OUTCOMES OF HYPOTHETICAL US-SOVIET NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS DURING THE 1973 MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

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• Publication Date: April 12, 1974

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12 April 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable James R. Schlesinger
Secretary Of Defense
SUBJECT : Outcomes of Hypothetical US-Soviet
Naval Engagements During the 1973
Middle East Crisis
NW # _230 741
1. The attached study was prepared in response to your request
for an assessment of the probable outcomes of a US-Soviet naval bat-
tle during the recent Middle East crisis, had such a battle occurred.
2. My colleagues' analysis is perforce hypothetical. It is
constrained by certain clearly stated assumptions, e.g., that any
such engagement would have remained localized, would have stayed non-
nuclear, and would not have been part of or allowed to precipitate a
wider general war. Such assumptions are necessary to create a man-
ageable analytical problem, since without them it would have been
virtually impossible to consider a Mediterranean naval conflict in
the abstract and not as but one component of a much larger and more
complex struggle, with many of the larger war's aspects having a
material bearing on that Mediterranean naval struggle's outcome.
These conceptual constraints, though necessary to keep the problem
manageable, are patently arbitrary and, in my opinion, quite artifi-
cial. I find it difficult to envisage even three days of intense
US-USSR naval combat (even non-nuclear combat) in the Mediterranean
not being part of a general war or precipitating a general war, hence
I find it hard to envisage any extensive set-to between the US Sixth
Fleet and the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron as being a kind of float-
ing Fashoda (remembering that the impact and consequences of Fashoda
would have been quite different had any shots actually been fired).
3. The attached study (per your wishes) was prepared quietly
within the Agency and not coordinated with anyone else. Indeed, to
my knowledge, no one outside the Agency is aware that we have done it.
It is for your eyes alone and we plan no further distribution.
Attachment
ucorge A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT
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Outcomes of Hypothetical US-Soviet
Naval Engagements During the 1973
Middle East Crisis
The attached study was prepared in response to
your request for an evaluation of the probable out-
come of a US-Soviet naval battle during the recent
Middle East crisis.
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8 April 1974
Outcomes of Hypothetical US-Soviet
Naval Engagements During the 1973 Middle East Crisis
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Contents
Page
Introduction 1
Summary of Key Judyments 1
Possible Origins of a Mediterranean Naval
Conflict 3
Political and Doctrinal Constraints 3
Soviet Strategy in a Mediterranean War. 3
US Counter-Strategy 5
A Hypothetical Engagement on 1 November. � �
The Balance of Naval Forces 6
Land-Based Aircraft 9
The Initial Exchange 11
After the First Blow 12
Annex: Outcome of a US-Soviet Naval Conflict
at the Height of the Middle East Crisis--
26 October 1973
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Introduction
This paper examines the likely results of
hypothetical engagements between US and Soviet naval
forces in the Mediterranean during the Middle East
Crisis of 1973. The body of the paper describes
the buildup of the opposing forces through the end
of October when the concentration of Soviet naval
units was greatest and assesses the probable outcome
of an engagement on 1 November. This interaction
is .examined against a background of the political
and doctrinal considerations that constrained the
military actions of both sides. The Annex to this
paper describes a more likely exchange--one oc-
curring on 26 October 1973 at the peak period of
tension following the threatened Soviet Middle East
intervention and the US military alert.
The conclusions of the study are general--a
consequence of the various assumptions necessary to
reduce a complex, hypothetical conflict to a workable
model. The paper's supporting judgments are not
based on an elaborate war game, but on an assessment
of the major strengths and weaknesses of the opposing
forces.
For the purposes of this paper, the "winning"
naval force is loosely defined as that which has
the preponderant offensive capability upon termi-
nation of the conflict.
Summary of Key Judgments
In a hypothetical engagement between conven-
tionally armed US and Soviet naval forces in the
Mediterranean Sea on 1 November 1973, the balance
of offensive naval weapons systems would have been
so close that the side which initiated a carefully
pre-planned and coordinated conflict would probably
have won the initial exchange (pages 11 and 12).
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If the Soviets had deployed land-based strike
aircraft to the Middle East, and used them in the
initial pre-emptive strike, it is likely that all
three US carriers could have been put out of action
(page 12).
If the Soviets had not had land-based aircraft
available, it is likely that at least one US carrier
would have continued flight operations. The balance
of offensive power would again have been roughly even
and the final outcome would have depended on the luck
and skill of the opposing commanders (pages 11-13).
The presence of Soviet land-based aircraft,
however, probably would not have altered the outcome
of an engagement begun spontaneously or with a US
pre-emptive strike. In both of these cases the
Sixth Fleet probably would have won (pages 11-12).
It is unlikely that US land-based strike
aircraft could have been introduced until after the
initial exchange when the outcome of the conflict
would already have been decided (page 10).
Had the conflict taken place on 26 October--a
more likely date--the Sixth Fleet would probably
have won regardless of who struck first (Annex--
pages 14-17).
Whichever side had "won", both the Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron and the Sixth Fleet would
have been fully committed to self-defense and
would not have been able to play an active role
in a wider Middle East or European conflict
(page 13).
The approximate 1973 replacement cost of the
US naval units considered in this 1 November en-
gagement was nearly $7 billion�of which about
$3 billion represented the three carriers and their
aircraft complements. The cost of the Soviet force
present was about $4 billion. If the conflict had
occurred at the lower force levels of 26 October,
these costs would have been slightly less, but the
basic relationship would have remained about the
same (pages 9, 16).
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Possible Origins of a
Mediterranean Naval Conflict
A US-Soviet naval conflict in the Mediterranean
could conceivably have begun in any of several ways.
A series of escalatory military moves--possibly be-
ginning with the introduction of Soviet airborne
troops into the Middle East--could possibly have led
to a naval battle initiated by either side. A mis-
perception by one side as to the military intentions
of the other, or unauthorized action by a military
commander might have caused a spasmodic conflict
to erupt.
Political and Doctrinal Constraints
However a naval engagement might have begun,
both sides would have been constrained by political
considerations from acting as they would in a general
war. It is unlikely that either side's allies would
have joined the battle in time to influence the out-
come. It is also unlikely that either side would
have used nuclear weapons unless the conflict had
shown signs of widening into a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
The following analyses of US and Soviet strategies
in a Mediterranean war are intended to establish
realistic doctrinal and political bounds for a
hypothetical conflict.
Soviet Strategy in a Mediterranean War
If naval hostilities had begun both the Soviets
and the US probably would have attempted to prevent
them from evolving into a broader European or inter-
continental conflict. The Kremlin almost certainly
would not have permitted the use of nuclear weapons
at the outset, although the potential for escalation
would have been high.
Soviet naval strategy stresses the importance
of the "battle for the first salvo" and the Soviet
Mediterranean force would probably have committed
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most of. its conventionally armed cruise missiles
to an initial anticarrier strike. They probably
would not have expended all of their conventional
missiles in the initial attack, however, since this
would have left no alternative but escalation to
nuclear warfare in the event of an extended conflict.
This would have been particularly important in a
conflict such as the one postulated in this paper
in whieh a major Soviet goal would have been to
achieve an acceptable settlement without risking a
wider war. We believe that about half of the
available missiles would have been used in the
initial attack. Of those missiles not used, half
would have been nuclear and half conventional.
Torpedo attack submarines would also have joined
in the initial attack, but many of these units would
have been assigned other tasks--for example, recon-
naissance, interdiction of support forces, and ASW.
The tasks probably would have included searching for
Polaris submarines as a hedge against escalation.
�Surface forces not equipped with antiship
missiles would have provided antiair and antisubmarine
defense and some might also have conducted anti-
Polaris searches. A few ships with SAMs capable of
being fired in a surface-to-surface mode might have
taken part in anticarrier attacks.
The participation of land-based naval strike
aircraft would have been desirable from the point of
view of the Soviet naval commander. If Syrian or
Egyptian airfields had been available, regimental
size air strikes could have been staged. If the
Soviets had been forced to keep their naval aircraft
at Soviet airfields, air strikes probably would have
been withheld for as long as the Soviets desired to
contain the conflict in the Mediterranean, because
violation of Greek or Turkish airspace could have
broadened the conflict into a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
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We cannot be certain what their strategy
would have been following the initial exchange.
Their forces probably would have regrouped and
continued to carry out conventional attacks until
their ammunition was exhausted or until the conflict
either ceased or escalated to a nuclear level.
US Counter-Strategy
As tensions mounted, the Sixth Fleet would
probably have brought its forces to full alert and
initiated counter-surveillance against Soviet naval
forces, concentrating on antiship missile units.
These would have been shadowed by attack aircraft,
by surface combatants or by the Mediterranean sub-
marine task force, which was composed entirely of
nuclear powered units. US forces probably would
have attempted to blunt a Soviet attack by engaging
firing units upon clear indication that hostilities
had commenced. Alternatively, they could, if
ordered, have executed a pre-emptive strike against
Soviet forces.
Concurrently with the initial strike or counter-
strike against Soviet forces, defensive actions
would have been undertaken against incoming missiles
or attacking submarines. These would have included
electronic countermeasures as well as fighter and
missile air defense and antisubmarine attacks.
After an initial exchange, US naval forces
would have regrouped, rearmed, and carried out
repeated attacks until either the end of hostilities
or the point of escalation was reached.
A Hypothetical Engagement on 1 November
A 1 November date was chosen to present a
"worst case" analysis of a naval conflict begun at
a time when the strength of the Soviet Mediterranean
Squadron was at its peak and the augmentation of
the US Sixth Fleet was incomplete. As events
actually occurred, however, the Middle East war
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was winding down in early November. Tensions between
the US and USSR had eased considerably by this time
and the possibility of a conflict was slight.
The Balance of Naval Forces
Assuming a 1 November date for an initial ex-
change between US and Soviet naval forces and assuming
that all surface combatants and submarines of both
sides were concentrated in the eastern Mediterranean,
the following units and major seaborne weapons
systems could have been available during the first
phase of hostilities:
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Composition . Composition of the US Sixth Fleet and
Soviet Mediterranean Sauadron, 31 October 1973
Ship Type* US Soviet
1. Surface Warships-- 42
a. Major Surface Combatants-- 26
Attack Carriers** 0
Cruisers 2
Missile Frigates 3
Missile Destroyers and
Escorts 11
Gun-Armed Destroyers and
Escorts 10
b. Minor Surface Combatants-- 7
Minesweepers 4
Patrol Boats 3
c. Amphibious Ships-- 9
2. Submarines-- 23
Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile 4
Diesel-Powered Cruise Missile 2
Nuclear-Powered Attack 0
Diesel-Powered Attack 17
3. Support Ships-- 31
TOTAL-- 96
* These ships are categorized so as to reflect comparable
size and capabilities. See SR RP 73-23 July 1973 (C),
Problems in Comparing US and Soviet Warships by Designation.
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Seaborne Weapons Systems
Fighter Aircraft*
Attack Aircraft*
Antiship Missile Launchers**
Antiair Missile Launchers***
� US Soviet
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Kresta II class guided missile friaate were not
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addition, _four launchers aboard an Osa class guided
missile patrol boat were not counted because the
patrol boat was being delivered to Syria at the time
and probably did not have missiles on board.
*** Some US and all Soviet surface-to-air missiles
have a limited surface-to-surface capabilitu.
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The US forces--ships, missiles and aircraft--
would have had an estimated replacement cost (in
1973 dollar terms) of about six and a half to seven
billion dollars. About three billion dollars of
this represents the costs of the US carriers including
their aircraft. The dollar valuation of the replace-
ment cost of the Soviet force would probably have
been about four billion dollars.
This dollar value of the US forces represents
to the degree possible--i.e., given the information
immediately available--the actual costs, adjusted to
a 1973 price base, to procure each ship in the force,
and fit it out with a full load of aircraft and
missiles. Shins which have undergone major conversions
since being built have the costs of those conversions
included in the total valuation. The dollar valuation
of the Soviet force represents agreed CT estimates (W(1 )
of what it would cost to reproduce the Soviet ships,
missiles, and shipborne aircraft in the US. No
estimates of operating costs, land-based support
costs, or nuclear weapon or other ordnance �costs have
been included in the totals for either side. In
calculating the costs we sought to produce dollar
valuations of the two fleets in as comparable terms
as possible, so that any biases that might be present
would work in the same direction for both the US and
USSR. Thus, while the specific cost figures are
fairly gross approximations, the relative values--
in index terms--are more meaningful and more reliable.
Land-Based Aircraft
The Soviets had 86 Naval Aviation Badger and
Blinder medium bombers and 22 Long Range Aviation
(LRA) heavy bombers in the southwestern USSR capable
of executing antiship strikes but they did not deploy
any of these strike aircraft to Middle East airfields
during the 1973 crisis. To have done so, they would
have had to obtain Egyptian or Syrian permission and
would have risked becoming actively involved in the
Arab-Israeli war zone. If the Soviets had been willing
to take the risk, they could have deployed about a
regiment (30) of TU-16 Badger medium bombers to either
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Egypt or Syria. Egyptian airfields, which have
hangarettes for Badger size aircraft, would have
been the more desirable locations.
It is unlikely that the Soviets would have
launched direct strikes from their own airfields.
Had they done so, they would have increased the
warning time available to the Sixth Fleet, risked
interception by US land-based fighter aircraft and
possibly sparked a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.
VS land-b
Redeployment of these aircraft
prior to overt hostilities would have been unlikely
because of resistance from our European allies.
Hence it is unlikely that they would have had a
significant impact on the initial phase of a naval
conflict. If they had been introduced after the
initial exchange they would have improved the Sixth
Fleet's defense against a second Soviet cruise
missile strike but would not have markedly altered
the outcome of the conflict.
Con-
seq
uen y, i is estimated that determined Soviet
submarine commanders could still have pressed through
some successful attacks.
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The Initial Exchange
The balance of offensive naval weapons systems
on 1 November would have been so close that the
outcome of the initial exchange probably would have
been decided by which side initiated the engagement.
If the Soviets had struck first they probably
would have committed about 36 submarine and surface-
launched missiles out of the total cf 72 tubes
available. These would have been targeted princi-
pally against the.three carriers and their major
supporting units. Considering attrition from US
counter-strikes and air defenses it is likely that
about 2 to 3 missiles would have reached each carrier.
In addition, a few Soviet SAMs might also have been
launched in a surface-to-surface mode.
The poor mobility of diesel submarines would
have limited their effectiveness in actively
searching for US combatants but the US carriers
probably would have been grouped in a limited area
and two to three torpedo attack submarines could
have succeeded eventually in attacking each carrier.
The result could have been three to six torpedo hits
on each carrier.
Altogether,-the total weight of Soviet ordnance
would probably have been adequate to disable two
aircraft carriers and to cause at least moderate
damage to the other. It is unlikely that any would
have been sunk.
If the US had struck first, the weight of the
Soviet strike probably would have been reduced to
about 16 submarine and surface-launched missiles.
The number of submarine torpedo attacks would have
been reduced as well--probably to about one salvo
per carrier. In this variant there would have been
a good chance that no US carriers would have been
put out of action although all probably would have
suffered moderate damage.
If the initial engagement had consisted of
sporadic, uncoordinated attacks, the Soviets probably
would have been unable to concentrate their forces
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sufficiently to fully disable any one carrier,
although they probably could have caused moderate
damage to all. The US force with its carrier-based
aircraft would have had greater flexibility, shorter
reaction times and thus a better opportunity to have
damaged Soviet surface combatants.
If the Soviets had had a regiment of land-based
strike aircraft available in the Middle East, they
probably would have coiruaitted about 20 of them--
carrying a total of about 3,0 missiles--to an initial
pre-emptive strike. The addition of these ten
missiles per carrier probably would have saturated
the Sixth Fleet's air defenses and resulted in
several more hits on each carrier. Under these cir-
cumstances, all three carriers would almost certainly
have been put out of action. If the US had struck
first, however, or if the conflict had begun
spontaneously, the Soviets probably would have been
unable to coordinate their land and sea-based missile
attacks sufficiently to disrupt Sixth Fleet defenses.
Under these conditions the availability of Soviet
land-based air probably would not have altered the
outcome.
After the First Blow
At this point the interaction would have become
extremely complex and the outcome would have depended
on tactical decisions and on the combat readiness of
the units which survived the initial attack. The
best judgment that can be made is that after the
initial exchange, sea-based air, reinforcement and
support capabilities would have been critical. If
none of the US carriers could have continued flight
operations the Sixth Fleet would have had essentially
no offensive capability. The Soviets, on the other
hand, would probably have retained a number of anti-
ship missiles.
If one US carrier had been able to continue
flight operations after the initial Soviet strike--
which would have been likely if Soviet land-based
air had not been used, the forces would have again
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been fairly evenly balanced and the final outcome
would have been determined by unpredictable factors
like luck and the skill of the commanders.
If the US had initiated the battle, and pre-
served most of its sea-based air assets, it probably
could have eliminated most of the Soviet surface com-
batants. There would have been a continuing threat
from Soviet submarines and land-based air, but these
probably could have been reduced to manageable
proportions. As the conflict wore on the Sixth
Fleet's superior its
reinforcement by on 4
November would have contributed to an
US victory.
almost certain
However the conflict might have evolved, it
probably would have been short. The Soviet force
had a limited resupply capability and probably
would have exhausted its combat supplies in a few
days. In addition, attempts would probably have
been made by the leaders of both sides to halt the
conflict, under favorable conditions if possible.
The entire conflict probably would not have lasted
more than three days.
No matter who had "won" the conflict, most of
the Sixth Fleet's resources and energy would have
been expended in self-defense. Thus US options for
active employment of the fleet in support of other
policy objectives would have been severely con-
strained. Soviet options, however, would also have
been limited by the same constraints.
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Annex
Outcome of a US-Soviet Naval Conflict at the
Height of the Middle East Crisis--26 October 1973
A more likely interaction of US and Soviet naval
forces than that hypothesized above can be conceived
for 26 October, when US-Soviet tensions were at their
height following the threatened Soviet Middle East
intervention and the US military alert. US aircraft
carrier and amphibious forces were concentrating in
the eastern Mediterranean in the vicinity of Soviet
antiship strike forces, and a force of two Soviet
amphibious ships and seven surface combatants were
moving toward waters about 100 nm north of Port
Said. During this period when the potential for
conflict was relatively high, the following US and
Soviet naval ships were present in the Mediterranean.
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Composition of the US Si:;.th Fleet
and Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
26 October 1973
Ship Type*
1. Surface Warships--
a. Major Surface Combatants--
Attack Carriers
Cruisers
Missile Frigates
Missile Destroyers/Escorts
Gun Armed Destroyers/Escorts
b. Minor Surface Combatants--
C.
Minesweepers
Patrol Boats
Amphibious Ships--
2. Submarines--
Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile
Diesel-Powered Cruise Missile
Nuclear-Powered Attack
Diesel-Powered Attack
3. Support Ships--
TOTAL--
US
Vv7c'
Soviet
32
21
2
1
9
9
4
4
7
18
3
2
0
13
33
83
* These ships are categorized so as to reflect comparable
size and capabilities.
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If these forces had been concentrated
eastern Mediterranean the following
could have been available:
Ave
in the
weapons systems
US Soviet
(b)(1)
Fighter Aircraft*
Attack Aircraft*
Antiship Missile Launchers
44
Antiair Missile Launchers**
28
(b)(1)
** Some US and all Soviet surface-to-air missiles
have a limited surface-to-surface capability.
(b)(1)
The Soviets had no land-based aircraft in the
Middle East on 26 October and they probably would
not have launched strikes from Soviet airfields.
The US forces would have had an estimated 1973
replacement cost of about six and a half billion
dollars, of which about three billion dollars
represents the cost of the carriers and their air-
craft. The cost of the Soviet force probably would
have been about three billion dollars.
The Initial Exchange
If the Soviets had struck first, they probably
would have committed about 22 submarine and surface-
launched missiles out of the total of 44 tubes
available. It is unlikely, however, that more than
one or two of these missiles would have reached each
carrier. Torpedo attacks would have resulted only
from random encounters and it is unlikely that each
carrier would have sustained more than one hit.
The net effect of these Soviet attacks might have
been adequate to disable one US aircraft carrier but
it is unlikely that any would have been sunk.
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If the US had pre-empted, damage to US carriers
from the initial Soviet blow would probably have
been negligible..
If the initial engagement had consisted of
sporadic, uncoordinated attacks, the Soviets probably
would have been unable to destroy any one major
target, although they might have caused some damage
to all.
Subsequent Engagements
If the naval war had continued at a non-nuclear
level beyond an initial exchange on 26 October, the
US Sixth Fleet would probably have destroyed the of-
fensive capability of the Soviet Mediterranean
Squadron. The Soviets would not have been able to
launch more than a few conventionally-armed cruise
missiles, an insufficient number to seriously disable
a carrier. US carrier aircraft probably would have
destroyed most of the Soviet surface combatants, and
US ASW operations should have been able to reduce the
Soviet submarine threat to manageable proportions.
As the conflict wore on, the more efficient and less
vulnerable US logistics support system would have
continued to favor the Sixth Fleet during this final
phase of the hostilities.
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ENSiTIVE
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Approved for Release: 2020/06/30 C03389911
MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs.
This memo from the NIOs (drafted by OSR)
was prepared only for the Secretary of Defense
(at his request). You may want to look at the
"conclusions" at paper clip.
Brent
15 Apr 74
(DATE)
FORM NO.
101 REPLACES FORM 10- 101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
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New TO-P�SEGRET_
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code, Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the UnitedStates
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