MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05241544
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02129
• Publication Date: October 21, 1983

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LV
1110
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC No. 7637-83
21 October 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : Milton Kovner
National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe
SUBJECT Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe
Item I. Post-INF Europe
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The Peace Movement. For the initial post-deployment period, peace
movement activity is likely to decline, reflecting some exhaustion after
the autumn peace campaign and demoralization in the face of initial
deployments. There is little evidence yet of any plans for major 1984
peace actions, but spontaneous, small-scale activities can be expected.
The flagging interest of moderate, non-violent anti-INF groups could,
however, leave the field to more militant protestors who will resort to
violence and sabotage to stop the continuing deployment schedule. The
potential for revived protest activity remains, since the organizational
structure of anti-nuclear groups will be kept alive by a hard-core
element, aided by Soviet-sponsored front groups and local Communist
parties. We cannot rule out greater peace movement activity next year in
the Netherlands and Belgium, where governments have avoided firm
deployment decisions and, especially in the Netherlands, where
anti-nuclear sentiments are strong across the political spectrum.
Soviet-West European Relations. If Moscow's judgment is that an
acceptable agreement cannot be reached quickly, it may see value in
interrupting the talks in order to exacerbate the serious split between
West German political parties on NATO nuclear policies and impel Bonn to
seek Western concessions to revive the US-Soviet dialogue. The Soviets
might link the suspension of talks with a vague final offer in November,
believing that such maneuvering could give it the upper hand in the INF
public relations game. Soviet approaches to Western Europe following the
December deployments, however, will have to balance a desire to punish
NATO for acquiescing to deployment with Moscow's wish not to undermine
the strong West European desire for detente. Some analysts believe that
Soviet reactions to INF could prove more benign and shortlived than
generally assumed, in part because Moscow will wish to continue the arms
control dialogue either in resumed Geneva talks on INF or in other arms
control fora (e.g., MBFR and CDE). Most analysts, however, concur with
the recent Memo to Holders on INF that does not rule out more dramatic
Soviet military and political countermeasures or a long breakdown of the
Geneva talks.
Arms Control/Defense Agenda. Once initial INF deployments occur,
other NATO Allies are likely to try to set a more positive tone in
European arms control fora and could challenge US positions on related
security issues. Most allies are not wedded to full-scale INF
deployment, and they might propose that the Alliance explore ways to
transcend the current impasse at Geneva -- possibly by slowing further
deployments, merging INF and START, and including discussion of UK/French
forces in that or some other forum. The allies are aware that broader
negotiations could be even more protracted -- thereby slowing a
resolution of the INF issue itself -- and that the superpowers might use
them to negotiate over their heads. Allied fears of a breakdown in INF
will redouble their interest in moving ahead in MBFR and in promoting CDE
as a serious East-West security forum.
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Item II Prospects for UDI in Cyprus
The DDI analyst believes there are growing indications that the
Turkish Cypriots are seriously considering declaring independence, a move
that almost certainly would kill any hope of a negotiated settlement.
More important, although Ankara has restrained the Turkish Cypriots from
taking this step in the past, there are signs that it may be reevaluating
its policy. UDI, however, probably would not come until it was clear a
proposed sunmit between Denktash and Cyprus President Kyprianou either
will not take place or has ended in failure -- presumably not until the
first quarter of 1984. The US would have little warning of a
declaration, and Turkey almost certainly would not be amenable to
last-minute appeals. This analyst believes that Ankara retains firm
control over major Turkish Cypriot policy actions. Thus, a declaration
of independence -- and early steps in that direction -- would require
Turkey's approval. )Ankara
shift in thinking is linked
to the perception that the recent UN initiative is disadvantageous to the
Turkish Cypriots and that the Greek Cypriots are attempting to change the
focus of the negotiations.
The NIO/WE believes that Cyprus developments bear increasingly close
scrutiny within the Intelligence Community, since a crisis of sorts is
likely if diplomatic efforts to resume talks between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots fail and the latter, with Ankara's blessing or forebearance,
declare their independence. He therefore urges that attention be paid
to the question of Turkish intentions, especially
following the November elections marking a return to civilian rule in
Ankara.
Milton Kovner
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