SOUTH AFRICA: THE SOVIET 'LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE' STRATEGY GAINING MOMENTUM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05429921
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: November 6, 1985

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #05510-85
6 November 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Frederick L. Wettering
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: South Africa: The Soviet "Legitimate Representative"
Strategy Gaining Momentum
The Strategy
1. The USSR is pursuing in South Africa its established strategy of
obtaining for the liberation movement over which it has the most
influence general world recognition as the sole "legitimate
representative" of its people. The Soviets pursued this strategy
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s in Africa and elsewhere--promoting
the MPLA in Angola (when it was clearly less effective and less organized
than Holden Roberto's GRAE/FNLA), the PAIGC in Cape Verde/Guinea-Bissau,
and SWAPO in Namibia quickly come to mind, as do Soviet efforts on behalf
of the PLO and NLF/Vietcong. Invariably, the Soviets will as quickly as
possible mask their direct role behind various "progressive" fronts,
spokesmen, and governments so that to the ordinary observer the Soviets
appear only to be supporting someone else's initiative. In Africa, this
usually involves governments sympathetic to Moscow--Ethiopia, Mozambique,
Madagascar, Congo, Benin, and Angola--taking the lead to form an African
"consensus." The strategy denies any world support to alternate groups
and creates a Manichean situation which facilitates the success of the
Soviet surrogate--Western support flows in without jeopardizing Soviet
Influence and/or control. The chosen Soviet vehicle in South Africa for
this strategy is the African National Congress (ANC).
The ANC-Soviet Connection
2. The Soviets have considerable influence over the ANC, both
directly (through funding, training, and supply of arms and facilities)
and indirectly. The indirect influence is exercised through the South
African Communist Party (SACP), a semi-clandestine party totally loyal to
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Moscow. The SACP is overtly accepted as a full partner of the ANC and
known SACP members are allowed participation in the ANC while still
retaining their SACP membership. In fact, the ANC National. Executive
Committee--the politburo of the party--has 15 of its 30 members known or
suspected as SACP members, and SACP officials fill many key ANC
positions, including secretary general and leader of the paramilitary
wing. SACP members also dominate ANC affiliates such as the South
African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). Many external ANC offices are
run by SACP members who receive support from local Communist parties--the
UK being a prime example of this. The fact that the ANC publication
Sechaba is printed in East Germany and is virulently anti-US and
To7F-35Viet is yet another example of the Soviet channel of influence and
direction. While Intelligence Community analysts are not totally in
agreement that Moscow directs the ANC, all agree that it has strong
influence within the ANC. For my part, I believe the case for direction
is persuasive and I plan another paper to examine this soon.
South African Black Representation
3. There is at present no generally accepted--by black
South Africans--party or organization which represents all or a majority
of black South Africans. There are numerous' groups--associational, such
as trade union and business group leaders; religious, both liberal
(Bishop Tutu) and conservative (Zionist Church); community, and tribal
(such as Gatsha Buthelezi). The Organization of African Unity and the
United Nations both do not grant exclusivity to the ANC--other groups,
such as the Pan-Africanist Congress, are also recognized as spokesmen for
black South Africans.
4. Nelson Mandela: To the extent that one South African black has
national popularity in South Africa it is Mandela. Much of this
popularity is mythic, since Mandela has by dint of being in prison for 21
years avoided having to make any decisions, statements, or policy moves
which might alienate segments of the black community. Mandela himself,
jailed for admitted leadership of terrorism, is a self-confessed saboteur
and admirer of Communism who continues to oppose peaceful change and
supports armed revolution (recent Lofton/Thomas interview in The
Washington Times).
Dialogue, Negotiations and the ANC
5. Many individuals and governments who wish to see nonviolent,
evolutionary change in South Africa advocate talks or dialogue between
the Botha Government and black spokesmen and groups, as does US policy.
Indeed, the Botha Government declares its willingness to meet and conduct
a dialogue with all black leaders who eschew violence and revolution.
The principal legal opposition party, the PFP, has promoted the concept
of a national roundtable conference to develop peacefully policy
alternatives to apartheid, and this concept has gained some international
currency. Some South Africans--encouraged in part by some foreign
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governments and observers--have traveled to Lusaka to meet with ANC
leaders in an attempt to engage the ANC in peaceful negotiated change.
All such efforts have failed and badly misread the ANC position.
6. The ANC leadership describes itself as the only representative of
all South Africans and has given no indication that it would accept
participation in talks with any entity other than the South African
Government. As regards talks, the ANC position is rather clear. In
August 1985, ANC President Nelson Mandela, through his wife, gave
definitive guidance--"there is no room for peaceful struggle." He
opposed any national convention and maintained that the armed struggle
was the only correct path. This line has been somewhat obfuscated by ANC
leaders abroad, who instead pose impossible preconditions to any talks
with the Botha government. These are: release all detainees, especially
Mandela; unban the ANC and allow it to freely operate; no truce or end to
the armed struggle; end the state of emergency; no other parties to be
included in talks; and enter talks only with the agenda of dismantling
apartheid and with the white government committed not to remain in
power. In effect, the ANC will talk only about terms of surrender. ANC
meetings with delegations of South Africans in Lusaka must be assessed as
mischievous and as ploys to divide white opinion rather than any serious
dialogue.
Recent Developments
7. Recent developments demonstrate that the Soviet strategy to
obtain unique "legitimate representation" status is gaining momentum.
Internationally, the campaigns to free Nelson Mandela are receiving
increasing support in the Third World and the West. More and more
moderate governments--exemplified by the recent visit of Senegal
President Diouf--are counseling us that Mandela must be freed and the
South African 6overnment must negotiate with the ANC. UNESCO's recent
decision to fund the Solomon Mhlangu Freedom College in Tanzania--an
exclusively ANC training school--may be a harbinger of other Soviet
efforts to get UN organizations to deal exclusively with the ANC. Even
among South Africans, pilgrimages by parliamentary opposition figures,
business leaders, students and cleric groups to Lusaka (ANC Headquarters)
and elsewhere in Zambia for talks with the ANC serve to legitimize the
ANC as the sole alternative to the Botha government. A statement by one
liberal South African clergyman illustrates the growing success of this
effort. Reverend Nico Smith, as quoted in the 3 November New York Times,
referred to the ANC as "the other party in the conflict."
US Policy
8. To the extent US policy promotes talks between the South African
Government and all opposition groups, it both combats and advances this
Soviet tactic. US and other efforts, for example, to promote Chief
Buthelezi as a valid black spokesman damage the ANC
US support tor the
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development of black groups such as trade unions and community groups
facilitates the growth of genuine spokespeople as long as there is due
diligence that such assistance does not enhance the status of ANC
surrogates and fronts. Unfortunately, there is a real question whether
such diligence is being performed. When senior USG spokesmen call for
the release of Nelson Mandela and promote talks with the ANC, we in fact
advance the Soviet objective--and such statements are increasing. The
June US condemnation of a rather finely focused South African raid on ANC
officials in Botswana (much more finely focused than similar Israeli
raids on PLO targets) was a deviation from the previous policy of
condemning paramilitary action from all parties, and the absence of any
US statements condemning ongoing ANC terrorism--and they have been absent
of late--also has the effect of legitimizing ANC presence in neighboring
states. I am concerned that there are some in the USG who for various
reasons--ideology, convenience--would like us to accord the ANC the
status the Soviets seek for it--the only "legitimate" representative
group for all or most South Africans. (In a similar situation, much of
the USG accords SWAPO just such a role in Namibia--to our considerable
disadvantage.)
Near-Term Future
9. Since by any objective standard the Soviet "legitimize the ANC
campaign" is gaining strength, there would seem to be no incentive for
the Soviets not to push harder. It would seem likely that the next year
will see new efforts by the Soviets--both directly and through a host of
fronts and surrogates--to enshrine the ANC as the "sole legitimate
spokesman for South Africa." Such moves will likely take place in the
UN, OAU, and other regional groupings, and the ANC will continue to be
the beneficiary of major Soviet Bloc media promotion, especially in the
West and the United States. We are already dangerously close to the
point where any black leader or group apart from Mandela and the ANC will
not receive credibility internationally (nor domestically in the US), and
in fact will be successfully tarred by the ANC as a "sellout" or "Uncle
Tom."
�
Fre derick L. Wetteri g
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_SECRET�NOFORT
NIC #05510,85
SUBJECT: South Africa: The Soviet "Legitimate Representative"
Strategy Gaining Momentum
NIO/AF/FLWettering
(b)(3) CIAAct
DISTRIBUTION:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
.4 - ER
1 - SRP
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - D/ALA
1 - D/SOVA
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - NIO/AF
1 - NIO/AF (USSR in Africa file)
1 - NIO/AF Chrono
1 - DDI Registry
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