MILITARY LESSONS LEARNED BY ISRAEL AND SYRIA FROM THE WAR IN LEBANON

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• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05360466
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• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2021
• Case Number: F-2021-01970
• Publication Date: May 1, 1984

Director of
Central
Intelligence
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SMITE-
01,1 67-I.?, TIT';71:
V" ,1
1:Lm
Military Lessons Learned
by Israel and Syria
From the War in Lebanon
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
ei C
NI JIM 84-10008
May 1984
Copy 470
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NI IIM 84-10008
MILITARY LESSONS LEARNED
BY ISRAEL AND SYRIA
FROM THE WAR IN LEBANON
Information available as of 19 April 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE 1
KEY JUDGMENTS
DISCUSSION
Overview
Joint Service Operations
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5
5
5
Joint-Service Logistic Operations
Joint-Service Command, Control, and Communications
Lessons Learned
Conduct of Air and Air Defense Operations
Lessons Learned
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7
12
13
18
Conduct of Naval Operations 19
Lessons Learned
iii
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Pace
Conclusions
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Annex: Effects of Terrain and Enemy on IDF Operations 27
iv
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SCOPE NOTE
The purpose of this Interagency Intelligence Memorandum is to
evaluate the military lessons by Israel and Syria from the 1982 war in
Lebanon and their potential impact on the military balance between
them. It does not attempt to analyze the overall Arab-Israeli military
balance, which was done in NIE 30-82, Key Military Issues in the
Middle East, the conclusions of which still obtain. It concentrates
instead on the two most likely adversaries in the Arab-Israeli arena over
the next five years and evaluates their performance in Lebanon and
subsequent force improvements to assess their relative military
capabilities.
This Memorandum was produced under the auspices of the
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia. It was
coordinated at the working level with the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the
intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Israel drew few major military lessons from the 1982 war in
Lebanon. Tactical innovations, equipment modifications, and doctrinal
changes were validated, and some relatively minor weaknesses were
noted. Major lessons, however, are not normally drawn from minor
wars, and some Israeli tactics used in Lebanon would not be appropriate
for open warfare on the Golan Heights. Similarly, the Syrians may not
consider lessons learned from Lebanon relevant to a battle on the Golan
Heights.
The war nevertheless marked the first time Israeli and Syrian
forces have engaged in pitched battles since 1973 and thus provides a
framework from which to measure and project relative capabilities.
Since the 1973 war, Israel has concentrated primarily on qualitative
improvements in its armed forces. Syria has generally emphasized
quantity, but the war in Lebanon spurred Syrian plans to upgrade, as
well as expand the size of, its armed forces.
Despite the rapid expansion and modernization of the Syrian
armed forces, Israel will maintain its margin of military superiority and
probably widen the gap over the next five years. Damascus may be able
to achieve its goal of parity, but only in numbers. Israel's greater
operational effectiveness, its possession of better weapons and their
subsystems, and its acquisition and integration of advanced command,
control, and intelligence systems will offset most Syrian improvements.
Israeli policymakers may have learned a major lesson, however, on
the importance of national consensus and unity in fighting a protracted
war. Lebanon marked the first time the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
experienced refusal of duty by a significant number of reservists and
large antiwar demonstrations by the civilian populace. The overall
mission of the IDF in Lebanon was never clearly defined, and Israel's
inability to extricate itself from the Lebanese quagmire with any
political advantage has called into question the fundamental premise
that has guided Israel's concept of a defense force: Israel goes to war
only when there is no choice and only to defend the state. Israeli
governments in future will have to be careful to ensure national
consensus before resorting to force and avoid using the IDF solely for
political objectives if they are to keep a strong citizen army.
The Syrian military, despite relatively high losses, believes its
ground forces performed reasonably well and would have done better if
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the air air and air defense forces had not failed. The Syrians are attempting
to correct problems in command and control, training, and their ability
to employ and maintain weapons incorporating advanced technology.
The Syrians, however, blame their massive defeat on the Soviet
weapons they used and not on their operation of them�an attitude that
suggests the problems are not being properly addressed. The specter of a
two-front war in Lebanon and the Golan Heights prodded the Syrians to
implement plans for corps-level commands and to significantly increase
the size of the standing Army; they have devoted little attention,
however, to developing and implementing a joint-service and com-
bined-arms doctrine to utilize these forces effectively.
Moscow's need to repair ties with Damascus after Syria's defeat
was more of a factor in determining the increase in Soviet military
support than Syria's need for any particular weapon system. The most
conspicious component of Soviet support has been the Soviet-manned
SA-5 surface-to-air missile units in Syria and delivery of SS-21 surface-
to-surface rocket launchers. This equipment has not been delivered to
any country outside the Warsaw Pact and, though of marginal value to
the Syrian armed forces, demonstrates a strategic commitment on
Moscow's part to Syria's defense.
The Soviets nevertheless have been working hard with the Syrian
air and air defense forces to improve their capabilities and have
equipped them with such items as new radars, new fighter-interceptors,
and an automated air defense command and control system. To use this
equipment effectively against their Israeli opponents, however, the
Syrians must develop new tactics and doctrine
and correct command and control deficiencies.
Over the long term, however, Syria can begin to overcome its
military disadvantage primarily by improving the quality of its man-
power and leadership. Qualified technical manpower is scarce, and the
steady expansion of the Syrian armed forces ensures that it will remain
so. Syrian military leadership depends more on religion, family connec-
tions, and political reliability than on professional expertise. Thus, the
level of professionalism of the average Syrian officer is much lower than
that of his Israeli counterpart.
The key element of Israeli's military advantage over the Syrians is
the operational effectiveness of its forces�based on superior leadership
and training, greater motivation, better command and control, individ-
ual initiative, and the ability of its armed forces to exploit more fully
the capabilities of weapon systems. The quality of its forces will
continue to give Israel its decisive edge.
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DISCUSSION
Overview
1. Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 was the
culmination of an escalatory process that began in
1976 with deployment of the Syrian-Arab Deterrent
Force there. Although the invasion was triggered by
the assassination attempt against the Israeli Ambassa-
dor in London, it had been planned for at least two
years. The growing military infrastructure of the
Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon led
Israel after 1980 to adopt a policy of preemptive
rather than retaliatory strikes against PLO positions
there. This policy was designed to disrupt Palestinian
plans and capabilities to conduct operations. Instead it
resulted in a major confrontation in July 1981 that
convinced Israeli policymakers an invasion of southern
Lebanon would be necessary. Syria's inability and
unwillingness to control Palestinian guerrilla activity
in the south and Syrian encroachment on Israel's self-
proclaimed -red lines- in Lebanon led Israeli policy-
makers to conclude also that the Syrian presence there
could not be tolerated indefinitely either.'
2. The war's objectives were political as well as
military and stemmed from a belief by Prime Minister
Begin and key Cabinet members Shamir and Sharon
that Syria and the PLO could be dealt a major political
and military defeat in Lebanon and that an Israeli-
dominated Christian Maronite government could be
installed in Beirut. The objectives at the outset were:
� To secure Israel's northern border area from
Palestinian rocket and artillery attacks.
'Israel had set "red lines" in Lebanon that Syrian forces tacitly
observed but violated when Damascus felt Israel was unilaterally
changing the rules. For example, Israel stipulated between 1976 and
1979 that no Syrian troops were to advance south of a line between
Sidon and the southern tip of the Buhayrat al Qir'awn (reservoir),
nor were Syrian artillery units to move within range of the Israeli-
Lebanese border. Syria also was warned not to deploy surface-to-air
missiles inside Lebanon or to interfere with Israeli reconnaissance
flights. The Syrians introduced SA-6 surface-to-air missile batteries
into the Bekaa Valley�a preplanned deployment triggered when
Israeli aircraft downed two Syrian troop-carrying helicopters near
Zahlan in 1981. Resulting tensions caused the Syrians to deploy some
forces south of Qieawn to cover critical road junctions. Ironically,
the "red lines" gave the PLO free rein to operate in southern
Lebanon because Israel's security enclave manned by Major Had-
dad's forces extended only 6 kilometers into Lebanon and the
mandate of the UN force (UNIFIL) limited its ability to control the
Palestinians.
5
� To destroy the PLO's military and political
infrastructure in Lebanon and by extension
weaken its influence in the West Bank.
� To install a Lebanese government that would
conclude a peace treaty with Israel.
An objective that emerged during the war was to
engage and if possible expel Syrian military forces
from Lebanon because their continued presence
would leave Damascus with too much influence on
any Lebanese government after the war. From a
tactical standpoint, Syrian forces had to be driven at
least from the Shuf and the southern Bekaa Valley,
where they could offer sanctuary to PLO forces and
threaten the Israeli Army's east flank.2
3. Most Israelis overwhelmingly supported the first
two objectives. The armed Palestinian presence in
southern Lebanon had become intolerable for Israel's
northern border communities, and most Israelis
viewed the growing power of the PLO in Lebanon as a
serious potential threat.
4. Israel's inability to achieve its third objective has
created dissension within the Israeli body politic hith-
erto unseen. A growing sense that Israel, despite its
military victory, has become mired in a political
situation that offers no hope of resolution has resulted
in widespread criticism of the appropriateness of
military force to achieve political gains. Syria's rapid
recovery from its military defeat in June 1982, its
strengthened political position in Lebanon, and the
disintegration of the Maronite-dominated Lebanese
government reinforce these doubts.
Joint-Service Operations
5. The invasion of Lebanon was the first real test
under combat conditions of organizational changes in
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) command structure
made as a result of lessons learned in the 1973 war. In
planning the invasion the IDF emphasized joint-
There was a compelling strategic-military logic for besieging
West Beirut apart from any political motivation for dislodging the
PLO. The Israeli Army had to cut the Beirut-Damascus highway to
drive a wedge between the Syrians in the east and the PLO in Beirut
and facilitate a linkup with the Lebanese Forces of Bashir Gemayel.
Such a wedge had to be wide enough to defend and permit
domination of the Jabal al Baruk ridgeline.
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service operations operations under the direction of a joint staff
attached to the General Headquarters (GHQ) staff.
The net effect was an
effective military machine capable of quickly exploit-
ing tactical opportunities with air support and com-
bined-arms maneuver down to the company level. As
a result the IDF defeated Syrian forces piecemeal
without decisive maneuver. By contrast, the Syrians
demonstrated little interservice planning, coordina-
tion, or cooperation.
Joint-Service Logistic Operations
11. Because of Lebanon's limited and constricted
road network, the IDF coordinated closely with the
Navy and Air Force to move men and materiel.
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The Syrians did not attempt to
interdict IDF supply lines in the eastern zone, so no
redirection of supply and support efforts was
necessary.
12. Israeli Air Force transport aircraft and heavy-
lift helicopters also were used
Thereat ter, temporary airstrips built by IDF
engineers were used to continue resupply operations
and troop rotations at forward bases along the cease-
fire lines.
Joint-Service Command, Control, and
Communications
13. The strikes against Syrian surface-to-air missile
sites, troop reinforcement, and command and control
elements involved extensive joint-service planning and
had to be precisely coordinated and controlled, partic-
ularly as Israeli forces neared Beirut. For Israeli
planners the primary considerations for the command,
control, and communications system were Lebanon's
mountainous terrain, the constricted airspace, and the
multiplicity of regular and irregular forces to be
engaged.
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in urban urban areas and mountainous terrain or when
enemy antitank defenses are organized in depth on
favorable terrain. Dismounted infantry supported by
the combined effects of naval gunfire, artillery, and
direct fire from 20-mm Vulcan antiaircraft artillery
pieces finally overcame the Syrian/PLO defenses at
Khaldah, but not before the IDF armored columns
leading the assault suffered a large number of casual-
ties.
46. Armor Operations. The 1982 war validated
IDF armor doctrine and tactics. Little was learned
except that tighter coordination and control between
adjacent units in constricted terrain is required to
preclude the possibility of firing on friendly units.
Lessons Learned
45. Combined-Arms Operations. The IDF was
able to concentrate overwhelming combat power on
all axes of advance during its operations, but had to
relearn a lesson from 1973: large numbers of dis-
mounted infantry are critical for offensive operations
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Conduct of Air and Air Defense Operations
55. During the 1982 air war over Lebanon, the
Israeli Air Force reaffirmed its position as the premier
airpower in the Middle East. It convincingly demon-
strated that Arab air defenses, whether ground based
or airborne, pose little threat to the IAF's superiority.
Overall, however, the air war reconfirmed important
tactical lessons previously learned.
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79. The Syrians continue to place primary impor-
tance on the acquisition of sophisticated airframes
without adjusting operational procedures to increase
overall force effectiveness. Syrian air-to-air training
still follows the rigid Soviet tactics employed with such
disastrous results in June 1982,
81. Air-to-Ground.
Israeli
attack helicopters and specialized
gi vunu-launclieu, surface-to-surface missile systems
may replace jet aircraft in the CAS role. This would
effectively free the strike-fighter to perform more
lucrative and cost-effective ground attack missions.
Lessons Learned
Learned
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Conduct of Naval Operations
91. During the June 1982 invasion of Lebanon,
Israeli Naval Forces (INF) supported ground force
operations with conventional amphibious landings,
naval gunfire support, commando raids, and a block-
ade of the central and southern coast of Lebanon.
While there were few surprises in the conduct of
Israeli naval operations, the extent to which the am-
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phibious landing ships were used is noteworthy
Lessons Learned
99. The Israeli Navy learned few lessons during the
1982 invasion, but gained valuable experience in
amphibious and extended duration blockade opera-
tions.
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Conclusions
123. Despite the rapid expansion and moderniza-
tion of the Syrian armed forces, Israel will maintain its
margin of military superiority and probably widen the
gap over the next five years. Damascus may be able to
achieve its goal of parity, but only in numbers. Israel's
greater operational effectiveness, its possession of bet-
ter weapons and their subsystems, and its acquisition
and integration of advanced command, control, and
intelligence systems will offset most Syrian
improvements.
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�See
124. Major lessons are not normally drawn from
minor wars, and Israel drew few of them from the
1982 war in Lebanon. At most, some tactical innova-
tions, equipment modifications, and doctrinal changes
were validated, and some relatively minor weaknesses
were noted. Because of terrain and other factors, some
Israeli tactics used in Lebanon would not be appropri-
ate for open warfare on the Golan Heights.
125. Israeli policymakers may have learned a major
lesson, however, on the importance of national consen-
sus and unity in fighting a protracted war. Lebanon
marked the first time the IDF experienced the refusal
by a significant number of reservists to carry out their
assigned duties and large demonstrations against the
war by the civilian populace. The overall mission of
the IDF in Lebanon was never clearly defined by the
government after the 43-kilometer line was crossed.
The siege of Beirut, the protracted guerrilla warfare in
the south, and Israel's inability to extricate itself from
the Lebanese quagmire with any political advantage
has highlighted the departure of the Lebanon cam-
paign from the fundamental premise that has guided
Israel's concept of a defense force: Israel goes to war
only when there is no choice and only to defend the
state.
126 The Syrian military, despite relatively high
losses, believes its ground forces performed reasonably
well and would have done better if the air and air
defense forces had not failed. The Syrians are attempt-
ing to correct problems in command and control,
training, and their ability to employ and maintain
weapons incorporating advanced technology. The Syr-
ians, however, blame their massive defeat on the
Soviet weapons they used and not their operation of
them�an attitude that suggests the problems are not
being properly addressed.
127. Despite its preference for Western equipment
and training methods, Syria can do little to break away
from the Soviet mold. With the likelihood of .another
Syrian-Israeli war, Syria cannot afford the expensive
and time-consuming process of a transition to Western
systems. Additionally, Syria would not be certain of
obtaining full and long-term Western military support.
At present the Soviet Union is Syria's only reliable
source of political and military support. We expect
Syrian dependence on the Soviets, particularly in the
air and air defense areas, to remain at the same or
higher levels for the foreseeable future.
128. The specter of a two-front war in Lebanon and
the Golan Heights prodded Syrian GHQ to implement
plans for corps-level commands and to significantly
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increase the size of the standing army. It has devoted
little attention, however, to developing and imple-
menting a joint-service and combined-arms doctrine to
utilize these forces effectively.
129. Moscow's need to repair ties with Damascus
after Syria's defeat was more of a factor in determin-
ing the increase in Soviet military support than Syria's
need for any particular weapon system. The most
conspicuous component of Soviet support has been two
Soviet-manned SA-5 surface-to-air missile units in
Syria and delivery of at least nine SS-21 surface-to-
surface rocket launchers. This equipment has not been
delivered to any country outside the Warsaw Pact,
and, though of marginal value to the Syrian armed
forces, demonstrates a strategic commitment on Mos-
cow's part to Syria's defense.'2
130. The Soviets nevertheless have been working
hard with the Syrian air and air defense forces to
improve their capabilities. Syrian air defenses have
been equipped with new radars and an automated
command and control system�Vektor 2�to tie to-
gether the Syrian air defense network. The 'Syrian Air
Force has received at least two squadrons of n�,,v MIG-
23 Flogger G fighter-interceptors as well as replace-
ments for all aircraft lost in Lebanon."
131. To use this equipment effectively against their
Israeli opponents, however, the Syrian armed forces
must develop new tactics and doctrine. Lebanon
demonstrated that sheer numbers were of marginal
value on the battlefield without integration and coor-
dination of other assets. We have few indications,
however, that the Syrians have adopted new tactics or
doctrine to remedy shortcomings evident in Lebanon.
Furthermore, some shortfalls will take years to correct,
such as training enough pilots adequately to replace
the losses from Lebanon.
132. A key element of Israel's military advantage
over Syria is the operational effectiveness of its
forces�based on superior leadership and training,
greater motivation, better command and control, com-
bat experience, individual initiative, and the ability of
its armed forces to exploit more fully the capabilities
of weapon systems. It is these factors that will enable
Israeli forces to operate more effectively in a battle-
See SNIE 11/35/36-83, Implications of the Military Balance of
Power in Lebanon, for more on the depth of Moscow's commitment
to Syria.
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field environment complicated by advanced technol-
ogy and sophisticated weapons. Israel's successes in
these areas are not likely to be substantially eroded
over the next five years, despite problems resulting
from manpower and budgetary constraints, and train-
ing limitations imposed by the Sinai withdrawal.
133. Aggressive and innovative leadership will be
essential to a fast-moving, offensive-type war. In con-
trast to the Syrians, Israel's military personnel have
demonstrated an ability to improvise and quickly
modify operational plans in the heat of battle. Officers
and noncommissioned officers are trained in contin-
gency planning and encouraged to make decisions on
the spot. Organizational flexibility and command ini-
tiative will enable Israeli military leaders to adjust
forces rapidly to meet any Syrian threat.
134. Unlike Syrian military leaders, Israeli com-
manders rise through the ranks on the basis of demon-
strated leadership, performance, and initiative. There
are no direct commissions in the Israeli armed forces.
Political loyalty or favoritism plays little role in per-
sonnel advancement, and assignments and promotions
are based almost exclusively on merit, except at the
highest levels, where personal and political factors also
influence selection.
135. Israeli leadership and training will continue to
be facilitated by armed forces composed of highly
motivated individuals. The majority of the population
is highly supportive of the armed forces and still is
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prepared to endure and accept a high collective cost�
in lives and in personal and economic sacrifice�to
defend the country. High motivation will continue to
enhance the capability of Israeli military personnel to
achieve the highest level of combat readiness.
136. Over the long term Syria can begin to over-
come its present military disadvantage only by im-
proving the quality of its manpower and leadership.
Qualified technical manpower is scarce, and the
steady expansion of the Syrian armed forces ensures
that it will remain so. The majority of Syrian con-
scripts are poorly educated and from a rural back-
ground. They do not have, and for the foreseeable
future will not have, the same proficiency on increas-
ingly complex weapon systems as their Israeli counter-
parts. The Syrian military leadership, moreover, does
not exhibit the same commitment and professionalism
as the Israeli. Religion, family connections, and politi-
cal reliability are more important for advancement
than professional expertise. The recent struggle be-
tween Rif aat Assad, commander of the Defense Com-
panies, and his opponents in the regular Army over
officer assignments suggests that at senior levels politi-
cal considerations are more important than compe-
tence. As a result, Syria will continue to have a
marginally proficient armed forces led by officers of
questionable competence. Such a military, even if able
to achieve a surprise attack and seize the Golan
Heights, is unlikely to succeed in holding it or prevent-
ing a total defeat at the hands of the IDF.
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ANNEX
EFFECTS OF TERRAIN AND ENEMY ON IDF OPERATIONS
Impact of Terrain
1. From a military point of view, the battle area of
southern Lebanon is clearly divided into two separate
sectors, with operations in one sector almost complete-
ly separate from those in the other. Lebanon is divided
in half by the Lebanon Mountains, which generally
run north to south through the center of the country.
The high ridgeline is sharply delimited, and its eastern
slopes are steep enough to virtually preclude east-west
movement except along three main roads.
2. The terrain in the western sector is best suited for
offensive infantry operations, while in the east the
southern approaches to the Bekaa Valley heavily favor
defense. The urban areas and the high ground over-
looking the routes to the north also heavily favor
defense. The Bekaa Valley is the only part of Lebanon
where high-speed mechanized operations are possible,
but key terrain overlooking the valley has to be taken
to conduct a successful attack. Sharply compartment-
ed terrain in the western sector, coupled with the
channelized southern approaches in the eastern sector,
thus decidedly favor an infantry- and mechanized-
infantry-heavy task force organization.
4. The Alayh ridgeline above Beirut is uneven but
reasonably clear, providing observation and helicopter
landing zones. Its sides are steep and forested, limiting
fields of fire from the ridge, and several good roads
run along the crest. Overall, the ridgeline favors the
defense because of its unevenness, its built-up areas,
and its alternating forested and clear areas.
5. East of Alayh are three relatively isolated ridge-
lines of roughly equal height extending from the
northeast. Above these loom the main ridge of the
Lebanon Mountains. All of these ridges have relatively
open crests, affording good observation over each
other. The first ridge is out of small-arms range of both
the Alayh Ridge and other ridges to its east, but the
last two rise in succession and are only about 2,000
27
meters apart. All have steep, well-forested sides, mak-
ing armored operations difficult at best. The resulting
compartmentalization offers significant advantages to
a defense oriented either to the west or southwest. An
eastward-oriented attack would face successive
ridgelines.
6. Terrain along the main Beirut-Damascus high-
way as it rises from Beirut to the pass at Dahr al
Baydar also favors the defense. This avenue of ap-
proach is restricted by steep valleys and is overlooked
by clear high ground that affords good observation and
long-range fields of fire. Alternate forested and open
areas provide other good ambush points. Between
Beirut and the pass, there is only one area where the
adjoining terrain is restrictive enough to prohibit
military vehicular movement if the road should be cut.
This area is a section of the steep initial rise from
Beirut about 2 kilometers west of Alayh. Moreover, the
highway between Alayh and Bhamdun is a highly
congested, built-up area that could make mechanized
operations costly.
7. Like the Lebanon Mountains in the west, the
Anti-Lebanon Range provides a virtually impenetra-
ble barrier to the east of the Bekaa Valley. There is a
major gap in these mountains northeast of Rashayya,
however, where four all-weather roads and numerous
smaller trails cross a 20-kilometer section of ridgeline
to break the isolation of the Bekaa Valley from the
Syrian Plateau. Moreover, the broken high ground
between this gap and the Bekaa not only directly
overlooks the valley but constitutes an excellent base of
operations against the valley because of easy access to
its floor. To control the southern Bekaa Valley, it is
imperative to control as much high ground around the
village of Yanta as possible. The higher slopes of
Mount Hermon are forbiddingly steep and cross-
compartmented, suitable only for guerrilla force
movement on the ground.
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Approved for Release: 2021/09/02 C05360466
Approved for Release: 2021/09/02 C05360466
Approved for Release: 2021/09/02 C05360466