CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/07/22

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03448343
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
September 20, 2019
Document Release Date: 
September 26, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 22, 1955
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15721987].pdf205.19 KB
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Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343 TOP SECRET ;/%/7 //07/ 22 July 1955 Copy No. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. 26 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. H DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2o/0 AU TH: HR 70-2 IihicTO, REVIEWER: Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 3.3(h)(2) 99 3.5(c);; o#� TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343 A .#LN %.+1 � LI A `NOr IMO SUMMARY FAR EAST 1. Tokyo current China policy (page 2. South Korean instructions to break off talks (page 3). SOUTHEAST ASIA 3. 4. Indonesian government may face early vote of confidence (page 4). NEAR EAST - AFRICA 5. Comment on Greek decision to resubmit Cyprus issue to UN (page 5). LATIN AMERICA 6. Comment on Argentine political situation (page 6). 22 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 TO Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343 I Lir I FAR EAST 1, Tokyo current China policy: Japan is not considering recognition of Communist China and will continue co- operating with the free world as the key- note of its diplomatic policy, Japan intends to continue friendly relations with National- ist China and will withhold all comment on possible direct talks between Communist China and the United States on the Formosa problem. Japan would observe Western controls on ra e wi ommums na. He as- serted that neither trade nor Japan's approach to Peiping on the repatriation of Japanese detainees involved recognition of the Com- munist regime. Comment: A majority of Japanese be- lieve that their nation Communist China. There have been indications the Japanese government is considering steps to ease existing trade controls. In view of the above statement of policy it would appear that the Japa- nese proposals will be designed for action within the COCOM frame- work. 2. South Korean instructions to break off talks: 22 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 tr n OEVIDE"r Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343 Approved for -2-079/09/16 C03448343 Rheets orders to break off the talks, which to date have not been acted on, may have been intended for American intelligence consumotion in a maneuver to force United States con- cessions. Similar threats to reject aid and institute austerity measures were leaked into American in- telligence ch n e s during negotiations over the terms of aid a year ago. SOUTHEAST ASIA 3. 4. Indonesian government may face early vote of confidence: The American embassy in Djakarta re- oorts that the focus of action in the Indo- iesian political crisis appears to be 22 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343 Page 4 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03446343 doh shifting to parliament, where debate on a no-confidence motion is scheduled to commence on 22 July. According to lo- cal press reports, the government will ask that a vote be taken that same even- ing. The embassy hesitates to predict the outcome of such a vote, pointing out that although the All govern- ment has been "massively discredited," opposition parties are re- luctant to assume the responsibilities of government prior to the general elections. All's future is in the hands of the smaller parties supporting his government. Comment: Three of the parties in the government coalition reportedly called on All to resign as of 21 July. If these parties vote with the parliamentary opposition on the no-confidence motion, All's chances of obtaining a favorable vote will be slim. It is possible that the cabinet may resign rather than face a confidence vote. Should the cabinet fall or resign, Vice President Hatta would probably request Ali to continue in a "care- taker" capacity until President Sukarno returns in early August. NEAR EAST - AFRICA 5. Comment on Greek decision to resubmit Cyprus issue to UN: Greece has decided to resubmit the Cyprus _ssue to the United Nations and has instructed its UN delegation accordingly. Foreign Min- ister Stephanopoulos has announced that this step was taken on direct order of Prime Minister Papagos. The prime minister's action was probably motivated by increasing distrust of London's intentions in scheduling the Anglo-Greek-Turkish conference on Cyprus to open on 29 August-- 22 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 TriP CT? F T Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343 - II, nine days after the deadline for the submission of items for the UN General Assembly's agenda. Papagos probably also feared that his government's position would be imperiled unless it took immediate action on the Cyprus issue. Recriminations over the conference open- ing date, which the British and Turks agreed on in advance and pre- sented to Athens on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, are likely to inten- sify distrust among the three powers. Presentation of the issue to the UN decreases the prospects of a successful conference. LATIN AMERICA 6. Comment on Argentine political situation: Another revolt may be attempted in Argen- tina at any time ..t...aEno.u.c Action groups" are still not satis- fied with the changes since the 16 June re- volt and want Peron ousted. Naval officers reportedly have been providing civilians wan arms, and anti-Peron student groups have been organizing into armed cells during the past week. The government's announcement on 20 July that fleet units had left Puerto Belgrano for "maneuvers" adds to the uncertainty of the military situation, since there is some doubt that the navy is under government control. Under ordinary conditions, maneuvers at this time of the year would not be unusual. Meanwhile, Peron may have been setting the stage for his resignation when he told Ambassador N-ufer on 19 July that he was not resigning "for the time being," and that he did not intend to resign "unless his resignation proved a sine qua non to the success of the pacification movement." He said he felt confident that the "pacification movement would not fail." He added, however, that if he did resign, it should not be taken to indicate disillusionment with the turn of events and that he would continue to act as head of the Peronista Party. 22 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 003448343 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343 v.... 400.4 ;14 Peron's bid for "coexistence" among all political groups has not been accepted by the Radicals, the largest opposition party. However, there is no unity among leaders of this badly splintered party or of the embryonic pro-church parties. Peron told Nufer that he was holding Peronista organizations under wraps for the time being, and that the powerful labor confederation would call a general strike if he asked it to. 22 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 WIT> CPWRFT Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343