PROSPECTS FOR REDUCING HEROIN SUPPLIES TO THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05184346
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-02250
• Publication Date: September 27, 1983

4-1-11
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Director of
Central
Intelligence
--Seeret
NOFORN
cm: !
O Rin7 TM
viv t I
OR MAIIK CU
Prospects for Reducing
Heroin Supplies to the
United States
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume 1�The Estimates
--SeCret,.
NIE 8-2,83
27 September 1983
Copy 394
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN� Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT� Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN� Caution�Proprietary Information Involved
NFIBONLY� NFIB Departments Only
ORCON� Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to ...
Foreign Government Information
REL
FGI�
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
�3Eeii.g.L_
NIE 8-2-83
PROSPECTS FOR REDUCING
HEROIN SUPPLIES TO THE
UNITED STATES
VOLUME I THE ESTIMATE
Information available as of 15 September 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Intelligence units in the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, and in the
United States Customs Service, Department of the Treasury, also participated in the
preparation of this Estimate.
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE v
KEY JUDGMENTS 1
DISCUSSION 5
The Setting
5
Changing Import Patterns 5
Changing Consumption and Marketing Patterns 6
Political-Economic Obstacles To Supply Disruption Efforts 8
Consumption of Illegal Heroin Versus Potential Output
Revenues From Producing and Trafficking in Heroin
Problems of Interdiction
8
9
Constraints on Governments of Producing Countries 10
Prospects for Reducing Heroin Through Supply Reduction 12
In Mexico 13
In the Golden Triangle 14
In Southwest Asia 16
In Other Countries 16
Implications for US Heroin Supply Disruption Policies 18
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 21
iii
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
SCOPE NOTE
Heroin consumption may be on the rise again in the United States
after it leveled off at about 4 tons a year in 1980 and 1981, with around
500,000 addicts. In other parts of the world, consumption and addiction
have been steadily increasing. It is estimated, for example, that in 1982
there were some 250,000 heroin addicts in Western Europe, 50,000 in
Pakistan, and 25,000 in Australia, all up considerably in the last few
years. As their addict population rises, these and other countries are
wrestling with the question of how to combat the heroin problem in
both its foreign policy and domestic dimensions.
Since the problem came earlier to our country, US administrations
for over a decade have been attempting to pursue an explicit foreign
policy to cut heroin flows into the United States. In the main, that
policy has focused on reducing supplies of heroin as close to the growing
source as possible, primarily through programs to eradicate opium
poppies (the raw material from which heroin is made) but also including
interdiction of supplies and arrests of traffickers. The purpose of this
two-volume study is to examine what overall impact the US supply
reduction program has had on heroin usage in the United States, what
the prospects are for reducing supplies to the United States in the next
few years, and what the implications are of pursuing current US supply
reduction policies. Volume I provides a general overview of the
problems, prospects, and implications of the US program to reduce
heroin supplies. Volume II contains supporting material in the form of
case studies of past instances of heroin supply reductions from Turkey,
Mexico, and Southeast Asia.
This study does not treat the demand side of the heroin use
equation, an aspect of any overall strategy to reduce heroin consump-
tion that is at least as important as cutting supplies. It also does not delve
into the financial aspects of heroin trafficking, a complex subject which
will be dealt with in future studies of narcotics-generated financial
flows. In addition, the study focuses exclusively on heroin, and its
conclusions do not necessarily apply to the prospects for reducing
supplies of other drugs, such as marijuana and cocaine.
The statistics used in this paper, as with virtually all numbers in the
drug area, must of necessity be read as midpoints on estimated ranges,
not as hard figures. Nonetheless, we believe they are accurate enough to
show direction of change and magnitude, and to support the conclusions
of the study.
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
KEY JUDGMENTS
In the next few years, the United States will be hard pressed to
contain the amount of heroin entering this country from Southwest
Asia, Southeast Asia, and Mexico, let alone to reduce it significantly
through supply reduction programs. Nonetheless, supply reduction
programs probably do help prevent sudden, massive increases in the
quantity of heroin imported into the United States.
There are three reasons for continuing to pursue foreign supply
disruption programs. First, there is no way of calculating whether and
how much additional heroin might flow to the United States if these
programs ceased. No one can predict precisely where the upward limit
on heroin consumption might be. Consequently, at least some risk exists
that heroin use in the United States would rise significantly in intensity
and possibly in magnitude if the retail price dropped sharply because
our market was flooded by supplies of this opiate.
Second, they are important symbols. US leadership in pushing
bilateral and international supply reduction programs provides an
important indicator of the depth of US concern about the societal harm
caused by the drug. Particularly as heroin abuse increases as a social
problem in Western Europe and other countries (such as Pakistan) with
which the United States has close ties, these governments will probably
look to the United States for closer cooperation on narcotics suppression
matters. Not maintaining US initiatives for joint and international
programs in these circumstances would probably raise serious questions
concerning US sincerity about combating heroin abuse.
Third, with the rising concern among West European governments
over increasing heroin abuse, the conditions are improving for even
closer joint intelligence and law enforcement action against the same
trafficking networks that often supply both Europe and the United
States. The West Europeans have also become more willing to encour-
age crop suppression efforts in source countries, adding to already
growing international diplomatic pressures on the governments of those
countries and possibly to the resources available for crop eradication,
substitution, and interdiction programs. While there is little chance that
these efforts will significantly reduce heroin availability in the United
States over the next few years, they provide some hope that the
participants in the poppyfield-to-street-market heroin chain can be kept
under enough pressure to limit growth in future supplies.
1
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
Temporary reductions of heroin in some regions in the United States
were achieved in the 1970s through cooperative actions with the
governments of Turkey and Mexico. The conditions which permitted
those limited successes, however, largely do not exist in current source
countries. In particular, governments in two of the three areas which
now produce heroin for the US market have neither the political control
over the producing regions in their countries nor the economic resources
to mount the kind of crop bans begun by Turkey in 1971 or the
eradication programs started by Mexico in 1976, both with US help.
In Southwest Asia�source of about half of the opium for the 4
metric tons or so of heroin consumed in the United States in 1981�the
Soviet-backed Karmal regime in Afghanistan is devoting little attention
to the narcotics problem. Moreover, these crops are grown primarily in
insurgent-dominated regions where neither the Soviets nor the Afghan
Government are likely to extend their control in the future. The
Pakistani Government has shown new interest in narcotic suppression
programs in the last year, but its efforts are likely to have only minimal
impact on the amount of heroin exported from Pakistan. The main
producing areas of Pakistan are mostly in the North-West Frontier
Province (NWFP), which is only partly under Provincial or Federal
government control. In any case, the federal government is unlikely to
mount the sweeping antinarcotics drive that would be necessary to cut
heroin production in the NWFP, because the probable violence accom-
panying such actions could aggravate the area's weak economy, destabi-
lize the Afghan refugee situation, and provoke hostilities from the
militant Pushtun tribes resident there.
The prospects for successful government narcotics countermeasures
are equally poor in the -Golden Triangle- of Southeast Asia, which has
recently supplied 10 to 15 percent of US heroin imports. Over 80
percent of the opium harvested in 1982 in the Golden Triangle was pro-
duced in Burma. The primary problem in Burma is that the main
producing areas in the country are to varying degrees insurgent
controlled and have been for years. While the Burmese are considering
an ambitious eradication program, including aerial herbicide spraying
in insurgent areas, it is doubtful that they could develop either the
technical or military capability to reduce opium production significant-
ly in these areas. In addition, there is conclusive evidence that high-level
Burmese Government and military officials, including some who were
responsible for the government's narcotics suppression programs, have
. profited from protecting drug traffickers. The government is attempt-
2
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
�3'eeR�EZ..__
NOFORN
ing to purge these officials, but corruption appears to be so widespread
that major doubts remain about how effective any Burmese Govern-
ment program to combat growing and processing opium can really be.
The ability of the government in Mexico�the third area now
supplying the US market�to suppress heroin production also seems to
have declined. At their peak in 1975, Mexican growers and traffickers
produced possibly as much as 6.5 tons of heroin for the US market�
probably more than three-fourths of the heroin consumed in the United
States that year. Imports from Mexico dropped to about 1 ton and the
Mexican market share to below 30 percent in 1979, largely because of
the success of a major crop eradication program undertaken by the
Mexican Government with strong support from the United States. After
1980, however, Mexican heroin supplies appear to have increased and
have remained at 1.5 tons or slightly higher, supplying around one-third
of the US market. The increase in production probably occurred
because Mexican poppy farmers learned techniques that make their
fields harder to find and their poppies more difficult to kill, and
cultivation spread into nontraditional areas.
These improved growing techniques together with the continued
existence of powerful Mexican trafficking organizations suggest that the
government would have to expand its eradication program to reduce
significantly Mexican heroin production from its present level. Even
maintaining the program at its current level may prove difficult,
however, in Mexico's present dire economic circumstances. These
circumstances are boosting the incentives for growing opium poppies as
other sources of farm income decline while simultaneously limiting the
government's ability to divert resources to crop eradication because of
the need to stick to a severe austerity program. Increased assistance
from the United States could provide some additional resources, but it
would probably not obviate the need for some growth in local Mexican
resources if the eradication program were to be significantly expanded.
Consequently, the outlook for Mexican heroin production, under the
best circumstances where the government maintains its current eradica-
tion program, is for heroin output to remain at about 1.5 tons or slightly
higher. If, despite good intentions, economic stringency forces the
government to cut back resources devoted to crop suppression, the
situation could worsen considerably, since Mexican heroin production is
probably capable of expanding fairly rapidly.
In addition to the inability of governments to extend their control
over poppy-growing areas or devote necessary resources to suppression
3
MtGakl,'
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
programs, a number of other political and economic factors severely
hamper efforts to reduce the flow of heroin to the United States:
� A vast amount of heroin is potentially available worldwide for
diversion into illegal channels from opium poppies grown for
the legal pharmaceutical market and for illegal but traditional
consumption in Asian societies. Only about 3 percent of total
opium production (legal and illegal) and less than 10 percent of
all illicit output is shipped to industrial countries in the form of
heroin. The entire illicit heroin consumption of these countries
could be grown from poppy acreage equivalent to an area
smaller than Washington, D.C.
� If the price were right, opium poppy production could easily be
expanded in both traditional and new areas to meet the
demands of the comparatively small US and Western illicit
markets; there are few agricultural restrictions on where it can
be grown. Furthermore, a shrinking of the licit market for
opium poppy derivatives could cause diversion into illegal
channels of some part of the massive legal crop grown in India
by farmers who would be loath to give up this important source
of income.
� Extraordinary revenues are generated by illegally producing
and moving heroin, far more than can be earned any legal way
by all participants in the system. Many billions of dollars are
produced annually by the sale of heroin used in the United
States.
� Sufficient heroin to supply the US market can be smuggled in
such individual small quantities as to make confiscation of
significant amounts virtually impossible. In addition, disrupting
supplies by enforcement action will not be as easy as in the
1970s because there are many more small, independent net-
works now than in the past.
One possible approach which might�although probably not with-
in the time frame of this Estimate�improve capabilities for inhibiting
trafficking of heroin to the United States involves disrupting narcotics-
generated financial flows into and out of the United States. Attacking
these flows through combined intelligence/diplomatic/enforcement
actions conceivably could reduce profits and raise risks to trafficking
organizations sufficiently to diminish their enthusiasm for supplying the
US market. The Intelligence Community is actively studying the
feasibility and implications of attempting this approach.
4
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
DISCUSSION
The Setting
1. Changing Import Patterns. Of the 4 metric
tons or so of heroin that now enters the United States
annually, a little over half comes from opium grown in
Southwest Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran),
about one-third originates in Mexico, and the remain-
ing 10 to 15 percent is produced in the "Golden
Triangle" in Southeast Asia (Thailand, Burma, and
Laos). (See table 1.) This import pattern, which has
held fairly steady since 1980, is quite different from
the pattern that was evident through most of the
1970s. Especially through the middle of that decade,
single source areas tended to dominate the market. In
1971, for example, 80 percent of US heroin came from
Turkey. By 1975, however, Turkey had disappeared as
a supplier for the US market, while Mexico had risen
to prominence, supplying about 85 percent of imports.
By 1980, the principal supplier had changed once
again, with half of the US market supplied by South-
west Asia, as Mexico dropped to 40 percent and the
Golden Triangle constituted about 10 percent.
Table 1
Estimated Supply of Heroin to the United States From Principal
Foreign Sources, 1975-83'
Metric tons
Area
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Mexico
6.5b
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
1.5c
1.5
NA
1.7d
(85)
(65)
(55)
(45)
(30)
(40)
(40)
Southeast Asia
1.0
2.0
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.5
NA
NA.
(15)
(35)
(35)
(40)
(30)
(10)
(10)
Southwest Asia
Negl
Negl
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.0
NA
NA
(10)
(20)
(40)
(50)
(50)
Total
7.5
6.0
5.5
4.5
3.5
4.0
4.0
NA f
NA
NOTE: US market shares are in parentheses.
�These figures are generally rough estimates rather than hard
numbers. They are believed, however, to accurately reflect trends
and magnitudes. All numbers have been rounded to the nearest 5.
The figures from 1975-79 come from DEA files. Those from 1980-
81 are derived from the 1981 National Narcotics Intelligence
Consumers Committee report.
b Our best estimate of heroin imports from Mexico in the peak year
of 1975 is 6.5 tons. This figure, however, illustrates how uncertain
we are of the accuracy of heroin statistics generally. We have
modeled a number of dimensions of heroin supply and demand for
the period 1970 to 1982. The amount of heroin that we estimate
was imported from Mexico in 1975 is not, according to the model,
congruent with what we think demand was that year. Six and a half
tons of heroin should have more than met consumption needs across
the nation. If, because of the highly regionalized nature of the US
market, there was still something of a shortage on the east coast in
1975, then, according to the model, there should have been so much
heroin available in the western and southwestern markets that
addiction figures and purity there should have risen sharply and
prices should have plummeted. Information available from the west
5
and southwest for that period, however, does not reflect these kinds
of sharp changes. The most likely explanation is that our estimate
for Mexican heroin production for that year is too high.
.The 1980 Mexico production figure of 1.5 tons of heroin is based
on a methodology which was not available in earlier years. Conse-
quently, the 1979 and 1980 figures are not strictly comparable and
the exact percentage of increase cannot be known accurately.
Nonetheless, the totality of available evidence indicates that some
increase in Mexican heroin production has occurred since the low
point was reached in about 1979, and the new level has been
maintained or may have even slightly increased during the last
three years.
d CIA projection.
e The 1982-83 opium harvest in Southeast Asia has been excellent,
suggesting this area will have at least as much heroin available for
export to the United States as it did in 1982.
indicates that 5.2 metric
tons of heroin were imported into the United States in 1982, 30
percent more than in 1981. Of this total, Southwest Asia may have
accounted for 2.7 tons or 52 percent, Mexico 1.8 tons or 34 percent,
and Southeast Asia 0.7 tons or 14 percent.
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
2. These swings in sources of supply were caused, in
part, by two US policy initiatives that resulted in
successive sharp reductions in the amount of Turkish
and Mexican heroin entering the United States. In the
early 1970s, Washington convinced Ankara to take
action that largely eliminated illicit opium production
in Turkey. At about the same time, joint Washington-
Paris law enforcement efforts severely disrupted the
trafficking network�the "Turkish-French Connec-
tion--that refined Turkish opium into heroin and
smuggled it into the United States. In the mid-1970s,
joint efforts by Washington and Mexico city success-
fully cut Mexican opium poppy crops. A two-year
drought in the Golden Triangle in the late 1970s also
affected marketing patterns; as the inflow of heroin
from that source declined, Golden Triangle heroin was
not available to take up the market share lost by the
Mexicans as their supplies shrank.
3. In each case of supply disruption, however, other
sources soon emerged. As it became clear, for example,
that demand for heroin would not be met from
Turkish crops, plantings of opium poppies increased
dramatically in Mexico, and the tonnage of Mexican
heroin exported to the United States went up sharply
each year between 1971 and 1975. Similarly, the drop
in availability of Mexican heroin in 1976 and 1977
opened the way for heroin from Southwest Asia�
which had bumper opium poppy crops in 1978 and
1979�to penetrate the US market in increasing quan-
tities. The drought in the Golden Triangle reduced
competition from that source, so that the Southwest
Asian market share in the United States grew steadily
from virtually none in 1976 to better than 50 percent
in 1981. The rise in imports from Southwest Asia
seems to have leveled off at about that point, however,
and it appears doubtful that supplies from that source
will in the future dominate the US market the way
Turkey and Mexico once did. In part, this results from
the partial recovery of opium poppy crops in Mexico,
beginning about 1980, as growers there found ways to
circumvent the government eradication program, and
because of three bumper crops in the Golden Triangle
following the end of the drought. In part, it may also
result from some basic changes that have occurred in
trafficking patterns and in the nature of the market in
the United States over the last 10 years.
4. Changing Consumption and Marketing Pat-
terns. The two major supply disruptions in the 1970s
produced a cyclical pattern in heroin use within the
United States as consumption rose and fell with avail-
ability. During periods of relative shortage, some
occasional users went off the drug, some addicts
turned to methadone clinics, and many addicts used
other drugs. Once heroin supplies became more avail-
able, both occasional users and many addicts returned
to heroin as their drug of choice. Peaks and troughs in
heroin use can be traced through rises and falls in such
indicators as deaths and injuries due to overdoses,
admissions to clinics, price changes in retail sales, and
measures of purity. According to these indicators, US
consumption was high in 1970, fell to a low point in
1973 following the loss of Turkish supplies, rebuilt to a
peak in 1975, and dropped again to a low in 1978-79
after Mexican heroin became scarce. If this three-to-
four-year cycle between peaks and troughs. continues
to hold true, supply and consumption could be ap-
proaching another high point, especially if new sup-
plies from the bumper crops in the Golden Triangle
enter the US market with no concomitant drop in
imports for Mexico or Southwest Asia. (See figure 1.)
5. Along with these supply-induced cyclical move-
ments, there have been other longer term influences
that at least up to now are tending to reduce overall
consumption. Although the evidence is not conclusive,
most experts believe that the high levels in consump-
tion reached in the late 1960s and early J 970s and in
1975 are not likely to be attained again, because:
� The number of persons in the prime age category
for drug use (17 to 25) has fallen significantly.
� Many heroin addicts have become multiple drug
users so that, even when heroin supplies increase,
addicts do not consume as much as when they
were on heroin exclusively.
� A significant subset of the population that for-
merly used heroin now prefers narcotic analge-
sics such as codeine.
6. The swings in heroin availability over the last 10
years or so have not occurred evenly throughout the
United States. Because the trafficking networks that
market heroin have much better access to some US
6
"Irefitis.
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
Figure 1
US Supplies of Heroin
Event
Major Suppliers
Use Cycles
1970
0 Turkish-French connection strong
O Mainly Turkish with 10 to 15 percent
0 Peak
71
from Golden Triangle and perhaps
a similar share from Mexico
72
0 Turkish-French connection disrupted
73
and Turks ban opium production
0 Mexico emerges rapidly
0 Trough
74
as the major drug source
75
76
0 Peak
77
0 Mexican crop sharply reduced
78
by eradication program
0 Trough
79
0 Drought in Golden Triangle and
�Southwest Asia becomes major supplier,
80
bumper crop in Southwest Asia
and by 1980 Mexican heroin becomes
more readily available; Golden Triangle
81
0 Bumper crop in Golden Triangle
supplies also rebound in 1982,climbing
to above 15 percent
82
0 Bumper crop in Golden Triangle
83
0 Continued good crop in Golden Triangle
3 Peak(?)
Unclassified
300830 10-83
cities than others and because, especially earlier in the
decade, strong preferences existed among users for
heroin from a particular source, the US market has
been relatively regionalized. The clandestine nature of
heroin trafficking and the strong desire to avoid arrest
means that common bonds reflected in ethnic, lan-
guage, and even- family ties are essential to building
and maintaining needed links of trust. This means that
trafficking organizations are very hesitant about serv-
ing communities other than those in which they are
well established or about making new connections to
obtain supplies of narcotics when traditional links are
disrupted. The Turkish opium ban and the disruption
of the Turkish-French Connection, for example, hit
the east coast hard as supplies fell off and prices rose
sharply. Meanwhile, the west coast and southwest
markets, traditionally served by Mexico, were little
affected. Mexican heroin, as production increased,
7
eventually worked its way east, but this took one to
two years. The opposite pattern occurred when Mexi-
can supplies plummeted in the mid-1970s: heroin
availability in the southwest and west fell off, while
the east was affected only marginally.
7. Some of this regionalism may be breaking down.
In particular, changes have occurred in the number
and variety of trafficking networks serving the United
States which may enhance their ability to fill more
quickly than in the past vacuums created either by
shortages of heroin from specific areas or law enforce-
ment successes against individual networks more
quickly than in the past. Southwest Asian heroin, for
example, is being smuggled into the United States by
Italian crime syndicates, by Lebanese traffickers, and,
increasingly, by Pakistanis. Even some of the former
French-Corsican traffickers are reappearing. Smug-
gling of Golden Triangle heroin has spread beyond
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
traditional Chinese groups to include emerging alli-
ances with southern European traffickers. Mexican
heroin still is smuggled and distributed almost exclu-
sively by Mexican networks, but these groups over the
years have moved out of the southwest along with the
spread of Mexican immigrants. Mexican distributors
have also probably retained some of the connections
they made on the east coast when they eventually
responded to a heroin shortage there in the early
1970s.
Political-Economic Obstacles To Supply
Disruption Efforts
8. Any supply disruption program faces a number
of major obstacles to success. In particular:
� A vast amount of heroin is potentially available
for diversion into illegal channels from opium
poppies grown for the legal pharmaceutical
market.
� If the price were right, opium poppy production
could easily be expanded enough in both tradi-
tional and new areas to meet the comparatively
small illicit consumption in the Western world;
there are few agricultural restrictions on where it
can be grown, although it would take a year or
two before the necessary production skills could
be transferred to new areas.
� Extraodinary revenues are generated by produc-
ing and moving illegal heroin�vastly more than
can be earned any legal way by all participants
in the system.
� Sufficient heroin to supply the illegal market can
be smuggled in such small quantities as to make
confiscation of significant amounts virtually
impossible.
� Most governments in countries where opium
poppies are grown for the illegal market have
virtually no political or military control over the
producing areas.
9. Consumption of Illegal Heroin Versus Poten-
tial Output. The amount of illegal heroin consumed in
industrial countries is minuscule compared with the
amount that could be produced either by diversion
from licit production or from new plantings. About
8
300 to 400 metric tons of opium poppy derivatives
(measured in heroin equivalent tonnage ') are pro-
duced annually throughout the world. About half of
these derivatives are sold to pharmaceutical firms,
mainly for producing codeine. (See figure 2.) Most of
the remaining poppy plant crop is consumed illegally
(by smoking or eating) in traditional Asian societies.
Only about 3 percent of total production (legal and
illegal) and less than 10 percent of illicit output is
shipped to industrial countries in the form of heroin.
(See table 2.) The entire illicit heroin consumption of
these countries could be grown from opium poppy
acreage equivalent to an area smaller than Washing-
ton, D.C.
10. Industrial country illegal heroin needs thus can
be satisfied by small shifts of supplies from traditional
to modern societies and from legal to illegal channels.
Although only minor amounts of legally grown poppy
now seem to be diverted to illegal use, higher prices
would probably substantially increase the flow, espe-
cially since stocks from legal production are at record
levels and are likely to remain so for the next few
years. The worldwide demand for legal drugs based on
the opium poppy plant has stagnated since the mid-
1970s despite relatively low global prices.
11. Although opium poppy plants mainly are culti-
vated in Asian regions stretching from Turkey to Laos
(including the central Asian republics of the USSR) (see
figure 3), they can be grown nearly anywhere. The
Asian regions provide almost all the global output
because of a combination of circumstances�favorable
climatic conditions, longstanding traditional uses of
opium poppy derivatives, and an abundant supply of
cheap labor to tend the labor-intensive growing proc-
ess (see inset). The concentration of cultivation, howev-
er, is influenced more by the social and economic
factors than botanical necessity. Opium poppies have
been grown successfully, on a commercial basis, in at
least 10 US states from Vermont to California.
12. Revenues From Producing and Trafficking
in Heroin. The production and distribution of illegal
opium, morphine base, and heroin provide enormous
For consistency, the amount of opium gum, poppy straw, mor-
phine base, and heroin are all stated in their heroin equivalent
weight.
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
Figure 2
Opium Poppy Plant: Derivatives
Poppy plant
(Papover Somniferum)
Raw opium
Poppy straw
�
Illicit uses:
O Smoking or eating in
traditional societies
O Heroin
O Smoking #3
O Injectable #4
Unclassified
Medical uses:
O Morphine
O Natural codeine
O Thebaine
Poppy seed
and oil
�
Cooking uses:
O Baking (seed)
O Cooking oil
300831 10-83
cash returns for all involved. (See table 3.) Despite the
risk,. the rewards available seem to bring forth an
unceasing stream of the relatively few persons needed
to move illicit supplies into industrial countries. Some
80 to 90 percent of the many billions of dollars in gross
revenues on heroin used in the United States are
earned by domestic US distributors. The remainder
goes to traffickers, the laboratory operators, and to the
farmers. Although the returns to the farmer are less
than one-tenth of 1 percent of the street value, they
are substantial from his point of view. Except when
opium prices are unusually depressed, no other crop
offers the same payoff. Net revenues from illicit
opium poppy production are most often two to five
times more than alternative legal crops. In some cases,
as in parts of Afghanistan, there are no practical
substitutable crops. Agricultural workers needed to
tend the poppy plant are easy to obtain since they are
paid up to four times their normal wage.
9
3. The payoffs for the smuggler bringing heroin
from European laboratories to US distributors are
huge, even when a "modest" threefold to sixfold
return is received, and when two out of 10 shipments
are seized (an extreme event). Smugglers now pay
roughly $50,000 for each kilogram at the European
laboratory and receive from $200,000 to $300,000 in
the United States. Their costs of operation (couriers,
bribes, and so forth) are perhaps $25,000. Given these
numbers, the smugglers' net revenues from 10 1-
kilogram shipments, with two seized, would be $1-1.8
million.
14. Problems of Interdiction. Trafficking in ille-
gal heroin is greatly facilitated by the small tonnage
involved and the ability to ship heroin in parcels of
almost any size or shape. Total US imports of illicit
heroin have generally ranged from 4 to 6 tons a year, a
minute fraction of the nearly 500 million tons of goods
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
�1-ECRE-T�
NOFORN
Table 2
Opium Poppy Plant:
Global Production and Use a
Metric tons
Production b
Mainly licit
India 100 to 130
Turkey (poppy straw) 40 to 90
Other (poppy straw) 50 to 80
Subtotal a 200 to 250
Mainly illicit
Golden Triangle 30 to 50
Southwest Asia � 70 to 140
Mexico 1 to 2
Subtotal C 100 to 150
Total
Use
300 to 400
Licit-global 170 to 185
United States 40 to 45
Illicit-industrial countries 10 to 14
United States 4 to 6
Western Europe 4 to 6
Other industrial countries 2
LDCs (mainly Asia) d 120 to 200
Total 300 to 400
a Approximate tons of potential pure heroin equivalent, average
annual rate from 1973 to 1983.
b Range of normal harvests.
c Does not add because lows and highs in individual producing areas
do not occur simultaneously.
d Includes changes in stocks (both licit and illicit).
brought into the United States annually. That small
amount of heroin also could be smuggled in by one-
hundredth of 1 percent of the more than 200 million
persons entering this country each year, assuming each
trafficker carried a half pound. Given these numbers
and the multitude of possible smuggling routes, the
chances of confiscating more than a small portion of
illegal heroin are nil. Most estimates indicate that less
than 10 percent of the heroin smuggled into the
United States is seized at points between the border
and the consumer. Border interdiction of heroin is
much more difficult than such bulky contraband items
as arms, marijuana, liquor, and cigarettes.
15. Constraints on Governments of Producing
Countries. Attempting to suppress opium poppy culti-
vation is generally very costly for producing country
10
Opium Poppy Plant:
Factors Affecting Production
The opium poppy plant is best suited to warm but
not humid climates. Thus the poppy is most often
grown in sometimes irrigated flat terrain in mountain
valleys, 3,000 or more feet above sea level.
Opium yields fluctuate widely with weather condi-
tions. A fourfold difference in output can occur de-
pending upon whether there is a drought or ideal
growing conditions. In addition, although the poppy
plant requires only a moderate amount of water before
and during the growth cycle to ensure profitable yields,
rainfall during the harvest period can be disastrous
because it leaches alkaloids from the pod.
Poppy farmers from Turkey through India seldom
devote more than 1 hectare to the crop. In these
producing countries, the farmers use the major part of
their land to produce food for their own needs, chiefly
wheat.
In some producing areas of the Far East, poppy
acreage represents a larger portion of the cropped land.
Some of the Meo hill tribes of northern Thailand, for
example, pursue a slash-and-burn type of agriculture
where half or more of the cropped land may be in
poppy and the remainder in upland rice.
Mexican farmers until the mid-1970s planted poppy
on about a third of a hectare but even these small plots
have been reduced to less than a 20th of a hectare since
a major eradication program.
governments.' The economic costs for crop eradication
and/or substitution programs are great because of the
sizable resource commitment needed (especially man-
power and equipment such as helicopters) and the
income lost, since no other crop can generate the same
revenues as narcotics. If heroin production in the
country is protected by extensive payoffs to govern-
ment officials, the potential economic loss to those
officials would also act as a deterrent to establishing an
effective crop suppression program.
Most of these constraints also affect the ability of governments
to control the production of other drugs. SNIE 8/80-83, 28 June
1983, Implication for the United States of the Colombia Drug
Trade, discusses these factors as they relate to Colombia's efforts, for
example, to control the production of marijuana and cocaine.
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
Figure 3
World Opium Producers and Major Smuggling Routes
S`�
'04\
Unclassified
700183 (A02683)10-83
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
0 Licit opium
0 Illicit opium
route
Table 3
Income From Illicit Heroin a
Asian Heroin
Mexican Heroin
Profit
Percent of
total
Profit
Percent of
total
Farmer
$300 to $2,000
Less than one-
tenth of 1 percent
$20,000 to $30,000
Ito 1.5
Middlemen (from farmer to heroin
laboratory operator)
$350 to $9,000 b
Up to 0.5
$10,000
0.5
Laboratory operator
$8,000 to $50,000
0.5 to 2.5
$60,000 to $70,000
3 to 3.5
Middlemen (from laboratory operator to
$150,000 to
7.5 to 10
$300,000
15
major distributor in the United States)
$200,000
Middlemen (from major distributor to
$250,000 to
12.5 to 15
$400,000
20
middle-level distributor)
$300,000
Middlemen (from middle-level distributor to
user)
$1.4-1.8 million
75
$1.2-1.4 million
60
User price
$1.8-2.3 million
a Approximate gross profits involved in I kilogram of pure heroin or
equivalent as of December 1982.
b The closer the laboratory to the final consumer, the higher the
amount.
11
GREz...
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
16. The political costs can be even greater. If the
producing areas in the country are populated by
government supporters or, at least, those not in opposi-
tion, there is the risk of stimulating active political
opposition by moving against their livelihood. If, as is
more often the case, the areas where opium is grown
and processed are not under effective central govern-
ment control, the political costs of attempting to
extend the government's reach to the point where it
could suppress production could be civil unrest, or
even insurrection, in those areas.
17. These economic and political costs, while they
inhibit government efforts to combat narcotic produc-
tion, do not always prevent them if sufficient political
and economic incentives favorable to undertaking
suppression programs develop. Foremost among these
positive incentives is a realization by the government
that it needs to extend its control over the producing
area for its own political reasons. In a few cases, heroin
addiction may be developing into a domestic problem
severe enough to weigh in favor of such a decision.
More often, the government is persuaded that the area
has to be brought under effective control because it
harbors armed political opposition, guerrillas, or some
other unacceptable challenge to central authority. In
addition, international pressure against illegal drugs
has been growing, so that government officials from
most illicit opium producing countries have indicated
they feel increasing opprobrium from continuing to be
a source country. If these factors strengthen the politi-
cal motivation sufficiently, the willingness to bear the
economic costs of at least initiating crop suppression
often follows, especially if external assistance is
available.
Prospects for Reducing Heroin Through Supply
Reduction
18. The chances are not good that the amount of
heroin now entering the United States can be signifi-
cantly cut in the next few years by supply reduction
programs. Unlike the situation in the 1970s in Turkey
and Mexico, the governments of the countries in the
primary heroin source areas do not possess the re-
sources to mount significant supply reduction pro-
grams and, even if they did, several probably do not
possess the will to use them effectively because of the
political costs that would be incurred. In retrospect,
for example, it appears that the conditions that per-
tained in Turkey at the time of the opium ban and
that have continued to keep domestically produced
Turkish opium off the illegal market for a decade
would be extremely difficult to replicate in another
country:
� Opium has generally not been used as a narcotic
in Turkey so that its cultural significance is less
than in growing areas where narcotics use is
deeply engrained.
� Turkish governments have a history of carrying
out harsh sanctions when disobeyed; their rheto-
ric tends to be believed, and they have adequate
control over growing areas to enforce their will.
� An economically viable substitute was available
for Turkish opium farmers. Profits from selling
poppy straw to the government are not as great
as producing opium gum that can be sold for
conversion into heroin, but growing opium pop-
pies still can produce cash.
� The military government which took Turkish
opium off the illegal market in 1972 had strong
political reasons to move against opium farmers:
these producers mainly supported the out-of-
power, left-of-center parties, and the military
believed narcodollars were financing gunrunning
to terrorist groups who were challenging the
regime. The producers could be affronted with-
out major political cost to the government.
� Turkish opium smugglers had little incentive to
push for renewed domestic opium gum produc-
tion after the military government stepped
down, since relatively large and cheap supplies
were available to them from Southwest Asia.
19. Few of these conditions exist or are likely to
develop soon in Southwest Asia or the Golden Trian-
gle. Moreover, some important underpinnings for suc-
cessful pursuit of narcotics suppression activities in
Mexico, where the political, social, and economic
environment has been more favorable, are changing.
In the past, the strength of the ruling political party
and years of political stability under the unifying
symbol of the Mexican Revolution have permitted the
central government to act effectively when it chose to
12
"ItefitEL
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
do so, even in the most remote regions. In addition,
opium has no tradition of use as a narcotic by rural
Mexican society, and heroin is rarely used by the
burgeoning modern urban class, although this group
does consume large quantities of illegally obtained
synthetic drugs. Finally, until recently the Mexican
Government has had economic resources to spend on
narcotics suppression because of its enormous intake of
petrodollars.
20. In Mexico. Even before Mexico entered its
current economic crisis, however, it had begun to
experience increasing difficulties in containing opium
poppy cultivation. Poppy farmers learned to circum-
vent eradication efforts by developing techniques
which make their fields harder to find and their
Figure 4
Poppy Cultivation Areas
poppies more difficult to kill. In addition, poppy
cultivation spread beyond the traditional area of Du-
rango and Sinaloa into new regions, including the
states of Veracruz, Chiapas, and San Luis Potosi. (See
figure 4.) Moreover, even though the government had
been willing to move decisively against the politically
weak farmers when it began a serious poppy eradica-
tion program in 1975, Mexico's federal law enforce-
ment officers did little to disrupt the major Mexican
drug smugglers, their laboratories, and their distribu-
tion networks. The continued existence of these well-
organized, powerful smuggling organizations together
with the improved production techniques of Mexican
poppy farmers suggest that the Mexican Government
would have had to improve its eradication program
simply to attempt to keep production from rising. The
80 TM
ulna � S.
uis
Sonora
.0
Chihuah
a
United $
ates
- Les .)
.Herreras
�Durango
Maps
� Mexico:-/
, Sain
"Y--(2, Potosi
fells
*ME ICU
Culiaa
Si
North Pacific Ocean
Unclassified
700186 10-83
�
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
er
ruz
Poppy cultivation
Estado (state)
boundary
0 300
Kilometers
Gulf of Mexico
(s
Oaxaca
Si Chiapas
*Iv
a
ze
13
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
government has succeeded in preventing heroin pro-
duction from returning to the multiton levels of the
mid-1970s. Nonetheless, production has increased
somewhat since 1979 and has remained at about 1.5
, tons or slightly higher for the last two years. Prelimi-
nary indications are that 1983 production will be in
the same range.
21. The big danger for Mexico is that the country's
present dire economic circumstances are conspiring to
boost the incentives for growing opium poppies while
simultaneously constraining the government's ability
to expand its eradication program. A crop that can
generate cash will seem very attractive to Mexican
smugglers and farmers at a time when most other
sources of foreign earnings are contracting and when
farm income is slipping. The Mexican Government's
need to hold to a severe austerity program in order to
be able to service its massive international debt,
however, limits the amount of resources it can afford
to devote to crop suppression programs. Increased
external assistance from the United States could pro-
vide some additional resources, but it would probably
not obviate the need for some increase in Mexican
manpower, logistic support, and local funding if the
eradication program were to be significantly expand-
ed. In addition, competition for resources is likely to
increase bureaucratic infighting among the Mexican
agencies involved in crop suppression, potentially de-
creasing the efficiency of government efforts. More-
over, the Mexican Government may be limited in how
much external assistance it can accept without affront-
ing strong nationalistic feelings among Mexican
politicians.
22. In sum, there is little chance that, in present
economic circumstances, the Mexican Government
can afford to increase significantly the resources it
spends on this program or that US Government aid
will lead to a greatly expanded effort. Consequently,
the outlook for Mexican heroin production, under the
best circumstances where the government maintains
the eradication program at about its present level, is
for heroin output to remain at about 1.5 tons or
slightly higher. If, despite good intentions, economic
stringency forces the government to cut back resources
devoted to crop suppression, the situation could wors-
en considerably since Mexican heroin production is
probably capable of expanding fairly rapidly.
14
23. In the Golden Triangle. The possibility that
the governments in this area can substantially reduce
the amount of opium grown in the region are minimal,
primarily because the central governments exert so
little control over most of the main growing locales. In
1982, an estimated 600 tons of opium were harvested
in Burma, while Thailand and Laos produced 57 and
50 tons, respectively. The primary problem in Burma
is that the states in which opium is grown�Kachin,
Kayah, and especially the Shan state in eastern Bur-
ma�are to varying degrees insurgent-controlled and
have been for years. (See figure 5.) Moreover, opium
represents a way of life for most of the people who
grow it and use it, and is the principal source of
revenue and, therefore, arms and other supplies for
the insurgent groups in the area. While the Burmese
are considering an ambitious eradication program,
including aerial herbicide spraying in insurgent areas,
it is doubtful that they could develop either the
technical or military capability to reduce opium pro-
duction significantly in these areas. In addition, there
is conclusive evidence that high-level Burmese Gov-
ernment and military officials, including some of those
directly responsible for government narcotics suppres-
sion programs, have profited from protecting drug
traffickers. The Burmese Government is making some
efforts to purge these corrupt officials, but corruption
appears to be so widespread that major doubts remain
about how effective any Burmese Government pro-
gram to combat growing and processing opium can
really be.
24. The Thai Government has to a limited degree
supported crop substitution programs, but these have
had little impact so far on production. It has also
moved Vigorously against laboratories that convert
opium into heroin, particularly those of the Shan
United Army on the Thai-Burmese border. This has
had the effect of pushing the laboratories deeper into
Burma and into southern Thailand. It has also opened
the way for other tribal and insurgent groups, includ-
ing the Burmese Communist Party, to move from just
growing opium poppies into processing heroin. Thai
military action seems also to have disrupted some of
the traditional routes for smuggling heroin through
Thailand to the international market, but these routes
were quickly replaced with others.
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
ET
NOFO N
Figure 5
Poppy Cultivation Areas and Smuggling Routes in the Golden Triangle
Um/f1
Si
Bay
of
Bengal
Mandalay. N.
. �Taunggyi
Kayalti
RANGOON
Moulmein
To Malaysia and
southern Thailand j
I= Major poppy cultivation
=3 Minor poppy cultivation
di Heroin refinery base
Major smuggling route
Opium
Heroin/opium
Minor smuggling route
Opium
Heroin/opium
State boundary
0 150
Kilometers
Kong Tung
me001.11C"
4,
.Louengphrabang
Laos
Thailand
To :ngk
souther T
k and
ailand
IENTIANE
700185 10-83
15
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
25. The Laotian Government has shown little inter-
est in suppressing opium poppy cultivation or exports.
In any case, the amount produced in Laos (and in
Thailand) is so small relative to what is harvested in
Burma that suppressing the crops in both countries
would have virtually no impact on the quantities of
opium available from the Golden Triangle for the
international market as long as Burmese production is
not significantly reduced.
26. In Southwest Asia. More illicit opium�some
650 to 925 tons�was produced in this region in 1982
than anywhere else in the world. Because of the
political, economic, and security demands they face, it
is unlikely that the governments of this area will or, in
most cases, can bring to bear the resources necessary to
reduce narcotics exports from the region. The primary
producer for the export market in 1982 was Afghani-
stan, which exported an estimated 130 to 190 tons of
opium to the international market. The Soviet-backed
Karmal regime there is devoting little attention to the
narcotics problem. Moreover, most production occurs
in areas beyond its control. So far, military operations
in these areas do not appear to have significantly
disrupted crops, and we do not believe the Soviets or
the Afghan Government will expand their control in
these insurgent-dominated regions enough to reduce
future opium production. The insurgents in these
areas, mostly fiercely independent tribesmen who
have long engaged in opium cultivation, have no
incentive to cut back, since sales of opium provide
them with badly needed income not available from
any other source.
27. The Pakistani Government moved only halting-
ly against the narcotics problem until late 1982, when
some important officials began to evince a much
greater interest in developing antinarcotics programs.
Convinced that Pakistan faced a burgeoning heroin
abuse problem of its own and under pressure from
Western narcotics officials, they attempted to put new
pressures on tribal leaders in the main producing areas
of Pakistan to put a stop to opium cultivation and
heroin trade. These areas, however, are mostly along
the frontier with Afghanistan in the North-West Fron-
tier Province (NWFP), which is only partly under
provincial or federal government control. (See figure
6.) Some heroin conversion laboratories were reported-
ly closed as a result of government pressure, but the
longer term effects on the narcotics trade are likely to
be only minimal. Tribal leaders will probably be
unwilling to enforce antidrug measures if it appears, as
is likely, that such actions will economically hurt their
tribe and benefit another. In addition, the heroin
laboratories are difficult to detect and easily moved,
including possibly across the border into Afghanistan if
necessary. Finally, the federal government is unlikely
to mount its own sweeping antinarcotics drive in the
NWFP because the violence likely to accompany such
action could further disrupt the area's already weak
economy, destabilize the Afghan refugee situation,
and provoke hostilities from the militant Pushtun
tribes.
28. Iran is the largest opium producer in Southwest
Asia, exporting a small portion of its crop through
Turkey to Europe and the United States. Overall,
however, it probably has been a net opium importer,
because it relies heavily on surplus production from
Afghanistan and Pakistan to meet the needs of its large
user population. The Iranian Government's antinarcot-
ics program is ineffective because of lack of resources
and the organizational deficiencies of those parts of
the bureaucracy responsible for narcotics control, civil
disorder in some parts of the countryside, and lack of
government control in some border areas. None of
these conditions is likely to change in the near future,
leaving Iran a question mark as to how much of its
production is potentially available to the international
market if other sources of heroin dried up and prices
rose significantly.
29. In Other Countries. Very little illicit heroin
now enters the United States from countries other than
Mexico and those in the Golden Triangle and South-
west Asia. Under the right market conditions, howev-
er, this situation could change. There is the danger, for
example, that if supplies from a current producer were
drastically reduced and other current sources did not
pick up the slack (thereby raising the price of heroin
significantly), a portion of India's vast licit production
of opium might be diverted into' illegal channels.
Although India's 1982 opium production dropped to
700 tons as New Delhi tried to reduce mounting stocks
that have resulted from stagnating world demand for
licit opium, it has generally produced some 1,000 to
1,300 tons of opium each year for conversion to
16
--SEGREJ,
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
Figure 6
Poppy Cultivation Areas and Smuggling Routes in Southwest Asia
uwait
Persian
*TEHRAN
gteat
Wagtoi.i tagiv
3,Eo_Lf1(1
Gulf
Bahrain
tar
MI Poppy cultivation
411I Smuggling route
390
Kilometers
liagaas./
e rase felon
�carman CLADCAINZe
gmboai ado
Afgh sta
fr,(54Rod Sea
tP,Ovi,g9YP,,kand Indian Ocean
via
/ North-West
Frontier Province
.1\ Cease- 06
MABAD
0m10
700184 (545035) 10-83
pharmaceutical products. Only a tiny fraction of this
amount (40 to 60 tons) would be needed to supply the
entire US heroin market. The facts that India already
has well-established trafficking organizations which,
for example, supply a depressant, methaqualone, to
South Africa and that the country recently has become
a transit point for heroin from the Golden Triangle
and from Southwest Asia to western markets point up
this danger. A second market change that could cause
the diversion of Indian production from licit to illicit
channels would be a major shrinkage of world demand
for pharmaceutical products made from opium pop-
pies. Indian farmers would strongly resist government
efforts to force them to cut back on the amount of
opium now sold. They could probably fairly easily
begin to underreport the acreage they plant in opium
poppies and divert this part of their crop to the illegal
market.
30. Because of the wide range of agricultural condi-
tions under which opium can be grown, it would also
not be surprising if other countries started to produce
heroin if world demand began to outstrip supply.
Those countries most likely to move in this direction
would be ones in which there are (a) a supply of cheap
agricultural labor, (b) rural areas over which the
government has little control, and (c) established traf-
ficking networks which could add heroin to the line of
products they already market. Two countries where
these conditions pertain, for example, are Lebanon
and Colombia. Lebanese traffickers already move
Southwest Asian heroin, and it is conceivable they
17
--St-GREL,
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
could develop their own production capabilities if
their present sources of opium became unavailable.
Colombian drug networks, which already produce
cocaine and marijuana and traffic in methaqualone
for the US market, might also diversify into heroin
under the right circumstances.
Implications for US Heroin Supply Disruption
Policies
31. In the next few years, the United States will be
hard pressed even to contain the amount of heroin
entering this country let alone to reduce it significantly
through supply reduction programs:
� Governments that have the political muscle to
cut sharply illicit opium poppy production�
Turkey and Mexico�have already done so. Even
holding the line will be a problem in Mexico
because of pressures the government will be
under to divert resources now going into crop
eradication programs to what the Mexicans are
likely to perceive as higher priority uses.
� Abundant supplies from the Golden Triangle will
be available from recent bumper crops, and
amounts available from Southwest Asia (particu-
larly Afghanistan) are not likely to diminish
significantly.
� Large excesses of licit supplies will exist, especial-
ly in India, and these will be a tempting source
for the illicit market.
� Disrupting supplies by enforcement action
against trafficking networks will not be as easy as
in the 1970s because there are many more small,
independent networks now than in the past. To
achieve a dramatic reduction similar to what
happened when the French Connection was
broken up would require the simultaneous dis-
ruption of a large number of those networks.
� Many of these traffickers probably have devel-
oped�or could develop more easily than in the
1970s�distribution capabilities in more than one
regional market in the United States. As a conse-
quence, it is possible that shortages in one region
could be much more quickly made up by sup-
plies from another area than in the past.
18
32. Despite this prognosis, there are three reasons
for continuing to pursue foreign supply disruption
programs. First, there is no way of calculating whether
and how much additional heroin might flow to the
United States if they ceased. No one can predict
precisely where the upward limit on heroin consump-
tion might be. Consequently, at least some risk exists
that heroin use in the United States would rise signifi-
cantly in intensity and possibly in magnitude if the
retail price dropped sharply because our market was
flooded by supplies of this opiate.
33. Second, they are an important symbol. US
leadership in pushing bilateral and international sup-
ply reduction programs provides an important indica-
tor of the depth of US concern about the societal harm
caused by the drug. Particularly as heroin abuse
increases as a social problem in Western Europe and
other countries (such as Pakistan) with which the
United States has close ties, these governments will
probably look to the United States for closer coopera-
tion on narcotics suppression matters. Not maintaining
US initiatives for joint and international supply reduc-
tion programs in these circumstances would probably
raise serious questions concerning US sincerity about
combating heroin abuse.
34. Third, with the rising concern among West
European governments over increasing heroin abuse,
the conditions are improving for even closer joint
intelligence and law enforcement action against the
same trafficking networks that often supply both
Europe and the United States. The West Europeans
have also become more willing to encourage crop
suppression efforts in source countries, adding to
already growing international diplomatic pressures on
the governments of those countries and possibly to the
resources available for crop eradication, substitution,
and interdiction programs there. While there is little
chance that these efforts will significantly reduce
heroin availability in the United States over the next
few years, they provide some hope that the partici-
pants in the poppyfield-to-street-market heroin chain
can be kept under enough pressure to limit growth in
future supplies.
35. One other possible approach which might�
although probably not within the time frame of this
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
Estimate�improve capabilities for inhibiting traffick-
ing of heroin to the United States involves disrupting
narcotics-generated financial flows. Attacking these
flows through combined intelligence/diplomatic/en-
forcement actions conceivably could reduce profits
19
and raise risks to trafficking organizations sufficiently
to diminish their enthusiasm for supplying the US
market. The Intelligence Community is actively
studying the feasibility and implications of attempting
this approach.
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
NOFORN
(b
(b
21
--Sreilfr.Z._
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. This copy is for the
information and use of the recipient and of persons under his or her jurisdiction on a need-to-
know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials
within their respective departments:
a. Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, for the Department of the Army
d. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Air Force
f. Director of Intelligence, for Headquarters, Marine Corps
g. Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, for the Department of Energy
h. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
i. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
j. Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, for the Department of the
Treasury
k. The Deputy Director for Intelligence for any other Department or Agency
2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable
security regulations, or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence.
3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a
period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed
or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding
agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346
Approved for Release: 2019/07/26 C05184346