SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05476895
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-02388
• Publication Date: September 17, 2001

Approved for Release: 2019/02/15 C05476895
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The SEIB must be returned to CIA within 5 working days
Monday, 17 September 2001
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Indications of Possible Iraqi Links to Attacks
Several reports since last Tuesday suggest a possible Iraqi role in the
attacks. These reports do not provide a compelling case that Iraq planned
and perpetrated the attacks, but they do raise questions regarding Iraq's
ties to one of the hijackers and possible Iraqi advance knowledge of the
plot.
� In the most direct indication of a potential official Iraqi link, a
foreign government service last Thursday reported that the local
Iraqi Intelligence Service chief met in mid-April with suspected
American Airlines Flight 11 hijacker Mohammad Atta. The
foreign government subsequently expelled the Iraqi for his
involvement in an alleged plot to attack the Prague Radio Free
Europe facility.
Other reports raise concern because they mention buildings that were
struck or they imply foreknowledge of the event, although all of these
reports came after the attacks.
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17 September 2001
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Ties to Bin Ladin?
A mutual antipathy toward the US suggests that a marriage of convenience
between Saddam and Usama Bin Ladin on terrorism is possible, if unlikely,
as the two have deep ideological disagreements.,
Bin Ladin and Saddam established
a relationship in the early to mid4990s, brokered by Sudan.
� Iraq's former Ambassador to Turkey may have facilitated meetings
between Baghdad and Bin Ladin,
Afghanistan
safehaven to Bin Ladin.
Saddam's Political Calculations
Discovery of Baghdad's involvement in the attacks would set back all of
the progress it has made in undermining UN sanctions and reintegrating
Iraq into the region. Saddam's internal situation is secure, and he is making
progress in ending his international isolation.
� He successfully thwarted US and British efforts in the Security
Council in July to pass a revised sanctions regime, and he is
gearing up for the next round in November by both pledging
economic incentives and threatening Council supporters and
neighbors.
Saddam sent a trusted envoy to
o make a preliminary offer of
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Approved for Release: 2019/02/15 C05476895