MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT - USSR-EE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05241568
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• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02129
• Publication Date: July 20, 1983

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National Intelligence Council
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
NIC #5298-83
20 July 1983
FROM Stanley M. Moskowitz
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT Monthly Warning Assessment - USSR-EE
1. The Soviet Position in the PLO/Syria/USSR Triangle.
A. Discussion.
The PLO revolt against Arafat started for internal PLO reasons
but has served both Soviet and Syrian interests. Although neither
the USSR nor Syria wants the PLO to fall apart completely, the
Soviets have benefited from the current disarray because it has
insured that Arafat is not free to engage in peace negotiations
along the lines of the US peace plan; the Syrians have gained by
acquiring greater control over the PLO. However, whereas the
Syrians have become active in the rebellion and tried to steer it
along the path they desire, the Soviets have remained more
passive. They have issued a statement calling for PLO unity,
The Soviets also appear to have made some contingency
planning by hosting the leader of one of the PLO's two Marxist
factions in Moscow, but they know that both of these factions are
too small to play any real role in Middle East politics. For his
part, Arafat, despite his personal hatred for Assad, has been
careful not to break with Syria. Similarly he is being careful not
to alienate the USSR which he could do by opting to reopen his
contacts with Hussein. The outlook is for all three parties to
maneuver carefully in line with their own agendas while being
careful not to completely alienate the other two parties in the
triangle.
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2. Developments in Afghanistan.
A. Discussion.
The Soviet assessment team headed by Marshal Sokolov and
composed of some three dozen other Soviet general officers has left
Kabul after a stay of some six weeks in country.
Overall, the Sokolov mission seems to have found an
-unsatisfactory state-of-affairs but not a crisis situation.
Consequently we expect its recommendations to be along the lines of
improving operations (for instance, by having better security,)
rather than by making fundamental policy changes .
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3.
Poland.
--Ttm-st-fara
A. Discussion.
The Papal visit has not brought much palpable change in the
domestic political situation: Jaruzelski continues to rule by
decree, the overwhelming majority of the population hates it but
can do little about it. Since Jaruzelski is having Parliament
incorporate key sections of martial law into civil law the
impending lifting of martial law should not be seen primarily as a
domestic matter but rather as part of Jaruzelski's strategy to
effect Western policies toward Poland. Still, Jaruzelski sees his
rapport with the Church as a stabilizing influence and may make
some limited gestures to maintain that relationship, for instance,
amnestying of a number of political prisoners and letting the
Church expand its role in relief activities.
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tOP SPCK.
4. Arms Control Negotiations.
A. Discussion.
(1). CSCE/CDE/MBFR. The Soviets compromises in CSCE, which,
although they fell short of what the West wanted they have allowed
the conference to terminate and paved the way for a schedule to be
established for the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). The
CDE Preparatory Meeting will be held in Helsinki in October and
November; the conference itself will begin in Stockholm in
mid-January 1984. In MBFR, the Soviets have accepted certain
elements of the Western position -- particularly in "associated
measures" -- albeit in very limited form (for example, inspection
not on demand as desired by the West but by invitation or after
negotiation).
We expect that in the coming weeks the Soviets
will draw as much propaganda advantage as possible from their
proported flexibility in both these negotiations. Beyond this,
they will have to devise a strategy for CDE and for linking CDE to
MBFR. They will probably convene a Warsaw Pact meeting of foreign
and possibly defense ministers early this fall to put the finishing
touches on that st
(3). INF. The Soviets have stayed with the fundamentals of
their position, that is, no US deployments and compensation for
French and British systems. But they have made their position more
official by spelling it out in government statements (i.e., the 28
May Soviet statement and the 28 June Warsaw Pact statement). At
the same time they have made possible a media blitz for September
by having Round VI of the INF negotiations begin on 6 September,
and by agreeing to have the official signing of the CSCE document
by foreign ministers sometime between 7 and 9 September. These
dates fall just before the convening of the fall session of the UN
General Assembly on 13 September. What we may thus see this fall
is:
the tabling of some comprehensive INF proposal in Geneva
around 6 September, containing cosmetic concessions
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an appeal to the old SALT II constituency in the United States
by pointing to the alleged concessions the Soviets have made
in their draft START treaty combined with the admonition that
the US could have this treaty if it showed "flexibility" in
INF (read: cancelled deployments).
the exploitation of their START and INF proposals both at the
CSCE signing ceremonies and UN General Assembly.
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Stanley M.
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