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January 17, 1956
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IT It I Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 Nuel CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE STAFF "EMORANDUM NO. 2-56 AGENCY OFFICE OP NATTONAL ESTIMATES 17 January 1956 SUBJECT: Princeton Consultants Meetings of 21-22 December 1955 a Chairman PARTICTPANTS of National Estimates Board Abbot E. Smith Consultants Lt. Gen. Harold R. Bull, USA (Ret.) James Cooley William H. Dunham Staff Members Calvin J. Hoover (b)(3) William L. Langer Philip J. Halle Col. George A. Lincoln, USA John Heires* Max F. Millikan* Philip E. Mosely (b)(3) William P. Bundy* William A. Reitzel Joseph R. Strayer T. Cuyler Young I. SOVIET FORETGN POLICY In connection with NIE 1143/1-55, "Review of Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference;r the consult- ants :tendered whether a tacit Understanding not to report to nuclear seem* had been reached at the Summit conference. While there was no agreement as to what had actually transpired at the Summit, the consensus was that world opinion, and particularly neutralist opinion, now cons id. ered the US to have renounced the use of nuclear weapons unless the USSR resorted to them first. * 22 December only SMARR ...*AIJMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS. II Cl DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS SC) NEXT REVIEW DATE: 199.0 AWN: HR 10-2 DATE; 13 tA5Kki, $30 REVIEWER. (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 *441101 MOSELY felt that it had been the aim of Soviet policy to develop pdlitical deterrents to the use of nuclear weapons by the US. The lessening of tension had come about because people think there has been de facto outlawry of nuclear warfare. The Russians got the idea from MiwiliFy Dulles, speech On "massive retaliation" that the US would resort to atomic weapons if Moscow undertook any new aggression. The Summit conference relieved the Soviet leaders considerably. The European public now feels more secure than at any time since 1945. Furthermore, the Soviets are increasingly able to separate Europe, where the American position is Strong, from Asia, where it is week. The Soviets now, have more room to maneuver in Asia; American use of atomic weapons there would provoke a highly unfavorable reaction in the UN. MOSEL! doubted that the public would distinguish between the tactical and the strategic use of atomic weapons. HOOVER and LANGER generally concurred with MOSELTIs view. LINCOLN, on the other hand, felt that long before Geneva US policy had aimed at avoiding nuclear warfare. The Summit conference represent- ed a major gain for US policy in that US leaders were able to dispel the misconceptions created abroad by McCarthy and by the statement on "massive retaliation." This gain was achieved primarily through the personality of the President. No specific statements were made; the President sought rather to establish a climate of opinion. With regard to Berlin, mrsEtY thought Soviet palmy was to produce 4 series of small annoy4mces 'Mich 'would force the West Germans to negotiate with the GDR. This Soviet policy Would succeed in the next six to twelve months; the only unresolved question was whether the East Germans would be willing to accept West German recognition in piecemeal fashion. There was general agreement that the Soviets no longer wished to force the West to withdraw from Berlin, but rather that the USSR planned to use Berlin as a lever for undermining Western influence on the Bonn republic. MOSEL! went on to Say that, in his view, the West tended to overestimate the durability of Bonn in the face of pressure frca the East. STRAYER thought that NIE 1143/145 overestimated Soviet clever. ness in dealing with the German problem. The estimate was wrong in suggesting that the Soviets did not lose anything by taking an intran- sigeant line on the matter of reunification. The USSR could have gained much by offering to negotiate on the German issue. LANGER and LINCOLN disagreed, feeling that the reunification of Germany is no more in the interest of the USSR than it is in the interest of France. Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 "140� CO There was no clear agreement =whether the Soviet stand at the second Geneva conference heralded a reversion to Stalinist tactics. ROMER thought this possibility could not be ruled outs especially if the Russians thought that the West was precluded by world opinion from resort to nuclear weapons. STWER suggested that perhaps Moscow feared the Summit conference had raised too many expectations among the population of the Bloc. MOS= argued that the basic change in Soviet pdlicy took place in 1951 and WAS consequent upon Western rearmament. The Russians had always mixed conciliatory and aggressive moves. Prom 1951 the proportion had been 60.40 in favor of conciliation. They will continue the present policy until they develop the ICBM. If they developed this missile first they might attempt to knock out the con- tinental US by surprise after which they would be able to occupy Western Europe without meeting any resistance. In the meantime the Soviets "will not oblige us" by reverting to the tactics of the Stalinist period. LINCOLN doubted that one side would develop the ICBM far enough ahead of the other to bring about a decisive alteration of the present stalemate. In response to specific questions on the Satellites, MOSEL! and LIUTGER took the view that Soviet leaders had now undertaken to enlarge the sense of initiative and responsibility within the Satellite Communist parties. There was to be less ordering and more discussion., The greatest strength came from driving with &loose rein. In foreign affairs, the greater the appearance of independence, the more useful the Satellites would be to the USSR. TT. MIDDLE FAST LANGER opened the discussion with general observations based on his recent trip to the.MAddle East. The principal impression he gained was that of a greater ferment than he had anticipated, but in the sense of activity and growth rather than in terms of preparation for war. Eco. nomic activity in the Arab world appeared to be as remarkable as that in Israel and, despite many mistakes, seemed fundamentally sound. A middle class is arising with a consequent increase in discontent and ' idealism, and thia may result in many old regimes being swept away. Although we sometimes think anti-US �pie= is rampant in the area, there is Tieh good will and gratitude toward the US which is not reflected in the press which is controlled, or by the riots, which are organised. If the Arab-Israeli question could be solved, LANGER thought 3 - CO Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 '"�' CO TIAL cur position would be eery strenge But Israel is doing everything possible to establish control and vested interests, right un to the ertittite lines. eanehile, the Arabs seem to roalize they cannot wine out Israel and that the most they can hope for is to annroximate the Tr'7 Partition line, which means Israeli evacuation of some settled areas i At the same time grow;ng Arab strength raises for the Israelis the problem of preventive tare LIVCCLN suggested that the Israeli general staff may already feel it is too late. Although theY could trounce the Arabs now, the latter might not stay beaten. YOTTNG added that only the longerun consequences have prevented the Israelis teleM gong ahead. They cohld take all of Palestine but they realized that Arab hatred would grow and that Israel would not achieve longerun Security. Irmo doubted that the Arabs would intentionally start a war in the near future, but they might be maneuvered into it. It was also essential to consider the intereArab struggle. Jordan was in a key geogranhical oosition ane Tgypt and fyria would hesitate to move unless they were sure of Jordan's attitude. Arab leaders learned the necessity of military coeordination during the l9V r'alestine war. LAIGER believed the Israelis were more likely to settle on the present boundaries than the Arabs, but R007ER said the Arabs think that no settlement on the present borders mould stick and that guarantees mould be needed. S"ITTI concluded that in the view of the Gonsnitants an Arab. Israeli war anneared not to be inevitable. STRAYT1 preferred to say that the chances were less than even but that unforeseen circumstances might eauseone, At the same time, altheugh no nermanent settlement would, be achieved, there might be a shorterun accommodation. YOUNG suggested the Arabs might hope that, in time, their numbers could overcome the Israelis. l'fleanwhile, the Arabs will play off the Soviets against us and thus nerhaps get a better settlement with the Israelis than might otherwise be nossible. The discussion then shifted to the eaghdad Pact. In this connection Yrom thought theYiddle last parer (NIL 3044.55� "The Outlook for Ue Interests in the 7iddle l%ast") failed to give enough attention to the probler of TreqK coordination. The Baghdad Pact was not a real �act until the Trx joined. he conseltants all agreed that Buraimi also demonstrated the need for better UFeUK coordination in the Middle Fast. RETT77.1 and TOTING argued that the nx has in a position to commit our poem� and that a showdown was neeessary to make clear which partner was making the decisions. The Soviets soon might force us to make basic Policy decisions in the area. LINCOLN suggested that the Kremlin general staff might favor bringing Iliddle .;astern matters into the UN. - 4 - CittLaW- CO TIAL Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 �viso CO I IAL 1-lth resnect to the imaibations of the 3aghdad Pact, I,AM7R deplored our apnarent affliction vith "pactitiso". STUTER, LI1CCL72 and TnTr?Ct agreed that we had ne ahoice but to back the pact now that we had it. STRI1ER added that the true value of the "orthern Tier" was not military but rather that it gave us an excute for building local forces capable of meintaining regimes we favored. In discussing roNiet reaction to the 'Northern Tiere- MOWT *aid that roviet policy had shifted frem pressing immediate neighbors to overleaping them. The Faviei propaganda line had changed now that countries like rgypt had achieved political indenendenoe. Soviet Propaganda, he said, contras.* the nolitical independence of these countries with their continuieg economic denendence on the 7"est. Although facilitated by summit declarations of non.aggressiveness� the Soviet � Policy of d4rect intervention in the 7Iddle Last would have come anyway, rowever, the snecific Soviet action in the Fgyntian arms deal was triggered more by rgyntian bitterness over the laghdad ?act, which the Soviets , sought to turn to their advantage* than by the c.'oviets own reaction to the "Tlarthern Tier." For the next few years we may exnect the Soviets to gunnert almost any type of reg'me nrovided it causes trouble for the West. By giving Egypt more bergaining nower the soviets seek to make Cairo more indenendent of the "oat.. LANIER agreed with MOS'LT that a change in Soviet policy in the 71ddle ;ast was inevitable but he thought that India and 3urma actually had a higher nrioritv with the ,oviets than did the Viddle :att. If Soviet diplomacy muddied the pater sufficiently in the 'olddle Last, the West would be nreoccunied therP, Particularly over. oil interests, and the WSR mould be free to advance her interests in India and Rurma. If India went Over to the aloe All rolad be lost for us in Asia. STRAYER emphasised that the 'riddle 1-at is one area where a local war might not directly involve the fast.4est conflict but could really distract us while the 3ommunists made gains, in Ante. RETTZEL added that the Soviets. have now put the.Arab-Israel conflict in a new frame oC reference awl "Mil! nointed out how an Arab-Israeli mar would help the Loviets. Such a conflict might pull Traq eTnt of the "rorthern Tier enforce the 'TS and UK into anti.Arab ni,sitions, and prompt some Arab countries to cancel oil concessions. LANOIR observed that the Ilddle Last naner seemed to ignore the Arab Teague, although the Arabs tended to unite on issues like Ruraimi and the Teague Might becoee an object of ...,oviet sunnart. Yn"1, however, noted various factors tending te retard the development or Arab unity, including the 3ritish support Of Persian Ger sheikdoms, which is resented by many Arabs who believe the ell revenues should not enrich a few sheiks but should be used much more widely for the economic development of the 5 - Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 ENTIAL -44 f422111 area* WTGFR agreed with YOTT'C', that the sheikdoms were an anomaly and concurred in his view that the raudi Arabian regime was becoming more unstable. ITT. MIA eTtIJKANKhoughtthat the draft India Payer (NIT 51.56$ ',India Over tha Next Five Years0) failed to eenvey enough sense of the Indiens being at the "crossroadsow With resncot to the new Five Year -Than,' there was a 'fundamental dispute between the nnhysical" plahners, who wished to set goals and then rind the funds, and the ',financial" planners .who ereferred to ascertain the amount of money available and then fie goals. Perhaps the goals actually set would be too high to be realistic* levertfieless, the five vear Plan had become se politically !mnortant that the government would probably have to find funds at home, which might require controls on the economn as well as from abroad a Although the plan is aimed at a 5 eercent increase in GNP, less than that degree of growth might give the needed ftenee of nrogress Provided lani reform and other activities giving this *sense of movement" proceed, the govern. ment is unlikely to be overthrown from below. il'eanwhile, the ncw plan, though still not nrecisely formulated, has sharpened Indians' awareness of the limitations on their ability to achieve their goals. LItInTR observed that so many Indians feel the need for nregress and see so little hope achieving it through private means that they tend to look to the _foviets who aebieVed mech when faced with a somewhat simil*Tsituation. If the Indians are unable to achieve tie rate of growth...required, controls inconsistent with democracy may be adopted. FTeNTrR suggested that this trend was not necessarily inevitable and that sere small growth might satisfy the masses while the debate on method continues at the top. alit "-WI/Cr' believed the danger lay not se much in a pelitical choice between totalitarian methods and a slow rate of growth as in an ostensibly technical choice which would have the effect of shifting the government in a totalitarian direction. 1,1CLLT inquired whether the mass of Indians mould think progress was being made if it were concentrated in small sectors of the economy or in limited goo.. graphic areas. MTVIKAM replied that the government was aware of this nroblem and atteepted to spread the gains. Lven though greater attention had been devoted to certain politicUly significant areas, there were probably nb large geographie areas where nothing had been done. In any oases the psychic advances thus far had been more imnortant than economic gains. In two or, three years, moreover, the economy might be strong enough to withstand the shock of a bad crop year. Yet inadeouate absorption of the unemploimd may pose a dangerous problem and the Pintellectnalu unemployed. may become the chief source or political trouble. 6 etaier4 CO T1AL Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 NV� CO AL One amelioratine factor in the nolitical situation, h-wever, is the fact that the Congress .'arty throreTh the Gandhi movedent has generally been able to maintain its influence fels11, well at the grass roots level. The discussion then moved on to a crnsideration of the probable effect of lehru's disamearance from the scene. MUM earlier had suggested that the paner had ooftsidered this question too lightly. .14e*125e Nehru really holds the partar together by his nersonanty, there would be a deterioration in the degree of consensus within the Party and a consequent fractionating of the organization. Development of measures wed be facilitated 'because there are many potential leaders and a considerable breadth or competent. in India, unlike such countries as Indonesia. Although the person named prime minister Mould nrobably be on the conservative side for the first two or three years after.Atehruis departure, it would be difficult to eredict what would bagmen after that.. "ith respect to fragmentation of the Congress 'arty, DTPIA" wondered whether it might not, result in Communist advances. '011..1ICATI discounted the likelihood or eignificant Ccarmunist gains, noting that the Conmunist Party in India was more,s,r.! a hard core organization with less protest votes and fellow travelers than in a country such as Italy. ftreover, he thought the political machine of the ''ongress Party would have sufficient momentum so that it would probably not break uo immediately. li`eagmentation.thus would be more gradual. According to MILtIKA71 the paper Also should contain more on the Indian view of Communist '4zinsto Until recently India knew littlo of China and could romanticize the character of reels regime. But as they learned more about 01mmunist China, the Indians acquired a dislike for the methods used by Chinese Communists in pursuit of their aims. However, they probabl-. will continue generally to sympathize with aspects of �'ommuniat China's foreign policy, such as its desire to enter the UN. Doth HOnVrP and al*T.T,TKA" agreed that the paper's statement that Indies "basicaymeathieerlay vith thc rest needed elaboration. ?!IT,TIKA71 noted that there WAS a strong strain or "voluntarism" in Indian character. Although agreeing that Indians are basically sympathetic to "estern ideas and culture, he felt the Indians feared being "swallowed uptiy! love" and ushed out of thPir neutral nosition. Another conflict in the Indian "Boni" stems from the legacy of "anti-colonialism.' iTaving had no exnerienee with the Soviet time nr colonialism they hearken back in their thinking to knglish colonialism. In MMTVT's oninoin NTT 5146 assumed the existence of a atatic condition in e'outheast Asia and ignored the question oC INdiats reaction to large territorial pains by the Communists In this area. LTITC(ILN and lIttTIWT thought India would move if there were an attack on Burma 7 CO AL Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 _ NNI 'eve CO NTIAL LAMER approved :MTH,' suggestion that India mould remain neutralist unless larma were invaded. In that case India might take A,patern aid but it would not necessarily give un neutralism in a larger sense. LTwylvl believed that the paper did not adequately consider what India would give in return for estern aid. nTI,T,T4U� on the other hand, emphasized that we could not bey India ammy from neutralise. 1:e had to rmeember that India could exert a nolitical influence much greater than that suggested by her military resources. V.ith respect to the matter of foreign aid, VTUTIRN believed the 'estimate should indicate the strong Indian preference for "internetion. *ligation" of assistance. On the policy level, he believed the US should propose an internationalization of aid, analogous to the Marshall "len, which would include the Soviets. It would be to our advantage in any event to build the Indians up, and the suggestion for international aid would be difficult for the Lariats either to accept or reject. HOOVER agreed that internationalization of aid mould be better than competin,I with Russian grants. T � MITA The discussion then shifted to China, with particular emphasis on the political effects of a relaxation of cxylar controls. MILLYKAI thought much denended on how it was done; YTS loss of "face" coed be - serious if the imnression were left that the US had relaxed trade contras under pressure; the reaction might be different if the US turned necessity into virtue and proposed to relax controls in the interests of mending world trade. HOOVIR questioned whether it was still worth attempting to keep contras on any but the most obvious tyoe of strategic goods. MTUT1A7 suggested there might be an intermediate stage between total abolition and complete retention of controls. Stiff controls mild still be maintained on trade with the US itself so that US markets at least would not be open to China. The effect which US relaxation of controls mould have on "wave of the future" thinking in &ate would probably depend on the country, with some rilTn countries regardinz it as a retreat by the PS etereas India and 3urma might feel otherwise. -ith regard to the problem of L,ino.Soviet relations, "OrIrLY felt that the degree of Chinese initiative denended on basic ,;hinese power. The 'oviets nrobably have been trying to decrease uhinese freedom of action in Southeast Ulla. Perhaps this has mused the Chicoms to "champ at the bit" but the Feviets rrobably argue that it is more Important to strengthen the i.;ommunist nosit4on with the neutrals first. STRAYER thought Soviet control was limited so that if the ,,hinese &aided to attack Formosa on their own the soviets might be faced with 8 CO Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 � '10.1 a fait accompli. MSELY, however& argued that the Soviets have a ccaRl ng uence over Lticom military equipment and the rate of industrial expansion. But 170(TFR thought a Chicom attack on Formaa.. would really bind the boviets& since they could in no case drop their Chinese allies. LrICPLAt suggested thatithe'formosa situation gives the S.oviets some leverage on the Chicoms as it limits th6 lattergs freedom of action. For this reason the Kremlin may prefer to maintain the status -quo with respect to Formosa. But LA' GTR thought the Chinese tail could wag the dog; the Soviets must concede the Chicoms first voice in Asian affairs and can only affect the rate of their expansion.Th weed be an enormous blow to the Soviets if the Chicoms were to go their own way. The Soviets also do not want an attack on Formosa for fear of repercussions elsewhere. !Jut STRAYER pointed out that it was still to the Soviet advantage to keep the Fermata issue alive, since it VAS a legitimate political question in Asia. RFTTZET, questioned this advantage, however& if it meant that the Ch4nese tail could wag the Soviet dog, WTI R added that the Soviets undoubtedlv were delighted to have Communism advance in Inia and that most progress would have to be made through Communist China. At the same time the Soviets want the line drawn before things get tee hot, not wanting to risk war or possiblv'even break up the relaxation or tension. V. TTAT.Y � On the question of an "opening to the lefto"., LAIRR thought this raised the problem of what Nonni Wanted and what he would do next. rTLITKAI-suggested other Questions invOlved were factional splits within the Christian e.mocratiil ?arty and the increased fluidity of all parties& with growing restlessness among Socialists and trade unionists who were seeking a non.Commist rallying point. STRAYER took the view that the overriding problem was what haplened to the Christian Democratic Party. 'Olit.offs from the Chriotian )e7ocratic Party and ',Tenni Socialists could represent favorable de:OlooMants& but according' to MTLT,T7(A7 this would depend on how many Christian Democrats go to the extreme right and how maw Venni Socialists to the extreme left. Then there would always be the problem or Whether any of the alleged disnutes between the Corn.. 'masts and the Nenni Socialists were real or Communist plants. STRAYER interjected that in fine Italian tradition we might very well end 1111 with a whole group of splinter Parties, once the nrocess got stxrted. 9 - Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596 CO IWIAL %le uNara alluded to the depressing maneuvering of narty leaders and noted that he had found Manni regarded as a Communist in Italy. He believed that from now on we must expect mere "popular front" talks with Nonni first attempting to brine in "moderate" Comunists and then less mod. orate ones. In !ILLIKA!Its view, !Termite policy of upholding his "unity- of action" pact with the Communists was significant, as was his party's stand on the Vanoni plan. ROOM agreed that some Christian Democratic leaders were interestwi in this plan, but right wing Christian Democra- tic would not implement the program. Therefore left -sing Christian Democrats who wished to push the Vanoni Plan and a reform program, needed leftist support and believed an "opening to the left" was necessary. In this overall 74artext, MILTIKA7 regarded it as somewhat anomalous that the political situation in Italy should be deteriorating while the economic situation was steadily improving. FIREIAL Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 C03436596