THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05309792
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-02757
• Publication Date: October 28, 1962

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USSR /CUB
Information as of 0600
28 October 1962
PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.
�77ARY
REVI
,
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This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
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28 October 1962
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SC No, 08184-a
SUMMARY CONTEN
I. Surveillance of 26 October and preliminary analysis
of yesterday's coverage shows that the development of both
IRBM and MRBM sites in Cuba is continuing its rapid pace.
All 24 MRBM launchers now appear to have reached full opera-
tional readiness. One nuclear storage facility is essentially
complete, but none of the bunkers observed is yet believedto
be in operation.
There are some indications in intercepted communications
that the U-2 lost yesterday over Banes was brought down by
the SA-2 system.
Cuban military units remain at a high state of alert and
the Castro regime is making a maximum effort to whip up troop
and public morale.
II. As of 0700 EST, two or possibly three more Soviet
ships are heading for Cuba in addition to the two dry cargo
ships and four tankers we have been watching. The tanker
GROZNY should have reached the quarantine line early this
morning. One Soviet transport aircraft which reached Brazil
is there to pick up the body of the Soviet ambassador. An-
other scheduled for Cuba via North Africa and Brazil turned
back at Morocco.
III. No significant redeployment of major Soviet ground,
air or naval forces has been noted. The general posture of
Soviet ground forces in forward areas is one of precaution-
ary defensive readiness. The overall total of Soviet subma-
rines on extended operations is somewhat greater than normal,
and a fourth F-class submarine may be in the area of the Cu-
ban quarantine line.
In non-military developments, Khrushchev's bid for re-
ciprocalwithdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba and Turkey
looks like the first step in a series of moves to demonstrate
the USSR's readiness for a negotiated solution. Soviet spokes-
men continue to play down the possibility that the Cuban crisis
Could lead to general war.
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28 October 1962
I. THE SITUATION IN CUBA
Construction and other development activities at both
IRBM and MRBM sites continue at a rapid pace, according to
photography of 26 October and a preliminary evaluation of
photography of 27 October.
Missile support equipment, including about 50 vehicles,
was moved into the vicinity of Guanajay IRBM Site 1 between
23 and 26 October. At the MRBM sites, the missile-launching
complexes are being checked out rapidly, and automatic anti-
aircraft weapons and personnel trenches have been prepared
during the last few days. Camouflage is being extended and
is becoming more effective, and dispersion of personnel and
equipment also is evident.
All 24 MRBM launchers now are estimated to be fully op-
erational.
Construction of probable nuclear storage facilities at
both MRBM and IRBM sites was continuing on 26 and 27 October.
None of the bunkers observed is yet believed to be in opera-
tion, although one at Guanajay Site No. 1 is essentially com-
plete.
Microwave relay towers have been noted at some of the
MRBM and IRBM sites photographed on 27 October, and there
are high frequency antennae at Sagua La Grande Sites 1 and
2. These indicate the development of command and control
communications systems.
A missile propellant offloading and transshipping fa-
cility now has been identified at a double-fenced area 50
miles west of Havana at Punta Gerardo, near Bahia Honda.
An American photographic reconnaissance aircraft
crashed about noon Cuban time on 27 October in the Banes-
Antilla area of northwestern Oriente Province. An inter-
cepted Cuban military message tentatively identified the
plane as a U-2 and indicated that its wreckage and the body
of the pilot had been located.
Castro had implied in a public announcement earlier on
27 October that foreign aircraft flying over Cuban territory
would be attacked, and Havana radio claimed in mid-morning
that anti-aircraft batteries "drove off unidentified war-
planes flying over wide areas of eastern Cuba."
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"The planned track of the U-2 took it over or within
the range of eight SA-2 sites at an estimated altitude
of 72,000 feet. Assuming the mission flew the planned
track, the U-2 overflew six SA-2 sites before the flight
terminated in the vicinity of Banes on the north coast of
Cuba. An SA-2 site is located near Banes and is believed
to be operational. The SA-2 is estimated to have a maxi-
mum effective altitude capability of 60,000 feet and limited
capability to 80,000 feet. The loss of the U-2 was probably
caused by intercept by an SA-2 from the Banes site, or pilot
hypoxia, with the former appearing more likely on the basis
of the available information."
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The French Ambassador in Havana reported to his gov-
ernment on 27 October his impression that the feverish ef-
forts �of the Castro regime to whip up enthusiasm among
the populace had had no visible effect in removing the
"apathy and depression" which he had noted since the first
days of the crisis. His report, passed by the French For-
eign Ministry to the US Embassy in Paris, also noted that
"countless" special committees had been established by the
regime in order to place the country on a war footing.
Internal repercussions of the crisis include snags in
communications and transportation, and both clandestine
and press reports state that hospital treatment has been
restricted to emergency cases. A national emergency com-
mittee was set up on 26 October to draft workers to fill
jobs wherever they were needed.
An internal Cuban broadcast was heard on the after-
noon of 27 October in which the chief of a militia unit
headquarters in Las Villas Privince ordered that "close
surveillance be maintained over militiamen and severe meas-
ures be taken with those who may demonstrate lack of loyalty
towards the present regime."
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IV. U Thant is thinking seriously of accepting Castro's
invitation to visit Cuba, and might go as early as Tuesday.
There is thus far only fragmentary mixed reaction to the Pres-
ident's rejection of Khrushchv's Cuba-Turkey proposal.
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LOCATIONS OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE SITES IN CUBA
Santiago
de Cuba
LOCATION OF MRBM AND IRBM SITES IN CUBA
A. MRBM SITES
1.
SAN CRISTOBAL
SITE 01
( N22-40-05
W83-17-55)
2.
SAN CRISTOBAL
S1TE 02
(N22-40-so W83-15-00)
3.
SAN CRISTOBAL
SITE #3
( N22-42-40
W83-08-25)
4.
SAN CRISTOBAL
SITE #4
( N22-46-55
W82-58-50)
5.
SAGUA LA GRANDE SITE#1 (.N22-43=44
W80-01-40)
6.
SAGUA LA GRANDE S1TE#2 ( N22-39-10
W79-51-55)
B. IRBM SITES
1.
GUANAJAY SITE # 1
(
N22-56-50
W82-39-20)
2.
GUANAJAY SITE #2
(
N22-57-25
W82-36-55)
3.
REMEDIOS SITE # 1
(
N22-25-00
W79-35-20)
C. PROBABLE NUCLEAR STORAGE INSTALLATIONS
62 10 25
1. GUANAJAY ( N22-56-50 W82-39-20)
2. PUNTA GERARDO ( Secured Port Facility) ( N22-56-00 W83-11-O0)
Secret n Dissem
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28 October 1962
II. SOVIET SHIPPING AND AIR TRAFFIC TO CUBA
The four Soviet tankers and two Soviet dry cargo ships
previously reported to be proceeding toward Cuba are still
en route as of 0600 EST and have been joined by two or per-
haps three additional Soviet vessels. One of these, the
LISICHANSK, cleared the Bosporus on 25 October with 32,000
tons of crude oil. The MICHURINSK passed through the Kiel
Canal on 26 October en route to Cuba from Leningrad with
timber and 2,300 tons of unknown cargo.
Another dry cargo vessel, the CHERNYAKHOVSK, may also
have started for Cuba. She was observed moving in a westerly
direction in the Baltic on 25 October and has been regularly
engaged in the Cuban trade in the past.
The East German passenger vessel VOELKERFREUNDSCHAFT
reached a point 10 miles from Havana harbor at 0730 EST. The
Polish dry cargo vessel BIALYSTOK probably will reach Cuba
today; it was only 600 nautical miles east of Havana on 26
October. The Soviet tanker GROZNY probably reached the US
quarantine line early this morning.
A Soviet IL-18 transport scheduled to pick up the body
of the Soviet Ambassador to Brazil was en route to Rio on
27 October. Another IL-18 scheduled for a trip from Moscow
to Havana via Morocco, West Africa, and Brazil, turned back
at Rabat for reasons as yet unknown.
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28 October 1962
III. THE SITUATION IN THE BLOC
A. MILITARY
We have noted the following Soviet military develop-
ments; an assessment of their significance will be issued
later this morning by the USIB Watch Committee.
No significant redeployment of major ground, air, or
naval forces has been noted. Elements of most of the ma-
jor commands are continuing what appears to be normal train-
ing.
One US T-29 aircraft outbound from Berlin in the cen-
tral corridor on the afternoon of 27 October was intercepted
by two Soviet FIREBAR aircraft. Three passes were made. J-2,
USEUCOM, comments that this incident and other upgrading of
air defense capability suggest that the Soviets may be think-
ing of some sort of corridor harassment.
Ground: There is no evidence that ground forces of
the western military districts of the USSR have moved or
are preparing to move to the forward area. US attaches in
Moscow, however, have been denied permission to visit the
Belorussian, Kiev, and Carpathian Military Districts.
The general ground force posture in the forward area
is that of precautionary defensive readiness. Only staff,
signal and reconnaissance elements of Soviet and German
ground forces in East Germany appear to be in the field.
The main combat units apparently are on standby alert in
garrison. Allied missions report no large scale movements
on the roads. There are no suggestions of a Communist mil-
itary move in the Berlin area.
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There are continued indications that Soviet forces in
Hungary are on alert status. Elements may have been de-
ployed to the Czech border area north of Budapest, but there
is no evidence of movement into Czechoslovakia. Low-level
exercises appear to be underway in northwestern Czechoslovakia.
Naval: Exercise activity continues in the Black Sea,
the Pacific and the Baltic. There may be missile firings
for training or developmental purposes in the Northern Fleet
in the near future.
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28 October 1962
B, OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
Khrushchev's 27 October letter to President Kennedy,
which was published immediately, constitutes Moscow's
first specific proposal for a negotiated settlement of the
Cuban crisis. His call for reciprocal Soviet-US withdraw-
als of offensive weapons from Cuba and Turkey under inter-
national supervision and for mutual non-aggression guaran-
tees covering these two countries was designed to encour-
age U Thant to intensify his mediatory efforts and to stim-
ulate other UN members to increase pressure on the US for
a compromise settlement. Khrushchev expressed the belief
that it is possible "to end the conflict quickly" and that
his proposal provides the "basis for a settlement."
Moscow probably will make further proposals calculated
to deter US military action against the missile sites or,
failing this, to make such action as costly as possible in
political terms. The 27 October bid for an exchange of com-
mitments regarding Turkey and Cuba probably represents Mos-
cow's maximum position. The USSR's next step may be to re-
duce these demands to a US guarantee not to attack Cuba
and to respect Cuban sovereignty in exchange for a Soviet
commitment to cease work on the missile sites and eventually
to remove them under some form of international inspection.
Soviet spokesmen continue to play down the possibility
of a general war and to emphasize the USSR's readiness to
work out a peaceful solution. A TASS correspondent in Ge-
neva told a Western journalist on 24 October that he did
not anticipate that the Cuban crisis would lead to an armed
conflict between the US and the USSR "because Cuba is not
important enough to cause the Soviet Union to go to war."
He expressed the belief that the USSR would make a strong
response to US actions, but refused to speculate what form
Soviet reaction might take. A Soviet diplomat in Geneva
told a Western colleague on 24 October that although he nad
no idea what the USSR's reaction would be, he was "certain"
the Kremlin would not start a war over Cuba.
In a talk with Ambassador Kohler on 25 October, Soviet
Foreign Ministry press chief Kharlamov said the USSR had
not published the text of President Kennedy's speech be-
cause it was full of "crude anti-Soviet attacks." He re-
ferred specifically to the President's statement regarding
the falsity of Soviet public and private assurances that
the military equipment being sent to Cuba was exclusively
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defensive. Kharlamov twice charged that the control of US
policy had passed into the hands of the military.. He said
the Soviet Union could not be treated like Belgium or Lux-
embourg, and warned that Soviet ships would be defended if
necessary.
Ambassador Kohler reported, however, that in general
Kharlamov seemed to reflect a genuine desire for concilia-
tion. The Soviet official said it was time for the two
sides to sit down together and work out a solution.
The USSR has floated a trial balloon regarding another
heads-of-government meeting in Vienna. Two Soviet embassy
officials in Vienna approached a friend of Austrian Foreign
Minister Kreisky on 25 October with the suggestion that neu-
tral Austria could play a role in the Cuban crisis. They
asked if Kreisky could do something to facilitate the eas-
ing of tensions, perhaps by offering Vienna as the site for
a summit meeting. Kreisky told the Soviet ambassador on
26 October that Austria would be glad to do what it can to
facilitate negotiation. He suggested to the US Embassy that
Khrushchev might find New York an undesirable site for a
meeting at the present time and recalled that the Soviet
premier had enjoyed himself in Vienna during the June 1961
meeting. It was evident that Kreisky would welcome a summit
in Vienna, both for the sake of Austrian prestige and as
a personal boost in the forthcoming Austrian elections.
The first evidence of direct Soviet pressure on a US
ally to dissociate itself from US policy on Cuba has come
from a report on the Soviet ambassador's interview with
Greek Foreign Minister Averoff on 26 October. After deliver-
ing a Soviet memorandum on the Cuban situation, the ambassa-
dor warned that by supporting the US in the crisis, Greece
was taking a "most dangerous" position for its own interests.
He said that although the USSR would not allow the US to
make another attempt to "subjugate" the Cuban people, it
would not provoke a war and would work for a peaceful set-
tlement.
Most of the bloc has not yet been heard to comment on
the US rejection of Khrushchev's 27 October proposals. The
line that will be taken is indicated, however, by Radio
Budapest, which describes the rejection as a "bitter disap-
pointment to everybody." According to the Hungarians, the
President was unresponsive to the "reasonable" Soviet pro-
posals because he is interested in maintaining tension, pos-
sibly in connection with the US election campaign.
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Other East European commentary stresses the negotiabil-
ity of the crisis. Radio Warsaw states that Khrushchev's
proposal indicates the USSR is willing to meet the United
States "more than half way." East Germany's First Deputy
Foreign Minister is quoted as saying that the Khrushchev's
proposal demonstrates the USSR's "far-teaching preparedness
for an understanding."
Some dimunition of public alarm in Poland is indicated
by the latest reports that scare buying has abated.- Panic
buying in Bucharest, however, apparently continues. Some
stores have been forced to close down, and the black market
in food has reappeared.
In Yugoslavia, the official daily sounded the hope on
26 October that Khrushchev's acceptance of U Thant's pleas
for negotiations would bring the "perilous crisis streaming
to its sensible end." If the situation does not improve,
however, Tito may meet with prominent neutralists, accord-
ing to unconfirmed reports from Belgrade. Nkrumah sent
Tito and Nasir messages on 25 October urging a "concerted
effort" to prevent any further deterioration of the situa-
tion.
The Chinese Communists continue to strike the most
militant notes in the bloc. According to the Peiping radio,
US determination to "unleash direct military invasion against
Cuba" becomes more apparent as additional events unfold each
day. The Chinese preference for a firm bloc posture in the
Cuban crisis is again indicated in a People's Daily editorial
of 28 October calling for mobilization of the people of the
world to "smash US war provocations."
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IV. NON-BLOC DEVELOPMENTS
U Thant is thinking seriously of accepting Castro's
invitation to visit Cuba. He may go to Cuba on 30 Octo-
ber, hoping to take with him a substantial group, mainly
technicians who could be used as expert observers at mis-
sile sites if they are allowed to inspect them. Castro
said he would agree to U Thant 'S proposal for a suspen-
sion of missile site construction during negotiations pro-
vided the US halts "threats and aggressive actions," in-
cluding the "naval blockade.".
Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa was expected to ar-
rive in New York on 28 October to talk with U Thant, pos-
sibly to establish the terms of reference for U Thant's
trip to Cuba.
Sweden's public reassertion on 26 October of the prin-
ciple of unlimited freedom of the seas in peacetime prompted
Finland to do likewise the next day, fearing that delay
might bring pressure from its "big neighbor." Swedish of-
ficials have indicated the need for Stockholm to be formally
"correct" because of the Baltic situation, but have made it
obvious to US representatives that they expect the US to
enforce the quarantine. The Swedish shipowners' association
on 27 October recommended that Swedish ships submit to Amer-
ican searches under protest, reserving the 'tight to claim
damages. The master of the Coolangatta disregarded instruc-
tions to this effect when he refused to stop on 26 October.
Belgian shipowners reportedly decided at a secret meeting
that no Belgian ship will visit Cuba.
In Berlin there are some indications Of Soviet and
East German efforts to create unrest and anxiety over the
Cuban situation. A Soviet Embassy official told a German
journalist that the USSR is powerful in Berlin and able to
take the initiative. East German border guards have asked
some Berlin-bound motorists their opinions of the Cuban sit-
uation, possibly recording the answers, And the West Berlin
�SED has launched a "hands off Cuba" propaganda campaign.
BritiSh Foreign Secretary Lord Home on 27 October called
In Soviet Charge Loginov and told him that the dangers in
the Cuban situation come not from the US blockade, but from
the buildup of Soviet missile bases. The War Office has re-
stricted the travel of bloc attaches to the London area. So-
viet attaches have made numerous requests to visit air bases,
especially those with USAF units.
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Ambassador Dowling in Bonn reports that he is pro-
foundly impressed by the support and approval of the Pres-
ident's policy by the government and people in Germany,
and in Europe generally. He believes there has been no
comparable response to US leadership since the decision
to intervene in Korea, and he feels this is all the more
remarkable since there is no illusion about the risk in-
volved.
Swiss Foreign Minister Wahlen considers that Soviet
retaliation is more likely in Turkey and Iran than in Ber-
lin or Cuba.
There has not yet been any reaction in Western Europe
to the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters pertaining
to Cuban and Turkish missile bases. Khrushchev's offer
was received in London diplomatic quarters with "intense
interest," but was described by British officials as "ir-
relevant."
analysis of the Soviet motivations in
Cuba estimates that one strategic consideration may have
been the belief that the Cuban missiles, because they pro-
vide less warning time than ICBMs would pose a new and dev-
astatlng threat to the SAC bomber capability.
however, that since Moscow is unlikely to have chosen a
strategic showdown in an area where it is militarily more
vulnerable, there must have been political considerations as
well. notes the USSR's desire to augment its bar-
gaining capacity in respect to Berlin, the elimination of
foreign bases, and the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.
Other objectives are to test the willingness of the US and
its Allies to stand up to a confrontation and hence the
credibility of US commitments around the world.
President Ayub told the US Ambassador on 26 October
that one reason Pakistan has not publicly supported the
United States on Cuba is that official statements by US
allies outside the American hemisphere would merely broaden
a dispute which should be handled expeditiously by the OAS
on a localized basis. Ayub stated his belief that resolute
hardne8s tacked by real power is the only posture that is
successful in dealing with the USSR.
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Venezuela plans to offer two destroyers and one sub-
marine to the OAS forces jointly with a Colombian offer of
naval vessels. Colombia decided to limit its offer to
naval forces when the War Minister threatened, to resign
if land forces were sent off at a time of serious internal
security problems. Venezuela also has had difficulty con-
trolling Castro-supported guerrillas and other belligerent
groups.
Venezuela on 27 October became the first Latin Ameri-
can country to order full-scale mobilization of its armed
forces. President Betancourt, long a leading advocate of
action against Castro, wants to "put an end once and for
all" to what he called Cuba's threat to Venezuelan security.
President Goulart, in a 25 October reply'to President
Kennedy's letter, adamantly reconfirmed Brazil's opposition
to military measures against Cuba other than the quarantine.
He expressed a fear that OAS decisions have been losing au-
thority and that these decisions have been taken by a "nu-
merical majority and with unjustifiable haste." Goulart
showed very little concern over the threat to the hemisphere
of the missiles in Cuba. He pointed out that "defense of the
principle of self-determination of peoples, in its broadest
sense, has become a crucial point of the foreign policy of
Brazil," and he then stated that any form of intervention in
an American state inspired by alleged incompatibility of
its political regime is deeply displeasing to the conscience
of the Brazilian people.
On 27 October Bolivia also declared its adherence to
the principles of "non-intervention and self-determination"
In the Cuban case, but endorsed the OAS vote calling for
the use of force if necessary to maintain the "blockade."
President Goulart told the US Ambassador in Rio on 27
October that he had ordered leaders of the stevedore�'
union not to strike against handling American ships because
Brazil supports the quarantine. This strike was reportedly
ordered by the Communist Party. According to a broadcast
from Rio the dockers decided to suspend the boycott because
the government had shown disapproval. President Goulart
also told Ambassador Gordon that he had informed the Soviet
Charge that the Soviet aircraft which may land at Recife on
its way to Havana would be inspected by the Brazilian Air
Force and any cargo removed.
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