). No.other mapping organization had ever existed based on the principle of separation of the basic phases of map construction. There was also a national lack of cartographic training especially in the area of thematic mapping. Consequently there was no source to which the Cartography Section could look for personnel for staffing or guidance in the detailed establishment of policies and procedures. The organizers of this new activity were professional geographers who were familiar with established mapping operations and of the short comings of many existing maps in conveying information. They had individual experience in making maps to support their own geographic research activities, maps which were special subject or thematic maps. Lacking precedent for the kind of mapping organization that was being organized they decided to avoid the defects in established napping organization which were in- efficient or utilized poorly trained personnel.* The separation of the compilation and construction phases permitted the focus of professional (research) and technical (construction) personnel on the respective phases, which they were best qualified to do. Consequently professional personnel were recruited for their geographic knowledge and research ability, and technical personnel were recruited for their ability to use drafting tools and hopefully some design ability. After recruitment it was also necessary to train these individuals (!) in their respective phases of production to produce intell5r-ence maps which were c::og;raDhically and visually sound. 4c.The Map Division Branch of Research and Analysis September 1943 pll Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 III. A. Page 5 Another basic principle adopted in these first months was that the intelligence map should be a self sustaining or complete intelligence document in itself. When removed from any document which it supported it would tell a story by itself; while the intelligence map would support a documentary presentation, and be a part of it, it would not need the document to support it as it would tell a whole story by itself. IY(-e The adoption of this principles coupled with the professional and technical competence of Cartography Section personnel prevented the Section from becoming a strictly service unit, and enabled it to take its place as a contributing partner in the production of intelligence and lead to the initiation of intelligence contributions in map form by the Cartography Section throughout its history. Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 III. B. 1 Page 1 % III. B. The Evolution of the Basic Organization - 1. The Coordinator of Information With the establishment of the Cartography Section in October 1942 and the immediate requests made on it for cartographic service it was necessary to set policies, to organize for production, and to pro- duce almost simultaneously. As stated earlier, two basic decisions made at this time largely set the pattern for the subsequent practice and development of thematic mapping in the C.O.I. and its successor organizations to the present time in the C.I.A. The decision to divide the two basic. operation in map making and to perform them in distinctly separate units is the be considered here. Prior to the establishment of the Cartography Section relatively little thought had been given to the organization of intelligence carto- graphy. In fact the whole problem of intelligence, at least in the United States, was not well understood. There were three general methods of producing maps in practice at that time. The commercial method of mapping utilized highly supervised compilation by relatively poor personnel. The academic practice was to have a professional research man and a draftsman working shoulder to shoulder. A third method of mapping was that in which the professionally trained cartographer compiled, designed, and drafted his own map. The first method lacks the quality of personnel that is necessary for intelligence cartography (thematic mapping); it was, however, s'Ated to such more routine operations as the Army 1.18:0 Service and the Hydrographic Office. The academic method is inefficient and is Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 C03188558 III. B. 1 Page 2 subject to inconsistency of accuracy and presentation. The third method was very little practiced in the United States and was ruled out. It was necessary then to evolve a system of cartography for the 0.0.1. which could operate in the field of intelligence. It would need to produce maps which were geographically and visually sound, and to produce them rapidly on a wide variety of topics. The two basic operations in map making were recognized as(beinecompilation, and construction; the first of these is largely a professional research pro- cess and the other is more a technical/mechanical process. It was de- cided to separate these processes into two distinct units staffed by appropriately qualified personnel. This would enable personnel to focus on those parts of the process which they could do best, and pro- duction should be more efficiently controlled with a resultant high level of accuracy, consistency of presentation, and production. The compilation operation was assigned to the compilation unit. The personnel of this unit were recruited for their geographic knowledge and research ability. The mission of this unit was to compile, design, and prepare drafting specifications for a wide range of special subject maps for intelligence purposes. The compilation unit was organized in C c h sub-units, or teams, consisting of imilarly qualified cartographers under the direct supervision of a Sr. 6artographer. This was done in order to establish close personal supervision and to insure consistency in work and product. Eb attempt was made to orcanize the sub-units on a topical or regional basis. AssiGnments of projects were made on the Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 003188558 Approved for Release: 2016/03/07 603188558 III. B. 1 Page 3 basis of workload, complexity of the projects, and the relative experience and ability of the individual cartographer. The three compilation sub- n units* reported directly to the Section Chief; there was no chief of compilation subordinate to the chief of the Cartography Section. The second major operation in the map making process was � 1 Ceer�flls:,.-'0x.1,;.1 concurrently organized as the Construction Unit. It's mission was to perform those technical/mechanical tasks necessary to prepare finished map drawings (fair drawings) from work sheets and specifications produced by the compilation unit(s). The larger part of it's personnel were designated as cartographic draftsman and were grouped in a drafting sub-unit which produced fair drawings ready for reproduction. The cartographic draftsman had varied experience and training; a few were draftsman, some had been artists, all had some familiarity with the usual drafting tools, and all were flexible. A second sub-unit in the Construction Unit was the Composing Room which was established in the Spring of 1942 when a small letter press was procured. This unit was staffed by experienced printers and An organization chart of 1 July 1944 shows three units although they are referred to a- sub-unit in accompanying text. The relationship to the Chief of the Cartography Sectio