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January 31, 2017
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October 28, 1962
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Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 USSR /CUB Information as of 0600 28 October 1962 PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED. �77ARY REVI , DOCUMENT# (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 TOP 28 October 1962 (b)(3) SC No, 08184-a SUMMARY CONTEN I. Surveillance of 26 October and preliminary analysis of yesterday's coverage shows that the development of both IRBM and MRBM sites in Cuba is continuing its rapid pace. All 24 MRBM launchers now appear to have reached full opera- tional readiness. One nuclear storage facility is essentially complete, but none of the bunkers observed is yet believedto be in operation. There are some indications in intercepted communications that the U-2 lost yesterday over Banes was brought down by the SA-2 system. Cuban military units remain at a high state of alert and the Castro regime is making a maximum effort to whip up troop and public morale. II. As of 0700 EST, two or possibly three more Soviet ships are heading for Cuba in addition to the two dry cargo ships and four tankers we have been watching. The tanker GROZNY should have reached the quarantine line early this morning. One Soviet transport aircraft which reached Brazil is there to pick up the body of the Soviet ambassador. An- other scheduled for Cuba via North Africa and Brazil turned back at Morocco. III. No significant redeployment of major Soviet ground, air or naval forces has been noted. The general posture of Soviet ground forces in forward areas is one of precaution- ary defensive readiness. The overall total of Soviet subma- rines on extended operations is somewhat greater than normal, and a fourth F-class submarine may be in the area of the Cu- ban quarantine line. In non-military developments, Khrushchev's bid for re- ciprocalwithdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba and Turkey looks like the first step in a series of moves to demonstrate the USSR's readiness for a negotiated solution. Soviet spokes- men continue to play down the possibility that the Cuban crisis Could lead to general war. TO CRET (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 TO CRET (b)(3) 28 October 1962 I. THE SITUATION IN CUBA Construction and other development activities at both IRBM and MRBM sites continue at a rapid pace, according to photography of 26 October and a preliminary evaluation of photography of 27 October. Missile support equipment, including about 50 vehicles, was moved into the vicinity of Guanajay IRBM Site 1 between 23 and 26 October. At the MRBM sites, the missile-launching complexes are being checked out rapidly, and automatic anti- aircraft weapons and personnel trenches have been prepared during the last few days. Camouflage is being extended and is becoming more effective, and dispersion of personnel and equipment also is evident. All 24 MRBM launchers now are estimated to be fully op- erational. Construction of probable nuclear storage facilities at both MRBM and IRBM sites was continuing on 26 and 27 October. None of the bunkers observed is yet believed to be in opera- tion, although one at Guanajay Site No. 1 is essentially com- plete. Microwave relay towers have been noted at some of the MRBM and IRBM sites photographed on 27 October, and there are high frequency antennae at Sagua La Grande Sites 1 and 2. These indicate the development of command and control communications systems. A missile propellant offloading and transshipping fa- cility now has been identified at a double-fenced area 50 miles west of Havana at Punta Gerardo, near Bahia Honda. An American photographic reconnaissance aircraft crashed about noon Cuban time on 27 October in the Banes- Antilla area of northwestern Oriente Province. An inter- cepted Cuban military message tentatively identified the plane as a U-2 and indicated that its wreckage and the body of the pilot had been located. Castro had implied in a public announcement earlier on 27 October that foreign aircraft flying over Cuban territory would be attacked, and Havana radio claimed in mid-morning that anti-aircraft batteries "drove off unidentified war- planes flying over wide areas of eastern Cuba." I-1 CRET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 TOP "The planned track of the U-2 took it over or within the range of eight SA-2 sites at an estimated altitude of 72,000 feet. Assuming the mission flew the planned track, the U-2 overflew six SA-2 sites before the flight terminated in the vicinity of Banes on the north coast of Cuba. An SA-2 site is located near Banes and is believed to be operational. The SA-2 is estimated to have a maxi- mum effective altitude capability of 60,000 feet and limited capability to 80,000 feet. The loss of the U-2 was probably caused by intercept by an SA-2 from the Banes site, or pilot hypoxia, with the former appearing more likely on the basis of the available information." 1-2 TO CRET Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 TO RET (b)(3) The French Ambassador in Havana reported to his gov- ernment on 27 October his impression that the feverish ef- forts �of the Castro regime to whip up enthusiasm among the populace had had no visible effect in removing the "apathy and depression" which he had noted since the first days of the crisis. His report, passed by the French For- eign Ministry to the US Embassy in Paris, also noted that "countless" special committees had been established by the regime in order to place the country on a war footing. Internal repercussions of the crisis include snags in communications and transportation, and both clandestine and press reports state that hospital treatment has been restricted to emergency cases. A national emergency com- mittee was set up on 26 October to draft workers to fill jobs wherever they were needed. An internal Cuban broadcast was heard on the after- noon of 27 October in which the chief of a militia unit headquarters in Las Villas Privince ordered that "close surveillance be maintained over militiamen and severe meas- ures be taken with those who may demonstrate lack of loyalty towards the present regime." 1-3 TO LCRET Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 TPSFCRET (b)(3) IV. U Thant is thinking seriously of accepting Castro's invitation to visit Cuba, and might go as early as Tuesday. There is thus far only fragmentary mixed reaction to the Pres- ident's rejection of Khrushchv's Cuba-Turkey proposal. (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 LOCATIONS OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE SITES IN CUBA Santiago de Cuba LOCATION OF MRBM AND IRBM SITES IN CUBA A. MRBM SITES 1. SAN CRISTOBAL SITE 01 ( N22-40-05 W83-17-55) 2. SAN CRISTOBAL S1TE 02 (N22-40-so W83-15-00) 3. SAN CRISTOBAL SITE #3 ( N22-42-40 W83-08-25) 4. SAN CRISTOBAL SITE #4 ( N22-46-55 W82-58-50) 5. SAGUA LA GRANDE SITE#1 (.N22-43=44 W80-01-40) 6. SAGUA LA GRANDE S1TE#2 ( N22-39-10 W79-51-55) B. IRBM SITES 1. GUANAJAY SITE # 1 ( N22-56-50 W82-39-20) 2. GUANAJAY SITE #2 ( N22-57-25 W82-36-55) 3. REMEDIOS SITE # 1 ( N22-25-00 W79-35-20) C. PROBABLE NUCLEAR STORAGE INSTALLATIONS 62 10 25 1. GUANAJAY ( N22-56-50 W82-39-20) 2. PUNTA GERARDO ( Secured Port Facility) ( N22-56-00 W83-11-O0) Secret n Dissem Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 .01 (b)(3) 28 October 1962 II. SOVIET SHIPPING AND AIR TRAFFIC TO CUBA The four Soviet tankers and two Soviet dry cargo ships previously reported to be proceeding toward Cuba are still en route as of 0600 EST and have been joined by two or per- haps three additional Soviet vessels. One of these, the LISICHANSK, cleared the Bosporus on 25 October with 32,000 tons of crude oil. The MICHURINSK passed through the Kiel Canal on 26 October en route to Cuba from Leningrad with timber and 2,300 tons of unknown cargo. Another dry cargo vessel, the CHERNYAKHOVSK, may also have started for Cuba. She was observed moving in a westerly direction in the Baltic on 25 October and has been regularly engaged in the Cuban trade in the past. The East German passenger vessel VOELKERFREUNDSCHAFT reached a point 10 miles from Havana harbor at 0730 EST. The Polish dry cargo vessel BIALYSTOK probably will reach Cuba today; it was only 600 nautical miles east of Havana on 26 October. The Soviet tanker GROZNY probably reached the US quarantine line early this morning. A Soviet IL-18 transport scheduled to pick up the body of the Soviet Ambassador to Brazil was en route to Rio on 27 October. Another IL-18 scheduled for a trip from Moscow to Havana via Morocco, West Africa, and Brazil, turned back at Rabat for reasons as yet unknown. TO CRET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 TOPSFCRET (b)(3) 28 October 1962 III. THE SITUATION IN THE BLOC A. MILITARY We have noted the following Soviet military develop- ments; an assessment of their significance will be issued later this morning by the USIB Watch Committee. No significant redeployment of major ground, air, or naval forces has been noted. Elements of most of the ma- jor commands are continuing what appears to be normal train- ing. One US T-29 aircraft outbound from Berlin in the cen- tral corridor on the afternoon of 27 October was intercepted by two Soviet FIREBAR aircraft. Three passes were made. J-2, USEUCOM, comments that this incident and other upgrading of air defense capability suggest that the Soviets may be think- ing of some sort of corridor harassment. Ground: There is no evidence that ground forces of the western military districts of the USSR have moved or are preparing to move to the forward area. US attaches in Moscow, however, have been denied permission to visit the Belorussian, Kiev, and Carpathian Military Districts. The general ground force posture in the forward area is that of precautionary defensive readiness. Only staff, signal and reconnaissance elements of Soviet and German ground forces in East Germany appear to be in the field. The main combat units apparently are on standby alert in garrison. Allied missions report no large scale movements on the roads. There are no suggestions of a Communist mil- itary move in the Berlin area. (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 TO RET (b)(3) There are continued indications that Soviet forces in Hungary are on alert status. Elements may have been de- ployed to the Czech border area north of Budapest, but there is no evidence of movement into Czechoslovakia. Low-level exercises appear to be underway in northwestern Czechoslovakia. Naval: Exercise activity continues in the Black Sea, the Pacific and the Baltic. There may be missile firings for training or developmental purposes in the Northern Fleet in the near future. 111-2 TO CRET Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 TOP SECRET (b)(3) 28 October 1962 B, OTHER DEVELOPMENTS Khrushchev's 27 October letter to President Kennedy, which was published immediately, constitutes Moscow's first specific proposal for a negotiated settlement of the Cuban crisis. His call for reciprocal Soviet-US withdraw- als of offensive weapons from Cuba and Turkey under inter- national supervision and for mutual non-aggression guaran- tees covering these two countries was designed to encour- age U Thant to intensify his mediatory efforts and to stim- ulate other UN members to increase pressure on the US for a compromise settlement. Khrushchev expressed the belief that it is possible "to end the conflict quickly" and that his proposal provides the "basis for a settlement." Moscow probably will make further proposals calculated to deter US military action against the missile sites or, failing this, to make such action as costly as possible in political terms. The 27 October bid for an exchange of com- mitments regarding Turkey and Cuba probably represents Mos- cow's maximum position. The USSR's next step may be to re- duce these demands to a US guarantee not to attack Cuba and to respect Cuban sovereignty in exchange for a Soviet commitment to cease work on the missile sites and eventually to remove them under some form of international inspection. Soviet spokesmen continue to play down the possibility of a general war and to emphasize the USSR's readiness to work out a peaceful solution. A TASS correspondent in Ge- neva told a Western journalist on 24 October that he did not anticipate that the Cuban crisis would lead to an armed conflict between the US and the USSR "because Cuba is not important enough to cause the Soviet Union to go to war." He expressed the belief that the USSR would make a strong response to US actions, but refused to speculate what form Soviet reaction might take. A Soviet diplomat in Geneva told a Western colleague on 24 October that although he nad no idea what the USSR's reaction would be, he was "certain" the Kremlin would not start a war over Cuba. In a talk with Ambassador Kohler on 25 October, Soviet Foreign Ministry press chief Kharlamov said the USSR had not published the text of President Kennedy's speech be- cause it was full of "crude anti-Soviet attacks." He re- ferred specifically to the President's statement regarding the falsity of Soviet public and private assurances that the military equipment being sent to Cuba was exclusively (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 TO RET (b)(3) defensive. Kharlamov twice charged that the control of US policy had passed into the hands of the military.. He said the Soviet Union could not be treated like Belgium or Lux- embourg, and warned that Soviet ships would be defended if necessary. Ambassador Kohler reported, however, that in general Kharlamov seemed to reflect a genuine desire for concilia- tion. The Soviet official said it was time for the two sides to sit down together and work out a solution. The USSR has floated a trial balloon regarding another heads-of-government meeting in Vienna. Two Soviet embassy officials in Vienna approached a friend of Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky on 25 October with the suggestion that neu- tral Austria could play a role in the Cuban crisis. They asked if Kreisky could do something to facilitate the eas- ing of tensions, perhaps by offering Vienna as the site for a summit meeting. Kreisky told the Soviet ambassador on 26 October that Austria would be glad to do what it can to facilitate negotiation. He suggested to the US Embassy that Khrushchev might find New York an undesirable site for a meeting at the present time and recalled that the Soviet premier had enjoyed himself in Vienna during the June 1961 meeting. It was evident that Kreisky would welcome a summit in Vienna, both for the sake of Austrian prestige and as a personal boost in the forthcoming Austrian elections. The first evidence of direct Soviet pressure on a US ally to dissociate itself from US policy on Cuba has come from a report on the Soviet ambassador's interview with Greek Foreign Minister Averoff on 26 October. After deliver- ing a Soviet memorandum on the Cuban situation, the ambassa- dor warned that by supporting the US in the crisis, Greece was taking a "most dangerous" position for its own interests. He said that although the USSR would not allow the US to make another attempt to "subjugate" the Cuban people, it would not provoke a war and would work for a peaceful set- tlement. Most of the bloc has not yet been heard to comment on the US rejection of Khrushchev's 27 October proposals. The line that will be taken is indicated, however, by Radio Budapest, which describes the rejection as a "bitter disap- pointment to everybody." According to the Hungarians, the President was unresponsive to the "reasonable" Soviet pro- posals because he is interested in maintaining tension, pos- sibly in connection with the US election campaign. 111-4 TO: HRET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 � Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 TO CRET Other East European commentary stresses the negotiabil- ity of the crisis. Radio Warsaw states that Khrushchev's proposal indicates the USSR is willing to meet the United States "more than half way." East Germany's First Deputy Foreign Minister is quoted as saying that the Khrushchev's proposal demonstrates the USSR's "far-teaching preparedness for an understanding." Some dimunition of public alarm in Poland is indicated by the latest reports that scare buying has abated.- Panic buying in Bucharest, however, apparently continues. Some stores have been forced to close down, and the black market in food has reappeared. In Yugoslavia, the official daily sounded the hope on 26 October that Khrushchev's acceptance of U Thant's pleas for negotiations would bring the "perilous crisis streaming to its sensible end." If the situation does not improve, however, Tito may meet with prominent neutralists, accord- ing to unconfirmed reports from Belgrade. Nkrumah sent Tito and Nasir messages on 25 October urging a "concerted effort" to prevent any further deterioration of the situa- tion. The Chinese Communists continue to strike the most militant notes in the bloc. According to the Peiping radio, US determination to "unleash direct military invasion against Cuba" becomes more apparent as additional events unfold each day. The Chinese preference for a firm bloc posture in the Cuban crisis is again indicated in a People's Daily editorial of 28 October calling for mobilization of the people of the world to "smash US war provocations." 111-5 To3011-S.EZET. (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 1 28 October 1962 (b)(3) IV. NON-BLOC DEVELOPMENTS U Thant is thinking seriously of accepting Castro's invitation to visit Cuba. He may go to Cuba on 30 Octo- ber, hoping to take with him a substantial group, mainly technicians who could be used as expert observers at mis- sile sites if they are allowed to inspect them. Castro said he would agree to U Thant 'S proposal for a suspen- sion of missile site construction during negotiations pro- vided the US halts "threats and aggressive actions," in- cluding the "naval blockade.". Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa was expected to ar- rive in New York on 28 October to talk with U Thant, pos- sibly to establish the terms of reference for U Thant's trip to Cuba. Sweden's public reassertion on 26 October of the prin- ciple of unlimited freedom of the seas in peacetime prompted Finland to do likewise the next day, fearing that delay might bring pressure from its "big neighbor." Swedish of- ficials have indicated the need for Stockholm to be formally "correct" because of the Baltic situation, but have made it obvious to US representatives that they expect the US to enforce the quarantine. The Swedish shipowners' association on 27 October recommended that Swedish ships submit to Amer- ican searches under protest, reserving the 'tight to claim damages. The master of the Coolangatta disregarded instruc- tions to this effect when he refused to stop on 26 October. Belgian shipowners reportedly decided at a secret meeting that no Belgian ship will visit Cuba. In Berlin there are some indications Of Soviet and East German efforts to create unrest and anxiety over the Cuban situation. A Soviet Embassy official told a German journalist that the USSR is powerful in Berlin and able to take the initiative. East German border guards have asked some Berlin-bound motorists their opinions of the Cuban sit- uation, possibly recording the answers, And the West Berlin �SED has launched a "hands off Cuba" propaganda campaign. BritiSh Foreign Secretary Lord Home on 27 October called In Soviet Charge Loginov and told him that the dangers in the Cuban situation come not from the US blockade, but from the buildup of Soviet missile bases. The War Office has re- stricted the travel of bloc attaches to the London area. So- viet attaches have made numerous requests to visit air bases, especially those with USAF units. IV-1 rThY)S' (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 TOT-SE .1..CET (b)(3) Ambassador Dowling in Bonn reports that he is pro- foundly impressed by the support and approval of the Pres- ident's policy by the government and people in Germany, and in Europe generally. He believes there has been no comparable response to US leadership since the decision to intervene in Korea, and he feels this is all the more remarkable since there is no illusion about the risk in- volved. Swiss Foreign Minister Wahlen considers that Soviet retaliation is more likely in Turkey and Iran than in Ber- lin or Cuba. There has not yet been any reaction in Western Europe to the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters pertaining to Cuban and Turkish missile bases. Khrushchev's offer was received in London diplomatic quarters with "intense interest," but was described by British officials as "ir- relevant." analysis of the Soviet motivations in Cuba estimates that one strategic consideration may have been the belief that the Cuban missiles, because they pro- vide less warning time than ICBMs would pose a new and dev- astatlng threat to the SAC bomber capability. however, that since Moscow is unlikely to have chosen a strategic showdown in an area where it is militarily more vulnerable, there must have been political considerations as well. notes the USSR's desire to augment its bar- gaining capacity in respect to Berlin, the elimination of foreign bases, and the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Other objectives are to test the willingness of the US and its Allies to stand up to a confrontation and hence the credibility of US commitments around the world. President Ayub told the US Ambassador on 26 October that one reason Pakistan has not publicly supported the United States on Cuba is that official statements by US allies outside the American hemisphere would merely broaden a dispute which should be handled expeditiously by the OAS on a localized basis. Ayub stated his belief that resolute hardne8s tacked by real power is the only posture that is successful in dealing with the USSR. IV-2 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792 TO T (b)(3) Venezuela plans to offer two destroyers and one sub- marine to the OAS forces jointly with a Colombian offer of naval vessels. Colombia decided to limit its offer to naval forces when the War Minister threatened, to resign if land forces were sent off at a time of serious internal security problems. Venezuela also has had difficulty con- trolling Castro-supported guerrillas and other belligerent groups. Venezuela on 27 October became the first Latin Ameri- can country to order full-scale mobilization of its armed forces. President Betancourt, long a leading advocate of action against Castro, wants to "put an end once and for all" to what he called Cuba's threat to Venezuelan security. President Goulart, in a 25 October reply'to President Kennedy's letter, adamantly reconfirmed Brazil's opposition to military measures against Cuba other than the quarantine. He expressed a fear that OAS decisions have been losing au- thority and that these decisions have been taken by a "nu- merical majority and with unjustifiable haste." Goulart showed very little concern over the threat to the hemisphere of the missiles in Cuba. He pointed out that "defense of the principle of self-determination of peoples, in its broadest sense, has become a crucial point of the foreign policy of Brazil," and he then stated that any form of intervention in an American state inspired by alleged incompatibility of its political regime is deeply displeasing to the conscience of the Brazilian people. On 27 October Bolivia also declared its adherence to the principles of "non-intervention and self-determination" In the Cuban case, but endorsed the OAS vote calling for the use of force if necessary to maintain the "blockade." President Goulart told the US Ambassador in Rio on 27 October that he had ordered leaders of the stevedore�' union not to strike against handling American ships because Brazil supports the quarantine. This strike was reportedly ordered by the Communist Party. According to a broadcast from Rio the dockers decided to suspend the boycott because the government had shown disapproval. President Goulart also told Ambassador Gordon that he had informed the Soviet Charge that the Soviet aircraft which may land at Recife on its way to Havana would be inspected by the Brazilian Air Force and any cargo removed. IV-3 1 0 RET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C05309792