SOUTH AFRICA: PROSPECTS FOR RAPID AND RADICAL CHANGE--THE DOWNSIDE RISKS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05476250
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: August 15, 1985

Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
15 August 1985
NOTE TO: DCI
DDCI
VC/NIC
NIO/AF
I mentioned to you earlier in the week that
I had commissioned ALA to do an alternative
analysis of developments. in South Africa,
specifically whether and how dramatic change
might occur faster than anyone presently
expects. (S)
NR analysis is attached. I
think it is an excellent, thoughtful essay
that needs serious consideration. Indeed,
some of the points in it perhaps should be
explored more fully in the SNIE. (S)
NR
Robert idj Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
ALA M 85-10084
SECRET Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
pproved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
SECRET
� NOFORN
15 August 1985
� MEMORANDUM
--SUBJECT: South Africa: Prospects for Rapid and Radical
Change--The Downside Risks
As the racial violence in South Africa continues to flare, the need
to take a hard, critical look at conditions for radical change will only
grow. In general, predictions that Pretoria will continue to dictate the
pace of political reform and that nonwhite opposition will not become
strong enough to force an end to white minority rule are based on a number
of broad assumptions:
The current unrest fits into the pattern of episodic violence
that has beset South Africa for decades. Blacks will
eventually run out of steam, and the townships will return--at
least for the short term--to their previous state of uneasy
calm.
� MP
The white authorities are still capable and willing to employ
whatever security measures prove necessary to restore a
semblance of order to the black townships.
White leaders, through a combination of limited political
reforms and the extension of greater economic benefits to urban
blacks, will be able to coopt a sizable black middle class.
These blacks will grudgingly accept whatever system of
political participation the government devises, rejecting
violent protest in order to preserve their economic gains.
This "coopted" black urban middle class will serve as a force
for stability in the townships.
White political leaders have firm "redlines" concerning
political reforms that they will not cross. Because whites
have a clear concept of what they do not want to do, they will
not be pushed by violence and civil disobedience into
initiating hasty reforms that could open the door for real
powersharing with nonwhites at the national level. An increase
in white casualties is one of the few developments that could
erode white resolve.
C P 13 r 1"
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
ALA M 85-10084
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
btl.Kt1
NOFORN
The risk, of course, is that one or more of these key assumptions is
off the mark. To the' extent that these underlying conditions fail to hold
up, the odds increase that South Africa could undergo fundamental change
In the near term.
Challenging the Key Assumptions
While some observers believe that the critical conditions for
fundamental stability in South Africa continue to hold, there is ample
evidence to argue the contrary. Indeed, numerous events suggest that at a
minimum each of the key assumptions underpinning a stability scenario is
In doubt. In some cases, the risk also exists that gaps in our knowledge
have blindsided analysis or allowed us to avoid facing up to major
uncertainties.
The current unrest fits into the pattern of episodic violence that has
beset South Africa for decades. Blacks will eventually run out of steam,
and the townships will return--at least for the short term--to their
previous state of uneasy calm.
The recent nonwhite violence in South Africa differs in many
significant respects from previous periods of unrest, and these
differences could very well mean that the violence will be self-sustaining
and much more difficult to contain. The circumstances surrounding the
violence and the nature of the violence itself are fundamentally different
from Sharpeville in 1960 and Soweto during 1976-77. The greater number of
attacks against black collaborators alone support this conclusion, but
other important distinctions can be drawn.
For the first time in South African history, significant
nonwhite opposition to the regime is occurring during the
tenure of a white government committed to changing the
apartheid system. Regardless of whether or not violence
actually influences government reform policy, nonwhite leaders
perceive that their actions are making a difference. According
to Embassy reporting, such UDF leaders as Alan Boesak believe
they have the government on the run. This perception gives
many blacks a new, concrete reason to continue defying the
government.
Violence is occurring at a time when South Africa is
experiencing its worst economic recession since the institution
of apartheid. Economic problems have always been recognized as
a contributing factor to nonwhite unrest, but not enough
attention has been paid to the severe impact that this economic
downturn has had on blacks. The three-year drought, for
2
crrEirr
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
I
NOFORN
example, has resulted in critical shifts in the black
populatioR. The Consulate in Cape Town reports the black
population in Eastern Cape townships has grown by as much as 30
percent in the past year because of harsh conditions in rural
areas and cutbacks in employment by white farmers. The
addition of unemployed, frustrated blacks to the pool of
already economically hard-hit township residents has
contributed to levels of violence that the English South
African press describes as approaching a state of civil war.
The unrest is occurring at a time when blacks have the majority
buying power in the South African economy. Although many
blacks are unemployed or barely make a living wage, other
blacks involved in the modern economy are able to buy a wide
range of consumer goods. This has significant implications for
the potential efficacy of future black consumer boycotts.
Whereas past boycotts have faltered because blacks eventually
had to break down and buy the necessities of life, today blacks
can cut back on "luxury items" and still hurt the white
economy. As it is, clothing and furniture merchants have been
among the hardest hit in the six-week boycott of white
establishments in the Eastern Cape.
The current unrest is occurring during a period of heightened
International criticism of South Africa and when some nations
have imposed economic sanctions and others are giving sanctions
serious consideration. Blacks know they are playing to an
International audience and that the recent US domestic
criticism of "constructive engagement" is in large part a
reaction to the continuing violence. They have been encouraged
further by such moves as New Zealand's decision to call off its
rugby tour.
The growing black labor union movement is also a new element in
the South African equation, although it has yet to play an
Important role in the current unrest. National labor leaders
have hesitated to become actively involved in politics per se
lest they invite government retribution. This, however, has
not stopped local union leaders from becoming involved in local
political issues, and the national unions have, as they did
last November, again supported calls for work stayaways and
consumer boycotts in the Transvaal. The labor movement is
essentially an untapped resource in the black drive to force
the government to address basic political issues, and national
union leaders probably will become less reticent to use their
power if violence persists. Some labor leaders have national
political aspirations, and they cannot afford to hesitate too
3
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
SECRET
NOFORN
long lest they be perceived as not having contributed to the
winning of black political rights.
&IMAM
The current unrest is also marked by the existence of more
vocal national black leaders who are making explicit demands of
the government. Today black leaders across the ideological
spectrum are demanding specific responses from the white
government. Bishop Tutu, Alan Boesak, Chief Buthelezi, and
even "moderate" groups--such as the black Chamber of Commerce
and the association of black township mayors are making the
same demands--free Nelson Mandela unconditionally, hold a
national convention where blacks and whites together agree upon
political reforms, and eliminate the last vestiges of
apartheid. In addition, many of these black leaders are
seemingly "untouchable"; despite South African claims that they
are immune to external pressure, the legitimacy afforded by the
international community to men such as Tutu, Boesak, and
Buthelezi has almost certainly made the government think twice
about acting against them.
A number of other issues also call into question the assumption that
the current unrest is just part of an ongoing pattern. One cannot dismiss
the idea that the current situation is marked by much higher levels of
hatred and fearlessness among blacks. This is a critical factor in
assessing the ability of blacks to sustain violence and civil
disobedience, but also the most difficult to measure. We have assumed
that most blacks--the silent majority--are essentially passive, want a
restoration of order, and are unwilling to risk material benefits for
ephemeral political gains. Much of this analysis is based on precedent
and on polls that continue to indicate blacks favor peaceful change and
place greater emphasis on economic issues.
Can we really bank on the reliability of such polls? Would polls in
prevolutionary Iran or Nicaragua have indicated that their citizens
welcomed violence and were disinterested in pocketbook issues?
the
ability of our mission officers to operate in black townships is severely
limited. Much of the reporting indicating unprecedented levels of black
frustration is anecdotal, but it should not be lightly dismissed. It is
the only recent evidence we have. In addition, the assumption that the
majority of blacks must favor violence if it is to be effective or that
black groups must be unified is historically flawed; most revolutionary
situations are driven by sizable and dedicated minorities.
Finally, we have already written extensively about the generational
gap in the townships; black youths are much more radical than their
elders, they are unemployed, they are captives of a dismal educational
system. The majority of blacks in South Africa are under the age of 18.
4
Approved for Cl' D r
Release:2018706/01 C05476250
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
LKI
NOFORN
Unlike earlier periods of violence when large numbers of militants left to
join ANC training outside the country, these youths will remain in the
townships because ANC activities in neighboring countries have been
effectively curtailed. If current levels of unrest persist, black youths
will grow up in an environment where violence is the norm. Once large
'segments of a community accept the inevitability of violence, as happened
in Lebanon, it becomes much more difficult to restore order.
The white authorities are still capable and willing to employ whatever
security measures prove necessary to restore a semblance of order to the
black townships.
The white authorities to date have been unable to restore order in
the black townships, and whites may be less willing to resort to
systematic brutality to contain black violence.
Whites, in fact, may already be hesitating to crack heads.
Press and Consulate reporting on the violence in the Eastern
Cape points out that during the months preceding the
declaration of the state of emergency, the South African
security forces often adopted a hands off attitude toward much
of the unrest, to the extent that some black militants were
openly boasting of Nliberatedu townships where the police dared
not enter. The police, however, argue that they were
judiciously avoiding knee-jerk reactions that might only
exacerbate tensions. Similarly, the police delayed entering
the black townships around Durban during the recent violence
there. Some attributed the delay to clever tactical
machinations on the part of the Afrikaner-led police force; the
press, however, described confused security officials uncertain
of what their next step should be. The truth in both instances
Is probably somewhere in between. What is important, however,
is that blacks may perceive that the government is not as quick
to respond as it once was, and that they will have at least
some opportunity to act with relative impunity.
The verdict is not yet in on whether the state of emergency has
worked to lessen violence in the affected townships and it has
certainly not reduced tensions. During the four weeks that the
emergency has been in effect, there have been approximately 110
deaths from black violence. Approximately 60 were in the
Durban townships, leaving some 50 deaths, many of which
presumably occurred in the townships affected by the
proclamation. Many of the reports concerning the efficacy of
the state of emergency have come from the police, and South
African newspapers question whether official accounts are
completely accurate. Most important, however, the state of
5
crrprr
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
NOFORN
emergency can only be judged effective if violence does not
resume in/townships once the heavy army and police presence is
lifted.
South Africa's security forces are neither omniscient nor
omnipotent. Much is made of the police's informer network; the
South Africans always know who the troublemakers are. Yet,
sketchy reporting indicates that the constant attacks against
black collaborators have taken their toll on the informer
network, particularly in the Eastern Cape townships. South
African journalists have told our Consulate that the police
force is the least informed player involved in the Eastern Cape
violence. Much is also made of the size of the South African
security forces; some 600,000 South Africans participate at
least part-time in security or defense-related activities.
Only about 150,000 of this number are full-time policemen or
active-duty members of the military, however; the remainder are
reserves and irregulars who are inexperienced in dealing with
black unrest and probably would only exacerbate tensions. In
addition, there are already indications that the regular
security forces are spread thin by the demand of the current
unrest. The press has speculated that yet another reason why
police responded slowly to the Durban riots is that the
authorities had to scramble to assemble a large enough task
force. Moreover, the Financial Times of London recently quoted
Anglo-American mining officials who believe that the government
would have to order a large-scale mobilization of army reserves
to quell any significant disturbances during the black miners'
strike planned for later this month--a move, the officials
added, which would be widely interpreted as proof that South
Africa's unrest was increasingly out of control.
About one half of the South African police force is nonwhite,
mostly black. Black officers have to date been loyal to the
white authorities, even though they, their families, and
properties have been the targets of attacks by militant
blacks. Some families of black officers have even been forced
to move from the townships to police compounds.
We thus probably will not have advanced warning of a
change in the black policemen's commitment to defend white
minority rule. This gap gains added significance in light of
the government's plan for black townships to establish local
police units that, in principle, would relieve the South
African police of some of the responsibility for containing
unrest. However, given the blacks rejection of Pretoria's
6
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
Ar FA L. I
NOFORN
black town touncil system (29 of 32 councils are now defunct),
there is little reason to believe the township's residents
would accept the authority of such a police force.
A decision by Pretoria to repress brutally black opposition
would almost certainly set back government attempts to coax
nonwhites into accepting its reform strategy. If we argue that
Botha and his allies are looking for a longterm solution to the
country's political problems, then we have to be more specific
about how this longterm commitment militates against the
imposition of drastic and counterproductive shortterm
measures. There are several reasons why this reform government
may hesitate to be brutal: 1) The last thing Pretoria wants
now are more black "martyrs", dead or imprisoned. President
Botha needs to keep domestic and international attention
focused on the nonwhite moderates; 2) The recent divisions in
the Afrikaner polity has significantly reduced the number of
archconservatives in the National Party--any move to use
extreme force is likely to prompt sharp debate within a cabinet
more evenly divided between moderates and conservatives. In
addition, some whites who would approve of drastic measures no
longer vote for the National Party and resorting to brutality
probably would cost the party the support of some moderate
English-speakers; 3) Botha or his successor face elections in
1989 and they probably believe that their prospects would
suffer if whites perceived the National Party to be confused
about its policy direction.
Finally, by working on the assumption that Pretoria will always act
forcefully if violence poses a more serious threat to white political
control, we run the risk of falling into some analytical traps.
Specifically, we will always be tempted to assume that the reason whites
have not acted is because the violence is not that serious, not because
the whites may be equivocating.
White leaders, through a combination of limited political reforms and the
extension of greater economic benefits to urban blacks, will be able to
coopt a sizable black middle class. These blacks will grudgingly accept
whatever system of political participation the government devises,
rejecting violent protest in order to preserve their economic gains. This
"coopted" black urban middle class will serve as a force for stability in
the townships.
There are a growing number of indications that whites are unlikely to
coopt a significant number of urban blacks through limited political
reforms.
7
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
� Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
J n L. I
NOFORN
Most blacks will not accept changes dictated from above. They
demand participation in some form of national decisionmaking
body that will formulate a new political dispensation for South
Africa. During the last ten years, the overwhelming majority
of politically-involved blacks have rejected such
government-imposed changes; the growing militancy of township
blacks and the uniformity in demands made by blacks across the
ideological spectrum strongly suggest that they are not
prepared to compromise on this fundamental issue.
The black middle class is likely to become increasingly
frustrated at the lack of improvement in their economic
position. They probably will also become more pessimistic
about their children's future, a concern that will add to their
desire for long-term solutons to their economic, political, and
social problems.
Given South Africa's mediocre economic prospects, unemployed
and underemployed blacks are likely to constitute an
Increasingly larger proportion of the urban black population.
They will contribute to the endemic instability of black
townships. As things now stand, South African economic growth
during the remainder of the decade probably will lag behind the
levels necessary to finance meaningful increases in social
spending for the majority of blacks or to provide new jobs for
the urban black population.
Even if some members of the black middle class do prosper, they will
almost certainly not abandon their political aspirations. Many of their
remaining economic goals, in fact, will be attainable only if blacks can
Influence government policy decisions. Prosperous blacks will want to
live in better areas closer to their work, they will want equal education
for their children, and improved public services. The black middle class
realizes that a more equitable distribution of South Africa's limited
economic resources will occur only when blacks have an effective political
voice at the national level.
White political leaders have firm 'redlines� concerning political reforms
that they will not cross. Because whites have a clear concept of what
they do not want to do, they will not be pushed by violence and civil
disobedience into initiating hasty reforms that could open the door for
real powersharing with nonwhites at the national level. An increase in
white casualties is one of the few developments that could erode white
resolve.
White political "redlines" have shifted significantly in the last ten
years, and we cannot assume that this process has ended. White attitudes
8
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
IN L. I
NOFORN
have changed dramatically even in the absence of black violence against
whites.
MI. MS
Other evidence suggests, however, that South African whites
increasingly appreciate the need for fundamental changes in the
apartheid system that would require whites to share national
political power with blacks. Business leaders have continued
to push for more rapid reform. One significant reflection of
Afrikaner political attitudes is the editorial slant taken by
prominent Afrikaans language newspapers. During the Soweto
riots, the Afrikaans press, although it recognized the need for
some change in the apartheid system, stressed the need for
moderate and cautious political reforms. Today, many Afrikaans
newspapers are urging the government to take political risks,
arguing that whites--for their own self interest--must make a
good faith effort to address black political demands. Some
influential Afrikaner political leaders share this view. Our
Embassy recently reported an influential Afrikaner journalist's
account of a conversation with Minister of Cooperation and
Development Viljoen, who is touted as a likely succesor to
Botha. According to the journalist, Viljoen sees his mission
not as one of retaining Afrikaner political domination, but of
preserving Afrikaner culture and society. The journalist
maintains that Afrikaner leaders are divided between those who
believe political dominance must be maintained and those who
argue that preservation of the Afrikaner volk will require the
surrender of significant political power.
This evolution of white political attitudes has occurred in the
absence of any significant black attacks against whites. We
have argued in the past that apartheid's economic
contradictions and the psychological impact of the Soweto riots
led whites to implement reforms that would have been
unthinkable five years ago. Given this, it is logical to
conclude that the current unrest and the refusal of blacks to
accept government-imposed limits on reform will again force the
white leadership to redefine the limits of acceptable change.
Scenarios for Change
If the key assumptions are flawed, the risk of unexpected and perhaps
sudden change only increases. Indeed, a case can be made that the white
government in South Africa has already lost the political initiative. For
9
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
btl,Kt1
NOFORN
gradual reform to work, the government must be able to manipulate black
attitudes. The widespread unrest during the past year and the refusal of
even moderate blacks to cooperate with the government reflect Pretoria's
failure.
- If this is the case, the government during the next three to four
years will confront persistent violence and growing international
--Criticism. It will react to these develoments by making vague promises of
more fundamental reform, but these promises and whatever policies Pretoria
does implement will not satisfy either audience.
In sum, Pretoria will be under strong and growing pressure to abandon
its program of incremental reform and choose between its remaining two
options: gamble that relying on repressive security measures can preserve
white power over the long run or negotiating a political solution
acceptable to legitimate black leaders. We believe that whites will weigh
the potential costs of failure versus success and eventually conclude that
political compromise is the only viable long-term option. Given the
current pace of unrest, it would not be unreasonable to see South Africa
with a black majority government by 1995.
Faster Change?
If black violence and civil disobedience activities intensify during
the next two years, the white leadership could be forced to abandon its
policy of incremental reforms even sooner. A major psychological shift
will have occurred in white attitudes.
Nature of Black Opposition. Underiiiis scenario, all forms of black
protest activity will increase dramatically. Violence in black urban
areas will make many townships ungovernable, particularly those in the
Eastern Cape. As the number of townships rocked by turmoil rises, the
resources of the security forces would be increasingly strained. Pretoria
would have to rely on relatively inexperienced personnel--a development
that would raise the risk of unintentional overreaction in delicate
situations. Given this, attempts by security forces to restore order will
have only a short-term effect, and the government will probably be forced
to concentrate its resources on maintaining a modicum of stability in key
black areas such as Soweto.
Black collaborators will continue to be targetted, and there will be
an increase in attacks against Colored and Asian politicians who have
supported the tricameral parliament. White civilian casualties will begin
to increase.
The period will also be characterized by a more effective use of
black economic leverage. To lessen the impact of consumer boycotts on
10
crr Approved for for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
� Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
NOFORN
blacks, opposition leaders could opt to alternate the areas targetted.
Labor strikes will become more frequent and be more closely connected to
political events.
Government attempts to disrupt opposition activities by arresting
black leaders will become increasingly ineffective. Blacks will be less
willing to act as informants for the security services, making it more
--difficult for whites to identify key black activists. Small community
organizations, operating under general guidelines from national black
groups such as the UDF, will have direct responsibility for coordinating
opposition activities.
Political Pressures on the Government. If the pace of violence
accelerates, political pressures will build within the white
establishment. National Party politicians will be increasingly concerned
about the impact the continued unrest will have on the 1989 elections.
White casualties and dissatisfaction with the government's inability to
restore order will boost the appeal of rightwing parties among rural and
blue-collar Afrikaners. At the same time, moderate English-speakers will
be dissatisfied with the government's failure to implement successful
reforms, and they may be tempted to vote for the Progressive Federal Party
(PFP) or not vote at all. National Party strategists will be concerned
that their numbers in parliament could be so diminished that they might
have to form a tacit coalition with the PFP. PFP leaders will be reading
the same polls, and they will be prepared to exact political concessions
from the National Party in return for their parliamentary support.
White journalists, academics, and businesspeople will be constantly
criticizing Pretoria's half-hearted reform efforts. In addition, local
white leaders, alarmed at the continued effectiveness of black consumer
boycotts in their communities, will be seeking to reach accommodations
with local black leaders. Many black demands, however, will only be
addressable at the national level.
International Pressures. Because of the continuing unrest, most
foreign governments will have adopted some form of economic sanctions
against South Africa. Even if a few of Pretoria's key Western friends
continue to argue against the imposition of full economic sanctions, they
will likely warn that continued Western support is contingent upon the
government agreeing to black demands for a national political forum to
discuss fundamental political reforms.
The externally-based insurgencies of the ANC and PAC will be only
marginally more effective. Most black activists inside South Africa,
however, will continue to associate their goals with those of the ANC, and
continue to demand the release of Nelson Mandela.
11
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
� Approved for Release: .2018/06/01 C05476250
NOFORN
A Crisis Occurs. 'These factors alone are unlikely to force white
political leaders to cross the final "redline" during the next two years
and agree to consult.with blacks about real powersharing at the national
level. The stage will have been set, however, for a dramatic event that
precipitously breaks white resolve. While any number of possibilities
could cause a major psychological jolt, some key contenders include:
The assassination of a prominent black leader, such as Bishop
Tutu in which the security services are somehow implicated.
Black violence quickly would escalate to even higher levels.
South Africa's Western supporters could no longer fend off the
calls for mandatory and comprehensive international economic
sanctions.
A violent confrontation between blacks and security forces that
results in unprecedented carnage that is shocking even by South
African standards. Again, violence escalates and economic
sanctions appear inevitable.
Moderate Colored and Asian politicians, alarmed at the
government's inability to protect them from black attacks and
convinced that the white regime has lost the political
initiative, threaten to leave the tricameral parliament unless
Pretoria moves immediately to meet black political demands.
Regardless of the spark that sets off the explosion, the white
political leadership will jump over intermediate reform steps and move
directly to a multiracial national political convention. In such a
setting, nonwhite leaders would likely insist that Nelson Mandela be
released as a precondition to their attendance or make that their first
nonnegotiable demand at the bargaining table.
Once they have made the jump, white leaders will be in a weak
position to deflect nonwhite demands for maximum concessions. Nelson
Mandela and other imprisoned leaders almost certainly would be released
early on in the process. At a minimum, nonwhite leaders will demand and
obtain white agreement to a government scheme that affords Coloreds,
Asians, and blacks majority rule.
Such a rapid denouement, however, will still leave South Africa
politically unstable.
ammo
Divisions among nonwhites, exacerbated by several years of
violence, will be difficult to bridge. Unequal distribution of
South Africa's economic resources, not just between whites and
nonwhites but between urban and homeland blacks, will persist.
12
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250
4 NOFORN
-- Many whites,are likely to leave South Africa, further
exacerbating the country's economic problems. Other
reactionary whites will resort to violence in an attempt to
disrupt the transition to black rule.
-- The Soviet Union, using the ANC as its entree, will undoubtedly
work hard to gain influence with the new government.
- Rapid changes in the political landscape of South Africa would also
alter a broad range of international considerations. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union would see numerous opportunities for new
leverage as well as encounter unexpected problems in their relations with
southern Africa. A political change in Pretoria would alter the dynamics
of events in Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, and most of the front-line
states. As existing client-patron relations are challenged, a new set of
allegiances and bilateral ties will have to be forged.
THIS MEMORANDUM IS SECRET NOFORN
IN ITS ENTIRETY
13
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05476250