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pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 NOFORN- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Fifty Years of the CIA Editors Michael Warner and Scott A. Koch Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 (b)(3) / Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 NOFORAV 00084 (b)(3) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Fifty Years of the CIA Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C0550 0084 Approved for Release: 2018/66/27 C055 NOFOR 00084 (b)(3) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Fifty Years of the CIA Editors Michael Warner and Scott A. Koch History Staff Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency 1998 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 National Security Unauthorized Disclosure Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions This publication contains copyrighted photographs that may not be further reproduced or disseminated without permission. All material on this page is Unclassified. pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 3VLG-U NOFORN- 00084 (b)(3) Contents Foreword (u) Introduction (u) Notes on the Essays and Contributors Chronological List of Directors of Central Intelligence The Creation of the Central Intelligence Group (u) Michael Warner The Office of Reports and Estimates (u) Woodrow J. Kuhns The First Star: Douglas Mackiernan in China and Tibet (c) Nicholas Dujmovic CIA and TPAjAX: The Tension Between Analysis and Operations (s) Scott A. Koch Closing the Missile Gap (u) Leonard F. Parkinson and Logan H. Potter The Construction of the Original Headquarters Building (u) Peyton F. Anderson and Jack B. Pfeiffer John A. McCone, Bud Wheelon, and the Wizards of Langley: The Creation of the DS&T and the Battle Over Spy Satellites (u) David Robarge The Demise of the House of Ngo (u) Thomas L. Ahern, Jr. The Shock of the Tet Offensive (u) Harold P. Ford vii xiii (u) xvii 1 19 45 75 99 111 133 147 179 209 Hunting the Rogue Elephant: The Pike Committee Investigation (U) 233 Gerald K. Haines (b)(3) ill Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 NeFORN Inside Moscow (U) 255 271 Hard Targets: Reviewing the Attacks on CIA's Gulf War Analysis (u) 299 Michael Warner iv pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/616/27 C055 NOFORN 00084 (b)(3) Foreword (u) This volume continues the effort of the CIA History Staff and the Center for the Study of Intelligence to make the history of the Central Intelligence Agency more accessible and understandable to Agency employees and other members of the Intelligence Community. The ed- itors, both members of the History Staff, have compiled the first collec- tion of classified, scholarly essays on CIA history to be published in book form. Scholars and journalists have tried to interpret the Agency's past without having access to its records. Some Agency officers with such access have also set down their reflections or penned chronicles of various offices and operations. This collection combines the best of both approaches; its essays meet academic standards of historical re- search and presentation, and were prepared from relevant CIA and US Government records. (u) The editors have attempted to present a balanced picture of the Agency's functions and its performance in carrying out its essential missions. Successes and setbacks are described here to help the reader gain an appreciation of the full historical context in which the Agency aided the United States in winning the Cold War and then in adapting to new and uncertain international realities. The volume includes essays on the work of all four directorates and the major functional tasks of the Agency as a whole, spanning the five decades of the Agency's existence (but naturally weighted toward the earlier years because of the avail- ability or sensitivity of sources). They touch on the Agency's presence in almost all of the main geographic areas of its work. Many of the es- says show how the Agency's components worked alongside their coun- terparts in various parts of the Intelligence Community, the military, and other agencies of the US Government. The editors have also taken pains to show the many ways in which CIA has served the interests of and interacted with policymakers in the White House and Congress. (u) The editors have included an explanatory introduction that ties the various essays together. It should be read carefully, as it can stand alone as a worthy contribution to the interpretive literature on the Agency's past. The introduction explains the dynamic tension between -yht4- Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C0550 0084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 AFORN Foreword (b)(3) the Agency's several missions, from analysis to collection to covert op- erations, and highlights the ways in which the fourteen historical arti- cles in this volume illustrate the problems and the advantages that have historically resulted from the combination of such varied responsibili- ties and capabilities in a single intelligence organization. (u) Four of the essays have been previously published; all the rest are being made available to a wider readership for the first time here. Most were adapted from manuscript histories at various stages of preparation under the supervision of the CIA History Staff. Two articles were ex- cerpted from limited-circulation histories prepared in the 1970s and now held in the History Staff's files. A note on the contributors and es- says, which follows the introduction, explains the origin of each essay and summarizes the backgrounds and Agency careers of the respective authors. (u) Gerald K. Haines Chief Historian October 1997 (This foreword is Unclassified.) ��14et- vi pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 00084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 NOFORN Introduction (u) Almost since its founding, the Central Intelligence Agency has at- tempted to preserve and interpret its past. As part of this effort, Agency officers and historians drafted several hundred historical studies of CIA offices and operations. Although concentrating on clandestine activi- ties, those studies touch on every major field of Agency work. Most of these studies have tended to concentrate on the accomplishments of Agency leaders, on specific projects, or on individual offices. These early histories preserve a wealth of detail about CIA's origins and de- velopment, but they offer comparatively few insights into the function- ing of the CIA as a whole and the Agency's role and place in the evolving intelligence, foreign policy, and security structures of the US Government. (Li) In recent years the Agency has sponsored a different way of study- ing its past. Using newly available files and benefiting from wider de- classification of US and foreign records, scholars employed by CIA have adopted a more comprehensive approach, looking at Agency lead- ers, activities, and offices as part of US Government policies and oper- ations and of America's role in the Cold War. The new approach examines what the Agency did or did not accomplish in its historical setting, instead of merely chronicling the activities of specific individu- als or offices. (u) What these new studies have shown is a tension between the Agency's major missions of strategic warning and clandestine activi- ties. For half a century the Central intelligence Agency has been the na- tion's primary agency for both missions. Strategic warning entails the concentration of information available to the US Government so that the discrete bits of publicly and covertly acquired data can be assessed for whatever they might reveal of an enemy's or potential adversary's intentions and capabilities. Clandestine activities are simply those ac- tions that the US Government wishes, for reasons of national security, to undertake in ways that conceal an official US hand. America, and ev- ery other nation, has always had some requirement and capability to vii S74.ct (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 NOtORN Introduction perform both missions. Before World War II, however, both functions were performed in the breach by the president himself and a few trusted advisers, with no controlling authority short of the Oval Office. (u) The relationship between these two missions has formed the cen- tral dynamic in the Agency's unfolding history. No law of nature or in- telligence practice dictates the same organization provide strategic warning and manage covert activities, and these two missions have not always fitted together comfortably, as several essays in this volume demonstrate. They are not mutually exclusive activities, but it takes a conscious effort to make them work harmoniously. Left to their own, they often go their separate ways. Nevertheless, conducting both mis- sions from under the same organizational roof has occasionally given rise to opportunities and inspirations that might otherwise have been missed. (u) These two missions actually came together in the same agency as much by accident as by design. The Agency began its statutory exist- ence in September 1947, but this event in a sense merely ratified a series of decisions taken after the end of the Second World War. When Presi- dent Truman dissolved the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in September 1945, he had no clear idea how to proceed in building the modern peacetime intelligence structure that he and his advisers be- lieved they needed in an atomic age. Over the course of 1946, the White House created a small staff�the Central Intelligence Group (CIG)�to collate intelligence reports from the armed services and civilian depart- ments, and allowed CIG to absorb the espionage and counterintelli- gence offices left over from OSS (which had been preserved in the War Department). Initially these disparate components in the new CIG shared little in common except an interest in foreign secrets and a sense that both strategic warning and clandestine activities abroad required "central" coordination. (u) Under a series of capable Directors of Central Intelligence, CIG and the Truman administration came to realize how strategic warning and clandestine activities complemented one another. This realization was codified in the National Security Act of 1947, which renamed CIG the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and gave it a statutory basis. The new CIA's performance in the worsening Cold War in Europe and East Asia would soon prove the flexibility and strength of the government's new intelligence arm. (u) SVrct viii pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Introduction Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 00084 (b)(3) President Truman's first mission for the Agency was to collate and analyze the pile of cables and reports that daily filled his inbox. Most of official Washington remembered all too vividly the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and the President and many of his aides believed (with some justification) that that disaster could have been averted if the var- ious departments had simply shared their intelligence. This view of in- telligence analysis had to be modified when it encountered everyday reality. Woodrow Kuhns's essay on the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE)�CIA's first analytic arm�explains how the new office spent its five-year existence interpreting the intelligence pouring into Wash- ington. That was no easy task. The capability itself had to be built al- most from the ground up (in part because the OSS' s pioneering Research and Analysis Branch had been disbanded after the war), po- tential analysts were scarce, and the sources available to CIA were of- ten, for various reasons, lacking. Dr. Kuhns shows how ORE, before DCI Walter Bedell Smith replaced it with a new Directorate of Intelli- gence, nonetheless built a credible analytic record, particularly in divin- ing Stalin's unwillingness to risk war to secure Soviet ambitions in Europe and Asia. (u) The Cold War also placed new demands on CIA's clandestine ser- vices. Nicholas Dujmovic separately illustrate the Agency's attempts under very different conditions to gather intelli- gence on the growing Communist threat. In Western China, Douglas Mackiernan reported on the deteriorating situation and opened contacts with anti-Communist forces before tragically losing his life in April 1950 the first CIA officer to die in the line of duty Covert action for a time became perhaps the Agency's preeminent mission during the Korean war and throughout the tenure of DCI Allen Dulles (1953-61). As the ideological battlelines stabilized in Europe and the Korean war ended, the main stage of superpower contention began shifting to developing nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, ix (b 3) )(3) )(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 pproved for Release: _2018/06/27 C05500084 N1FoRN Bold CIA operations convinced President Eisenhower and Agency leaders that covert action offered a cheap, effective, and safe means of reversing Communist gains in what would come to be called the Third World. One of those operations, TPAJAX, is known to scholars and the public, but Scott Koch reveals important details of the project. (s) Technological advances during the 1950s for the first time permit- ted Agency officers to surmount the Soviet Union's security systems and collect accurate information on deployments and capabilities. Sovi- et deception measures combined with incomplete intelligence, howev- er, to convince many US Government officials that the USSR was outstripping the United States in the production of jet bombers and long-range missiles. This faulty intelligence produced the "bomber gap" and "missile gap" controversies. The missile gap in particular loomed large after the Soviets' 1957 launch of the Sputnik satellites, and even became an issue in the 1960 presidential campaign. According to Leonard Parkinson and Logan Potter, hard analytical labor using a variety sources�from human agents to manned reconnaissance aircraft to the first imagery satellites�proved the missile gap illusory. Accurate data from these sources about the scope and pace of Soviet missile de- ployments may well have saved billions of dollars. From these sources President Kennedy soon received Intelligence Community information and assessments on the strategic balance that would prove invaluable a year later as he sought a peaceful solution to the Cuban Missile Crisis� the closest the superpowers ever came to nuclear war. (u) The growing importance of satellites and other technological means prompted DCI John McCone to reorganize and enhance the Agency's scientific capabilities in the early 1960s. David Robarge shows how McCone ultimately recruited a brilliant young physicist, Al- bert (Bud) Wheelon, to run the new Directorate of Science and Technol- ogy (DST). Under Wheelon's leadership, the Directorate during the 1960s played a major role in the National Reconnaissance Program and the development of new collection technologies. Although full consol- idation of Agency scientific and technical functions would not take place until the early 1970s, the DST took primary responsibility for col- lecting information vital to the Agency's strategic warning mission. (c) The conflict in Vietnam consumed much of CIA's operational and analytic energies in the 1960s. Tom Ahern's description of the plots against President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam in 1963 demon- strates the importance that CIA's Saigon station played in the direction of the war�and the importance that an individual case officer could �sei�et- x pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Introduction Introduction Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 NOFORN 00084 (b)(3) suddenly assume in the deliberations in Washington. Harold P. Ford's evaluation of the Intelligence Community's analysis of the warning in- dicators before the Communists' 1968 Tet offensive shows again how hard it has been for analysts to anticipate sudden shifts in an opponent's strategy. Some CIA and Community officers read the signs and predict- ed an attack, but the uncertain evidence and the debates among ana- lysts�and policymakers themselves�prevented a clear warning from reaching the White House and commanders in the field. (u) The nationwide debates over the Vietnam war fractured the politi- cal consensus that had long underlain bipartisan support for a strongly anti-Communist foreign policy and an activist Central Intelligence Agency. The Watergate scandal in the mid-1970s�itself partly a prod- uct of President Nixon's response to criticism over Vietnam�briefly threatened to engulf the Agency. Revelations emerging in conjunction with Watergate and allegations of CIA wrongdoing prompted far- reaching Congressional probes of CIA and the entire Intelligence Community. Gerald Haines examines one of the most important of these investigations, led by Representative Otis Pike of New York. The Pike Committee investigation is not as well-known today as Senator Frank Church's Select Committee, but Dr. Haines shows that the House's ef- fort was, despite its ultimate failure, actually the more insightful of the two probes. As such it heralded a new era of Congressional oversight for CIA, and a new legal climate for Agency operations. (u) The revival of Cold War tensions after the Soviet invasion of Af- ghanistan in 1979 helped to refocus CIA efforts on "the main enemy." Under the Reagan administration, the Agency once a ain launched si nificant covert action programs on four continents xi Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 . pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 NIFORN Introduction With the end of the Cold War in early 1990s, CIA found itself fac- ing new challenges. Ironically, some of the problems analysts and oper- ators faced in this new era look much like those confronting their predecessors two generations earlier. Michael Warner's essay on Agen- cy analysis of Iraqi intentions and capabilities in the Gulf war argues that predicting sudden, dramatic shifts in opposition strategy is still as difficult as it had been in 1941 or 1968. Technological and political changes, however, have added new wrinkles to CIA' s analytical mis- sion. Dr. Warner explains that "smart weapons" and improved national reconnaissance capabilities opened new means of support to American military forces in the field, while Congress's growing role as a consum- er of finished intelligence brought continued questions as well as oppor- tunities for the Agency. (C) Throughout its five decades of operation, the Agency's dedicated and sometimes gifted personnel have labored in strange and even dan- gerous conditions all over the world. Sacrifices were also made by employees who labored in safe but nevertheless cramped and uncomfort- able temporary quarters scattered around downtown Washington during the Agency's early years, until the opening of a modern headquarters compound in Langley, Virginia, in September 1961. Peyton Anderson and Jack Pfeiffer explain how the Original Headquarters Building was built, and in the process they explain how and why much of the physical environment familiar to so many Agency veterans came to be. Their essay chronicles, in particular, the enormous contributions of the Direc- torate of Support (now the Directorate of Administration), and especially of its longtime chief, Col. Lawrence K. White. (u) Few government departments so quickly have the opportunity to assess objectively how well they have performed their missions. The end of the Cold War provided just such a moment for the Central Intel- ligence Agency when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1997. Viewed from the present, the CIA made a palpable difference in bringing about the end of the Soviet empire. The Cold War was in many ways an intelli- gence struggle, drawing upon the Agency's expertise in foreign collec- tion, analysis, covert action, counterintelligence, and technological innovation. CIA did not win every confrontation, or every battle, but it won often enough. The awkward fit between CIA' s primary missions� strategic warning and clandestine operations abroad�sometimes caused problems. That same tension, however, also gave rise to inspira- tions and innovations that helped to provide the ultimate margin of vic- tory in the Cold War. (u) 6,4 et xii pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 00084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 Lfljftfl S..A. NOFORN Notes on the Essays and Contributors (b)(3) The Office of Reports and Estimates (U) Woodrow J. Kuhns of the CIA History Staff wrote this article as the Preface for his collection of declassified documents, Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years, published by CIA in 1997. A graduate of Kutztown State College in Pennsylvania, Dr. Kuhns received his M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Pennsylvania State University. Before joining the Center for the Study of Intelligence in 1996, he was an analyst in the Directorate of Intelligence. He also served for three years as CIA's representative on the faculty of the Naval War College. (u) The First Star: Charles Mackiernan in China and Tibet (C) This account of the first CIA officer to die in the line of duty developed from a speech that Acting DCI George Tenet delivered at the annual ceremony at the Memorial Wall in the lobby of the Original Headquarters Building in May 1997. Nicholas Dujmovic received his Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Di- plomacy at Tufts University. Prior to coming to CIA in 1990, he served as a US Coast Guard officer and an instructor at the US Coast Guard Academy. He began his CIA career as a Directorate of Intelligence ana- lyst Dr. Dujmovic has also served on rotation to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and was then-ADCI Tenet's speechwriter. He is currently an editor for the President's Daily Brief (C) (b (b)( )(3) 3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p roved for Release: _2018/06/27 C05500084 IGORN Closing the Missile Gap (u) This article was adapted from "The Development of Strategic Research at CIA, 1947-1967," Office of Strategic Research (OSR-2), May 1974. A copy of the original history, which focuses on the Office of Research and Reports' s (ORR) role in resolving the issue, resides in History Staff files. Leonard F. Parkinson was born in 1937 in Kansas. After graduating from the University of Kansas, he joined CIA's For- eign Broadcast Information Division. From the mid-1960s he worked as an industrial and economic analyst in the Directorate of Intelligence un- til his resignation in 1977. Logan H. Potter was born in 1920 in Seattle. He graduated from the US Merchant Marine Academy in 1944. Mr. Pot- ter served as a junior officer in the US Navy at the end of World War II, attended Georgetown University, and held several jobs with the US Government before joining ORR in 1952. He worked as an industrial and economic analyst with the Directorate of Intelligence until his re- tirement in 1980. (u) Notes The Construction of the Original Headquarters Building (u) This essay was adapted from a classified history by Peyton F. Anderson and Jack B. Pfeiffer, "Planning and Construction of the Agency Headquarters Building, January 1946�July 1963" (DCI-6), June 1973, in CIA History Staff files. Peyton F. Anderson was born in Richmond, Virginia in 1921. He served as a sergeant in the US Army Air Forces in World War II, and worked with the Veterans Administra- tion after the war. Mr. Anderson joined the Agency in 1949. A longtime Office of Logistics officer, he was assigned to the Building Planning Staff during the construction of the Original Headquarters Building. After serving two tours supporting the CIA station in Saigon, Mr. Anderson resigned from CIA in 1973, and died in 1976. Jack B. Pfeiffer was born in 1920 in Peoria, Illinois. He earned a doctorate in History at the University of Chicago, and worked for several years as an intelligence analyst for the US Air Force before joining CIA' s Office of Research and Reports in 1955. He transferred to the Historical Staff of the Office of the DCI in 1969; his chief project there was a multivolume official history of the Bay of Pigs operation. Dr. Pfeiffer resigned from the Agency in 1984, and died in 1997. (u) John McCone, Bud Wheelon, and the Wizards of Langley: The Creation of the DS&T and the Battle Over Spy Satellites (u) This article is part of a study-in-progress of John McCone's tenure as Director of Central Intelligence. David Robarge received bachelor's and master's degrees from George Mason University and a doctorate in history xiv , pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 00084 Notes Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 NOFOR from Columbia University. He has taught on the adjunct history faculties of both schools. Dr. Robarge was a historian for the Rockefeller Family and a researcher at the Gannett Center for Media Studies before coming to the CIA in 1989. After serving briefly in the Office of Information Resources, he worked as an intelligence analyst in the Counterterrorism Center, the Office of Leadership Analysis, and the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. He joined the History Staff in 1996. (u) The Demise of the House of Ngo (u) This account of the closing episode in the Agency's relationship with the Ngo Dinh Diem government in South Vietnam is adapted from The CIA and the House of Ngo. That volume is the first of three History Staff studies on the CIA role in Vietnam. Drafted for the History Staff by Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., it will be published in 1998. Mr. Ahern was educated at the University of Notre Dame and joined CIA in 1954. He became an officer in the Directorate of Plans in 1956 Mr. Ahern retired from the Agency in 1989. The edi- tors, with Mr. Ahern's cooperation, added material on DCI John A. McCone's role in the US Government's halting encouragement of the coup d' etat against Ngo Dinh Diem. (u) The Shock of the Tet Offensive (u) This account of the performance of US intelligence prior to the enemy's sudden Tet offensive of early 1968 is adapted from Harold P. Ford's CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962- 1968. Drafted on contract for the CIA History Staff in 1995, it was pub- lished in June 1998. Dr. Ford was educated at the University of Red- lands, served as a naval officer in the Pacific in World War H, and took a Ph.D. in History at the University of Chicago. In 1950 he joined CIA's Office of Policy Coordination, but soon transferred to the Directorate of Intelligence, where he served the bulk of his Agency career. After serv- ing Dr. Ford worked for the Office of Na- tional Estimates and participated in several Vietnam War analytical working groups. He retired from CIA in 1974 and worked for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Dr. Ford returned to the Agency's National Intelligence Council in 1980; he served as Acting Chief of the Council before retiring again in 1986. (S) Hunting the Rogue Elephant: The Pike Committee Investigation (U) This account of the Congressional probe was excerpted from Gerald K. Haines's draft history of CIA relations with Congress. XV (b) (b) (b)( (b)( 1) 3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 N FORN- Notes xvi pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 NOFORN 00084 (b)(3) Directors of Central Intelligence (u) Sidney W. Souers Hoyt S. Vandenberg Roscoe Fl. Hillenkoetter Walter B. Smith Allen W. Dulles John A. McCone William F. Raborn, Jr. Richard Helms James R. Schlesinger William E. Colby George Bush Stansfield Turner William J. Casey William H. Webster Robert M. Gates R. James Woolsey John M. Deutch George J. Tenet (This chronology is Unclassified.) 23 Jan 1946 � 10 Jun 1946 1 May 1947 � 7 Oct 1950 � 26 Feb 1953 29 Nov 1961 28 Apr 1965 30 Jun 1966 2 Feb 1973 � 4 Sep 1973 � 30 Jan 1976 � 9 Mar 1977 � 28 Jan 1981 � 26 May 1987 6 Nov 1991 � 5 Feb 1993 � 10 May 1995 11 July 1997 xvii 10 Jun 1946 � 1 May 1947 7 Oct 1950 9 Feb 1953 �29 Nov 1961 �28 Apr 1965 �30 Jun 1966 � 2 Feb 1973 2 Jul 1973 30 Jan 1976 20 Jan 1977 20 Jan 1981 29 Jan 1987 �31 Aug 1991 20 Jan 1993 9 Jan 1995 � 13 Dec 1996 � present Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Creation of the Central Intelligence Group (U) Michael Warner January 1996 marked the 50th anniversary of President Harry Truman's appointment of the first Director of Central Intelligence and the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), CIA's institution- al predecessor. The office diary of the President's chief military advis- er, Fit. Adm. William D. Leahy, records a rather unexpected event on 24 January 1946: At lunch today in the White House, with only members of the Staff present, Rear Admiral Sidney Souers and I were presented [by President Truman] with black cloaks, black hats, and wooden daggers, and the President read an amusing directive to us outlin- ing some of our duties in the Central Intelligence Agency [sic], "Cloak and Dagger Group of Snoopers."' With this whimsical ceremony, President Truman christened Sidney W. Souers as the first Director of Central Intelligence. (u) The humor and symbolism of this inauguration must have been lost on many veterans of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the big intelligence and covert action agency that President Truman had sud- denly dismantled at the end of World War II, only four months earlier. CIG inevitably suffered (and still suffers) from comparisons with OSS. The Group began its brief existence as a bureaucratic anomaly, with no independent budget, no statutory mandate, and staffers loaned from the permanent departments of the government. Nevertheless, CIG grew rapidly and soon gained a fair measure of organizational autonomy. The Truman administration vested it with two basic missions�strate- gic warning, and the collection of foreign intelligence�although inter- departmental rivalries prevented the Group from performing either 'Diary of William D. Leahy, 24 January 1946, Library of Congress. Admiral Leahy was simultaneously designated the President's representative to the new, four-member Na- tional knell igence Authority (CIG's oversight body). The other members were the Sec- retaries of State, War, and Navy. (6) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Creation mission to the fullest. Strategic warning and clandestine collection are the two basic duties of today's CIA.2 (u) Historical accounts of President Truman's dissolution of OSS and creation of CIG have concentrated on assigning credit to certain actors and blame to their opponents and rivals.' The passage of time and the gradually expanding availability of sources, however, promise to foster more holistic approaches to this subject. (u) The problem for the Truman administration that autumn of 1945 was that no one, including the President, knew just what he wanted, while each department and intelligence service knew full well what sorts of results it wanted to avoid. With this context in mind, it is infor- mative to view the gestation of Central Intelligence Group in the fall of 1945 with an eye toward the way in which Truman administration offi- cials preserved certain essential functions of OSS and brought them to- gether again in a centralized, peacetime foreign intelligence agency. Those decisions created a peacetime intelligence structure that, while still incomplete, preserved some of the most useful capabilities of the old OSS while resting on a firmer institutional foundation. (u) From War to Peace (u) Before World War II, the US Government had not seen fit to cen- tralize either strategic warning or clandestine activities, let alone combine both missions in a single organization. The exigencies of global conflict persuaded Washington to build a formidable intelligence apparatus in A recent unclassified statement to CIA employees entitled "Vision, Mission, and Val- ues of the Central Intelligence Agency" identified the following as the CIA's basic mis- sions: "We support the President, the National Security Council, and all who make and execute US national security policy by: � Providing accurate, evidence-based comprehensive and timely foreign intelligence related to national security; and � Conducting counterintelligence activities, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security as directed by the President." (u) Several authors describe the founding and institutional arrangements of CIG. Three CIA officers had wide access to the relevant records in writing their accounts; see Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990); Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Washington DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1981); and Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence: Octo- ber 1950-February 1953 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), pp. 15-35. See also Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Ori- gins of the CIA (New York: Basic Books, 1983). B. Nelson MacPherson offers thought- ful commentary on this literature in "CIA Origins as Viewed from Within," Intelligence and National Security 10 (April 1995), pp. 353-359. (u) �Zet 2 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Creation Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7-- Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan (u) Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan's Office of Strategic Services. OSS's novelty was that it was America's first centralized and nondepartmental intelligence arm. As such, it encountered an enduring resentment from the established services like the Justice Department's Federal Bureau of 3 �Zet Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 App roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Creation Investigation (FBI) and the Military Intelligence Division of the War De- partment General Staff (better known as the G-2). (Li) General Donovan advocated the creation of a permanent foreign intelligence service after victory, mentioning the idea at several points during the war. President Franklin D. Roosevelt made no promises, however, and after Roosevelt's death in April 1945 and the German sur- render that May, President Truman felt no compulsion to keep OSS alive. Mr. Truman apparently disliked Donovan (perhaps fearing that Donovan's proposed intelligence establishment might one day be used against Americans).5 More importantly, the President and his top mili- tary advisers knew that America's wartime intelligence success had been based not on human sources but on cryptologic breakthroughs�in which OSS had played only a supporting role. Signals intelligence was the province of the Army and Navy, two jealous rivals that only barely cooperated; not even General Donovan contemplated centralized, civil- ian control of this field. (u) President Truman could have tried to transform OSS into a central intelligence service conducting clandestine collection, analysis and op- erations abroad. He declined the opportunity and dismantled OSS in- stead. Within three years, however, Truman had overseen the creation of a central intelligence service conducting clandestine collection, anal- ysis, and operations abroad. Several authors have concluded from the juxtaposition of these facts that Truman dissolved OSS out of igno- rance, haste, and pique, and that he tacitly admitted his mistake when he endorsed the reassembly of many OSS functions in the new CIA. Even Presidential aide Clark Clifford has complained that Mr. Truman "pre- maturely, abruptly and unwisely disbanded the OSS."6 (it) A look at the mood in Washington, however, places President Tru- man's decision in a more favorable light. At the onset of the postwar era, the nation and Congress wanted demobilization�fast. OSS was already marked for huge reductions in any event because so many of its personnel served with guerrilla, commando, and propaganda units considered extraneous in peacetime. Congress regarded OSS as a tem- porary "war agency," one of many bureaucratic hybrids raised for the Donovan's "memorandum for the president," dated 18 November 1944, is reprinted in Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 445-447. (u) Richard Dunlop, Donovan: America's Master Spy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982), pp. 467-468. See also Troy, Donovan and the CIA, p. 267. (U) 6 Clark Clifford, it bears noting, played little if any role in the dissolution of OSS; see Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 165. Will- iam R. Corson calls the affair a "sorry display of presidential bad manners and short- sightedness"; The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire (New York: Dial Press, 1977), p. 247. (u) S/cret 4 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Creation Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 national emergency that would have to be weeded out after victory.' Indeed, early in 1945 Congress passed a law requiring the White House to seek a specific Congressional appropriation for any new agency op- erating for longer than 12 months.' This obstacle alone might have blocked a Presidential attempt to preserve OSS or to create a permanent peacetime intelligence agency along the lines of General Donovan's plan, especially given the wide circulation of innuendo, planted by Donovan's rivals, that the General was urging the creation of an "Amer- ican Gestapo."9 (ti) Truman had barely moved into the Oval Office when he received a scathing report on OSS. (Indeed, this same report might well have been the primary source for the above-mentioned innuendo.) A few months before he died, President Roosevelt had asked an aide, Col. Richard Park, Jr., to conduct an informal investigation of OSS and Gen- eral Donovan. Colonel Park completed his report in March, but appar- ently Roosevelt never read it. The day after Roosevelt's death, Park attended an Oval Office meeting with President Truman. Although no minutes of their discussion survived, Colonel Park probably summa- rized his findings for the new President; in any event, he sent Truman a copy of his report on OSS at about that time. That document castigated OSS for bumbling and lax security, and complained that Donovan's proposed intelligence reform had "all the earmarks of a Gestapo sys- tem." Colonel Park recommended abolishing OSS, although he conced- ed that some of the Office's personnel and activities were worth preserving in other agencies. OSS's Research and Analysis Branch, in particular, could be "salvaged" and given to the State Department. Donovan himself hardly helped his own cause. OSS was attached to the Executive Office of the President, but technically drew its orders and pay from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Donovan refused to compromise on his proposals with JCS representatives delegated to study postwar intelligence needs. The General insisted that a permanent intelligence arm ought to answer directly to the President and not to his ' The Bureau of the Budget had warned Donovan in September 1944 that OSS would be treated as a war agency to be liquidated after the end of hostilities; Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 219-220. (u) The legislation was titled the "Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1945," Public Law 358, 78th Congress, Second Session. (u) ' For an indication of the mixed Congressional attitudes toward OSS, see Smith, The Shadow Warriors, pp. 404-405. (u) 1� The Park report resides in the Rose A. Conway Files at the Harry S. Truman Library, "OSS/Donovan" folder; see especially pp. 1-3, and Appendix III. Thomas F. Troy noticed strong similarities between the Park report and the famous Walter Trohan "Gestapo" stories in the Chicago Tribune; see Donovan and the CIA, pp. 267, 282. (u) 5 S/iret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7- The Creation advisers." The Joint Chiefs had already rescued Donovan once, when the Army's G-2 had tried to subsume OSS in 1943. This time the White House did not ask the Joint Chiefs' opinion. The JCS stood aside and let the Office meet its fate. (u) Taking the Initiative (u) The White House evidently concluded that the problem was how to create a new peacetime intelligence organization without Donovan and his Office. Many senior advisers in the Roosevelt and Truman ad- ministrations believed that the nation needed some sort of permanent in- telligence establishment; that it could not return to its pre-1941 ways. The White House's Bureau of the Budget took up this issue shortly before the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945, presenting itself to Roosevelt as a disinterested observer, and creating a small team to study the government's intelligence requirements and recommend pos- sible reforms. Soon after he took office, President Truman endorsed the Budget Bureau's effort. '2 (U) In August, the Budget Bureau began drafting liquidation plans for OSS and other war agencies, but initially the Bureau assumed that liq- uidation could be stretched over a period of time sufficient to preserve OSS' s most valuable assets while the Office liquidated functions and released personnel no longer needed in peacetime. On 27 or 28 August, however, the President or his principal "reconversion" advisers (Budget Director Harold D. Smith, Special Counsel Samuel Rosenman, and Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion John W. Snyder) sud- denly recommended dissolving OSS almost immediately.13 Bureau staffers had already conceived the idea of giving a part of OSS, the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A), to the State Department as "a going concern." The imminent dissolution of OSS meant that some- thing had to be done quickly about the rest of the Office; someone in the "Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith, pp. 19-21. For more on Donovan's refusal to compromise, see Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 270-271. (u) 12 George F. Schwarzwalder, Division of Administrative Management, Bureau of the Budget, project completion report, "Intelligence and Internal Security Program of the Government" [Project 2171, 28 November 1947, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 51 (Bureau of the Budget), Series 39.35, "Progress Re- ports," Box 181, p. 5. (u) " George Schwarzwalder recorded several years later that the Budget Bureau learned on 24 August that OSS would be dissolved; see his 1947 progress report on Project 217, cited above, p. 9. (u) 7�ret 6 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Creation Approved for Release: 201,8/06/.27 C05500084 Budget Bureau (probably the Assistant Director for Administrative Management, Donald C. Stone) quickly decided that the War Depart- ment could receive the remainder of OSS "for salvage and liquida- tion."4 Stone told frustrated OSS officers on 29 August that important functions of the Office might survive: Stone stated that he felt that the secret and counterintelligence activities of OSS should probably be continued at a fairly high level for probably another year. He said he would support such a program. '5 (U) The reconversion trio of Smith, Snyder and Rosenman endorsed the Budget Bureau's general plan for intelligence reorganization and passed it to President Truman on 4 September 1945.6 Donovan predict- ably exploded when he learned of the plan, but the President ignored Donovan's protests, telling Harold Smith on 13 September to "recom- mend the dissolution of Donovan's outfit even if Donovan did not like it." Within a week the Budget Bureau had the requisite papers ready for the President's signature. Executive Order 9621 on 20 September dissolved OSS as of 1 October 1945, sending R&A to State and every- thing else to the War Department. The Order also directed the Secretary of War to liquidate OSS activities "whenever he deems it compatible with the national interest." � That same day, President Truman sent a let- ter of appreciation (drafted by Donald Stone) to General Donovan.� The transfer of OSS' s R&A Branch to the State Department, wrote the President, marked "the beginning of the development of a coordinated system of foreign intelligence within the permanent framework of the 14 Donald C. Stone, Assistant Director for Administrative Management, Bureau of the Budget, to Harold Smith, Director, "Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and the Transfer of its Activities to the State and War Departments," 27 August 1945, repro- duced in Thomas Thorne, Jr., and David S. Patterson, editors, Emergence of the Intelli- gence Establishment, US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 22-23. Hereinafter cit- ed as FRUS. (Li) G.E. Ramsey, Jr., Bureau of the Budget, to Deputy Comptroller McCandless, "Con- ference on OSS with Don Stone and OSS representatives, Aug. 29," 29 August 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 51 (Bureau of the Bud- get), Series 39.19, "OSS Organization and Functions," Box 67. (u) '6 Smith, Roseman, and Snyder to Truman, "Termination of the Office of Strategic Ser- vices and the Transfer of its Activities to the State and War Departments," 4 September 1945, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library, Indepen- dence, Missouri. (U) The quoted phrase comes from the Harold Smith's office diary for 13 September 1945, in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York. (u) '8 Executive Order 9621, 20 September 1945, FRUS, pp. 44-46. (U) 19 Stone's authorship is noted in Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 246. (u) 7 Sicret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Creation Government." The President also implicitly repeated Donald Stone's earlier assurances to OSS, informing Donovan that the War Department would maintain certain OSS components providing "services of a mili- tary nature the need for which will continue for some time."2� (U) OSS was through, but what would survive the wreck? The Presi- dent probably gave little thought to those ostensibly necessary "services of a military nature" that would somehow continue under War Depart- ment auspices. Truman shared the widespread feeling that the govern- ment needed better intelligence, although he provided little positive guidance on the matter and said even less about intelligence collection (as opposed to its collation). He commented to Budget Director Harold Smith in September 1945 that he had in mind "a different kind of intel- ligence service from what this country has had in the past"; a "broad in- telligence service attached to the President's office."21 Later remarks clarify these comments slightly. Speaking to an audience of CIA em- ployees in 1952, President Truman reminisced that, when he first took office, there had been "no concentration of information for the benefit of the President. Each Department and each organization had its own in- formation service, and that information service was walled off from every other service."22 (U) Mr. Truman's memoirs subsequently expanded on this point, explaining what was at stake: I have often thought that if there had been something like coordi- nation of information in the government it would have been more difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. In those days [1941] the military did not know everything the State Department knew, and the diplo- mats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew. 23 These comments suggest that President Truman viewed strategic warning�preserving the United States from another Pearl Harbor in a nuclear age�as the primary mission of his new intelligence establish- ment, and as a function that had to be handled centrally. His remarks also suggest that he viewed intelligence analysis as largely a matter of " Harry S. Truman to William J. Donovan, 20 September 1945; Document 4 in Michael Warner, The CIA under Harry Truman, (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994) p. 15. See also Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 302-303. (0 2' Harold Smith's office diary entries for 13 and 20 September 1945, Roosevelt Library. (u) 22 Truman's speech is reprinted as Document 81 in Warner, The CIA under Harry Tru- man, p. 471. (u) " Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume II, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1956), p. 56. (u) S7tt 8 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Creation Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 collation; the facts would speak for themselves, if only they could be gathered in one place. That is what he wanted his new intelligence ser- vice to do. (u) The Budget Bureau itself had not proposed anything that looked much clearer. Bureau staffers wanted the State Department to serve as the president's "principal staff agency" in developing "high- level intelligence," after taking the lead in establishing the "integrat- ed Government-wide program."24 At the same time, however, Bud- get Bureau officers wanted the departments to continue to conduct their own intelligence functions, rather than relegating this duty to "any single central agency." A small interagency group, "under the leadership of the State Department," would coordinate the depart- mental intelligence operations.25 This proposed program rested on two assumptions that would soon be tested: that the State Depart- ment was ready to take the lead, and that the armed services were willing to follow. (u) In the meantime, General Donovan fumed about the President's decision yet again to Budget Bureau staffers who met with him (on 22 September) to arrange the details of the Office's dissolution. An oversight in the drafting of EO 9621 had left the originally proposed ter- mination date of 1 October unchanged in the final signed version, and now Donovan had less than two weeks to dismantle his sprawling agen- cy. One official of the Budget Bureau subsequently suggested to Donald Stone that the War Department might ease the transition by keeping its portion of OSS functioning "for the time being," perhaps even with Donovan in charge. Stone preferred someone other than Donovan for this job, and promised to discuss the idea with Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy on 24 September.26 (u) Two days later, McCloy stepped into the breach. Where Donald Stone had simply ensured that pieces of OSS kept a temporary lease on life in the War Department, McCloy glimpsed an opportunity to do much more: to save these components as the nucleus of a peacetime intelligence service. McCloy was a friend of Donovan's and had long promoted an improved national intelligence capability.27He interpreted 2' Quoted phrases are in Snyder, Roseman, and Smith to Truman, 4 September 1945. (u) " Harold D. Smith to Harry S. Truman, "Transfer of Functions of the Office of Strategic Services," 18 September 1945, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library. (u) 26 G.E. Ramsey, Jr., Bureau of the Budget, to the Assistant Director for Estimates, Bureau of the Budget, "Disposition of OSS," 24 September 1945, FRUS, pp. 51-52. (U) " For McCloy's advocacy of a centralized intelligence capability, see Kai Bird, The Chairman: John J. McCloy, the Making of the American Establishment (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 129-130. (u) 9 yeret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Creation the President's directive as broadly as possible by ordering OSS ' s Dep- uty Director for Intelligence, Brig. Gen. John Magruder, to preserve his Secret Intelligence (SI) and counterespionage (X-2) Branches "as a go- ing operation" in a new office that McCloy dubbed the "Strategic Ser- vices Unit" (ssu): This assignment of the OSS activities.. .is a method of carrying out the desire of the President, as indicated by representatives of the Bureau of the Budget, that these facilities of OSS be examined over the next three months with a view to determining their appro- priate disposition. Obviously this will demand close liaison with the Bureau of the Budget, the State Department and other agen- cies of the War Department, to insure that the facilities and assets of OSS are preserved for any possible future use.... The situation is one in which the facilities of an organization, normally shrink- ing in size as a result of the end of fighting, must be preserved so far as potentially of future usefulness to the country." (U) The following day, the new Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, confirmed this directive and implicitly endorsed Assistant Secretary McCloy's interpretation, formally ordering Magruder to report to Mc- Cloy and to "preserve as a unit such of these functions and facilities as are valuable for permanent peacetime purposes" [emphasis added].29 With this order, Patterson postponed indefinitely the assimilation of OSS ' s records and personnel into the War Department's own intelli- gence arm, the G-2. (u) General Magruder soon had to explain this unorthodox arrange- ment to sharp-eyed Congressmen and staff. Rep. Clarence Cannon, chairman of the powerful House Appropriations Committee, asked the General on 2 October about the OSS contingents sent to the State and War Departments and the plans for disposing of OSS ' s unspent funds (roughly $4.5 million). Magruder explained that he did not quite know what State would do with R&A; when Cannon asked about the War De- partment's contingent (SSU), the General read aloud from the Secretary of War's order to preserve OSS' s more valuable functions "as a unit."3� " John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, to John Magruder, OSS, "Transfer of OSS Personnel and Activities to the War Department and Creation of Strategic Services Unit," 26 September 1945, FRUS, pp. 235-236. (U) 29 Robert P. Patterson to John Magruder, 27 September 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 319 (Army Intelligence), Decimal File 1941- 48, "334 OSS," box 649, "Strategic Services Unit" folder. (u) " US House of Representatives, House Appropriations Committee, "First Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Recission Bill, 1946," 79th Cong., First Sess., 1945, p. 615-621. (u) SiZet 10 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Creation Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Two weeks later, staffers from the House Military Affairs Committee asked why the War Department suddenly needed both SSU and the G-2: General Magruder explained that he had no orders to liquidate OSS (other than, of course, those functions without any peace time significance) and that only the Assistant Secretary of War [McCloyl could explain why OSS had been absorbed into the War Department on the basis indicated. He said he felt, however,... that the objective was to retain SSU intact until the Secretary of State had surveyed the intelligence field and made recommenda- tions to the President. Committee staff implicitly conceded that the arrangement made sense, but hinted that both SSU and the remnant of R&A in the State Department ought to be "considerably reduced in size."3 (u) Reducing SSU is just what was occupying the Unit's new Execu- tive Officer, Col. William W. Quinn: The orders that General Magruder received from the Secretary of War were very simple. He was charged with preserving the intelli- gence assets created and held by OSS during its existence and the disbandment of paramilitary units, which included the 101 detach- ment in Burma and Southeast Asia, and other forms of intelli- gence units, like the Jedburgh teams, and morale operations, et cetera. My initial business was primarily liquidation. The main problem was the discharge of literally thousands of people. Con- sequently, the intelligence collection effort more-or-less came to a standstill." (U) Magruder did his best to sustain morale in the Unit, keeping his deputies informed about high-level debates over "the holy cause of central intelligence," as he jocularly dubbed it. He suggested optimisti- cally that SSU would survive its current exile: In the meantime I can assure you there is a great deal of serious thinking in high places regarding the solution that will be made for OSS ESSIJ1. I hope it will prove fruitful. There is a very serious 3' John R. Schoemer, Jr., Acting General Counsel, Strategic Services Unit, memoran- dum for the record, "Conference with representatives of House Military Affairs Com- mittee," 19 October 1945, CIA History Staff HS/CSG-1400, item 14. (u) " William W. Quinn, Buffalo Bill Remembers: Truth and Courage (Fowlerville, MI: Wilderness Adventure Books, 1991), p. 240. (u) 11 Se/ret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 CL The Creation movement under way to reconstruct some of the more fortunate aspects of our work." (U) Despite Magruder's and Quinn's efforts, the House of Represen- tatives on 17 October lopped $2 million from the OSS terminal budget that SSU shared with the Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS), its erstwhile sister branch now set in the Department of State. The cut directly threatened both SSU and IRIS. The Truman adminis- tration eventually convinced Congress to drop the House's recision and even increase funding for both pieces of OSS, but not until after several anxious weeks in SSU and the War Department. 34 Institutional enemies closer to hand also seemed to threaten SSU's independence that fall. Just before Thanksgiving, McCloy warned Sec- retary Patterson that only "close supervision" could prevent the Depart- ment from taking "the course of least resistance by merely putting [SSU] into what I think is a very unimaginative section of G-2 and thus los[ing] a very valuable and necessary military asset."35 General Magruder told his lieutenants that SSU was quietly winning friends in high places, but repeatedly reminded staffers of the need for discretion, noting that "some people" did not like SSU "and the less said about [the Unit] the better."36 (U) Controversy and Compromise (u) McCloy (with Stone's help) had precipitated an inspired bureau- cratic initiative that would eventually expand the Truman administra- tion's options in creating a new intelligence establishment. Amid all the subsequent interagency debates over the new intelligence agency's structure and authorities that autumn, SSU preserved OSS' s foreign in- telligence assets for eventual transfer to whichever agency received this " SSU Staff Meeting Minutes, 23 October 1945, National Archives and Records Ad- ministration, Record Group 226 (OSS), Entry 190, WASH-DIR-OP-266 (microfilm roll M1642), roll 112, folder 1268. General Magruder made his "holy cause" quip at the 29 November meeting. (Li) SSU Staff Meeting Minutes for 19 October, 30 October, and 20 December 1945. Har- ry S. Truman to Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House, 7 November 1945, reprinted in US House of Representatives, "House Miscellaneous Documents II," 79th Cong., 1st Sess., serial set volume 10970, document 372, with attached letter from Harold D. Smith to Truman, 6 November 1945. First Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Act, 1946, Public Law 79-301, Title 1, 60 Stat. 6, 7 (1946). (u) " McCloy to Patterson, "Central Intelligence Agency," 13 November 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 107 (Department of War), Entry 180, Files of the Assistant Secretary of War, box 5, "Intelligence" folder. (u) 36 SSU Staff Meeting Minutes for 1 November, 6 November, and 29 November 1945. (u) 5/et 12 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Creation Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 responsibility. The Truman administration waged a heated internal ar- gument over which powers to give to the new intelligence service. The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, who quickly agreed that they should oversee the proposed office, stood together against rival plans proposed by the Bureau of the Budget and the FBI. The Army and Na- vy, however, would not accept the State Department's insistence that the new office's director be selected by and accountable to the Secretary of State. The armed services instead preferred a plan outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff back in September, which proposed lifting the new intelligence agency outside the Cabinet departments by placing it under a proposed National Intelligence Authority.31 (U) This was the plan that would soon settle the question of where to place SSU. The JCS had been working on this plan for months, having been spurred to action by General Donovan's 1944 campaigning for a permanent peacetime intelligence agency. In September, JCS Chairman William Leahy had transmitted the plan (JCS 1181/5) to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, who sent it on to the State De- partment, where it languished for several weeks. The plan proposed, among other things, that a new "Central Intelligence Agency" should, among its duties, perform "such services of common concern as the Na- tional Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accom- plished by a common agency, including the direct procurement of intelligence." This artful ambiguity�"services of common con- cern"�meant espionage and liaison with foreign intelligence services, the core of clandestine foreign intelligence. Everyone involved knew this, but no one in the administration or the military wanted to say such things out loud; hence the obfuscation.39 In any case, here was another function that the drafters of the JCS plan felt had to be performed, or at least coordinated, "centrally." (U) In December 1945 an impatient President Truman asked to see both the State Department's and the Joint Chiefs' proposals and decided that the latter looked simpler and more workable. This decision dashed the Budget Bureau's original hope that the State Department would lead the government's foreign intelligence program. Early in the new year, Truman created the Central Intelligence Group, implementing what was " Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 297-300, 315, 322. (U) 3' JCS 1181/5 is attached to William D. Leahy, memorandum for the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, "Establishment of a central intelligence service upon liqui- dation of OSS," 19 September 1945; Document 2 in Warner, The CIA under Harry Tru- man, p. 5. (u) " The term "services of common concern" apparently originated with OSS' General Magruder and was adopted by a JCS study group; Troy, Donovan and the CIA, p. 233. (0) 13 SeiZet Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Creation in essence a modification of the JCS 1181/5 proposal. President Truman persuaded Capt. (soon to be Rear Admiral) Sidney Souers, the Assistant Chief of Naval Intelligence and a friend of Navy Secretary Forrestal (and Presidential aide Clark Clifford) who had advised the White House on the intelligence debate, to serve for a few months as the first Director of Central Intelligence.40 The CIG formally came into being with the President's directive of 22 January 1946. Cribbing text from JCS 1181/ 5, the President authorized CIG to "perform, for the benefit of said in- telligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally."4' Here was the loaded phrase "services of common concern" again, only this time the telltale clause "including the direct procure- ment of intelligence" had discreetly disappeared. (With minor editing, the phrase would reappear again in the CIA's enabling legislation, the National Security Act of 1947.) (U) Two days later, on 24 January, President Truman invited Sidney Souers to the White House to award him his black cape and wooden dagger. Thanks in part to McCloy' s order to preserve OSS' s SI and X- 2 Branches, the "cloak and dagger" capability�the "services of com- mon concern" mentioned in the President's directive�was waiting in the War Department for transfer to the new CIG. General Magruder qui- etly applauded Souers's appointment as DCI, explaining to his deputies that SSU might soon be moving: With respect to SSU, we and the War Department are thinking along the same lines: that at such time as the Director [of Central Intelligence] is ready to start operating, this Unit, its activities, personnel, and facilities will become available to the Director, but as you know, the intent of the President's [22 January] directive was to avoid setting up an independent agency. Therefore, the Central Intelligence Group, purposely called the Group, will uti- lize the facilities of several Departments. This Unit will become something in the way of a contribution furnished by the War Department.42 (u) Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy had saved the foreign in- telligence core of OSS in the Strategic Services Unit; all that was required " Truman, Memoirs, pp. 55-58. See also William Henhoeffer and James Hanrahan, "Notes on the Early DCIs," Studies in Intelligence 33 (Spring 1989), P. 29; also Clif- ford, Counsel to the President, p. 166. (U) 4I President Truman to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 22 January 1946; FRUS, pp. 178-179. (U) 42 SSU Staff Meeting Minutes, 29 January 1946; Magruder praised Souers' s appoint- ment at the 24 January meeting. (u) SpZet 14 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Creation Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 "fret President Truman and Sidney Souers (t) was for the new National Intelligence Authority to approve a method for transferring it. This the NIA did at its third meeting, on 2 April 1946.4' The actual transfer of SSU personnel began after CIG had acquired a new Director of Central Intelligence, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, in June 1946. Vandenberg, a month later, was able to report matter-of-factly to the National Intelligence Authority that the tiny CIG had begun to take over "all clandestine foreign intelligence activities," meaning the much- larger SSU. At that same meeting, Admiral Leahy also reminded partici- pants (in a different context) that "it was always understood that CIG eventually would broaden its scope."'" (U) 43 National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the NIA's 3rd meeting, 2 April 1946, CIA History Staff HS/HC-245, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 263 (CIA), History Staff Source Collection. (u) 44 National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the NIA's 4th meeting, 17 July 1946; Document 13 in Warner, The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 56-59. (u) 15 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 71-CL The Creation From Small Beginnings (u) An eminent historian once remarked that the crowning achieve- ment of historical research is to attain an understanding of how things do not happen. To put it simply, history rarely offers up tidy events and clear motivations. President Truman did not follow a neat plan in found- ing the Central Intelligence Group. He implicitly imposed two broad re- quirements on his advisers and departments in the fall of 1945: to create a structure that could collate the best intelligence held by the various de- partments, and to make that structure operate, at least initially, on funds derived from the established agencies. Indeed, the friction and waste of the process that resulted from this vague guidance prompted the com- plaint that the President had acted rashly in dissolving OSS and ignoring the advice of intelligence professionals like William J. Donovan. (u) In the fall of 1945, the President vaguely wanted a new kind of centralized intelligence service, but his Cabinet departments and exist- ing services knew fairly specifically what kinds of central intelligence they did not want. Between these two realities lay the gray area in which the Central Intelligence Group was founded and grew in 1946. Truman always took credit for assigning CIG the task of providing timely stra- tegic warning and guarding against another Pearl Harbor. CIG acquired its second mission�the conduct of clandestine activities abroad�in large part through the foresight of Donald Stone and John J. McCloy. These two appointees ensured that trained personnel stayed together as a unit ready to join the new peacetime intelligence service. Within months of its creation, CIG had become the nation's primary agency for strategic warning and the management of clandestine activities abroad, and within two years the Group would bequeath both missions to its successor, the Central Intelligence Agency. (u) The relationship�and tension�between the two missions (strate- gic warning and clandestine activities) formed the central dynamic in unfolding early history of CIA. Many officials thought that the two should be handled "centrally," although not necessarily by a single agency. That they ultimately were combined under one organization (CIG and then CIA) was due largely to the efforts of McCloy and Magruder. Nevertheless, it is clear from the history of the SSU that high-level Truman administration officials acted with the tacit assent of the White House in preserving OSS' s most valuable components to be- come the nucleus of the nation's foreign intelligence capability. Presi- dent Truman's actions do not deserve the charge of incompetence that pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084_ The Creation Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 yet has been leveled against them, but it does seem justified to conclude that Truman's military advisers deserve most of the credit for the creation of a CIG that collected as well as collated foreign intelligence. (u) (This essay is Unclassified.) 17 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 NOFORN 00084 (b)(3) 19 S/ret (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / /cret 20 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / (b)(1) (b)(3) 21 7�ret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 I pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / Stet 22 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 i Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / (b)(1) (b)(3) 23 Setet Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p / proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / Xret 24 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/6/27 C05500084 (b)(1) (b)(3) 25 S/-et Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 i ,S�ret 26 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 sitret (b)(1) (b)(3) 27 het Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7g.-1 GI S/ret 28 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 srret 00084 (b)(1) (b)(3) 29 S/ret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C0550 0084 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 yet Sicret 30 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/616/27 C055 00084 (b)(1) (b)(3) 31 'Get Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C0550 0084 1 p . roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / S,Zet 32 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C0550 0084 33 ycret (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p / roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / Syeret 34 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2019.6/27 C055 00084 35 Sticret (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 i pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 I S ret 36 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7ret (b)(1) (b)(3) 37 ?iret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 or. GI Icret 38 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 T. CL 00084 39 Siteret (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 T- SAret 40 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 7eL 00084 (b)(1) (b)(3) 41 iZret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / Se et 42 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/9127 C05500084 (b)(1) (b)(3) 43 Se/ret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p i roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 I Sicret 44 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 NOFOR (b)(3) The Office of Reports and Estimates (U) Woodrow J. Kuhns During World War II, the United States made one of its few orig- inal contributions to the craft of intelligence: the invention of multi- source, nondepartmental analysis. The Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) assembled a talented cadre of analysts and experts to comb through publications and intelli- gence reports for clues to the capabilities and intentions of the Axis powers. R&A's contributions to the war effort impressed even the harshest critics of the soon-to-be dismantled OSS. President Truman paid implicit tribute to R&A in late 1945 when he directed that it be transplanted bodily into the State Department at a time when most of OSS was being demobilized. The transplant failed, however, and the in- dependent analytical capability patiently constructed during the war had all but vanished when Truman moved to reorganize the nation's peace- time intelligence establishment at the beginning of 1946. (u) Current Intelligence Versus National Intelligence (u) The Central Reports Staff, home to the analysts in the Central In- telligence Group (CIG), was born under a cloud of confusion in January 1946. ' Specifically, no consensus existed on what its mission was to be, although the President's concerns in creating CIG were clear enough. In the uncertain aftermath of the war, he wanted to be sure that all relevant information available to the US Government on any given issue of na- tional security would be correlated and evaluated centrally so that the ' The name of the Central Reports Staff was changed in July 1946 to the Office of Re- search and Evaluations, and again in October 1946 to the Office of Reports and Esti- mates (ORE), by which name it was known until it was abolished in November 1950. CIA veterans typically use "ORE" as the shorthand name for the analytical office for the whole period 1946-1950. (u) 45 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates country would never again have to suffer a devastating surprise attack as it had at Pearl Harbor.' (u) How this was to be accomplished, however, was less clear. The President himself wanted a daily summary that would relieve him of the chore of reading the mounds of cables, reports, and other papers that constantly cascaded onto his desk. Some of these were important, but many were duplicative and even contradictory.' In the jargon of intelli- gence analysis, Truman wanted CIG to produce a "current intelligence" daily publication that would contain all information of immediate inter- est to him.4 Truman's aides and advisers, however, either did not understand this or disagreed with him, for the presidential directive of 22 January 1946 authorizing the creation of CIG did not mention current intelli- gence. The directive ordered CIG to "accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the ap- propriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strate- gic and national policy intelligence."5 Moreover, at the first meeting of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) on 5 February, Secretary of State Byrnes objected to the President's idea of a current intelligence summary from CIG, claiming that it was his responsibility as Secretary of State to furnish the President with information on foreign affairs.6 (u) Truman wrote in his memoirs that he had "often thought that if there had been some- thing like coordination of information in the government it would have been more dif- ficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor." Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Double- day, 1956), p. 56. (u) See Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), p. 81. (U) Current intelligence was defined in National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3, "Coordination of Intelligence Production," 13 January 1948, as "that spot infor- mation or intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest and value to operat- ing or policy staffs, which is used by them usually without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation." See United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 1110. Hereafter cited as Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment. (u) "Presidential Directive on Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities," United States Department of State, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, pp. 178, 179. Also reproduced in Michael Warner, ed., The CIA under Harry Truman (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), pp. 29-32. (u) "Minutes of the First Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority," United States Department of State, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, p. 328. The National Intelligence Authority was composed of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and a rep- resentative of the President, Flt. Adm. William Leahy. (u) �t 46 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates FCL Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Byrnes apparently then went to Truman and asked him to recon- sider. Adm. Sidney Souers, the first Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), told a CIA historian that Byrnes' argument: ran along the line that such information was not intelligence within the jurisdiction of the Central Intelligence Group and the Director of Central Intelligence]. President Truman conceded that it might not be generally considered intelligence, but it was information which he needed and therefore it was intelligence to him. The result was agreement that the daily summaries should be "factual statements." The Department of State prepared its own digest, and so the President had two summaries on his desk.' This uneasy compromise was reflected in the NIA directives that outlined CIG' s duties. Directive No. 1, issued on 8 February 1946, ordered CIG to "furnish strategic and national policy intelligence to the President and the State, War, and Navy Departments."' National Intel- ligence Authority Directive No. 2, issued the same day, ordered the DCI to give "first priority" to the "production of daily summaries containing factual statements of the significant developments in the field of intelli- gence and operations related to the national security and to foreign events for the use of the President." 9 (U) In practice, this approach proved unworkable. Without any com- mentary to place a report in context, or to make a judgment on its likely veracity, the early Daily Summaries probably did little but confuse the 'Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, pp. 81, 82. (u) 'National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 1, "Policies and Procedures Governing the Central Intelligence Group," 8 February 1946, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab- lishment, pp. 329-331. After CIA was established, National Security Council Intelli- gence Directive No. 1, "Duties and Responsibilities," issued on 12 December 1947, again ordered the DCI to produce national intelligence, which the Directive stated should be "officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial dissent." National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3, 13 January 1948, gave CIA the authority to produce current intelligence: "The CIA and the several agencies shall produce and disseminate such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet their own internal requirements or external responsibilities." See Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, pp. 1119-1122; 1109-1112. (u) 9 National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 2, "Organization and Functions of the Central Intelligence Group," 8 February 1946, Emergence of the Intelligence Establish- ment, pp. 331-333. Interestingly, Souers, who drafted both NIA Directive 1 and Direc- tive 2, continued to believe that CIG's principal responsibility was the production of strategic and national policy intelligence. In a memorandum to the NIA on 7 June 1946, Souers wrote that the "primary function of C.I.G. in the production of intelligence... will be the preparation and dissemination of definitive estimates of the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries as they affect the national security of the United States." "Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence to the National Intelligence Authority," 7 June 1946, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, p. 361. (u) 47 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p . roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / Reports and Estimates President. An alarming report one day on Soviet troop movements in Eastern Europe, for example, would be contradicted the next day by a report from another source. Everyone involved eventually realized the folly of this situation, and analytical commentaries began to appear in the Daily Summaries in December 1946�episodically at first, and then regularly during 1947. The Weekly Summary, first published in June 1946 on the initiative of the Central Reports Staff itself, was also sup- posed to avoid interpretative commentary, but its format made such a stricture difficult to enforce. From its inception, the Weekly Summary proved to be more analytical than its Daily counterpart. (U) The Confusion Surrounding National Intelligence (U) Similar disarray surrounded CIG' s responsibilities in the produc- tion of "strategic and national policy intelligence." The members of the Intelligence Community simply could not agree on the policies and pro- cedures that governed the production of this type of intelligence. Most of those involved seemed to believe that national intelligence should be coordinated among all the members of the Intelligence Community, that it should be based on all available information, that it should try to esti- mate the intentions and capabilities of other countries toward the United States, and that it should be of value to the highest policymaking bodies. (U) The devil was in the details. High-ranking members of the intelli- gence and policy communities debated, without coming to a consensus, most aspects of the estimate production process, including who should write them, how other agencies should participate in the process if at all, and how dissents should be handled. Some of this reflected genuine dis- agreement over the best way to organize and run the Intelligence Com- munity, but it also involved concerns about bureaucratic power and prerogatives, especially those of the DCI and his Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), both newcomers to the Intelligence Community. Even the definition of "strategic and national intelligence" had implica- tions for the authority of the DCI and thus was carefully argued over by others in the Community. '� (U) DCI Vandenberg eventually got the NIA to agree to a definition in February 1947, but it was so general that it did little to solve the problems 1� Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, p. 367. (u) _,,,..t_ 48 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 that abounded at the working level." Ray Cline, a participant in the pro- cess of producing the early estimates, wrote in his memoirs that: It cannot honestly be said that it [ORE] coordinated either intelli- gence activities or intelligence judgments; these were guarded closely by Army, Navy, Air Force, State, and the FBI. When attempts were made to prepare agreed national estimates on the basis of intelligence available to all, the coordination process was interminable, dissents were the rule rather than the exception, and every policymaking official took his own agency's intelligence appreciations along to the White House to argue his case. The pre- war chaos was largely recreated with only a little more lip service to central coordination.12 (u) In practice, much of the intelligence produced by ORE was not coordinated with the other agencies; nor was it based on all information available to the US Government. The Daily and Weekly Summaries were not coordinated products, and, like the other publications produced by ORE, they did not contain information derived from "The NIA agreed that "strategic and national policy intelligence is that composite in- telligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officers and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security.... It is in that political-economic-military area of concern to more than one agency, must be objective, and must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department." "Minutes of the 9th Meeting of the National Intelligence Author- ity," 12 February 1947, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, p. 492. After the establishment of CIA, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3, 13 Janu- ary 1948, similarly defined national intelligence as "integrated departmental intelli- gence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department... and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department." See Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, p. 1111. (u) 12 Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washing- ton, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1976), pp. 91, 92. Cline rose to become Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) between 1962 and 1966. Another veteran of the period, R. Jack Smith, who edited the Daily Sununary, made the same point in his memoirs, The Un- known CIA (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), p. 42: "We were not fulfilling our primary task of combining Pentagon, State Department, and CIA judgments into na- tional intelligence estimates.... To say it succinctly, CIA lacked clout. The military and diplomatic people ignored our statutory authority in these matters, and the CIA leader- ship lacked the power to compel compliance." Smith also served as DDI, from 1966 to 1971. (u) 49 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates communications intelligence. '3 The Review of the World Situation, which was distributed each month at meetings of the National Security Council, became a unilateral publication of ORE after the first two is- sues.14 The office's ad hoc publications, such as the Special Evaluations and Intelligence Memoranda, were rarely coordinated with the other agencies. By contrast, the ORE series of Special Estimates were coor- dinated, but critics nonetheless condemned many of them for contain- ing trivial subjects that fell outside the realm of "strategic and national policy intelligence." (o) Whatever CIG' s written orders, in practice the President's interest in the Daily Summaries, coupled with the limited resources of the Cen- tral Reports Staff, meant that the production of current intelligence came to dominate the Staff and its culture. National estimative intelli- gence was reduced to also-ran status. An internal CIG memo stated frankly that "ORE Special Estimates are produced on specific subjects as the occasion arises and within the limits of ORE capabilities after current intelligence requirements are met." It went on to note, "Many significant developments worthy of ORE Special Estimates have not been covered...because of priority production of current intelligence, insufficient personnel, or inadequate information."16 This remained true even after the Central Reports Staff evolved into the Office of Reports and Estimates in CIA. " (u) If the analysts in CIG, and then CIA, had only to balance the com- peting demands of current and national intelligence, their performance might have benefited. As it happened, however, NIA Directive No. 5 Smith, The Unknown CIA, pp. 34, 35. ORE began receiving signals intelligence in 1946 and was able to use it as a check against the articles it included in the Summaries. Security concerns prevented its broader use. Signals intelligence was sent to the White House by the Army Security Agency (from 1949 on, the Armed Forces Security Agen- cy) during this period. CIA did not begin including communications intelligence in the successor to the Daily until 1951. (u) w The delays involved in interagency coordination made it difficult to meet the publica- tion deadline while still including the most recent events in its contents. George S. Jack- son, Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1951, Miscellaneous Studies, HS MS-3, vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1954), pp. 279-287. National Ar- chives and Records Administration, Record Group 263, History Staff Source Collec- tion, NN3-263-95-003. (u) 1 See the discussion of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report below. (u) 16 Memo from Chief, Projects Division to Assistant Director, R&E, "Proposed Concept for Future CIG Production of Staff Intelligence," 1 July 1947. CIA History Staff Job 67- 00059A, Box 2, Confidential. Nevertheless, during its existence ORE did produce over 125 estimates, 97 of which were declassified in 1993 and 1994 and deposited in the National Archives. (u) This point is made repeatedly throughout George S. Jackson, Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1951. Jackson himself served in the office during the period of this study. (u) 50 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates Approved for Release: 2018/06%27 C05500084 soon gave the analysts the additional responsibility of performing "such research and analysis activities" as might "be more efficiently or effec- tively accomplished centrally." '8 In practice, this meant that the analysts became responsible for performing basic research as well as wide- ranging political and economic analysis. To accommodate this enhanced mission, functional analysis branches for economics, science, transportation, and map intelligence were established alongside the existing regional branches. (u) A high-ranking ORE officer of the period, Ludwell Montague, wrote that this: was a deliberate, but covert, attempt to transform ORE (or CRS, a staff designed expressly for the production of coordinated national intelligence) into an omn i competent ...central research agency. This attempt failed, leaving ORE neither the one thing nor the other. Since then, much ORE production has proceeded, not from any clear concept of mission, but from the mere existence of a nondescript contrivance for the production of nondescript intelli- gence. All our efforts to secure a clear definition of our mission have been in vain.20 (u) Another veteran of the period, George S. Jackson, agreed with Montague's assessment: "It would not be correct.. .to say that the Office...had failed utterly to do what it was designed to do; a more ac- curate statement would be that it had done not only what was planned for it but much that was not planned and need not have been done. In National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 5, "Functions of the Director of Central Intelligence," 8 July 1946, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, p. 392. (U) The Scientific Intelligence Branch of ORE was established in January 1947 and short- ly thereafter incorporated the Nuclear Energy Group, which had been in charge of atom- ic energy intelligence in the Manhattan Project, within its ranks. At the end of 1948, the branch was separated from ORE and elevated to office status, becoming the Office of Scientific Intelligence. (u) 20 Montague to Babbitt, "Comment on the Dulles-Jackson Report," 11 February 1949. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 263, History Staff Source Collection, HS/HC 450, NN3-263-94-010, Box 14. Montague's reference to a "deliberate but covert" attempt to increase the responsibility of ORE refers to the efforts of DCI Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg to boost himself, and CIG as a whole, into a dominant position in the Intelligence Community. Opposition from the other departments largely scuttled his attempts in this direction. See Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, p. 366. (u) 51 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved,3f)r. Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates consequence, the Office had unnecessarily dissipated its energies to the detriment of its main function."21 He noted that: Requests [for studies] came frequently from many sources, not all of them of equal importance, but there seemed not to be anyone in authority [in ORE] who would probe beneath any of them to make sure that they merited a reply. Nor was there anyone who took it upon himself to decline requests�no matter from what source� when they were clearly for a type of material not called for under the responsibilities of the Office of Reports and Estimates.22 (u) A Mixed Reception (U) NIA Directive No. 5 opened the door to proliferation of various kinds of publications and, consequently, to a dilution of analysts' efforts in the fields of current and national intelligence.23 Perhaps as a conse- quence of the confusion over the analytical mission, these products received mixed reviews. The President was happy with his Daily Sum- mary, and that fact alone made it sacrosanct. Rear Adm. James H. Foskett, the President's Naval Aide, told ORE in 1947 that, "the Presi- dent considers that he personally originated the Daily, that it is prepared in accordance with his own specifications, that it is well done, and that in its present form it satisfies his requirements."24 President Truman's views on the Weekly Summary were less clear, but lack of criticism was construed as approval by ORE: "It appears that the Weekly in its present form is acceptable at the White House and is used to an undetermined extent without exciting comment indicative of a desire for any particu- lar change."25 (u) Other policymakers were less impressed with the current intelli- gence publications. Secretary of State George Marshall stopped reading the Daily Summary after two weeks, and thereafter he had his aide flag only the most important items for him to read. The aide did this only two "Jackson, Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1951, vol. 1, p. 95. (U) " Ibid., p. 98. (u) " In addition to the publications mentioned above, ORE produced Situation Reports (exhaustive studies of individual countries and areas) and a variety of branch-level pub- lications (daily summaries, weekly summaries, monthly summaries, branch "esti- mates," and reports of various types). (u) " Montague to J. Klahr Huddle, Assistant Director, R&E, "Conversation with Admiral Foskett regarding the C.I.G. Daily and Weekly Summaries," 26 February 1947, in Warn- er, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman, p. 123. (u) " Ibid. (u) 52 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 or three times a week, telling a CIG interviewer that "most of the information in the Dailies is taken from State Department sources and is furnished the Secretary through State Department channels."26 Mar- shall also stopped reading the Weekly after the first issue.27 The Secre- tary of the Navy, James Forrestal, considered both Summaries "valuable but not...indispensable," according to one of his advisers.28 By contrast, an aide to Secretary of War Robert Patterson reported that the Secretary read both the Daily and Weekly Summaries "avidly and regularly."29(U) The analytical office's work came in for the most severe criticism in the so-called Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report of January 1949, which assessed both the performance of CIA and its role in the Intelligence Community.3" This report, commissioned by the National Security Council in early 1948, was prepared by a trio of prominent intelligence veterans who had left government service after the war: Allen Dulles, William Jackson, and Mathias Correa. (U) Their report candidly admitted that "There is confusion as to the proper role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of in- telligence reports and estimates," and that "The principle of the author- itative national intelligence estimate does not yet have established acceptance in the Government."31 They nevertheless took ORE to task for failing to perform better in the production of national intelligence, noting that although ORE had been given responsibility for production of national estimates, "It has.. .been concerned with a wide variety of activities and with the production of miscellaneous reports and summa- ries which by no stretch of the imagination could be considered national estimates."-" (u) The trio found unacceptable ORE' s practice of drafting the esti- mates "on the basis of its own research and analysis" and then circulat- ing them among the other intelligence agencies to obtain notes of dissent or concurrence. 33 "Under this procedure, none of the agencies " Memo from Assistant Director, Office of Collection and Dissemination to Huddle, "Adequacy Survey of the CIG Daily and Weekly Summaries," 7 May 1947, History Staff Job 67-00059A, box 2, Secret. (u) " Ibid. (u) " Ibid. (u) " Ibid., p. 5. (u) 3" Allen W. Dulles, William H. Jackson, and Mathias F. Correa, "The Central Intelli- gence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence: A Report to the National Se- curity Council," 1 January 1949. The summary of the report is reprinted in Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, pp. 903-911. The entire report is available at the Na- tional Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Box 1555. (U) 3i Ibid., pp. 65, 69. (u) " Ibid., p. 6. (U) 33 Ibid. (u) 53 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates regards itself as a full participant contributing to a truly national esti- mate and accepting a share in the responsibility for it." 34 They recom- mended that a "small group of specialists" be used "in lieu of the present Office of Reports and Estimates" to "review the intelligence products of other intelligence agencies and of the Central Intelligence Agency" and to "prepare drafts of national intelligence estimates for consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Committee." (U) The three also were not impressed with ORE's efforts in the field of current intelligence: "Approximately ninety per cent of the contents of the Daily Summary is derived from State Department sources.... There are occasional comments by the Central Intelligence Agency on portions of the Summary, but these, for the most part, appear gratuitous and lend little weight to the material itself."16 They concluded, "As both Summaries consume an inordinate amount of time and effort and appear to be outside of the domain of the Central Intelligence Agency, we be- lieve that the Daily, and possibly the Weekly, Summary should be dis- continued in their present form."" (U) The trio concluded disapprovingly that "the Central Intelligence Agency has tended to become just one more intelligence agency pro- ducing intelligence in competition with older established agencies of the Government departments." (u) The Analysts (u) The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report was extremely, perhaps un- fairly, critical of ORE' s production record. Intelligence analysis is not an easy job in the best of times�the available information on any given analytical problem is invariably incomplete, or contradictory, or flawed in some other important way�and these clearly were not the best of times. Signals intelligence, which had proven devastatingly ef- fective against the Axis powers in the war, was less effective against the security-conscious Soviets, and, as noted above, in any event could not yet be cited directly in CIA publications, even in those sent to the Ibid. (u) " Ibid., pp. 6, 7. (u) 3' Ibid., pp. 84, 85. (u) " Ibid., pp. 85, 86. (u) " Ibid., p. 11. (u) 54 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 President." 9 The sophisticated aircraft and satellites that would one day open the whole interior of the USSR to surveillance were not yet on the drawing board, and the intelligence collection arm of the new CIA was finding it impossibly difficult to penetrate Stalin's paranoid police state with agents. In the end, the analysts had little to rely on but diplomatic and military attache reporting, media accounts, and their own judg- ment. (u) The paucity of hard intelligence about the Soviet Union placed a premium on the recruitment of topnotch analysts. Unfortunately, CIG and CIA had trouble landing the best and the brightest. CIG was in a particularly difficult situation; it had little authority to hire its own staff employees and thus depended on the Departments of State, War, and Navy for both its funding and personne1.40 Ludwell Montague com- plained to DCI Vandenberg in September 1946 that these departments were not cooperating: "From the beginning the crucial problem... has been the procurement of key personnel qualified by aptitude and expe- rience to anticipate intelligence needs, to exercise critical judgment re- garding the material at hand, and to discern emergent trends. Such persons are rare indeed and hard to come by, [and] the recruitment of them is necessarily slow."4' Montague was particularly bitter about Army intelligence's (G-2) efforts to fob off on CIG what he termed "low-grade personnel."''' (u) The establishment of CIA in September 1947 ended the Office's dependence on other departments for personnel and funds. It permit- ted the rapid expansion of ORE from 60 employees in June 1946 to " From unsecured Soviet communications, signals intelligence provided reliable infor- mation on such things as foreign trade, consumer goods policies, gold production, pe- troleum shipments, shipbuilding, aircraft production, and civil defense. A weekly all- source publication that did contain COMINT, the Situation Summary, was created in July 1950 and sent to the White House. The Situation Summary's purpose was to warn, in the wake of the North Korean invasion of South Korea, of other potential acts of ag- gression by Communist forces. See George S. Jackson and Martin P. Claussen, Orga- nizational History of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1950-1953, Chapter VIII, Current Intelligence and Hostility Indications, The DCI Historical Series (Washington, D.C.: The Central Intelligence Agency, 1957), p. 21, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 263, History Staff Source Collection, NN3-263-92-004. (u) " When the Central Re (Irts Staff began o erations, it consisted o people as- signed to it by State by War, and by Navy�all of whom immediately became preoccupied with preparing the Daily Summaries for President Truman, the first of which they published on February 15,1946. The Staff published its first piece of nation- al intelligence, ORE 1, "Soviet Foreign and Military Policy," at the end of July. (u) 4' Montague to Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, "Procurement of Key Personnel for ORE," 24 September 1946, in Warner, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman, p. 85. (u) " ibid. (u) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) 55 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates (b)(3 (b)(3 staff employees of whom were either analysts or managers of analysts, by the end of 1950.4' Although this solved the quantity problem, quality remained an issue. (U) Hanson W. Baldwin of The New York Times in 1948 noted that: personnel weaknesses undoubtedly are the clue to the history of frustration and disappointment, of friction and fiasco, which have been, too largely, the story of our intelligence services since the war. Present personnel, including many of those in the office of research and estimates [sic] of the Central Intelligence Agency, suffer from inexperience and inadequacy of background. Some of them do not possess the "global" objective mind needed to evalu- ate intelligence, coldly, logically and definitively. 44 (U) A senior ORE officer, R. Jack Smith, shared Baldwin's view, noting that: We felt obliged to give the White House the best judgment we could command, and we continued to try as the years passed by. Eventually.. .the cumulative experience of this persistent effort, combined with the recruitment of some genuine specialists and scholars, produced a level of expertise that had no counterpart elsewhere in the government. But this was a decade or more away.45 (u) Ray Cline agreed with Smith's views. Cline wrote that "the expan- sion under [DCI] Vandenberg made the agency a little bigger than be- fore but not much better. It was filled largely with military men who did not want to leave the service at the end of the war but were not in great demand in the military services. The quality was mediocre."46 (U) During the critical year of 1948�which saw, among other crises, the Berlin Blockade� analysts worked in the As a group, their strength was pri- or exposure to the Soviet Union: Their backgrounds, however, were less (b)(3) (b)(3) impressive in other respects. "Table of Organization," 20 December 1950, Office of Transnational Issues Job 78- 01617A, Box 55, Confidential. (u) �Baldwin, "Intelligence�IV, Competent Personnel Held Key to Success�Reforms Suggested," The New York Times, July 24, 1948. (u) " Smith, The Unknown CIA, p. 36. (u) 46 Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars, p. 92. (u) 56 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates Approved for Release: 2018/66/27 C05500084 rret. Of those with college expe- rience, a surprising number majored in fields far removed from their work with CIG/CIA: civil engineering, agriculture, and library science, for example. Far from being stereotypical well-heeled graduates of the Ivy League, many had attended colleges that, at least in that period, were undistinguished. Although military experience was widespread, had served in the OSS.47 (U) To be fair, the analysts faced a number of impediments that made it difficult for their work to match expectations. The information at their disposal was, for the most part, shared by others in the policy and intel- ligence communities. Moreover, the pace of the working day was hec- tic, and the analysts were under constant pressure. The pressure came from outside�from government officials who demanded immediate support�and within, from individuals who realized that career ad- vancement rested on quantity of production. Consequently, analysts had precious little time for reflection. In perhaps the best-known example, Ludwell Montague in July 1946 was given only three days in which to research, write, and coordinate with the other agencies ORE-1, "Soviet Foreign and Military Policy," the first estimate produced by CIG." (u) Nowhere was the pressure greater than in the production of the Daily Summaries. Each morning, at nine o'clock, couriers would arrive at CIA headquarters with the previous day's cable traffic from State and the Pentagon. Between nine and 10, an editor would read the cables, write comments on those he thought worthy of using in the Daily Sum- mary, and sort them according to ORE' s branch organization. The ana- lysts had on average only one hour, between 10 and 11, to draft their articles. Between 11 and noon, the articles were edited, and at noon, the branch chiefs, editors, and office leadership met to decide which articles should be published. "By one o'clock, the Daily was usually dittoed, as- sembled, enclosed in blue folders, packaged, receipted for, and on its way by couriers to its approximately 15 official recipients."49 (u) Because there were few contacts between the analysts and editors on the one hand and senior policymakers on the other, choosing which stories to include in the Daily was a shot in the dark. As R. Jack Smith, then editor of the Daily recalled: The comic backdrop to this daily turmoil was that in actuality nobody knew what President Truman wanted to see or not see.... " Author's survey of CIA personnel files. Another veteran of the period, James Hanra- han, recalls that pockets of greater academic expertise existed in other branches of ORE, such as the West European branch. Interview with James Hanrahan, 16 July 1997. (u) " Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, p. 130. (u) " Jackson, Qflice of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1951, vol. 5, p. 583. (u) 57 (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates How were we supposed to judge, sitting in a rundown temporary building on the edge of the Potomac, what was fit for the Presi- dent's eyes?" After gaining experience on the job, Smith decided that: Intelligence of immediate value to the president falls essentially into two categories: developments impinging directly on the secu- rity of the United States; and developments bearing on major U.S. policy concerns. These cover possible military attacks, fluctua- tions in relationships among potential adversaries, or anything likely to threaten or enhance the success of major U.S. policy pro- grams worldwide." (u) The combination of uncertainty over what the President needed to see and the analysts' need to publish as much as possible brought edi- tors, analysts, and branch chiefs into frequent conflict. The analysts and their branch chiefs believed that they, as the substantive experts, should have the final say on the content of the Summaries, while the editors felt that the experts were too parochial in outlook to make such decisions." Neither side held command authority, so the disputes had to be settled through argument and compromise. The most intractable cases would be bucked up to the office leadership to decide. This situation remained a source of tension within the office throughout ORE' s existence. (U) The Threat of War in Europe... (u) From the beginning, the current intelligence sent to the White House contained numerous alarming reports about Soviet behavior from nearly all corners of the globe: the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and Korea in particular. A policymaker reading the Summaries, or the original reports on which the Summaries were based, could easily have concluded that Soviet military aggression was an im- minent possibility. (U) The most consistent�and perhaps most important�theme of CIG/CIA analysis during this period, however, was that Soviet moves, no matter how menacing they might appear in isolation, were unlikely to lead to an attack against the West. This judgment looks even bolder " Smith, The Unknown CIA, p. 34. (u) 51 Ibid., pp. 31-33. (u) 58 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 71.1C11� in light of President Truman's evident intention that ORE was to warn the US Government of another Pearl Harbor�that is, a sudden surprise attack on American forces or allies. Denied the ability to make com- ments in the Summaries for most of 1946, CIG' s first opportunity to put these reports into perspective was ORE-1, "Soviet Foreign and Military Policy," published on 23 July 1946. It noted that although "the Soviet Government anticipates an inevitable conflict with the capitalist world," Moscow "needs to avoid such a conflict for an indefinite period."52 (U) Similarly, a Special Study published a month later and sent to the President noted that "during the past two weeks there has been a series of developments which suggest that some consideration should be given to the possibility of near-term Soviet military action."" The authors judged, however, that: The most plausible conclusion would appear to be that, until there is some specific evidence that the Soviets are making the neces- sary military preparations and dispositions for offensive opera- tions, the recent disturbing developments can be interpreted as constituting no more than an intensive war of nerves. The purpose may be to test US determination to support its objectives at the [Paris] peace conference and to sustain its commitments in Euro- pean affairs." (t) Subsequent crises did not shake this assessment. During the March 1948 "war scare," touched off when Gen. Lucius Clay, the US military governor in Germany, sent a message to the Pentagon warn- ing of the likelihood of a sudden Soviet attack, CIA analysts bluntly " This and most of the studies cited in this essay are included in Woodrow J. Kuhns, Ed. Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Years, (Washington: Central Intelligence Agen- cy, 1997.) See ORE 1, "Soviet Foreign and Military Policy," 23 July 1946. (u). " On 9 February 1946, Stalin had given a harsh speech that convinced many leading Americans, including Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and Supreme Court Justice Will- iam 0. Douglas, that war with the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly likely. See Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 134, 135. Other incidents of this period that caused particular concern were Soviet diplomat- ic pressure on Turkey over joint Soviet-Turkish control of the straits, Yugoslavia's de- struction of two US aircraft, and a vicious Soviet propaganda campaign and internal crackdown (the Zhdanovshchina) against Western influences. On the Zhdanovshchina, see Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 123-125. (u) " Special Study No, 3, "Current Soviet Intentions," 24 August 1946. (u) 59 �s/get� Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 App roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates rejected the notion.55 During the scare, the State Department reported, in separate cables, that senior members of the Czechoslovak and Turk- ish Governments also feared the Soviet Union was prepared to risk an imminent attack. In comments on these reports made in the Daily Summary on 16 March 1948, analysts said "CIA does not believe that the USSR is presently prepared to risk war in the pursuit of its aims in Europe." On the following day, they added that "CIA does not believe that the USSR plans a military venture in the immediate future in ei- ther Europe or the Middle East."56 (U) During the Berlin blockade, CIA's position remained the same. "The Soviet action.. .has two possible objectives: either to force the western powers to negotiate on Soviet terms regarding Germany, or failing that, to force a western power withdrawal from Berlin. The USSR does not seem ready to force a definite showdown."57 The ex- plosion of the Soviet Union's first atomic bomb, on 29 August 1949, similarly failed to change the analysts' judgment: "No immediate change in Soviet policy or tactics is expected" was the verdict in the Weekly Summary.58 (U) ...and in the Far East (u) ORE initially deemed the possibility of aggression by the Soviet client regime in North Korea as more likely. An armed invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Peoples' Army is not likely until US troops have been withdrawn from the area or before the Communists have attempted to "unify" Korea by some sort of coup. Eventual armed conflict between the North and South Korean governments appears probable, however, in the light of such recent events as Soviet withdrawal from North Korea, intensified improvement of North Korean roads leading south, Peoples' Army troop movements to areas nearer the 38th parallel and from Manchuria to North Korea, and combined maneuvers." (0) " Clay's message, sent on 5 March 1948, stated that "For many months... I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness." Quoted in Frank Kofsky, Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 104. (u) " Daily Summary, 16 March 1948, Daily Summary, 17 March 1948. (u) " Weekly Summary, 2 July 1948. (u) " Weekly Summary, 30 September 1949. (u) " Weekly Summary, 29 October 1948. (u) 60 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates pere. ORE earlier had predicted that Soviet withdrawal from North Korea would be followed by "renewed pressure for the withdrawal of all occu- pation forces. The Soviet aim will be to deprive the United States of an opportunity to establish a native security force in South Korea adequate to deal with aggression from the North Korean People's Army.''60 (t) Unfortunately for ORE and the policymakers who read its analy- sis, this line was revised in early 1950. "The continuing southward movement of the expanding Korean People's Army toward the thirty- eighth parallel probably constitutes a defensive measure to offset the growing strength of the offensively minded South Korean Army," read the Weekly Summary of 13 January. ORE further stated that "an inva- sion of South Korea is unlikely unless North Korean forces can develop a clear-cut superiority over the increasingly efficient South Korean Ar- my."6' Although this assessment appears naive in retrospect, it actually fit in well with the views held by senior American military officers, who believed the South Korean Army was sufficiently strong and no longer required US military aid. South Korean strongman Syngman Rhee, moreover, had begun making noises to American officials about reuni- fying Korea under his control; the possibility of South Korean provoca- tion thus was not as remote at the time as it seems now.62 (u) The day after the North Korean attack on 25 June 1950, the Daily Summary counseled that "successful aggression in Korea will encour- age the USSR to launch similar ventures elsewhere in the Far East. In sponsoring the aggression in Korea, the Kremlin probably calculated that no firm or effective countermeasures would be taken by the West. However, the Kremlin is not willing to undertake a global war at this time."63 (U) After initially suggesting that "firm and effective countermeasures by the West would probably lead the Kremlin to permit a settlement to be negotiated between the North and South Koreans," the analysts with- in days concluded that "It is probable.. .that a concerted attempt will be " Weekly Summary, 16 July 1948. ORE 3-49, "Consequences of US Troop Withdrawal from Korea in Spring, 1949," published 28 February 1949, similarly predicted that the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea "would probably in time be followed by an invasion." Reprinted in Warner, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman, p. 265. (u) 61 Weekly Summary, 13 January 1950. (u) " Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Admin- istration, and the Cold War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 365. (u) 63 Daily Summary, 26 June 1950. (u) 61 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 App roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates made to make the US effort in Korea as difficult and costly as possi- ble." 64 A week later, the analysts amplified this theme: All evidence available leads to the conclusion that the USSR is not ready for war. Nevertheless, the USSR has substantial capabil- ities, without directly involving Soviet troops, for prolonging the fighting in Korea, as well as for initiating hostilities elsewhere. Thus, although the USSR would prefer to confine the conflict to Korea, a reversal there might impel the USSR to take greater risks of starting a global war either by committing substantial Chinese Communist forces in Korea or by sanctioning aggressive actions by Satellite forces in other areas of the world. 6' (u) ORE analysts quickly concluded, however, that Chinese interven- tion was not likely. They reasoned that, although a North Korean defeat would "have obvious disadvantages" for the Soviet Union, "the com- mitment of Chinese Communist forces would not necessarily prevent such a defeat and a defeat under these circumstances would be far more disastrous, not only because it would be a greater blow to Soviet pres- tige throughout the world, but because it would seriously threaten Sovi- et control over the Chinese Communist regime." Moreover, if the Chinese were to emerge victorious, "the presence of Chinese Commu- nist troops in Korea would complicate if not jeopardize Soviet direction of Korean affairs; Chinese Communist prestige, as opposed to that of the USSR, would be enhanced; and Peiping might be tempted as a result of success in Korea to challenge Soviet leadership in Asia." Finally, the analysts believed that Chinese intervention was unlikely because "the use of Chinese Communist forces in Korea would increase the risk of global war, not only because of possible UN or US reaction but because the USSR itself would be under greater compulsion to assure a victory in Korea, possibly by committing Soviet troops."66 (u) " Ibid.; Weekly Summary, 30 June 1950. (u) Weekly Summary, 7 July 1950. Three days after the war began, ORE analysts assured President Truman that "No evidence is available indicating Soviet preparations for mil- itary operations in the West European theater...." Nevertheless, the analysts cautioned, "Soviet military capabilities in Europe make it possible for the USSR to take aggressive action with a minimum of preparation or advance notice." Daily Summary, 28 June 1950. (u) 66 Weekly Summary, 14 July 1950. (u) 4ret- 62 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7. The Weekly Summary of 15 September 1950 briefly described the evidence that suggested Chinese intervention was likely but still con- cluded that Beijing would not risk war with the United States: Numerous reports of Chinese Communist troop movements in Manchuria, coupled with Peiping's recent charges of US aggres- sion and violations of Chinese territory, have increased specula- tion concerning both Chinese Communist intervention in Korea and disagreement between the USSR and China on matters of mil- itary policy. It is being argued that victory in Korea can only be achieved by using Chinese Communist (or Soviet) forces, that the USSR desires to weaken the US by involving it in a protracted struggle with China, and that the Chinese Communists are blam- ing the USSR for initiating the Korean venture and thus postpon- ing the invasion of Taiwan. Despite the apparent logic of this reasoning, there is no evidence indicating a Chinese-Soviet dis- agreement, and cogent political and military considerations make it unlikely that Chinese Communist forces will be directly and openly committed in Korea.� (u) The first Chinese warnings of intervention in the war if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel were published in the Daily Summary on 30 September without comment, perhaps because they were downplayed by the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, to whom others in the Mos- cow diplomatic corps had passed the warnings." On 3 October, the an- alysts drew on a similar report from the US Embassy in London to state that "CIA estimates... that the Chinese Communists would not consider it in their interests to intervene openly in Korea if, as now seems likely, they anticipate that war with the UN nations [sic] would result." 69 In the same article, the analysts warned, as they had before and would again, that "The Chinese Communists have long had the capability for military intervention in Korea on a scale sufficient to materially affect the course of events." Nevertheless, in eight subsequent Daily Summaries, CIA analysts restated their belief that China would, first, not intervene, and then�as the intervention got under way�that it would not develop into a large scale attack. The last Summary containing this judgment came "7 Weekly Summary, 15 September 1950. For the contemporary research on this issue, see, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 77-82. (u) '8 Daily SUMMary, 30 September 1950. (u) 69 Daily Summary, 3 October 1950. (u) 70 Ibid. (u) 63 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 App roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates on 17 November, three weeks after the first Chinese troops, wearing Korean uniforms, entered combat in far northern Korea.7' (u) The Danger of Subversion in Europe (u) Throughout this period, ORE analysts were far more concerned about Soviet use of local Communist parties to subvert pro-Western governments than they were about the possibility of armed aggression by the USSR or one of its Communist allies. As ORE expressed it in September 1947, "The USSR is unlikely to resort to open military ag- gression in present circumstances. Its policy is to avoid war, to build up its war potential, and to extend its influence and control by political, economic, and psychological methods."" (U) CIG had reached a very similar conclusion about the first serious postwar confrontation with the Soviet Union�its refusal to withdraw its forces from northern Iran and its subsequent support for the break- away Iranian provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.'" After the worst of the Iran crisis had passed, the first Weekly Summary warned that the Soviets, having recognized that their policy toward Iran was "heavy- handed and over-hasty" would rely on "gradual penetration." It de- clared that "the Soviets clearly feel that 'time is on their side' in Iran and that the general economic backwardness of the country and the unpop- ular labor policy of the British oil companies will forward their cause."74 "Their cause" was identified as "gaining control over Iranian oil and blocking closer military ties between Iran and the West."75 (u) ORE tracked the gradual but inexorable consolidation of Commu- nist power across Eastern Europe, as brought about through a combina- tion of political manipulation by local Communists and pressure from the Soviet occupation forces. The political and economic undermining of the prospects for democracy in Eastern Europe reinforced the ana- lysts' conclusion that this type of subversion was the greatest danger from the Soviet Union. The analysts observed that Moscow's objective Daily Summaries, 9 October 1950; 16 October 1950, 20 October 1950, 28 October 1950,30 October 1950,31 October 1950,2 November 1950, 17 November 1950. (U) 71 Review of the World Situation, CIA 1, 26 September 1947, (u) In December 1945, Iranian rebels under the protection of Soviet forces proclaimed an independent Azerbaijan and an independent Kurdish People's Republic. The govern- ment of Iran protested this Soviet interference in its internal affairs before the UN Se- curity Council in January 1946. (U) 74 Weekly Summary, 14 June 1946. (u) " Weekly Summary, 18 March 1949. (u) 64 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports arid Estimates Approved for Release: 2018/0�/27 C05500084 7- - in the region was to "establish permanent safeguards for their strategic, political, and economic interests, including ..stable and subservient, or at least friendly, regime[s]."76 (u) The analysts were most troubled by the consolidation of Commu- nist power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, judging that it would diminish: the possibility of a compromise in Europe between the ideologies of the Kremlin and the principles of western democracy and indi- vidual freedom. Such a compromise had apparently been achieved in Czechoslovakia.... The coup...reflects the refusal of the Com- munists to settle for anything less than complete control and their conviction that such dominance could never have been achieved under a freely operating parliamentary form of government." (u) On Germany, ORE anticipated that Stalin would use subversive tactics to try to create a unified German state from the occupied ruins of the Third Reich: "A German administration strongly centralized in Ber- lin will be much more susceptible than a loose federation to Soviet pres- sures.... Posing thus as the champions of German nationalism and rehabilitation, the Soviets can attempt to discredit the policy of the western powers and to facilitate the Communist penetration of their zones."" The analysts warned that the removal of zonal barriers would place the Soviets in a "position to launch a vigorous campaign to com- munize the Western zone." (u) After the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) conference in Mos- cow in the spring of 1947 failed to reach agreement on Germany's fu- ture, ORE analysts advised that the Soviets may be trying to (1) "prolong the unsettled conditions in Europe conducive to Communism; and (2) to encourage the US to expend its patience and energy in a vain quest for agreement until forced by its internal economic and political conditions to curtail its foreign commitments and to leave Europe to the USSR by default."'" (u) " Weekly Summary, 5 July 1946. The quotation refers specifically to Bulgaria, but the same point was repeated about other East European countries as well. Weekly Summary, 19 July 1946, hit- example, contains a piece on Hungary that notes the "Soviet desire to establish the control of the minority Communist Party in anticipation of the peace set- tlement and the ultimate withdrawal of Soviet troops." (u) " Weekly Summary, 27 February 1948. (u) " Weekly Summary, 19 July 1946. (u) 79 Weekly Summary, 2 August 1946. (u) m Weekly Summary, 2 May 1947. (u) 65 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates ORE noted that Soviet efforts to penetrate the Western zones of Germany focused on attempts to "extend the SED [Socialist Unity Par- ty, the Communist's stalking horse in the Eastern zone] political struc- ture to the West, while, simultaneously, efforts are made to establish Communist front organizations, such as the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ), and to penetrate Western Zone labor unions."81 ORE warned that if "Soviet efforts at the [November 1947] CFM fail to achieve a united Germany on Soviet terms, the USSR will attempt to blame the Western Powers for failure of the conference. At the same time, the Kremlin may announce the recognition of a 'German Republic' east of the Elbe and attempt to secure the removal of the Western allies from Berlin."" (U) Once the first signs of the Berlin blockade emerged in April 1948, ORE analysts advised that Stalin wanted "a negotiated settlement.. .on terms which would permit ultimate Soviet control of Berlin and Com- munist penetration of Western Germany."" After the blockade was lift- ed in the spring of 1949, CIA assessed that Soviet objectives in Germany remained unchanged: "Soviet agreement to lift the Berlin blockade and enter into four-power discussions on Germany does not represent any change in the Soviet objective to establish a Germany which will eventually fall under Soviet domination."84 (U) The analysts also highlighted the Communist threat in France and Italy. Both countries had emerged from the war with widespread devas- tation and strong Communist parties sharing power in coalition govern- ments. After the French and Italian prime ministers expelled the Communist ministers from their governments in the spring of 1947, ORE predicted that: The Kremlin apparently proposes for countries such as France and Italy: (1) intensive agitation against their present governments and against non-Communist liberals; and (2) the development of highly-disciplined Communist cores which, at the proper moment, could assume control. Such a program is well-adapted to the current situation in France where, [now] relieved of govern- mental responsibility, the Communists are in a position to threaten (by propaganda, subversion, and trade-union agitation) the stabil- ity of the present Government. Where Communism is less power- ful, the Kremlin desires to concentrate on gaining control of trade unions and other liberal organizations." (u) 81 Weekly Summary, 5 September 1947. (u) " Ibid. (u) " Weekly Summary, 5 November 1948. (0 84 Weekly Summary, 6 May 1949. (u) " Weekly Summary, 9 May 1947. (u) 66 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 ORE warned in September 1947 that "the sudden overthrow of the De Gasperi Government [in Italy] by Communist-sponsored armed force, following [the December 1947] withdrawal of Allied troops," was "within the realm of possibility" because of the Italian Army's weakness. But the analysts thought that outcome was unlikely. They wrote that "the USSR is unwilling to support directly such a step be- cause it might involve war with the US" and because the potential fail- ure of the much-anticipated European Recovery Program (better known today as the Marshall Plan) could deliver Italy into the hands of the Communists in the April 1948 elections. ORE worried more that a Communist-inspired general strike could paralyze the important north- ern Italian industrial area; such an event could "defeat the operation of the European recovery program and eventually throw not only Italy into the Soviet orbit, but possibly France as well."86 (u) A Special Evaluation published on 13 October 1947 concluded that Moscow's establishment of the Communist Information Bureau in September 1947: suggests strongly that the USSR recognizes that it has reached a point of diminishing returns in the attempts of the Communist parties of Western Europe to rise to power through parliamentary means and that, consequently, it intends to revert to subversive activities, such as strikes and sabotage, in an effort to undermine the stability of Western European governments. This move like- wise tends to substantiate the contention that the USSR considers international subversive and revolutionary action, rather than mili- tary aggression, as the primary instrument for obtaining its world- wide objectives." (U) ORE concluded that, "In its efforts to sabotage the European re- covery program, which is the USSR's immediate and primary target, the Kremlin will be willing even to risk the sacrifice of the French and Italian Communist Parties" by ordering them to use sabotage and vio- lence against the Marshall Plan. "If these Parties are defeated and driven underground, the USSR will have lost no more than it would lose by the success of the European recovery program. CIA believes that the unex- pectedly rapid progress of the [proposed] Marshall program has upset " Weekly Summary, 12 September 1947. (u) " "Implications of the New Communist Information Bureau," Special Evaluation 2/, 13 October I 947. (u) 67 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates the timetable of the Kremlin and forced this desperate action as the last available countermeasures." (u) The unexpectedly severe defeat of the Italian Communists in the April 1948 national election considerably eased the concerns of ORE' s analysts. Noting that the election results had "vastly improved the mo- rale and confidence of the anti-Communists in both Italy and France," the analysts predicted that "for the immediate future, Communist activ- ities in western Europe are likely to be directed toward rebuilding the popular front rather than an early or determined bid for power." Never- theless, "the Communists are not expected to relax their efforts to pre- vent recovery in Europe.... Strikes and industrial sabotage...therefore can be expected." (u) The civil war in Greece, which had begun in 1946, received rela- tively little attention in the current intelligence publications until the British Government announced in early 1947 that it would have to with- draw its forces from the country and significantly reduce its assistance to Greece's non-Communist government. The Weekly Summary of 28 February, published seven days after the British announcement, sum- marized the dire situation facing Greece: Alone, Greece cannot save itself. Militarily, the country needs aid in the form of equipment and training. Politically, Greece's diehard politicians need to be convinced of the necessity of a housecleaning, and the prostrate Center.. requires bolstering. Economically, it needs gifts or loans of commodities, food, for- eign exchange, and gold to check inflation. Of these needs, the economic are the most vital.... Without immediate economic aid.. .there would appear to be imminent danger that the Soviet- dominated Left will seize control of the country, which would result in the loss of Greece as a democracy." (u) ORE analysts believed the chain of command for the Communist forces in Greece started in Moscow and ran through Yugoslav leader Josip Broz-Tito to Bulgaria and Albania before reaching the Greek " Daily Summary, 4 December 1947. (u) " Weekly Summary, 23 April 1948. (u) 9' Weekly Summary, 28 February 1947. (Li) 68 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Communists." Nevertheless, they rejected the possibility that armies of those countries would assist the Greek guerrillas, despite numerous ru- mors to the contrary: CIG considers direct participation by the Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian armies unlikely. Such action would obviously have far- reaching international repercussions and might even involve the USSR in a world war for which it is unprepared. The likelihood of direct participation by Soviet troops in Greece or Turkey at this time is so remote that it need not seriously be considered." (u) In July 1948, ORE advised the President that Tito's rift with Stalin, which appeared in March, would considerably lessen the pres- sure against Greece." it soon followed with a report of slackening Bul- garian support for the guerrillas, although ORE was unable to specify the cause of the change." (0) The Threat From Revolution in the Far East (U) In their coverage of the Chinese civil war in the late 1940s, ORE analysts noted that "the Soviet Union has scrupulously avoided identi- fying the Chinese Communist Party with Moscow, and it is highly im- probable that the Soviet leaders would at this time jeopardize the Chinese Communist Party by acknowledging its connection with the world Communist movement."'" They later affirmed that the USSR had "given renewed indications that it is not ready to abandon its 'correct' attitude toward the Nanking Government in favor of open aid to the Communists in China's civil war."9" Moreover, "Because of the intense- ly nationalistic spirit of the Chinese people.. .the [Chinese] Communists are most anxious to protect themselves from the charge of Soviet dom- inance."97 (0) Not until the end of 1948 did ORE analysts begin to worry about what a Communist victory in China might mean for the global balance of power: "A tremendously increased Soviet war potential in the Far Weekly Summary, 15 August 1947. (u) " Daily Summary, 5 September 1947. (u) 93 Weekly Summary, 9 July 1948. (u) 91 Weekly Summary, 23 July 1948. (u) Weekly Summary, 19 December 1947. (u) " Weekly Summary, 9 January 1948. (U) 97 Weekly Summary, 27 February 1948. (u) 69 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved ,tor Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates East may result eventually from Communist control of Manchuria and north China."98 At the same time, the analysts began warning that "Re- cent statements from authoritative Chinese Communist sources empha- size the strong ideological affinity existing between the USSR and the Chinese Communist party...and indicate that Soviet leadership, espe- cially in foreign affairs, will probably be faithfully followed by any Communist-dominated government in China."99 (U) After the Communists' final victory over Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime in the autumn of 1949, the analysts doubted that Mao's protracted stay in Moscow, which began in December 1949 and lasted for nine weeks, was a sign of potential trouble in the alliance: "Although the length of Mao's visit may be the result of difficulties in reaching agreement on a revised Sino-Soviet treaty... it is unlikely that Mao is proving dangerously intractable. Mao is a genuine and orthodox Stalinist, [and] is in firm control of the Chinese Communist Party."10� The analysts believed that "The USSR can be expected to gradually strengthen its grip on the Chinese Communist Party apparatus, on the armed forces, on the secret police, and on communications and informa- tional media."1�1 (U) ORE initially devoted little attention to the French struggle in In- dochina against the Viet Minh independence movement led by Ho Chi Minh�in fact, the office devoted much more coverage to the problems the Dutch were having in their colony in Indonesia. Although most of ORE' s information came from French officials, the analysts were skep- tical that Paris would be able to put down the rebellion.'�' They conclud- ed that "Any Vietnam government which does not include Ho Chi Minh or his more moderate followers limited in scope of authority by the perimeters of French military control and will be open to wide- spread popular opposition and sabotage."�3 (U) Ho was not at first portrayed by ORE as either a Communist or a Soviet ally. The analysts referred to him as "President Ho."�4 The first mention of a tie to Moscow, made in May 1948, was a grudging one: "Ho Chi Minh.. .is supported by 80% of the population and.. .is allegedly loyal to Soviet foreign policy."105 As late as September 1949, " Weekly Summary, 12 November 1948. (u) " Weekly Summary, 3 December 1948. (u) Weekly Summary, 13 January 1950. (u) Weekly Summary, 17 February 1950. (u) 102 Weekly Summary, 10 January 1947. (u) 1" Weekly Summary, 14 March 1947. (u) I" Weekly Summary, 24 October 1947. (u) Weekly Summary, 14 May 1948. (u) 70 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 analysts wrote that "Ho's relationship with the Kremlin and the Chi- nese Communists remains obscure....Ho has stated his willingness to accept military equipment from the Chinese Communists. On the oth- er hand, Ho still maintains that neutrality between the US and the USSR is both possible and desirable." " (u) Moscow's recognition of Ho's government on 31 January 1950 prompted the analysts to change their stance dramatically, however." They saw the likelihood of a series of regional governments falling in turn under Soviet influence: If France is driven from Indochina, the resulting emergence of an indigenous Communist-dominated regime in Vietnam, together with pressures exerted by Peiping and Moscow, would probably bring about the orientation of adjacent Thailand and Burma toward the Communist orbit. Under these circumstances, other Asian states Malaya and Indonesia, particularly�would become highly vulnerable to the extension of Communist influ- ence.... Meanwhile, by recognizing the Ho regime, the USSR has revealed its determination to force France completely out of Indochina and to install a Communist government. Alone, France is incapable of preventing such a development."' (u) The analysts concluded that, although only the United States could help France avoid defeat, the "Asian nations... would tend to interpret such US action as support of continued Western colonialism."" (u) Soviet Aims in Israel (u) Like many in the State Department and elsewhere in the US Gov- ernment, ORE, worried by reports that the Soviets were funneling arms and money to Zionist guerrillas, suggested that the creation of Israel could give the USSR a client state in the Middle East."� Formation of a Jewish state in Palestine will enable the USSR to intensify its efforts to expand Soviet influence in the Near East and to perpetuate a chaotic condition there.... In any event, the '" Weekly Summary, 9 September 1949. (u) 107 Communist China had recognized Ho's government on 18 January 1950. (u) Daily Summary, 1 February 1950. (Li) Ibid. (u) "" Daily Summary, 25 June 1948. (u) 71 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates flow of men and munitions to Palestine from the Soviet bloc can be expected to increase substantially. The USSR will undoubtedly take advantage of the removal of immigration restrictions to increase the influx of trained Soviet agents from eastern and cen- tral Europe into Palestine where they have already had consider- able success penetrating the Stern Gang, Irgun, and, to a lesser extent, Haganah.'" (u) Not until November 1948, five months after Israel declared its in- dependence and defeated a coalition of Arab opponents, did ORE sug- gest that events might turn out otherwise: "There is some evidence that Soviet.. enthusiasm for the support of Israel is diminishing." "2 ORE later suggested that the change in attitude stemmed from a Soviet esti- mate "that the establishment of Israel as a disruptive force in the Arab world has now been accomplished and that further military aid to a country of basically pro-western sympathies would ultimately prove prejudicial to Soviet interests in the Near East."3 (U) Conclusion (u) ORE met its end shortly after Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith and William H. Jackson, of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa survey team, arrived in late 1950 as Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Director, re- spectively. They abolished ORE that November and replaced it with three new units: the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Re- search and Reports, and the Office of Current Intelligence. These steps finally ended the confusion over the analytical mission, primarily by splitting the competing functions of national, current, and basic intelli- gence into three offices. (u) Much maligned by insiders and outsiders alike, ORE' s record is perhaps not as bad as its reputation. Its analysis holds up well when compared to both the views held by other agencies at the time and our current understanding of events in that period. Of course, ORE, like all intelligence organizations in all eras, had its failures. Dramatic, sweep- ing events, such as wars and revolutions, are far too complex to predict or analyze perfectly. Even with the benefit of unprecedented access to Russian and Chinese sources, for example, contemporary historians are Weekly Summary, 14 May 1948. (u) 1" Weekly Summary, 12 November 1948. (u) I" Weekly Summary, 17 December 1948. (u) 72 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Reports and Estimates Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 unable to conclusively pinpoint when and why Mao decided to inter- vene in the Korean War. "4 (u) Gaps also exist in our knowledge about what intelligence Presi- dent Truman saw, understood, believed, and used. Judging the impact of intelligence on policy is difficult always, and especially so from a distance of fifty years. On many issues, such as the Communist threat to Italy, ORE's work tended to reinforce what many policymakers in the Administration and officials in the field already believed. (u) It does seem fair to conclude, however, that ORE' s repeated, cor- rect assurances that a Soviet attack in Europe was unlikely must have had a steadying influence when tensions were high and some feared a Soviet onslaught. In this, the analysts of ORE served President Truman well, and their accurate assessment ultimately must be considered ORE' s most important contribution in those early, fearful years of the Cold War. (u) (This essay is Unclassified.) The two sets of sources appear to be at least partially contradictory. See the discus- sion in Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, pp. 65-69, and in John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 77-80. (U) 73 74Q.L Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 Jecuet 00084 NOFORN The First Star: Douglas Mackiernan in China and Tibet (C) Nicholas Dujmovic "Don't shoot," called Douglas Mackiernan, American vice consul. Moments later, he was dead, killed in a fusillade of bullets fired by ner- vous guards on the border between China and then independent Tibet. It was April, 1950. Mackiernan received posthumous honors from the Secretary of State, and his name would grace the State Department's memorial to fallen Foreign Service officers. (U) Forty seven years later and half a world away, Acting Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet stood in front of CIA's Memorial Wall, with its seventy stars. He spoke before a large audience that had packed the lobby of CIA's Original Headquarters Building for the an- nual Memorial Ceremony. To the hushed crowd, which included Mac- kiernan's widow, Acting Director Tenet acknowledged Mackiernan as the first CIA officer to die in the line of duty: "He is the first star on that Wall, and the space in the book where his name should be is blank... but we claim Doug Mackiernan as one of our own.. .now, in a sense, we've brought him home." (s) The story of Douglas (Mack) Mackiernan is the story of a brave and resourceful officer working for his country in a desolate, isolated foreign land undergoing a Communist revolution. It demonstrates the continuity of US foreign intelligence from the War Department's Strategic Services Unit, through the Central Intelligence Group, to the ' The earliest account of Mackiernan's death was told by the American who survived the attack, Frank Bessac, "This Was the Perilous Trek to Tragedy," Life, 13 November 1950. Other well known sources include Heinrich Harrer, Seven Years in Tibet (Lon- don: Hart-Davis, 1953), pp 237-38; Godfrey Lias, Kazak Exodus (London: Evans, 1956), pp. 170-72; and Fred Donner, "Overland from China," Foreign Service Journal, April 1985, pp. 38-41. All these accounts preserved cover for both Mackiernan and Bessac. Last year, however, a Tibet scholar published a history that exposes their CIA affiliation; see Warren W. Smith, Jr., The Tibetan Nation (Boulder: Westview, 1996), pp. 278-79. More recently, Mackiernan's widow cooperated with a Washington Post re- porter: Ted Gup's article, "Star Agents: Covert Lives and Covert Deaths at the CIA" (The Washington Post Magazine, 7 September 1997), is replete with errors but tells the main part of Mackiernan's story all too correctly that he was a CIA officer operating under cover in far western China from 1947 through 1949. (u) 75 S7(et (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The First Star Central Intelligence Agency. It shows an early friction between the practice of intelligence and the world of diplomacy. It illuminates the fears held by US officials during the initial stages of the Cold War. Above all, it reminds us of the peculiar kind of secrecy demanded by in- telligence, which insists that the heroic mission of Doug Mackiernan, who died in the service of this country far from home, should remain in a shroud of secrecy even after five decades. (s) An Extremely Capable Operative (u) Douglas Mackiernan was born in 1913, attended high school in Stoughton, Massachusetts and studied physics at the Massachusetts In- stitute of Technology. He was an expert in both radio and meteorology; he was fluent in Spanish and had proficiency in French, German, and Russian. In April 1942, Mackiernan became a US Army meteorologist, which allowed him to serve his country while indulging his love of trav- el. He deployed to Greenland, Alaska, and then China. Mackiernan spent almost two and a half years with the US Army's 10th Weather Squadron in Urumqi, capital of Xinjiang province in far western China, on the Soviet border.2 In the spring of 1946, Mackiernan headed home for his discharge from the Army.' (0) But Mackiernan wanted to return to Urumqi. He found the Xin- jiang province�with its extremes of desert and mountain, its volatile ethnic mix, and its frontier character�fascinating. The War Depart- ment's Strategic Services Unit (SSU�which housed remnants of the OSS) expressed an interest in Mackiernan' s talents and knowledge.4 SSU was particularly interested in Xinjiang province because it was widely believed that local uprisings against Nationalist Chinese author- ity in the Sino-Soviet border region were instigated by Moscow.' Soviet influence and inroads were believed to stem in part from a desire to con- trol important mineral deposits of the region�especially uranium. It Names and spellings are problematic for this region. For this article I use the current Chinese "pinyin" usage for Urumqi and Xinjiang, rather than the older forms Urumchi and Sinkiang. Complicating matters is the fact that Mackiernan and his contemporaries called Urumqi, the ancient Uighur name for the provincial capital, by its Chinese name, Tihwa or Tihua. DO records reflect all these usages and more. (u) See Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949 (London: Sharpe, 1990), passim. (u) 7Cet 76 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084.. The First Star Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 also made sense for Moscow to keep tabs on the nationalist and inde- pendence movements of Xinjiang, as these could affect minorities in neighboring Soviet Central Asia. All this was speculation; what was known for sure was that the Soviets had five consulates in the province. What American intelligence needed was an astute observer on the ground, and Mackiernan seemed ideal. (s) SSU officers interviewed Mackiernan in China and judged him a trainable intelligence officer ideally suited to operations in Xinjiang. Be- sides his knowledge of radio, he knew a lot about photography. He already spoke Russian, and be was also studying Chinese and Mongolian.' (S) On his arrival in Washington, SSU made an employment offer, and 1946. Expectations regarding Mackiernan were high Indeed, the highest intelligence priority concerned Soviet activities and influence in Xinjiang, especially intelligence relat- ed to Soviet efforts to construct an atomic bomb. Mackiernan was di- rected to discover where the Soviets might find uranium in the province, whether they were mining it, and whether any "atomic recearrh" w2C being conducted on Chinese territory. He was 77 S7(et (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The First Star also to find out what he could regarding Soviet diplomatic, military, economic, and intelligence activities; Soviet military aid tn unrin 1Q eth- nic factions; and the spread of Communist propaganda (b)(1) (b)(3) Almost as soon as he returned to China in October 1946, Mac- kieman became one of the select number of SSI T officers whn rhnde the transition to the Central Intelligence Group. (b)(1) (b)(3) on his own initiative got the State Department to hire him as a clerk for the US Consulate General (here- inafter referred to as the US Consulate) in Urumqi. (b)(1) (b)(3) He requested through CIG channels to be made vice consul. (DCI Hillenkoetter made the for- mal request to the State Department on 20 August 1947.)'� (s) (b)(1) At that time, the Embassy in Nanking sent him (b)(3) Urumqi overland�a distance of 2,400 miles. Mackiernan and a young Foreign Service Officer named Edwin Martin (later Ambassador to Burma) took a jeep, an Army truck and trailer, and four tons of supplies. They barged their convoy across the Yangtze, spent ten days on freight trains to Xi'an in central China, then drove the remaining 1700 miles to Urumqi, arriving on 12 June." (s) (b)(1) (b)(3) " Edwin Martin, "Overland Again, Foreign Service Journal, September 1985, p. 8. I am indebted to Fred Donner for this reference. (U) S,/et 78 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The First Star Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 S et Mackiernan was immediately thrown into a fast-moving situation that provided a wealth of important intelligence. Border clashes be- tween Nationalist border guards and troops of Soviet satellite Mongolia erupted into serious fighting in mid-June 1947. 12 Nationalist China pub- licly accused Moscow of supporting Mongolian raids into Xinjiang. 12 See The New York Times stories on the fighting, 11-13, 18 9 June 1947. (u) (b)( (b)( 1) 3) (b)(1) (b)(3) 79 S/ret �Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 yeret The First Star S/ret 80 (b (b pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The First Star Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 S96-et In May of 1948, the State Department formally granted CIA's re- auest for Mackiernan' s aunointment as vice consul in I Jrnmai Mackiernan was to focus his efforts on Xinjiang, especially what CIA's Office of Reports and Es- timates called "the most difficult puzzle" in Xinjiang: Soviet intentions, capabilities, and activities in the province. Intelligence on Soviet min- ing, military and intelligence activities, and Soviet influence in the rebel 81 Sicret (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Tut The First Star districts was especially sought after. (b)(1) (b)(3) -the gathering of intelligence on Soviet development of an atomic bomb�received assistance and enhanced capability from the US Air Force. While still in Shanghai in September 1947, Mackiernan had been approached by the Air Force about setting up a station in Urumqi that would monitor signs of a Soviet nuclear explosion. The Air Force did not know Mackiernan was a CIA officer but apparently be- lieved the Army meteorological experience of the young State Depart- ment employee made him ideal for this project. The initial phase of the plan, as further developed in Washington in mid-1948, was to place barographic, seismographic, and radiological equipment, provided by the Air Force and disguised as a weather station, under Mackiernan' s supervision at the Urumqi consulate. Later, more sophisticated equip- ment would be sent. Mackiernan told CIA the Air Force wanted an im- mediate report, "should an unmistakable indication of an atomic explosion be recorded."24 (S) pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The First Star Approved for Release: 2018/0f6/27 C055 00084 83 S/et (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p i proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / The First Star The new provincial government was powerless to stabilize the now-chaotic economy or calm ethnic tensions; its incapacity further dis- credited the dying Nationalist Chinese regime. Rumors began to circu- late in Urumqi that the province was prepared either to cede Xinjiang's mineral resources to the USSR or to surrender to the Chinese Commu- nists. Mackiernan himself believed that Xinjiang would align itself with ,tet 84 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084� The First Star Approved for Release: 2018/06;27 C05500084 Mao's Communists in order to gain protection against Soviet hegemo- ny, but that this realignment would take some time.32 (s) Flight From Urumqi (U) The rapid advance of Mao Zedong's army toward northwest China led Secretary of State Acheson to decide in late July 1949 to close the Consulate in Urumqi.34 CIA and State agreed to leave Mackiernan in place for approximately three months to continue intelligence gathering. Mackiernan cabled CIA that he was "willing [to] remain here last long as needed, " Benson, Ili Rebellion, pp. 172-76. (U) The possibility that the USSR would actually annex portions of Xinjiang was raised in an April 1949 CIA estimate; CIA believed Moscow favored "the formation of an autonomous territory of Xinjiang, possibly with a view to creating a new Soviet Union Republic at some time in the future." ORE 29- 49, "Prospects for Soviet Control of a Communist China," in Michael Warner, ed., The CIA under Harry Truman (W-ozhino-tnn C � CIA Hictnry qtaff 1 QCIA.1 nn 9R1 155 Nee tne aispatcnes trom w astungton, canton, and Nanking, 22-29 July 1949, in FRUS, 1949, volume VIII, The Far East: China, pp. 1303-06. (0) 85 S/ret (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) -Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 'p i proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / The First Star I (S) (b)(1) (b)(3) The Air Force, for its part, made it known that it wanted Mackier- nan to continue monitoring for signs of a Soviet atomic test. In response to a query from Headquarters, Mackiernan cabled on 11 August that his Air Force equipment was in operation and that his instructions were to make a report only for an "unusual event of which none so far."36 (s) On the morning of 16 August, Consul General Paxton, his wife, and several Consulate employees left Urumqi on an arduous journey that would take them west across Xinjiang and into India by late Octo- ber; Paxton would make it back to the United States in mid-November." As Vice Consul and the only American presence left in Urumqi, Mac- kiernan proceeded to destroy the Consulate's files and turn US property over to the British Consulate Genera1.38 (S) The doors to Mackiernan's future began to shut. On 25 August, he cabled to Headquarters that the western route to India had been closed by the provincial government. On 3 September, Mackiernan reported that Nationalist Chinese forces were beginning to evacuate Urumqi, and the city was in a panic." CIA cabled back, saying that under no circum- stances should Mackiernan remain in Urumqi if a Communist takeover was imminent.40 Mackiernan then heard that the main mountain passes from western Xinjiang into both India and Afghanistan had been sealed. For a possible return to Urumqi, Mackiernan spent many of his remain- ing days in the area caching equipment, cipher material, supplies, and gold reserves (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) " On Paxton's journey, see Lisagor and Higgins, Overtime in Heaven, pp. 173-206. (u) (b)(1) (b)(3) S/ret 86 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The First Star Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Amidst this activity, CIA sent Mackiernan the following cable: "Report priority all info and rumors on atomic explo- sion supposed to have occurred on Asiatic mainland last half August 1949. Handle with greatest discretion." (S) The Soviet Union, of course, had exploded its first atomic device in neighboring Kazakhstan, about 650 miles to the north west of Urum- qi, on 29 August. For reasons unknown, the Air Force equipment had not registered anything unusual. It is likely that Mackiernan' s equip- ment�which the Air Force had intended primarily for baseline barographic, seismic, and radiological readings for the region and which was supposed to be replaced with more sophisticated equip- ment�was not sufficiently sensitive to detect the changes produced by the Soviet explosion. Through no fault of his own, Mackiernan had missed his chance to become part of the history of the nuclear arms race. On 15 September he ceased monitoring and destroyed the equipment.42 (s) 87 t (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 'p / proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The First Star / (b)(1) (b)(3) On 25 September, Mackiernan learned that the Xinjiang provin- cial government had decided to sever all ties with the Nationalists the following day and to accept the authority of the Communist government in Beijing.44 Word reached Mackiernan that foreigners would be prevented from leaving Urumqi along the likely escape route soutl(b)( 1) ward. He cabled CIA on 27 September, "Am taking to hills (b)(3) They would go on a route east and south, toward western Qinghai province, that the Communists probably would not expect them to use.45 That was the last me sage from CIA's Urumai station. (s) (b)(1) (b)(3) 44 Vice Consul at Tihwa [Urumqi] Mackiernan to Secretary of State of 25 September 1997 in FRI'S' 1949 vol IX n 1062 (th Set 88 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084" The First Star Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 00084 89 yret (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / The First Star (b)(1) (b)(3) 90 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The First Star Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05 00084 91 7�et (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 S9.6et The First Star 1 (b)(1) (b)(3) ?Zret 92 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The First Star Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 Syl-et 00084 93 S/Zet (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 e7et The First Star (b)(1) (b)(3) The Mackiernan party in early March 1950 prepared for its jour- ney to India (b) (b) (1) (3) Vcret 94 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The First Star Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 7ret 00084 The Final Journey (U) through the mountain passes to Lake Ayyakum. From there, it was a relatively easy matter to navigate due south toward Tibet. Mackiernan carried a hand drawn map of the route On March 29th, CIA requested the State Department to get Tibet's clearance for the safe ar- rival of the Mackiernan party. State passed the information to the Em- bassy in New Delhi the following day, and the Indian Government was urged to get the necessary clearances in Lhasa. Between the second and fifth of April, Tibetan messengers left Lhasa for all border outposts to warn them of the imminent arrival of the Mackiernan party.61 (s) During these last weeks of Mackiernan's life, he and the party he led traversed some of the wildest, most beautiful and austere territory on earth. Today, the entire region is a nature preserve of the People's Republic of China. Then, it was known simply as the Tibetan Plateau, an area with altitudes of 15,000 to 22,000 feet, dotted with a myriad of lakes and rivers, snow-covered peaks and treacherous passes 95 L3,{ret (b) (b) (1) (3) (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7et. The First Star On the morning of 29 April 1950, at a place in northern Tibet called Shigarhung Lung, the Mackiernan party came upon a Tibetan nomad family tending their sheep. The nomads, who were armed, quickly retreated to a small rock shelter, ready to fire. Anxious to dem- onstrate that the newcomers were not Kazakhs intent on stealing sheep, Mackiernan ordered the party to pitch camp in the open near a small stream. Suddenly, a separate group of six armed Tibetans in what ap- peared to be uniforms appeared on horseback. (b)(1) (b)(3) The Tibetan patrol, which had fired from behind an embankment, got up and walked toward the unarmed party. Then, apparently, one of the Tibetans panicked ane fired. Tibetans opened fire. Douglas Mackiernan, then all th(b)(3) were killed. were taken prisoner. The Tibetans mutilated the bodies (b)(1)c the dead men and looted their belongings for two days before setting ot(b)(3) for the town of Shentsa with their prisoners. On the journey, on May 4th, they met the government messenger from Lhasa on his way to in- form the soldiers to welcome Mackiernan and his party. He was five days too late.� (s) It is clear that CIA had delayed initiating its request for Tibeta(b)(1 ) clearance. (b)(3) because CIA feared for the party's safety should Tibet defect to or be invaded by the Chinese (b)(1) (b)(3) Sylret 96 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The First Star Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 3e,ret Communists. What is less clear is whether this delay mattered in Mackiernan's death. In Lhasa, the Tibetan Government told that all Tibetan outposts received the message about the party by mid- April all except the outpost at Shigarhung Lung, due to the failure of one messenger to pass the information.64 (s) A greater factor in the tragedy was probably Mackiernan's own misjudgment. Believing himself to be farther north than he actually was, he may have been less cautious about the endemic violence in the region about which Headquarters had warned him.65 Mackiernan was perhaps a victim of his own naivete about Tibetans, who are often viewed romantically by Westerners as peaceful and gentle, but who can be as brutal and capricious as any other people. Mackiernan, knowing he could shoot his way out of a difficult situation, gambled on a peaceful approach and lost. In the end, it was an accident, a tragic happenstance that took the life of the first CIA officer to die in the line of duty. (s) The bodies of Mackiernan and his companions were buried at Shigarhung Lung by a contrite Tibetan Government, horrified at the tragedy. three crosses that were built in Lhasa and sent back to stand over their graves. A photograph of the site was supposed to be taken and provided to the US Embassy at New Delhi, but there is no record that this happened. Douglas Mackiernan's grave, for all we know, is unmarked as well as forgotten. (s) The question asks itself: could his remains be found? If so, does the Agency owe Doug Mackiernan the effort to locate his grave and bring his remains back to the United States? The US Government mounts extraordinary efforts to find and return the remains of US sol- diers, sailors and airmen who are lost in the most distant lands. Though it would be difficult logistically, not to mention politically, to succeed in bringing Doug Mackiernan back home to the country he served so faithfully, the effort would seem appropriate for all he gave. (s) S cret (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) 97 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 00084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 CIA and TPAJAX: The Tension Between Analysis and Operations (S) Scott A. Koch In the summer of 1953, the US Government saw what it thought were unmistakable signs that Iran was about to fall behind the Iron Cur- tain. Prime Minister Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq had broken off negoti- ations with Britain concerning compensation for the assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which Iran nationalized in 1951. Mossadeq, having ridden to power on a wave of nationalism, exploited the anti-British sentiment of the population and made political and diplomatic overtures to the Soviet Union. To Washington's alarm, he considered taking members of the Tudeh (Iranian Communist Party) into his Eovernment (u) Washington's view changed when Dwight Eisenhower took the Presidential oath of office in January 1953. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles did not think Mossadeq was a guarantor of political sta- bility, and events bore him out. Mossadeq's popular political support was almost gone by the summer of 1953. His allies in the Iranian Par- liament (the Majlis) had deserted him to protest his increasingly dicta- torial behavior. The Iranian economy was in shambles as the effects of a British boycott on Iranian oil took hold. The Prime Minister seemed unwilling or unable to exert the authority of the central government against growing crowds of Tudeh-inspired demonstrators. The State Department thought Mossadeq vulnerable to Tudeh subversion or even ' Mossadeq's negotiating style baffled most Westerners. He frequently wept, fainted, and conducted business while in his pajamas. British author L.P. Elwell-Sutton captured the attitude of British foreign policy officials when he wrote, "Really, it seemed hardly fair that dignified and correct western statesmanship should be defeated by the antics of incomprehensible Orientals." L.P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil: A Study in Power Poli- tics (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1955), p. 258. (u) 99 (b)( (b)( (b (b (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 CIA and TPAJAX a coup. No one in Washington was willing to watch Iran fall behind the Iron Curtain. (U) CIA's role in Mossadeq's fall quickly became an open secret and attracted the attention of the scholarly community. (b)(1) (b)(3) The Office of National Estimates and TPAJAX (s) The Board of National Estimates (BNE) in the Office of National Estimates (ONE) was CIA's analytical component responsible for pro- ducing long-range appraisals of world events. These appraisals, known as National Intelligence Estimates, ideally represented the Intelligence Community's best thinking on a particular topic. Under the leadership first of Harvard historian William Langer, and then Yale historian Sher- man Kent, ONE took the long view and did not concern itself with day- to-day events or crises. Instead, it concentrated on trends and probable future courses of action of other nations. Primarily because the Soviet Union was the focus of its attention, ONE paid little attention to Iran. These priorities changed when Mossadeq's Iran became a critical issue in US foreign policy.' (U) 2 Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). (u) For a discussion of Sherman Kent and ONE, see Donald P. Steury, ed., Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays (Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994). (u) 100 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 CIA and TPAJAX Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7-- ONE did not always have the cooperation of the clandestine ser- vices when drafting an estimate. In 1951, the year before DCI Walter Bedell Smith merged the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC, the of- fice responsible for covert action) and the Office of Special Operations (OSO, the office responsible for espionage) into the new Directorate of Plans, Dr. William Langer, head of BNE, asked OSO for its views for an upcoming national intelligence estimate on Iran. OSO management resisted the request on several grounds: (1) OSO had too many similar requests from ONE, (2) OSO personnel "were not paid to 'estimate,' but to produce facts," and (3) OSO personnel could barely keep up with their assigned duties, much less help ONE do its job.4 OSO clearly was not interested in dialogue with analytical components for the purpose of producing a superior analytical product. (s) ONE' s ability to produce accurate national intelligence estimates on Iran in the early 1950s suffered because the office knew next to noth- ing about the Tudeh. (s) the OSO Iranian desk officer, admitted that his field people had only a handful of low-level contacts within the Tudeh Party Hewitt did not think the absence ot intelligence on the ludeh reflected OSO' s lack of interest; as he explained to Kent, that office had been preoccupied almost exclusively with the Soviet Union and could not divert scarce resources to working the Iranian problem. Even if OSO had turned immediately to Iran, the office faced significant obstacles recruiting Iranian informants who could provide the sort of high-level, reliable information ONE needed. (b)(1) (b)(3) 101 "(let� (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 'p / proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 / CIA and TPAJAX 1 Yet in March 1953 it was clear that I (b)(1) (b)(3) had made giant strides in collecting information from Iranian sources. Acting Division Chief Miles Copeland assured Deputy Director (Plans) Frank Wisner that "when we report on the activities of an important in- dividual such as Mossadegh or the Shah, we are in almost all cases get- ting our information directly from a dependable espionage agent in intimate contact with the individual reported upon."' Copeland's mem- orandum noted that intelligence reporting on Iran had greatly improved but did not mention whether the analytical components were receiving these reports. In all likelihood the analysts never saw most of them, which helps explain why ONE found it difficult to draft satisfactory NIEs on Iran. (c) The Office of Current Intelligence and TPAJAX (S) The tension between ONE and the clandestine services was unfor- tunate but not potentially crippling to American policymakers during fast-breaking events. ONE concentrated on larger perspectives that were not sensitive to daily crises. The Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), on the other hand, analyzed events as they happened. OCI ana- lysts could help shape policymakers' views and decisions during crises. Their writing could have an immediate impact. (u) In the summer of 1953, OCT was responsible for keeping the Pres- ident informed about daily events that might affect US foreign policy. Analyst in OCI prepared "all- (b)(3) source current intelligence reports and items for OCT publications" and provided "briefing and other current intelligence support for other CIA components."8 (s) (b)(1) (b)(3) -s74- 102 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 CIA and TPAJAX Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 7 - - 0084 (b)(3) (b)(3) OCI initially conducted its analysis of the unfolding events in Iran ignorant of the developing American role. wrote that Mossadeq had been faced with many plots in the past but had always defeated them, and that there was no reason to believe that he would not do so again.9 (C) The day be bre DDP executed the operation someone finally called oes not remember who), said that there was an im- minent covert action, "and on this side of the house your analysts are saying there's no chance that it'll work." At this point analysts (b)(3) finally received a briefing about the operation. "From an analytical point," says, "this changed the situation completely. This was a major piece of information that we didn't have, and that if we had known it ahead of time, we would have phrased things differently, or maybe simply kept our mouth shut about it until it went off."i� (C) After TPAJAX tried to develop closer personal ties with his counterparts in the DDP. He did not expect the operators in the Iran Branch to tell him what was going on all the time, but he wanted to de- velop a relationship so that "they would trust me enough that they might tell me things that otherwise wouldn't get on paper, and so on. And by the same token to demonstrate to them that we could help them."" (S) gradually built a rapport with DDP officers that he says paid off for both sides. Nonetheless, he thinks that more cooperation could have improved the intelligence product immensely. When he trans- ferred to the DDP in 1957 "and started clawing through the files, one thing that struck me was how much useful intelligence information was in the operational files but had never made it out into intelligence reports because the reports officer or whoever had just not spotted it as intelligence report material." 12 (C) (b)(3) is philosophical about the limited contact that he and the oth- er analysts in his branch had with the people on the Iranian desk in the Directorate of Plans. There was, he says, "indeed a very deep gulf, institutionally, and policywise," and he speculates that the reason lay in differences between overt and covert employees. He and his fellow analysts were overt; many DDP employees were covert. From the 103 (b)(1 (b)(3 (b)(1 (b)(3 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 CIA and TPAJAX DDP's perspective, overt employees were not sufficiently sensitive to security issues. "There was a measure of distrust," believes, "on the DDP side against these overt analysts who probably had loose tongues and if we [in DDP] talk too much they'll [OCI analysts] go blabbing around town."" (c) John Waller makes the same assessment of the relationship between the analysts and operators. In a July 1995 interview, Waller suggested two additional reasons for the unofficial separation between the two directorates. First, most Irani- an specialists in the DDP were OSS veterans who had spent substantial amounts of time in the Middle East. They had acquired their knowledge from practical experience and thought that knowledge acquired this way was superior to the academic knowledge that Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts prized. Second, the DDP officers' relationships with the DI analysts were informal. "There was a lot of time," Waller said, "before you sort of had a wiring diagram that put us [DDP] together with the DI. It was all based on if you need their help, go get it, but you'd better know who you were talking to. There's no point in talking to a man who's only read the books you've read."4 (u) Bureaucratic differences probably played an important part in reinforcing the separation between the DDP and the DI. DDP officers may have thought that if the DI were included in covert action planning, analysts would begin to challenge DDP' s preeminence in covert opera- tions. Similarly, DI analysts may have feared that DDP operators would question their analytical preeminence and that close association with a covert action would raise questions about their objectivity. Philosophi- cal, organizational, and physical separation ensured that these kinds of issues seldom touched off bureaucratic warfare. (u) At least in the case of TPAJAX, the relationship between the DDP and the DI contrasted sharply with the relationship between DDP and the State Department. After the operation, John Stutesman, former Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Tehran, wrote to Roy Melbourne, First Secretary of the Embassy in Tehran, telling him of the close personal relationship he had developed with CIA's John Waller and Roger Goiran. "John Waller and (b)(1) Roger Goiran are men," Stutesman wrote, "upon whose judgment we (b)(3) can all rely without qualification and Arthur Richards [Director of the 104 (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084- CIA and TPAJAX Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 - 7 0084 Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State] and I have been happy to observe that they go out of their way to maintain friendly and close relations with us, asking our advice often upon sub- jects which their organization might not normally discuss with working levels in the Department."5 (s) Allen Dulles's Personal Directorate of Intelligence (U) The highest levels of management in CIA did nothing to discour- age the estrangement of the Directorate of Plans and the Directorate of Intelligence, and in fact reinforced it. Allen Dulles ignored the Agen- cy's analytical arm during TPAJAX, preferring to use personal acquain- tances as sources of information. I6 He had numerous contacts across the world and throughout American society from his prewar days as an attorney and his wartime service in the Office of Strategic Services. Personal relationships were important to Dulles, and he tended to trust the information he got from people he knew. On Iran, much of this in- formation came from Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Max Thornburg, an oil industry consultant. There is no evidence that Dulles ever passed on information from these sources to analysts in ONE or OCI. (S) Schwarzkopf had spent considerable time in Iran, had trained the Iranian Gendarmerie during World War II, and knew the Shah well. Through his work with this police force, which maintained a presence in all the provinces, Schwarzkopf became a storehouse of knowledge about Iran and was happy to share it with Dulles." (0) Max Thornburg ran Overseas Consultants, Inc., a firm that advised Middle Eastern governments on oil and economic questions. In 1950 he was in Iran as a consultant to the government, advising Iranian officials about the country's seven-year economic plan. ft Peter Grose's biography of Dulles captures this characteristic well. "Institutional ties never inhibited Allen from nurturing his own private networks of diverse colleagues and friends, many dating back decades, upon whom he would call in his regular trips to Eu- rope for civilized exchanges among men and, increasingly, women of the world." Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), p.319. (u) Waller interview. (c) 105 -404- b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 CIA and TPAJAX Thornburg gained unusual access to then-Deputy Director (Plans) Allen Dulles and key State Department officials. He maintained a steady correspondence with both CIA and State about events in the Middle East. Thornburg was not shy about telling "Allen" what he thought should be done, and consistently urged that the United States had to change the psychological climate in the Middle East. He also ar- gued that the Shah was not weak, but only "young, beaten-down and un- derstandably skeptical about any real support coming from the United States or Britain."19 Thornburg sat in on several sessions with Dulles and drafted some papers for CIA. (5) The Operation (U) (b)(3) The initial plan depended upon a military coup to remove Mossa- deq. Planners in CIA's Iran Branch in the Near East and Africa Division of the Directorate of Plans (DDP, the forerunner of the current Director- ate of Operations), hoped that Mossadeq's arrest would lead to a blood( b)(1 ) less change of leadership. After prompting from (b)(3) Americans, such as Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf2� and NEA Divison Chief Kermit Roosevelt, the Shah signed orders dismissing Mossadeq and replacing him with Zahedi. With the Shah's signed decrees, or fir- mans, in hand, Col. Nematollah Nassiri of the Shah's Imperial Guard ar- rived at Mossadeq' s Tehran home on the night of 15/16 August 1953. Mossadeq, however, had been tipped off that Nassiri was coming and (b)(3) 19 Letter, Max W. Thornburg to Allen Dulles, 10 February 1953, Office ot the Director of Central Intelligence Records, Job 80-R01731R, Box 13, ARC. (s) (b)(3) 106 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 CIA and TPAJAX Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 71.-1 00084 was prepared. When Nassiri attempted to deliver the papers, troops loyal to Mossadeq arrested him.21 Early in the morning of the 16th, Radio Tehran broadcast the news that a military plot against the government had been uncovered and foiled. It appeared that Mossadeq had triumphed, for the anti-Mossadeq officers' resolve melted as soon as Nassiri was arrested. They failed to seize their assigned objectives and many simply hid, hoping the whole thing would blow over. It did not. The Shah left his summer palace in the suburbs of Tehran and flew to Baghdad. The Iranian Communist Party took to the streets challenging the authority of Mossadeq's gov- ernment, demanding the Shah's life, and toppling statutes of the Shah's father. Mossadeq stood by and did nothing to suppress the Communist mobs." (ti) Kermit Roosevelt, who had arrived in Tehran to take field com- mand of the operation, was momentarily at a loss. Nassiri's arrest forced him to improvise and he beaan by 2etting in touch with his assets. (S) On the night of 18 August 1953, Mossadeq finally ordered securi- ty forces to clear the streets of Tudeh demonstrators. Some did so with a will, and forced the bloodied Iranian Communists to shout pro-Shah slogans as they were being beaten. On Wednesday morning, 19 August, the tide began to turn irreversibly against Mossadeq. A small pro-Shah demonstration- 107 (b)(1 (b)(3 (b)(3 (b)( (b)( (b)(1 (b)(3 (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 CIA and TPAJAX -began at about 0900 in the bazaar of Tehran. The crowd milled aimlessly until several people went into a small print shop and returned with copies of the Shah's firmans. The firmans were the spark the crowd needed. Eager hands reached for copies and the supply soon ran out.25 (S) At this point members of Iranian Zuhrkaneh (exercise clubs) ap- peared at the head of the crowd. Weightlifters, tumblers, and acrobats i exercised in unison while shouting pro-Shah slogans. (b)(1) (b)(3) iThe enthusiasm was infectious, and spread quickly. The crowds surged toward the offices of the pro-Mos- sadeq and anti-American newspaper Bakhtar Emruz and destroyed them as security forces watched.26 (s) During this time the military had remained quiet. Although many members of the officer corps opposed Mossadeq, they hesitated to move against the Prime Minister until they saw which way public opinion would swing. By 1130 there was no longer any doubt about Tehran's pro-Shah sentiment, and truckloads of soldiers sped through the streets waving the monarch's picture. Radio Tehran fell into royalist hands and at 1530 was broadcasting what Roosevelt later called "deliriously pro- Zahedi" messages. Tanks from the Imperial Guard escorted Fazlollah Zahedi to Radio Tehran, where he declared that he was the legitimate Prime Minister. By the late afternoon of the 19th, Zahedi had consoli- dated his hold on the government, Mossadeq was under arrest, and forc- es loyal to the former leader were in jail or in hiding. The Shah returned to a tumultuous welcome in Tehran on 22 August 1953, where he re- mained until the Iranian revolution and establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979.27 (u) The Consequences of Analytical Exclusion (u) TPAJAX illustrates the philosophical tension inherent in planning covert operations. Preparation must balance the need for fully informed decisionmaking with the need for strict operational security. The former requires that those with knowledge relevant to the operation be intimately involved from the start, while the latter requires that the number of people involved be kept to a minimum. (s) 108 (b)(3) pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084� Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 CIA and TPAJAX Nitret An ideal operation is at neither extreme and acknowledges the in- evitability of tradeoffs. Covert actions might have to be planned on im- perfect knowledge to ensure that they remain covert, and there may have to be compromises on absolute security in order to take advantage of relevant available expertise. How to balance these conflicting re- quirements has been a recurring issue throughout the history of CIA's covert operations. TPAJAX offers some clues on how this tension might be resolved in some cases. (S) TPAJAX was planned and executed with far greater concern for operational security than for ensuring that the planners had all relevant information. There is no evidence that operators in the Iran Branch of Kermit Roosevelt's Near East and Africa Division consulted either ONE or OCT at any stage of the operation. ONE and OCT might not have been able to provide much help because they had chronic difficulty get- ting intelligence reporting from DDP (the component responsible for espionage and covert action)�a problem that itself reflects poor com- munication between the analysts and collectors. (S) The consequences of the analysts' exclusion from TPAJAX can be examined from its effect on analysis itself (product and process), and on the preparation and execution of the operation. Exclusion damaged the analytical product because it prevented OCT analysts from basing their judgments on complete information. Exclusion harmed the analytical process because it impeded the creation of a valid framework for assess- ing future developments. (5) Had they been apprised of the US role in deposing Mossadeq, an- alysts probably would have been more circumspect in concluding that, because the Iranian Prime Minister had turned back coup attempts in the past, he was likely to prevail again. Knowledge that this time the United States was supporting Mossadeq' s opponents with extraordinary mea- sures might have changed or tempered this judgment. Inclusion in TPA- TAX planning might have made analysts more inclined to recognize the operation's potential for success. (s) Whether the segregation of analysis from operational planning af- fected the conception and execution of TPAJAX is less certain. The analysis was essentially incompati- ble with the planned covert political action, but did not dissuade the President, the Secretary of State, and the DCI from executing TPAJAX. Under these circumstances, one can make a strong argument that analytical exclusion had negligible consequences for TPAJAX. (s) 109 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 CIA and TPAJAX Fully informed analysis, nevertheless, might have enhanced the operation. The Dl's more scholarly and detached perspective and its methodology for assessing a dynamic situation perhaps could have helped NEA clarify the assumptions upon which TPAJAX was based, and how changes in those assumptions might affect the operation. (s) The operation's initial failure on 15 August 1953 provides the most conspicuous evidence that the absence of analytical expertise may have been detrimental. When Col. Nematollah Nassiri of the Shah's Imperial Guard arrived at Mossadeq's home to arrest him, Mossadeq arrested him. The Prime Minister had been informed that an attempt to depose him was underway, and had acted vigorously to head off the threat by calling on troops loyal to him. Col. Nassiri's arrest disheart- ened the other anti-Mossadeq officers, and the military challenge to Mossadeq melted away. Headquarters wanted to call off the operation. Had operational planning taken into account the possibility�even the likelihood�that segments of the Iranian military would react this way, DDP could have prepared contingency plans. (u) Incorporating analytical products into the planning for TPAJAX might not have guaranteed success�which owed much to Kermit Roosevelt's flexibility and initiative�but it would have forced the op- erators to question their assumptions and recognize that things might go wrong. If someone other than Roosevelt had been on the scene, things might have gone differently. (s) Advances in collection technology have given today's analysts ac- cess to an almost bewildering array of sources inconceivable to their colleagues of 44 years ago. The exponential growth of information from signals intelligence, imagery, and exotic collection platforms supple- ments but cannot replace clandestine reporting. Analytical products will be much richer if they add clandestine reporting to these sources; in turn, clandestine operators will have analysis that is fully informed and therefore more useful (u). 110 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 0084 Approved for Release: 2018/0L7 C0550 NOFORN Closing the Missile Gap (U) Leonard F. Parkinson and Logan H. Potter The search for information on the Soviet missile program became the most critical and elusive intelligence problem and the most demand- ing in terms of approach and management of the many substantive issues encountered in the first 20 years of strategic research at CIA. The Agen- cy drafted its first national intelligence estimate on Soviet guided missile development in 1954. Nonetheless, it was not until 1957 that American policymakers, military planners, and intelligence analysts began to wor- ry that the Soviet missile program had outstripped US development ef- forts. TASS' announcement of a successful flight test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in August 1957, followed in the next few weeks by the launches of Sputniks I and II�the world's first artificial satellites�prompted the Intelligence Community to draft its fourth estimate of the Soviet missile program in as many years. Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-10-57 can be considered the begin- ning of the "missile gap" controversy; its judgment that the Soviet SS-6 ICBM flight test program had "an extremely high priority.., if indeed it is not presently on a 'crash' basis," would be reconsidered and hotly debated for several more years.' At the heart of the dispute was an infor- mation gap of major proportions that was closed in late 1961 by those sources that at the beginning were thought to have the greatest prom- ise clandestine, communications, and photographic intelligence. (S) Soviet Missile Development (U) At the end of World War Ii, the Soviets began to exploit Hitler's missile effort, including the removal of missiles, missile equipment, and ' Director of Central Intelligence, Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 11-10- 57, The Soviet ICBM Program, 10 December 1957, (declassified). All of the NIEs (as well as SNIEs and SEs) mentioned in this essay are declassified and available in Record Group 263 (Central Intelligence Agency) at the National Archives and Records Admin- istration. Many of the NIEs cited are reprinted in Donald P. Steury, editor, Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983 (Washington: Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, 1996). (u) 111 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 FL Closing the Missile Gap 400 German scientists and technicians to the USSR. Using this German base, the USSR created a large research and development program for rockets of all types, including ballistic missiles. Almost all of the indus- trial effort supporting this activity was obscured from the West by high- ly effective security procedures. (0) On 5 February 1959 Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev an- nounced to the world that the Soviet Union "now has the means to de- liver a blow to aggressors in any part of the world. It is not just rhetoric when we say that we have organized the mass production of interconti- nental ballistic missiles; nor do we say this as a threat to anyone, but to make clear the real situation."' US analysts had watched Soviet missile development for years, and this was not the first of Khrushchev's many boasts. Nonetheless, his new threat, along with others in the winter of 1958-59, had commanded the attention of DCI Allen Dulles and the new United States Intelligence Board (USIB) of the National Security Council. USIB assigned the drafting of an assessment for the DCI to the Guided Missiles Branch of the Directorate of Intelligence's Office of Research and Reports (ORR). The task of reevaluating the evidence fell to Roland Inlow, Chief of ORR' s Guided Missiles Branch. His branch's report that winter noted that only limited new evidence on Soviet ICBM development had appeared, and was still being evaluated.' (s) Meanwhile, interest in Soviet ICBM statements continued at a high level through the first half of 1959, a period in which Khrushchev's first Berlin campaign withered away in the face of NATO's united re- sponse to his six-month deadline for a one-sided German peace treaty. In February or March, Inlow requested an analysis of Moscow's rocket claims from the DDI' s Radio Propaganda Branch of the Foreign Broad- cast Information Division (FBID). In June, at the request of DDI Robert Amory, Edward Proctor and Inlow collaborated on a paper assessing FBID's assessment of the Soviet statements. The June paper, like In- low's January memorandum for the White House, accepted as fact the assertion that the USSR had commenced mass production of interconti- nental ballistic missiles.4 (C) 'Quoted in NIB 11-5-59, Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles, 3 November 1959. (u) 'Roland Inlow, Chief, Guided Missiles Branch, to Edward W. Proctor, Chief, Industrial Division, Office of Research and Reports, "Monthly Report, December 1958," 6 Janu- ary 1959 (hereinafter cited as IDERA Monthly Reports), (S); Otto E. Guthe, Assistant Director for Research and Reports, to Robert Amory, Deputy Director for Intelligence, "Soviet ICBM Production Under Certain Assumptions," 29 June 1959; both documents reside in Office of Russian and European Analysis Job 79R01001A, Box 4, (S). It was not possible to locate accurate job and box numbers for every document cited in this study. All box citations, however, are to Job 79R01001A. (s) a IDERA Monthly Reports, June 1959, Box 4. (s) S/et 112 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap Siserct In response to White House and Congressional concern that de- ployment and series production were under way somewhere in the USSR, CIA scheduled three major estimates for late 1959 on the Soviet program. In retrospect, these stood as the crucial NIEs of the entire mis- sile controversy; they established a realistic forecast for the beginning of deployment of the first operational missiles. Two estimates projected numbers of launchers, and, for the first time, subordinated total numbers of missiles to the militarily more important number of launchers. Finally, the same two NIEs marked the beginning of the Intelligence Community's internal controversy over the intended size and pace of the Soviet ICBM program. (u) Controversy With the Air Force (u) Sherman Kent, chairman of the Board of National Estimates, asked that Edward Proctor be made available to work full time on the three estimates. Proctor was detailed to the Office of National Estimates (ONE) in South Building that August. In the meantime, the interagency Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), the Office of Scientific Intelligence's (OSI) Guided Missile Division, and ORR' s Guided Missiles Branch spent all of August preparing contribu- tions. Supplementary contributions for the estimates and memoranda on ICBM production for senior officials in the Eisenhower administration and for DCI Allen Dulles took the rest of the year. (C) To support this research and analysis, Dulles called on the "Hyland panel" to try to answer a more refined set of questions.' The panel comprised Laurence Hyland of Hughes Aircraft, Charles R. Irvine of Advanced Research Projects Agency, and Brig. Gen. Osmond J. Rit- land of the Air Force's Ballistic Missile Division. These holdovers from the previous year's three-day meeting were joined by Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, OSI' s consultant Dr. W. H. Pickering of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Rear Adm. William F. Raborn, Jr., Director of Navy's Special Projects (Raborn, then working on the Polaris nuclear submarine program, would become DCI in 1965), Dr. Albert D. Wheelon of Space Technology Laboratory, and Dr. William J. Perry of Sylvania Electronics Defense Laboratory. (C) The panel convened on 24 August 1959. After listening to brief- ings on Soviet strategic requirements, production and deployment, U-2 The Hyland Panel first convened in 1954 to critique NIE 11-6-54, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field, 5 October 1954. The Panel's mem- bership varied at its several meetings in the 1950s and early 1960s. (c) 113 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7 - Closing the Missile Gap The U-2 "spy plane." The U-2 was instrumental in proving the so-called "missile gap" did not exist. (It) photographic coverage, range activities, and telemetry, the panel turned its attention to some critical questions: � At what priority is the USSR developing an ICBM system and what progress toward development of an operational weapon system are the Soviets likely to have made to date from test activities at Tyura Tam?6 Is there evidence of support to this program in activities at Kapustin Yar? � What is the likelihood that the program has already been suc- cessful enough to permit the USSR to establish an initial opera- tional capability? What characteristics might an operational ICBM system have at present? � What is the likelihood that the Soviets have or are now flight testing more than one generation of ICBM? � Is there any evidence to support the present existence of or preparation for an operational ICBM capability in the USSR? Or a production program for ICBMs and system equipment? Would such evidence be detectable by current US collection capabilities? 6"Tyuratam" was the subsequent spelling. (u) 114 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap 71131. � What is the likelihood that the USSR is emphasizing space flight at the expense of ICBM development and that many of the tests, now evaluated as ICBMs, may in reality be develop- ment of space vehicle propulsion systems? � What changes, if any, are required in the panel's November 1958 report regarding ICBM production quantities and timing?' (S) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The panel came up with some tentative answers. The members correctly concluded that the SS-6 weighed about 500,000 pounds, and came close to the mark with an estimate of 750,000 pounds of initial thrust (its thrust was one million pounds). On the basis of continued SS- 6 testing and the lack of evidence of the development of a second-- generation ICBM, the panel members did not doubt that the SS-6 would be deployed. They had doubts, however, regarding the configuration of the missile, and could not choose between a "parallel stage" or a "one- and-a-half stage." Like the rest of the contemporary Intelligence Community, the panel was right in its estimation of a 6,000-pound warhead.' (s) The Hyland panel's conclusion that the pace of the Soviet program was "deliberate" was a sharp turn from the community's earlier belief in a crash program. This key conclusion was largely based on the small number of tests that the USSR had conducted since the panel's last meeting in November 1958. Up to that time, 10 tests had taken place at Tyuratam. The panel expected 20 to 30 more would be conducted by July 1959, but by the time the panel met in August, the Soviets had test- ed only 15 more. Thus, the total was 25, instead of the panel's anticipat- ed 30 to 40. In light of this limited testing, the panel concluded that the only short-term development could be a deployment of 10 ICBMs. The operational site the panel picked was at Polyarnyy Ural in northern Rus- sia. The Intelligence Community had detected construction activity at this site similar to that at Tyuratam.9 (s) ' "Agenda, Director of Central Intelligence Ad Hoc Panel on Soviet ICBM Program, Barton Hall, Room 1521, 24, 25, 26 August 1959," (S). See also John A. White, Secre- tary, DCI Ad Hoc Panel on Soviet ICBM Program, "Meeting of Director of Central In- telligence Ad Hoc Panel on Soviet ICBM Status," 11 August 1959, (S). Both in Box 4. (s) 'Charles M. Townsend, Deputy Executive Secretary, USIB, memorandum for the Unit- ed States Intelligence Board, "Notes on Discussion Between the US Intelligence Board and the Hyland Panel," 8 September 1959, Box 4, (TS Daunt). (s) 9 Ibid. (TS Daunt). The Soviets may have intended to deploy an SS-6 ICBM complex at Polyarnyy Ural, but for reasons still obscure, construction activity was abandoned dur- ing 1959. The construction of the Plesetsk SS-6 complex also began in 1959, but it was not firmly identified as such until a satellite photographic mission in 1962. (s) 115 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap The premise of a deliberate pace in the Soviet testing program led the panel to conclude that the Soviets would deploy no more than 400 to 500 missiles and that these could be operational by late 1962.'0 This premise and conclusion had a major impact on the next three national intelligence estimates. The first was NIE 11-5-59, a reference aid designed to display all available intelligence data on the capabilities of Soviet missiles and space vehicles. The estimate formally endorsed the panel's premise� based on a smaller number of tests than had been anticipated�that the So- viet ICBM program was proceeding in an orderly fashion. Initial opera- tional capability would be, the NIE assumed for planning purposes, 1 January 1960. But the estimate did not restate the panel's conclusion on operational ICBM levels; it made no effort to project force levels." (S) NIE 11-8-59 did and, in so doing, formally inaugurated the Intelli- gence Community controversy. For the first time, missiles on launchers became the central measure of force levels. But in the range of projec- tions, the low side was directly keyed to the output of a single plant, the high side to two plants. Army and Navy opted for the low side; State, Air Force, and the Pentagon chose the high side out to mid-1961. Beyond that period, a formal dissent from the Air Force's Assistant Chief of Staff, In- telligence, Maj. Gen. James H. Walsh, provided still higher figures (see table below). Soviet ICBMs Deployed as Projected in NIE 11-8-59 Intelligence Community Jan 1960 (IOC) 10 Air Force Footnote 10 Actual Number of Launchers a Mid-1960 35 35 4 Mid-1961 140-200 185 4 Mid-1962 250-350 385 38 Mid-1963 350-450 640 91 a Sources: NIE 11-8-59, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through Mid-1964, 9 February 1960. Analysis of the entire Soviet ICBM program in the 1960s produced the actual number of launchers. (u) This table is Unclassified. i� Ibid., (TS Daunt). (s) " NIE 11-5-59, Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles, 3 November 1959, and Annex A. (u) �s7(et- 116 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap Approved for Release: 20170_6/.27 C05500084 The Air Force did not object to the community's new conclusion that the Soviet ICBM effort was "not a crash program." Rather, Walsh attacked the idea that "The goal of the [Soviet ICBM] program is prob- ably an ICBM force as large as Soviet planners deem necessary to provide a substantial deterrent and preemptive attack capability." In his view, the Soviet Union was trying to attain decisive military superiority over the United States and would not be satisfied either with deterrence or a preemptive attack capability. 12 (u) NIE 11-4-59 followed 11-8-59, although formal USIB concur- rence for both came on 9 February 1960. NIE 11-4-59 differed sharply from the Air Force's belief that the Soviet program was aimed at all-out superiority. The estimate held that, while the USSR would build a "substantial long-range missile force," uncertainties, risks, and high economic costs would prevent it from constructing a force powerful enough to "permit them to plan attacks on Western retaliatory forces with the degree and certainty of success required to insure that the USSR could win a general war without incurring unacceptable dam- age." n (U) Of the three estimates, NlE 11-8-59 was by far the most important, because of the controversy surrounding its quantitative projections of ICBM force levels. Its major flaw was the lack of knowledge of the So- viet decision to limit deployment of SS-6 ICBMs, an analytical mistake that the Intelligence Community made on the basis of the strongest evidence available�the continued testing of the SS-6. NIE 11-8-59 was mainly Proctor's effort, and DDI Robert Amory and ONE' s Sherman Kent commended him for it. Proctor briefed DCI Dulles in December on the draft estimate. The NIE became the basis for Dulles' s testimony in the acrimonious joint Senate committee hearing on Friday, 29 January 1960.'4 (C) Allen Dulles Goes Before the Senate (U) The January Senate hearing was the roughest "missile-gap" pro- ceeding on record and underscored the problems of strategic research be- fore satellite reconnaissance. The next two missile NIEs and an important (though temporary) consolidation of CIA's missile-intelligence expertise '2 NIE 11-8-59, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through Mid-1964. (u) '3 NIE 11-4-59, Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959-64, 9 February 1960. (0 14 IDERA Monthly Reports, 1959. (s) 117 iLet� Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 /- Closing the Missile Gap followed the hearing. DCI Dulles appeared as the prime witness before the Senate's Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences and the Pre- paredness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Ser- vices, both chaired by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX). (u) Johnson called the committees to order and announced that its members intended to "interrogate (Allen Dulles) not only as to the na- ture and magnitude of the threat, but also to determine why the yardstick for measuring this threat was changed, and the extent to which it has been changed." Johnson noted that Secretary of Defense Neil H. McEl- roy had testified the previous year that the Soviets "could have a 3-to-1 missile superiority in the near future." In a January 1960 hearing only a week before Dulles's testimony, the new Secretary of Defense, Thomas S. Gates, Jr., said that there was no "missile gap" because the analytical assumptions had changed. According to Gates, the US Intelligence Community now looked at the issue from the perspective of what the Soviets intended to do rather than what they could do. '5 (s) In his testimony on 29 January, DCI Dulles repeatedly explained that the latest estimate did not rely exclusively on a "new yardstick," but that as more and more evidence on the Soviet ballistic-missile program came into CIA, Agency analysts were able to get a hold on Soviet pro- gramming decisions.16 (s) Dulles used a chart to point out that 15 of the 21 successful Soviet ICBM firings to 3,500 nautical miles or more had taken place in 1959. "Somewhere in the range of 20 percent" of the tests failed after launch, but the CIA did not know the number of failures before launch.17 The DCI then discussed the more recent tests, and concluded that the Soviet Union had made "very real progress in ballistic missiles during 1959," with a measured and orderly test-firing program. "For planning purpos- es," he said, the USSR had an initial operating capability of "a few, say ten" operational ICBMs at completed launching facilities. is (s) 15 US Senate, "Hearing Held before Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences and Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Brief- ing by Allen Dulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency," 29 January 1960, (Ts). Hereafter cited as "Senate Hearing." Secretary Gates's testimony was in a closed ses- sion of the House Committee on Armed Services, "Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services," 22 January 1960. (s) '6 Senate Hearing, p. 73, (TS). (s) '7 Ibid., pp. 14-15. Senator Symington asked: "Does that mean that you do know it, that you do not want to say it, or you just don't know it?" Dulles: "No, I meant that presen- tation about failures was sensitive. It is sensitive to distinguish the sources that are used to learn about failures. They are highly sensitive sources.... But we don't get enough intelligence with regard to (failures before launching). It is just (that) they never get off the pad at all. We never get much information." (s) 's Ibid., pp. 17-18, (TS). (s) 49tet- 118 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7- - After a brief treatment of the community's reexamination of Sovi- et ICBM accuracy and reliability, Dulles turned to the projected ICBM force goals over the next two years, using another chart to explain the changes from the 1958 estimate. He observed that such deployments could be accomplished by the middle of the next year without apprecia- bly hindering other Soviet military programs or civil programs relating to the goals of the USSR's Seven-Year Plan. At this point, Dulles acknowledged that there was a conflict with Air Force Intelligence, which "believes that the growth of the missile force, particularly after 1962, will be considerably greater than this."'" (s) Dulles then spelled out the Intelligence Community's generally agreed position on Soviet strategic intentions. The figures he used assumed that the Soviets were not engaged in a "crash" ICBM develop- ment program and were not subordinating everything else to it. Dulles explained that Khrushchev was persuaded that he had the ability to take over the Free World without war, and "therefore he is straining his resources and his capabilities in many ways to promote his ability to take over the free world in this way."2" (S) Dulles had to endure a vigorous cross-examination from Special Counsel Edwin L. Weisl, lasting until the hearing recessed at 1735. The Senate's skeptical response to Dulles's testimony at this hearing would influence the next several national estimates as well as Edward Proc- tor's and Roland Inlow's work days (and nights) in ways that they and about 30 other CIA officers would long remember. (s) The Guided Missile Task Force (U) Angry over the course and tone of the Senate hearing, Dulles im- mediately intensified CIA's intelligence effort against Soviet ICBMs. He ordered a briefing to learn in detail the activities of each component in the Intelligence Community dealing with the enigma of Soviet ICBM deployment. (U) Within CIA, the onus was initially on Inlow, who reported to Dulles by 5 February 1960 not only on ORR' s but also on OSI' s activ- ities related to the problem of deployment. With time only to complete '9 Ibid., pp. 22-23, (TS). (s) 2" Ibid., pp. 37-38, 39. (TS). In the afternoon session, Senator Jackson appeared to take exception to Dulles's view of Khrushchev's plans. "Well, I think that Mr. Khrushchev, if he can get a war�get one going in which he can destroy the enemy and that is the only way he can do it and survive himself, he will do it." Ibid., p. 154. (s) 119 s/fet Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap a rough draft, Inlow's defense emphasized that not a single Soviet ICBM launch site had yet been identified. He reported that NIE 11-8-59 was controversial mainly because USIB member agencies could not agree about their views on the Soviet ICBM goal: military superiority, a high level of deterrence, or a modest capability with the principal emphasis on space. Because of the paucity of data on intentions and capabilities, most of the DDI activity, Inlow wrote, "had been focused on stimulating and guiding collection activity."" (s) Inlow's briefing described the analytic effort of the past two years. He highlighted twelve major research areas, described their results, and noted the number of manhours committed to the projects thus far." The total DDI analytical manpower allocated directly or indirectly to the specific problem of ICBM deployment probably represented no more than 10-to-12 full-time research analysts. Moreover, it had only been since mid-1959 that ORR had as many as five or six analysts working exclusively on deployment of the 15 or so Soviet missile systems CIA believed operational. Resource limitations, extremely heavy demands for intelligence support of all kinds, and the complexity of the problem made it impossible to ensure systematic and comprehensive exploita- tion of all of the material already available in the community. On the other hand, doubling or tripling the analytical resources devoted to the problem probably would not materially improve the rate of progress in the next year or two. (s) Dulles responded to Inlow' s briefing by ordering USIB members to cooperate in a reexamination of deployment data and to resolve the differences between the Air Force and the rest of the community. In February, USIB once again directed the GMAIC to rework the evidence on production and deployment. To accomplish this "highest priority" task as quickly as possible, USIB approved temporary working groups on production and deployment. GMAIC appointed Inlow chairman of the Production Working Group, and assigned an Army officer the chair on the Deployment Working Group." (s) The specific question before GMAIC was whether NIE 11-8-59 had accurately estimated the pace of the Soviet ICBM program. 2' Memorandum for Assistant Director for Research and Reports, from Roland S. Inlow, Chief of the Guided Missiles Branch, "ORR-OSI Activities Concerning Soviet ICBM Deployment," 18 February 1960. (S) " Ibid. (S) " IDERA Monthly Reports, 1959 and 1960, (Secret), Earl McFarland, Jr., Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee [GMAIC], memorandum for Chairman, United States Intelligence Board, "Re-examination of NIE 11-8-59," 2 March 1960. (S) 120 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7-- GMAIC' s two new working groups were to evaluate the evidence on every potential launch site and production facility, and each working- group member was required to divulge the evidence his intelligence component held. For the effort, Inlow committed about half of the ana- lysts in his branch plus the support of three other branches in ORR.24 (S) At issue was a closely held, extensive Air Force list of suspected ICBM launch sites. A dispute arose when Air Force, probably in late February 1960, briefed US1B on its isolated position. Because data backing up this briefing had not been made available to GMAIC, Col. Earl F. McFarland, Jr., USAF, reported to USIB that he had served, in effect, a summons on his own career component: GMAIC requested a written version of the briefing, with graphics, that the Air Force gave USIB.25 (S) Air Force eventually supplied the list, and by 4 April 1960 the Deployment Working Group completed its report. Judging from a later GMAIC study, the group had evaluated about 95 potential launch loca- tions and divided these into six categories: one confirmed site (Tyuratam), no probable sites, and four possible sites (Kapustin Yar, Plesetsk, Polyarnyy Ural, and Ust' -Ukhta). Twelve other locations were undetermined and the remainder fell into the doubtful or negative cate- gories. Outside the test range, not a single operational ICBM could be conclusively identified.2" (s) For Proctor and lnlow the substantive problem was baffling. They had evidence of continuing testing, but no evidence on deployment. The latter could be (and was) explained away with the argument that large areas of the USSR still had not been covered by the U-2 program. The absence of telltale signs of a substantial program, however, could not be explained away. US contractors had informed Proctor, Inlow, and Clar- ence Baier of the numerous factors involved in US missile deployment, and these DDI officers had, in turn, used this information to determine the features of a substantial Soviet ICBM program (defined, as early as SNIE 11-10-57, as 500 operational missiles). The analogy suggested that the number of workers and telltale signals would have to be almost astronomical. Inlow assessed that hundreds of thousands�up to 500,000 construction workers and numerous manufacturing plants " IDERA Monthly Reports, 1960, (Secret); McFarland, "Re-examination of NIE 11-8- 59." (S) " Ibid.; Amory to Dulles, "Memorandum to DCI Dated 16 February 1960, Subject: 'In- telligence Activities Directed Against ICBM Deployment," 8 July 1960, Box 4. (s) 26 Report of the GMAIC Deployment Working Group, "Soviet Surface to Surface Mis- sile Deployment," I September 1960, (TS Daunt Chess); Authors' interview of John G. Godaire, 3 June 1971, transcript in Box 8. (s) 121 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7. � Closing the Missile Gap would have to be involved in a support effort to acquire this substantial operational ICBM capability at the times projected in the NIEs." (s) For the Air Force, the substantive problem was simple: the Intel- ligence Community's collection efforts were missing critical evidence of a substantial Soviet ICBM program. Air Force generals, like Thomas S. Powers of the Strategic Air Command, publicly asserted that the USSR could destroy US retaliatory forces, frequently challenged the Eisenhower Administration's defense policy, and even more frequently received congressional support from influential Senators, including Stuart Symington, Henry Jackson, Lyndon Johnson, and John Kennedy. Thus, when new estimates would be made later in the year, the Air Force would increase its projections of deployed Soviet ICBM launch- ers while the rest of the community would make substantial reduc- tions�although even these overestimated the scope of the Soviet deployment program." (s) To ensure that it had not missed something, CIA undertook the first DDI consolidation of missile research in the Agency's history. In February 1960, DDI Amory suggested the idea of establishing an ad hoc DDI Guided Missile Task Force (GMTF), and DCI Dulles promptly agreed to his proposal. A single temporary component with Proctor as chief and Inlow as his deputy included OSI and ORR expertise. Not only did this arrangement reflect Agency senior officials' confidence in Proctor and Inlow, it also gave de facto recognition to ORR that it had the primary responsibility for CIA intelligence analysis on the building and fielding of rockets (with OSI retaining responsibility for analysis of research and development).29 (C) The GMTF included about 30 analysts when it began operations in April 1960. The Task Force dispensed with standard administrative chores and occupied itself with substantive and methodological prob- lems. Even the title of the group did not apparently concern its admin- istrators. It was, for example, sometimes referred to in its own reports as the "DD/I Task Force on Long-Range Ballistic Missiles," or the "DD/I Task Force on Ballistic Missiles," or just the "DD/I Task Force." (C) " Edward W. Proctor, Chief, Guided Missile Task Force, to Amory, "Status of Guided Missile Task Force Research," 15 October 1960, Box 4, (TS Daunt); Godaire interview, (S); see also SNIE 11-10-57, The Soviet ICBM Program, (declassified). (s) " Godaire interview. (s) 29 Ibid., (S); Amory, "Memorandum to DCI Dated 16 February 1960, Subject: 'Intelli- gence Activities Directed Against ICBM Deployment," 8 July 1960, (S); IDERA Monthly Reports, 1960. (s) itaFet- 122 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 r" Proctor's and Inlow's GMTF produced detailed and comprehen- sive reports on both ICBM production and deployment. The principal objectives of the task force were spelled out in Proctor's first six-month status report the following October: � The allocation of adequate personnel resources and their inte- gration into an effective research team on the problems of pro- duction and deployment of long-range ballistic missiles. � A more intensive focusing of the research effort on the substan- tive areas most likely to yield definite results. � Assurance that all available evidence is being thoroughly and systematically exploited. � Development of new approaches to both research and collection problems. (s) His summation of the results of the first six months was honest, his forecast for a breakthrough (a view which apparently reflected his con- cern about the trouble-plagued CORONA project) was pessimistic, and his strategy was simply to try harder: "The fact that we have not achieved and cannot yet anticipate major breakthroughs," Proctor not- ed, "has further increased our sense of urgency in seeking solutions to this critical problem."'" (s) The "missile gap" controversy that Spring led directly to a spec- tacular failure�the Soviet shootdown of Francis Gary Powers's U-2 on 1 May 1960. The primary targets for the Powers mission were Tyuratam, Severodvinsk, and the suspect ICBM complexes at Plesetsk and Yur'ya. The planned mission would have identified launch facili- ties at Plesetsk and Yur'ya. More importantly, Yur'ya and Complex C at Tyuratam could have been identified with a second-generation ICBM, thereby questioning the basis of the NIEs that had opened the dispute in the first place. But the U-2's crash and Powers's capture marked the abrupt end of the U-2 program over the USSR, and contrib- uted to Proctor's forecast that major breakthroughs could not be antici- pated.'' (c) The seemingly unpromising future of overhead photography prompted the task force and GMAIC' s two working groups to reexam- ine all the evidence to ensure that the Intelligence Community had not " Proctor, "Status of Guided Missile Task Force Research," 15 October 1960, (TS Daunt). (s) '' National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), NPIC/R-1/61, Photographic In- terpretation Report, "Yur'ya ICBM Launch Complex," July 1961, (TS Chess); Proctor, "Status of Guided Missile Task Force Research," 15 October 1960, (TS Daunt). (s) 123 Approved for for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Nfret Closing the Missile Gap overlooked anything. In June, GMAIC' s ad hoc Production Working Group completed a 109-page supplement to its earlier evaluation of po- tential ICBM production plants.32 The supplement supported earlier findings that the Scientific Research Institute (NII 88) in Kaliningrad "probably" fabricated ICBMs for the test range (it did) and that Design Bureau (OKB) Plant 456 in Chimki "very probably" developed the en- gines used in the Soviet ICBMs (as it did as well). Four categories of missile production (airframe, production and final assembly, propul- sion, and ground-rail transport) and some 50 individual plants had been evaluated in the process of preparing the group's supplement. The De- ployment Working Group used this study as part of its review (which could confirm only Tyuratam as an ICBM launch area), completed in September." (s) The two GMAIC reports formed the base for the extensive support the GMTF provided on NIE 11-8-60. The task force took four major ap- proaches. First, GMTF Deployment Group attempt- (b)(3) ed to determine the most likely Soviet concepts for ICBM deployment. In this endeavor, the group used data from the Soviet test ranges, infor- mation on missile characteristics, and (with support from Space Tech- nology Laboratory) relevant analogies from the US missile business. Second, Baier' s GMTF Production Group reviewed Soviet long-range missile programs to identify the kinds of activity taking place at various phases of each program and to determine the extent of interrelation- ships. Third, Baier' s group tried to develop a methodology for estimat- ing the production capacity of a final assembly plant. Finally, the same group prepared a detailed analysis of the major ballistic missile proto- type production centers located in the Moscow area. 34 (s) None of the GMTF studies was complete by the time the Intelli- gence Community published NIE 11-8-60, but then none was expected to improve the projection on ICBM deployment because U-2 photo- graphs were no longer available." Consequently, the community " GMAIC, Supplemental Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on ICBM Production, "Evaluation of Evidence on Soviet ICBM Production," 17 June 1960, (TS Daunt). (s) " GMAIC, "Soviet Surface-to-Surface Missile Deployment," 1 September 1960, (TS Daunt Chess); NPIC, Photographic Interpretation Report, "Chronology of Moskva Mis- sile and Space Propulsion Development Center IChimki 456, USSR," February 1968, (TS Chess); ATIC, "Kaliningrad Guided Missile Plant and Experimental Station NII-88 and Kaliningrad Arms Plant 88 (55�55'N-37�49'E)," June 1958. (s) " Proctor, "Status of Guided Missile Task Force Research," 15 October 1960, (TS Daunt). (S) " Ibid.; Authors' interview with Edward W. Proctor, 15 December 1970, transcript in Box 8, (TS Daunt); Interview with Roland Inlow, January 1971, transcript in Box 8, (TS Daunt). (s) 44- 124 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 controversy over Soviet ICBMs got out of hand and the NIE of 1960 increased rather than reduced uncertainty. (U) The End of the Dark Era (U) With the circulation of NIE 11-8-60 on 1 August 1960, the contro- versy over Soviet ICBMs hit an historic level of acrimony. Unable to re- solve any significant differences regarding projected force levels, the estimate illustrated individual departmental and agency positions in a chart. Program "A," estimating a Soviet force of 400 ICBMs by mid- 1963, was the DCP s pick as the nearest approximation of the actual So- viet program. The Air Force's Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, ar- gued for the more ambitious program "B," estimating a Soviet force of 700 ICBMs by mid-1963, and complained in a footnote that the rates of increase shown in its projection should be continued through 1965. The Director of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, the As- sistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, and the Di- rector for Intelligence of the Joint Staff picked an undefined area within the "A-B" range. The Army's and Navy's intelligence services believed that program "C" (a Soviet force of 200 ICBMs by mid-1963) most nearly reflected the actual Soviet effort. Most participants agreed, how- ever, that the Soviet Union had only "a few�say 10" deployed ICBMs.36 (U) Thirty-six dissenting departmental footnotes to the estimate sup- ported the short-term interests of the individual services. The estimate's summary highlighted that the threat programs "A" and "B" posed was practically the same through the end of 1960; that is, before the year's end, either projection would give the Soviets the capability to destroy major US metropolitan areas. At the beginning of the next year, "A" or "B" would pose a threat to SAC' s operational airbase system. By mid- 1961, the Air Force's projection would give Soviet planners "high as- surance" of being able to damage most of the SAC airbase system in an initial salvo, whereas CIA' s projected program would reach this hypo- thetical capability late in the year. Navy's and Army's low projection for 1961 (which in fact was too high) gave the Soviets the capability to inflict massive destruction only on US urban areas. NIE 11-8-60 NIE 11-8-60, Soviet Capabilities For Long Range Attack Through Mid-1965, 1 Au- gust 1960. (u) 125 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 App roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 57-1. Closing the Missile Gap concluded, with objections only from the Air Force, that none of the above catastrophes was imminent." (U) Shortly after the dissemination of this extraordinarily dissent- ridden NIE, a series of closely spaced breakthroughs marked the begin- ning of the end of the "missile gap" controversy. The first involved CO- RONA. After months in a standdown, a successful diagnostic flight test of Discoverer XIII took place on 10 August 1960. Discoverer XIV, launched a week later, carried a camera and 20 pounds of film. This mission gave the Intelligence Community its first usable satellite pho- tographic coverage of the USSR. Although the photographs did not pro- vide direct evidence on ICBM deployment, the next mission, launched on 10 December, provided the first coverage of an ICBM site. The res- olution was much lower than that obtained from the U-2' s cameras, but the area of coverage was much greater and the interpretability of the product soon improved. This source of overhead reconnaissance would provide masses of highly classified information on Soviet development programs and deployments, but was modestly�and appropriately� codenamed "KEYHOLE." Proctor and Inlow's task force prepared the first report based on KEYHOLE photography. "An Assessment of an Installation at Plesetsk, USSR, as an ICBM Site" represented the first of the all-source, in-depth studies that would become a standard item in the new era. (S) The second break involvecj (b)(1) a second( b)(3) generation Soviet ICBM exploding during its launch from Tyuratam. ICBM analysts knew almost immediately that something odd had hap- pened, but could piece together only gradually the extent and signifi- cance of the tragedy. The Soviet press never mentioned the incident." (s) On 25 October 1960, Moscow Radio reported the death ("as the result of an air crash" on the 24th) of Marshal Mitrofan Nedelin, the Commander in Chief of the recently formed Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. Later analysis in the GMTF confirmed that beginning on the 25th an unusually large number of aircraft from Moscow and Dnepro- petrovsk had flown into the Tyuratam area. These flights could not be " Ibid. (u) " Kenneth E. Greer, "Corona," reprinted in Kevin C. Ruffner, editor, CORONA: Amer- ica's First Satellite Program (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995), p. 26. (u) " Proctor to Amory, "Major Soviet Missile Disaster in October 1960," 25 September 1961, Box 10, (TS Dinar). (s) �4Fet- 126 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Col. Oleg Penkovsky, GRU logically associated with any subsequent test event because the range went into a standdown for a three-month period. In succeeding months, clandestine sources told of an explosion and of the death or injury of 127 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p z proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap hundreds of important officials and range personnel at the test center. The flights in late October were, most likely, filled with caskets, con- sultants, and medical personne1.4� (s) When all the data were assembled, the disaster appeared to result from a malfunction of a quite different ICBM undergoing its initial range test. Data on ICBM launches on 2 February and 3 March 1961 confirmed that a new missile, later designated the SS-7, had entered the test-range phase. Beginning in June 1961, improved KEYHOLE photography exposed the progress of SS-7 deployment. Then data from a launch on 9 April confirmed the arrival of another new missile, the SS-8. The Soviets had two second-generation ICBMs under development. (s) The third breakthrough involved Soviet Col. Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovskiy. In August 1960, Penkovskiy, a high-ranking official in the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Red Army General Staff, established contact with the CIA and the British. The case would cover the period of August 1960 through August 1962 and provide more than 8,000 pages of translated reporting, the bulk of which carried the code- name IRONBARK. Most of these reports constituted highly classified Soviet Ministry of Defense documents. During this period, three series of lengthy debriefing and briefing sessions were held with Colonel Pen- kovskiy. According to Richard Helms, then the Deputy Director for Plans, "Every Western intelligence requirement of any priority was covered with him during this time and all aspects of his knowledgeabil- ity and access were explored." Over 90 percent of the approximately 5,000 pages of Russian-language documentary information provided by Penkovskiy concerned military subjects. Roughly half of this informa- tion came from the Chief Intelligence Directorate library, while the re- mainder he photographed either in the missile and artillery headquarters of Marshal Varentsov or at the Dzerzhinskiy Academy.41 (s) The IRONBARK documents gave strategic researchers their first comprehensive look into Soviet strategic thinking. They also provided a wealth of information on Soviet ballistic missiles. The top secret pub- lication of the Soviet's newly formed Strategic Rocket Forces, The Information Bulletin of the Missile Troops, permitted Agency analysts to learn the organization and structure of the USSR's strategic missile units, the functions of the various staffs in each unit, how these units were linked to the military high command in Moscow, and the activities of missile units at different levels of combat readiness. Through three sessions with Colonel Penkovskiy in England and France, sessions 4) Ibid., (TS Dinar). (s) 4' Richard Helms, Deputy Director for Plans, to John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, "Essential Facts of the Penkovskiy Case," 31 May 1963. (s NF) 128 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 0084 which, when written up in clandestine reports, generally carried the innocent-sounding codename CHICKADEE, Agency analysts received detailed technical information on the missiles themselves, the yields of their warheads, targeting methods, and targets.42 (C) In April 1961, Penkovskiy had his first face-to-face sessions with his British and American case officers. In an Information Report of 16 May 1961, Penkovskiy described the "missile gap" as a hoax. Khrus- chev, he said, was more interested in fostering the impression that the Soviet Union already had a tremendous ICBM program when in fact it was practically nonexistent. Penkovskiy cautioned that the USSR would eventually have many missiles because "millions of men's ef- forts are directed to this work," and the "entire economy of a nation is directed by a one-party system to which all is subordinate."43 (S) Penkovskiy's testimony alone was not enough to close the "mis- sile gap," but it tentatively supported the almost heretical argument for a limited Soviet ICBM program. Inlow's reaction to the first CHICKA- DEE report was to recognize that, after all the urgent collection efforts of the past three years, the evidence on ICBM production, deployment, and training "really hadn't been much."44 (s) Force projections in the previous estimates had been based on the empirically supported assumption that the Soviets would widely deploy the SS-6. Penkovskiy's report, following the tape of the SS-7 missile di- saster, weakened this assumption.45 (c) The SS-6, though a good rocket, was in the later words of the Hyland Panel "a large and difficult-to-handle missile." The SS-6 used cryogenic fuel, which could not be stored in the missile for long. Built in Kalinin- grad's Nil 881, the SS-6 system was reliable and no doubt met original design specifications, and it remained the prime booster for the Soviet space program. But from a technical standpoint, the inability to store fuel on the SS-6 (and the enormous amount of support facilities it required) made the cryogenic technology less desirable for military applications. 42 For a discussion of later uses of IRONB ARK and CHICKADEE, see Leonard F. Par- kinson, "Penkovskiy's Legacy and Strategic Research," Studies in Intelligence 16 (Spring 1972). This article has been declassified and can be found in Record Group 263 (Central Intelligence Agency), National Archives and Records Administration. (u) 43 After Penkovskiy's apprehension in late 1962, the DDP circulated this report as CSDB No. 3/652, 800, "The Soviet ICBM Program," 21 February 1963, Box 5. (s) " Godaire interview. (s) 45 Except for the Air Force, which dissented from NIE 11-8/1-61, asserting that the So- viets would deploy the SS-6 as an interim measure until second-generation missiles be- came available. The Air Force also predicted that accelerated deployment would follow at a far faster pace and larger scale than did the majority of the Intelligence Community. NIE 11-8/1-61, Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile Forc- es, 21 September 1961. (u) 129 4t- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap The smaller SS-7, built at the Dnepropetrovsk Missile Development and Production Center, used storable liquid fuel and did not require anywhere near the support facilities of the first-generation system. 46 With new information derived from virtually every area of the classic and modern intelligence collection spectrum, the majority USIB' s NIE 11-8-61 of June 1961, Soviet Capabilities For Long-Range Attack, started to close the "gap" by substantially reducing projected force levels. But not all the revolutionary findings had been fully appre- ciated. Only hinting that fundamental improvements in collection were within grasp, the estimate cautiously concluded that the evidence at hand was not sufficient to "establish with certainty even the present strength of the ICBM force." Thus the range of projection remained wide, but most of the estimates (save the Air Force's) were reasonable, and the Army's and Navy's came close to the mark (see table below). Soviet ICBMs Deployed as Projected in NIE 11-8-61 NIE 11-8-61 State's Footnote Army's and Navy's Footnote Air Force's Footnote Mid-1961 50 to 100 75 to 125 "a few" "at least 120" Mid-1962 100 to 200 150 to 300 50 to 100 300 Mid-1963 150 to 300 200 to 450 100 to 200 550 Mid-1964 200 to 400 150 to 300 850 Mid-1965 1150 Mid-1966 1450 This table is Unclassified The estimate, in a veiled reference to KEYHOLE photography of Plesetsk, noted that US intelligence, "through intensive collection ef- forts by all available means," had achieved partial coverage of the re- gions best suited to the deployment of Soviet ICBMs.� (u) 4' USIB-D-33.8/7, "Working Notes on 6 June 1962 Meeting With USIB Ad Hoc Panel on Status of Soviet ICBM Program," 14 June 1962, Box 5, (TS Dinar); CIA, FMSAC- STIR/TCS/71-21, SR IR 71-16, "The SS-9 ICBM Program: Organizational Aspects of Soviet Decision Making," September 1971, (TS Umbra). (S) NIE 11-8-61, Soviet Capabilities For Long-Range Attack, 7 June 1961 (with later USIB action completed on 13 June 1961). State's footnote seemed to reject the "new yardstick" of estimating on the basis of programming information that DCI Dulles had defended before the two Senate committees on 29 January 1960. Thus the Director of Intelligence and Research Roger Hilsman argued in his footnote that the NIE "should include an estimate of the largest ICBM force which the USSR could have in mid- 1961... and the probable Soviet force level in mid-1961. (Emphasis in original.) (0) 130 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap Approved for Release: 2018/66/27 C05500084 /el et Most importantly, NIE 11-8-61 formally opened up the case for limited near-term deployment. Its authors were not sure whether "The inadequacy of confirming evidence regarding deployment is attribut- able either to (a) the limitations of our coverage, combined with the suc- cess of Soviet security measures, or (b) the fact that deployment has been on a relatively small scale to date." 48 (U) The Hyland Panel reconvened to try to clarify the uncertainty. The members for the panel's third meeting included Hyland and Perry (the only carryovers from the 1959 meeting); Dr. Hendrik W. Bode, the Vice President of Bell Telephone Laboratories; Lt. Gen. Howell M. Estes, the Deputy Commander of Air Force's Aerospace Systems; Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky from Harvard (by then a veteran in the missile contro- versy who, from July 1959 to January 1961, had succeeded Killian as the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology); Arthur E. Raymond, RAND Corporation's Vice President and its Director of Research; and Navy's Special Projects Technical Director, Rear Adm. Levering Smith. In early September 1961 the members heard briefings on the new data leading up to the new estimate and on recent determi- nations that KEYHOLE photography of June and July 1961 had identi- fied two ICBM complexes.4" (s) After considering all the evidence, the panel members decided that, while "there may be as many as 50 ICBM launch pads under con- struction or in use in the USSR," there were no more than 25 operational launching pads. The panel concluded that the threat to the United States from Soviet ICBMs should be materially downgraded, and that the mis- siles did not represent an adequate first strike capability.50 (S) The "missile-gap" issue was over, but it required an NIE to put it to final rest. NIE 11-8/1-61 of 21 September 1961 did just that in its two opening sentences. "New information, providing a much firmer base for estimates on Soviet long-range ballistic missiles, has caused a sharp downward revision in our estimate of present Soviet ICBM strength," Ibid. (u) " Harry J. Thompson, Acting Executive Secretary, USIB, "Report of USIB Ad Hoc Panel on Status of Soviet ICBM Progress," 8 September 1961, (TS); NPIC/R-1/61, "ICBM Complex Yin' ya, USSR," (TS Chess); NPIC/B-18/61, "Possible ICBM Launch Site Near Kostroma, USSR," August 1961 (TS Chess). (s) 5" Thompson, "Report of USIB Ad Hoc Panel," (TS). Terms were soon needed to dis- tinguish among the three ICBMs. The Intelligence Community adopted the designation "Category A" for the SS-6. Because it was not possible to tell which of the remaining ICBMs had come next, the panel could only describe the SS-7 as the "Category B or C" vehicle. The SS-8 was described, for a time, as the "Category C or B" missile. (s) 131 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Closing the Missile Gap the NIE said. "We now estimate that the present Soviet ICBM strength is in the range of 10-to-25 launchers from which missiles can be fired against the US, and that this force level will not increase markedly dur- ing the months immediately ahead." The "dark era" in strategic research was over, thanks to CORONA and KEYHOLE.51 (u) 51 NIE 11-8/1-61, Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long-Range Ballistic Missile Forces, 21 September 1961. Four days later, columnist Joseph Alsop (who had actively pushed the "missile gap") leaked the main thrust of NIE 11-8/1-61: "Prior to the recent recalculation the maximum number of ICBMs that the Soviets were thought to have at this time was on the order of 200�just about enough to permit the Soviets to consider a surprise attack on the United States. The maximum has now been drastically reduced, however, to less than a quarter of the former figure�well under 50 ICBMs and, there- fore, not nearly enough to allow the Soviets to consider a surprise attack on this coun- try"; "Facts About the Missile Balance," The Washington Post, 25 September 1961. (u) �setzet-- 132 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 00084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 CL NOFORN- The Construction of the Original Headquarters Building (U) Peyton F. Anderson and Jack B. Pfeiffer The Central Intelligence Agency inherited its original quarters from its wartime predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services. The effort to provide CIA with a headquarters building�acquisition, planning, construction, and occupancy stretched over a period of about 15 years (1947-62), during which Agency components in the Washington area were stuffed, crammed, or otherwise deployed in a variety of structures that never quite became "home." Congress appropriated money in 1951 for a headquarters facility, but it still took four more years to pick a site. By then the funds appropriated earlier were insufficient. In the Summer of 1955 Congress authorized $51.5 million for the purchase of land in Langley, Virginia, for the extension of the George Washington Parkway, and the planning and construction of the new building. Once the archi- tectural and engineering contractor was selected in July 1956, responsi- bility for the Agency's new headquarters fell to the Real Estate and Construction Division (RECD) of the Office of Logistics in the Director- ate of Support (now the Directorate of Administration). For much of the construction phase, RECD was succeeded in this task by the Building Planning Staff (BPS), an ad hoc group operating directly under James A. Garrison, Director of the Office of Logistics.' The entire planning, con- struction, and moving effort also benefited from the close attention of Deputy Director for Support Lawrence K. White. Construction Begins (u) The first significant construction contract was for the clearing and grubbing of the site. This meant the removal of trees and brush from about half of the acreage and the clearing or removal of dead trees and underbrush from the rest of the tract. The contract bid opening date was 12 September 1957. Morrison and Johnson, Inc., of Bethesda, ' BPS�to which RECD contributed several key personnel was subsumed back into RECD in July 1960. X 133 S/ret (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 771vi. The Construction Maryland, had the low bid: $31,450.2 Work was started in October 1957 and completed in March 1958. By this time another contract had been let for grading the site to bring it to the proper elevations determined by the site planners and for the installation of site drainage structures to carry off the accumulation of surface water. Under this contract, prelim- inary roads, site parking, and storage areas were being graded and given a gravel-surface treatment to accommodate the building contractor's supplies and equipment. (c) The summer and fall of 1957 were marked by long dry spells for construction work, but almost as soon as the clearing and grubbing op- erations started, heavy rains began to fall. The weather continued to be unfavorable through most of the winter of 1957-58, although perhaps not unfavorable enough to block completely the public relations ploy that the Deputy Director for Support Lawrence K. White had in mind: I also told him [H. S. Chandler] that I wanted to make every possi- ble effort not only to let the grading contract as soon as possible, but to have some grading actually done before Congress returns to town on the first of January.' Although snowstorms were the worst for the Washington area in many years and the spring and summer rainfall in 1958 was well above normal, the grading and drainage contract was substantially finished by October 1958. The excavation and foundation contract, with a base bid of $2,289,000, was opened on 9 October 1958; and on 21 October 1958, the notice to proceed was issued to the Roscoe Engineering Corporation and the Ajax Construction Co., Inc. of Washington, D.C., as a joint ven- ture. Up to this point the contracting work had been performed on the site as a whole. Now the job of excavating and pouring the massive con- crete foundations for the Headquarters Building itself was split into three separate contracts, saving perhaps nine months to a year. While the work was in progress, the chief architects and engineers at Harrison and Abramovitz (H&A) in New York worked with BPS to pr pare the complex and detailed plans required for the main building. The high bid was $102,000! Col. Lawrence K. "Red" White, Deputy Director for Sup- port, for many years kept a detailed log of his activities, which the authors relied on ex- tensively in the preparation of this analysis. The relevant extracts from White's log, hereafter cited as Diary Notes, reside in History Staff Source Collection, HS/HC-849, History Staff Job 84-00499R, Box 1. The citation above is at Diary Notes, 12 September 57. (g5 The low and high bids for grading and drainage were $460,000 and $1,113,000, re- spectively. The low figure was less than half the amount ($1,030,000) that had been al- located. Ibid., 19 December 1957. SO 134 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Construction Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7et Even as the plans and work proceeded, Agency representatives were frequently harassed by Defense Department and civil defense of- ficials about the need to incorporate expensive features intended to en- hance protection from atomic blast and fallout. The Deputy Director of Support personally endured considerable badgering for his reluctance to take drastic steps to "harden" to facility against nuclear attack�such as the idea that the Agency should mine a deep shelter in the basalt bed- rock beneath the foundation�but Colonel White held firm in his refusal to complicate the project any further. 4 Additional work began at about the same time in the area of the Langley compound. The new four-lane George Washington Memorial Parkway leading to the site's north gatehouse entrance had been com- pletely graded. Piers for the several bridges on this parkway were com- pleted. The entire parkway project was paved and ready for use early in 1960, well in advance of CIA's actual moving date; and as early as July 1958 construction work had been started to widen Virginia Route 123 leading to the south gatehouse entrance. The negotiations related to the access roadway situation�partic- ularly the problems of the George Washington Parkway and the Cabin John bridge�were complex. The Agency was involved with the De- partment of the Interior, the Bureau of Public Roads, the National Park Service, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the highway commis- sions and engineers of the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, and Fairfax County.' Some of the difficulties were ironed out by the "old school tie": Colonel White did not hesitate to draw on his broad net of military acquaintances to influence the various engineering contin- gents, many of which were headed by former Army officers. At other times he found opportunities for some quid pro quo. In March of 1961, for example, he noted: General Clarke, the District Engineer, and Mr. Aitken, his High- way Supervisor, were over for lunch; however, General Clarke and Mr. Aitken are very much concerned about the traffic problem in connection with getting to and from our new building. They feel that the selection of Chantilly particularly is going to jam up the roads very much and that we may have some congestion. They are looking for some support to get the Chain Bridge double- decked and to get another bridge built at the Three Sisters Island 4 Ibid., 19 December 1961. (c) Ibid., 17,24 January 1955; 7-8 February 1955; 19,21-25 November 1955; 23-26 July 1956; 2 February 1959. X 135 S et Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Riease: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Construction location. I told them that we would certainly give them full sup- port and that this was in our interest, but they should not put us in the position of not having made an adequate transportation study at the time we selected this site. Gen. Clarke and Mr. Aitken said they both fully appreciated this and that their emphasis would all be on developments since the site was selected. Fairfax County officials were proceeding with the plans for ex- tending water and sewer lines, and the pumping stations required for these facilities were under construction. Plans for the electric power substation to supply the Headquarters Building were well along by the spring of 1959. ,Ter) The problems of physical security during the construction of the new building were complex. A contract had been let for the erection of the security fence in August 1958, and by the middle of November the site was under security patrol and badges had been issued to the contrac- tors.8 Between the fall of 1958 and February 1961, bona fides were obtained for about 15,000 construction workers�this in addition to the requirements to plan building security, badging, guard force, and the host of other security projects with which the Office of Security was charged.9f,reri The main building contract�that is, the superstructure contract� had been advertised on 18 December 1958, and bids were opened on 25 February 1959. Thirteen bids were received, and on 25 March the con- tract was awarded to the Charles H. Tompkins Co. and the J. A. Jones � In the fall of 1961 Clarke requested�and received�a letter from the Agency in sup- port of his position on the need for a bridge at Three Sisters Island. Ibid., 16 November 1961. SA.T ' In addition to the supply of electric power from the Virginia Electric and Power Co., Agency planners also modified the plans to include a diesel emergency generator. White authorized a change order in August 1960, noting that it would cost about $50,000. Ibid., 4 August 1960. Ski $ Draft Outline, DDS Support Services Bulletin, 1 August 1958, (S). It was not possible to locate all of the authors' sources for this article. Several, including this one, were ap- parently held in files of the Building Planning Staff, Office of Logistics, and are here- after sourced as "BPS/OL."X 9 It was not until after the building was occupied, however, that serious attention was paid to the potential security risk posed by the four privately owned tracts of land adja- cent to the new building area. Shortly after he became DCI, John A. McCone ordered that a study of the feasibility of purchase be undertaken; Diary Notes, 15, 19 November, and 14, 21 December 1962, feg). Consequently, White appointed a committee to review this matter; and their findings disclosed that the building was vulnerable to penetration by surveillance. Photographs taken in the wooded area adjacent to the front of the build- ing indicated the feasibility of identifying personnel, with the possibility of identifying documents. After considerable coordination by the DDS and the DCI�with Congres- sional committees, the Fairfax County Executive, and the Bureau of the Budget�acqui- sition of the perimeter property was ccomplished by the mid-1960s at a cost of approximately half a million dollars. Sefet 136 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Construction Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Construction Co. The low bid was $33,287,600, somewhat less than had been expected.ikj The contract had gone on the construction market at an opportune time, in the midst of a nationwide economic recession. Business conditions were favorable to the Government and to the Agency. In- deed, the money saved was soon put to good use. Of the $54,500,000 appropriated, $8.5 million was transferred to the National Park Service for the extension of the George Washington Parkway to the site. The su- perstructure and site work contract ($33,287,600), the contract with the Otis Elevator Co. ($1,122,669), plus other fees and contingency re- quirements, approximated $43 million, leaving an unobligated balance of approximately $3 million. This amount was considered "no year funds," and used to purchaseoproperties adjoining the site and to con- struct the new printing plant. Superstructure work started in May 1959. The contractor's first ef- forts were directed toward organizing his work forces and executing the numerous subcontracts required for the project. Shop drawings�com- pletely detailed plans based on the contract drawings and used for fab- ricating and installing structural steel, duct work, plumbing, and electrical and mechanical facilities were being prepared. The forms for the ground-floor concrete walls and for the first-floor slab of the north half of the building were nearly completed by midsummer. Gov- ernment and H&A representatives were on the site every working day and checked each step in the construction. They also reviewed all shop drawings, along with samples of the materials to be used." President Dwight D. Eisenhower visited the site in November 1959 for the ceremonial laying of the building's cornerstone. A US Air Force band and the Chaplain of the US Senate also graced the occasion, and DCI Allen Dulles made certain beforehand that a large contingent of the Agency's female employees had reserved seats "in order to high- light the vital role which women play in the Agency." Accompanied by Dulles and a host of Washington dignitaries, the President briefly wielded an engraved silver trowel to set the stone in place:2 Inside the 1" Walter Pforzheimer, Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, to Jack B. Pfeiffer, Support Services Historical Officer, 10 February 1971, HS/HC-849./ " Draft Outline, DDS Support Services Bulletin, 7 August 1959, BPS/OL file. 12 Before the event DCI Dulles had let Col. White know that he wanted to see "some of the women employees of the Agency in attendance [in the ceremony's reserved seating areal." See White to Executive Officer, Office of the DCI, "Reserved Seats for Corner- stone Ceremony," 27 October 1959, HS/HC-849. 137 Setet Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Construction cornerstone went a box containing various acts and executive orders authorizing the Agency and the new facility, along with speeches, mi- crofilmed newspapers, a CIA seal, and an aerial photograph of the site�but no classified documents. 3 Steady Progress (u) The contract called for completion of the building by the middle of 1961, but a reasonable amount of delay�frequently caused by con- ditions beyond the contractor's control�was expected on a project such as this. For example, there was a strike in the steel industry in August 1959. Had this strike lasted much longer, it would have delayed con- struction. There was every reason to believe, however, that the building would be completed some time during the last half of 1961. Meanwhile, BPS was reviewing space layout plans for the purpose of adjusting them to fit changes in the Agency's requirements. As of 31 March 1960 the contractor was slightly behind schedule, even though the winter weather had been reasonably favorable. There had been a considerable number of relatively small change orders, and it did not appear that completion of the contract would be extended ma- terially. In fact, such excellent progress was being made that a portion of the concrete roof of the north penthouse had been poured. As was customary when the highest point on the construction project was reached, the workmen held an impromptu flag-raising ceremony, and for a day or two a flag flew from this rooftop. (0) In May, progress was marred by the only serious accident that occurred during the entire course of the construction. In the words of Colonel White: There was an accident today at Langley; apparently a cable broke allowing the scaffolding at the power building to fall. Ten people were hurt, seven of them very seriously. At this point one of the ten has died and another remains on the critical list. fjel Workers had been removing wooden forms from the power plant's concrete ceiling when one of three cables suspending the scaffolding snapped, tumbling the men and the forms to the boiler room floor '3 The cornerstone and its "time capsule" were finally placed their permanent loca- tions on 2 November 1960; Diary Notes, 9 November 1960. '4 C/BPS to C/F'S/OL, 6 October 1959, sub: Killian Committee Report, BPS/OL S/ret 138 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084� The Construction Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 ret Original Headquarters Building under construction, 1950-60 / 25 feet below. Joseph A. Wood, 56, of Northeast Washington was dead on arrival at Arlington Hospital, but fortunately he was the only fatali- ty.15.0er By spring, work had been started on the excavation for the audito- rium building, which was a separate hemispheric structure near the front of the main building but connected to it by a tunnel. Structural steel had also been delivered to the site for the curved roof of the cafeteria build- ing. 6 Plantings for the three large and two small court areas enclosed by the building had been completed. This landscape and planting contract was undertaken early in the project so that all threes and shrubs requiring Diary Notes, 4 May 1960, (S). "1 Killed, 8 Hurt as Staging Falls," The Washington Post, 5 May 1960.4�) 16 Walter Pforzheitner recalled: The curved roof of the cafeteria. ..brings to mind an interesting highlight arising out of the Washington Evening Star sending periodic flights over the building to photo- graph the progress in its construction as a newsworthy item. In their issue of 13 June 1960, they printed one of these early views and caused us some laughing embarrass- ment by their caption, which noted, "The crescent-shaped objects at left are decora- tive waterfalls." Actually they were the curved steel girders, not yet installed, which hold up the roof of the cafeteria! Pforzheimer to Pfeiffer, 10 February 1971. f$1 139 Setet Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7rer The Construction large balls of dirt would be set in place before the courts were entirely enclosed. Throughout the construction Agency officers sought to pre- serve the campus-like feel of the grounds�to the point where in one in- stance it added $60,000 to the bill. I8 (C) By the end of September 1960 the superstructure contractor had completed 54 percent of his work. The contractor was slightly behind schedule, but this was mainly a continuance of the earlier delays. The north half of the building was expected to be ready for occupancy by September 1961. It was almost completely enclosed, and plastering of the interior walls was progressing on the lower floors. Except for the seventh-floor roof of wings 1 and 2, and the penthouse roof, all of the structural slabs had been poured for the south half of the building, and precast concrete window panels had been installed up to the fourth-floor level. The structural steel covering for the cafeteria roof had been erect- ed and installed. Plans were being developed with the telephone company to begin installing equipment for the north half of the building. Space layouts were being used by Agency components to plan requirements for unit- ized furniture, location of floor outlets, and determination of the neces- sary types of telephone service:9 Normal telephone installation was complicated by the additional requirements for a secure internal system and an intercom among the offices of the Director, the Deputy Direc- tors, and the Office/Division Chiefs.2� The superstructure contract was 78 percent complete as of 31 March 1961. The work had been delayed because of bad weather, but occupancy of the north half of the building would not be delayed appre- ciably. The entire building was now enclosed, and plastering had been completed in the north half. The dome for the auditorium had been 17 Draft Outline, DDS Support Services Bulletin, 25 May 1960, BPS/OL files. / '8 White recorded in his Diary Notes: Met with Jim Garrison and H. S. Chandler to discuss landscaping changes at the new building. There are three large areas in which trees are growing in a considerable de- pression. Water collects to such an extent that drains are plugged up; consequently, the areas are not only unsightly but in all probability the trees are going to die before we move into the building. . . . It is now estimated that it will cost some $60,000 to rectify it, especially in view of the fact that there is not sufficient dirt available to fill in all three of the holes. I authorized H. S. Chandler to go ahead and negotiate to fill in one of them�for which we do have ample dirt�and to contemplate, at least for the moment, on filling in the other two if and when we construct an auxiliary build- ing, at which time we will again have plenty of "fill" available without buying it. Diary Notes, 3 May 1960. 19 C/BPS to C/PS/OL, 3 October 1960, sub: Killian Committee Report, BPS/OL " Diary Notes, 20 October, 2 and 15 November, 14 and 20 December 1960; 4 January 1961.X S et 140 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Construction Approved for Release: 2018/66/27 C05500084 por re L erected, and the floor slab had been poured. BPS had revised contract drawings involving partition revisions, medical, X-ray, and projection equipment, and the instantaneous generator for the signal centers. The floorplans were retemplated from standard to unitized furniture. Telephone service orders and wiring diagrams were completed for 50 percent of the north half of the building.- The building was ready for its first occupants. Moving Days Xri The Headquarters Building was originally scheduled to be com- pleted by the spring of 1962, but sufficient progress had been made on the north half of the building to permit the first phase of the move�that of some DDI elements to begin on 19 September 1961. This permitted all components housed in Washington in the vicinity of the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge to be moved by 21 October. Three separate Federal Works Agency contracts were let to accommodate the move of CIA fur- nishings and equipment to the new headquarters. Merchants Transfer and Storage Co. was awarded two, and the Roy M. Hamilton Co. of Cincinnati, Ohio, won the third. Xiiefj The planners must have breathed a collective sigh of relief once the DDI elements began to move into the new building. Beginning in 1957 and continuing even after the completion of the move, the Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Amory engaged the planners in a series of disputes over the space allocations and floorplans for the DDI area. Amory had legitimate grounds for objecting to the location and the lay- out of the library, but he was less justified in his vacillating over deci- sions to include or exclude various other DDI components in the new building. Amory's indecision disrupted Colonel White's equanimity. White noted at one point: 21 Had a discussion both on the squawk box and later in the day with Bob Amory about the new building. Bob is, in my judgment, somewhat irrational about his desires to close up the library deal, put the Office of Basic Intelligence back into the building, etc. At his suggestion that we thrash the whole thing out with [DCI Dulles] I readily agreed, at which point he backed water considerably. I told him that I was fed up with his threatening to Memo, AC/BPS for C/PS/OL, 4 April 1961, sub: Killian Report on Fl Activities 1 October 1960-31 Mar 1961, /). BPS/OL 141 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 � go to the Director at any time he didn't get what he wanted in con- nection with the new building and that I wanted him to understand fully that I was prepared to meet with him and the Director at any hour of the day or night, without any advance notice, on his or any aspect of the building. I also told him that the DD/I area was slower than any other component in supplying the information that we needed to pass on to the architect and that unless we got his information very soon it would be necessary to stop work on the building again.n (u) The Construction Amory also complained to White�and in some cases even to DCI Dulles�about plans for ground floor windows, about the use of asphalt tile rather than more expensive flooring in the library, about the morn- ing rush hour traffic pattern over Key Bridge, about the temperature in the new building, about the empty vending machines, and about the hours of the credit union. 23 Other directorates had their own complaints at the time of the planned move to the new building. The question of adequate space for the Directorate of Plans (DDP�now the Directorate of Operations) contingent was the subject of serious discussion from 1959 until the ac- tual move. The basic problem was to determine the actual number of bodies that were to be accommodated and whether or not the entire DDP should be moved into the new building, even at the expense of space for the DDI or DDS. 24 DCI Dulles and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board decided in June 1961 that the Directorate of Plans would not, in fact, be moved in its entirety to the new building. As components moved into their new quarters, they found that new unitized furniture had replaced all Class C furniture, and had been pre-positioned with telephones in place ready to be cut over to the new numbers.25 For mechanical and security reasons, certain facilities (principally the pneumatic tube and conveyor systems) were not available until the entire building was occupied. Although incinerator 22 Diary Notes, 15 April 1957. (s) " Ibid., 29 October 1957; 9, 21 November 1960; 6, 30 Mar, 3, 6, 20, 27 November 1961. " Perhaps because Colonel White was in charge of the overall planning for the Head- quarters construction activity, space and other problems of the DDS components appear infrequently in the Diary Notes. In January of 1961 a request from General McClelland, Director of the Office of Communications, for additional space was rejected. Ibid., 8 January 1961. < " As a result of year-end savings during 1960 and 1961, these funds (totaling $1,298,900) were applied along with $340,000 obtained from the Director's Special Projects Fund (subject to DDS recommendation and DCI approval) for procurement of unitized furnishings. Se 142 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Construction eL Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 chutes were being made available for depositing classified trash during the period of interim occupancy, the material could not be burned in the building until later.2' Concurrent with the start of the move�on the night of 18 Septem- ber 1961�the new headquarters telephone switchboard facility was put into service. The operators were instructed to answer incoming calls with "Central Intelligence Agency" instead of "Executive 3-6115." This change in procedure attracted attention; extensive publicity was already being given by the news media to the CIA relocation, and this departure from secrecy was grist for the journalistic mills. The previous method of answering calls was resumed after a few weeks. By 13 November 1961 the move into the north half of the building was completed, and by 15 May 1962 the entire move had been accom- plished. Problems of winter weather, security escorts, communications, transportation, supplies and supply operations, had largely been over- come!' Decorating and decor, including the planned sculptures for the main entrance area, and office and hallway colors, hangings, and the like, were a continuing problem.:' Heating, ventilating, and air condi- tioning also presented problems. (u) Mail and courier deliveries posed special difficulties because of widespread confusion over the address of the new Agency building. "Langley" was and is the local name for a part of Fairfax County and has no political or corporate identity. Some mail addressed to Langley, particularly when posted in the Washington Metropolitan area, would be sent by the Postal Service to McLean, Virginia�the nearest post of- fice. The McLean postmaster reported, however, that most "Langley Mail" went first to Langley Air Force Base at Hampton Roads, Virginia, and was then forwarded to McLean. Relocation Bulletin No. 33 correct- ed the problem. The cafeteria was not completed until 28 February 1962, but in October 1961 necessary kitchen facilities, operated by Guest Services, Inc., were available to permit a limited operation in the table-service area. Vending machine rooms were put into operation on the floors be- ing occupied, and the Virginia Society for the Blind was granted per- mission to operate two snack bars. The combination of ongoing 26 Draft Outline, DDS Support Services Bulletin, 2 October 1961. BPS/OL files. c4 " Authors' conversation with the Chief, Telephone Facility Branch, 20 October '1970. " Project Officer to Deputy Chief, BPS/OL, 13 November 1961 to 15 May 1962, sub: Hq Move, BPS/OL " Diary Notes, 7 October, 4 November 1959; 22 January, 21 March, 8 June 1960; 9 January, 15 March, 5 April, 9 October 1961; 29 November 1962.X " White to Garrison, 12 June 1962, sub: Hq Bldg. Heating, Ventilating, and A/C Systems.X 143 S et Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Construction Aerial view, Main Entrance, circa 1963 / construction and ad hoc dining arrangements soon fathered an unfore- seen problem. Walter Pforzheimer recalled: At the time of the first move, I think the far end of the DDP part of the building was still partially open so that heavy equipment could be brought in.... As cold weather approached...the building became infested with the cutest collection of field mice you [will] ever see. In the course of serious dictation, soberminded DDI'ers would be interrupted by piercing shrieks [sic] from their secretar- ies which would herald the fact that another mouse had just appeared. In the Historical Intelligence Collection we were con- tinually setting mousetraps with devastating effect, including the fact that the Curator's extremely squeamish secretaries would not empty them, and that task fell on the Curator himself. Not only was the building open at the far end, but the cafeteria was not yet open, and everyone was eating out of the vending machines or "brown bagging it." Thus the mice had a never-ending supply of food. The mice also had the habit of chewing through telephone S/e t 144 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 The Construction Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 yeret wires and once chewed their way through the special gray [secure] phone wires, creating a security problem which resulted in having to have the mice cleared!'' When the move was in its initial stages, the presence of the DCI- designate John A. McCone�who was not noted as a particularly patient or tactful individual�provided an added fillip for the planners and movers. Reportedly "very well pleased with the building" on his first visit to the site, he began to throw his weight around even before his swearing in and taking over as DCI on 29 November 1961.32 Furniture had to be switched; he wanted a closed circuit television link with the White House; he asked for comparative construction costs with the new Atomic Energy Commission and Department of State headquarters buildings; and he complained that the movers were defacing the walls.33 The new DCI and his staff moved to the new building on the day he was sworn in. He occupied temporary quarters on the third floor until his seventh-floor suite was ready in the first week of March 1962.- (u) The HSLA office at the building site was closed on 2 February 1962; the auditorium roof tile installation was finally completed during May 1963; and the final payment for architectural and engineering ser- vices was made to H&A on 24 October 1963. The total construction time for the project, including change orders, corrections, and omis- sions, was six years and one month, from October 1957 to November 1963. At a total cost of about $43.7 million, the Agency had acquired a new, modern building with just over 1.3 million gross square feet of space, including some 837,000 net square feet of "office-type" space. In the spring of 1963, the new building housed nearly personnel, and at least more remained quartered in 13 other buildings in the Washington area.35 (C) 3' Pforzheimer to Pfeiffer, 10 February 1971./ "2 Diary Notes, 26 September 1961. (s) 33 Ibid., 18, 21, 28, 29 November 1961. "4 Project Officer Report, February 1962, BPS/OL files. 3' These figures were included in data provided to the authors by the Office of Logistics on 10 November 1972; the data are contained in HS/HC-849./ 145 S/ret (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 NOFORN 0084 John A. McCone, Bud Wheelon, and the Wizards of Langley: The Creation of the DS&T and the Battle Over Spy Satellites (U) David Robarge CIA officers and intelligence scholars widely regard John A. McCone' s tenure as Director of Central Intelligence during 1961-1965 as among the most effective in the Agency's history. His term is partic- ularly notable for its two main achievements in science and technology: the creation of a directorate dedicated to those fields, and the protection of the CIA's role in satellite reconnaissance from takeover by the De- fense Department. McCone's background as an engineer and manager of large technology, military, and energy organizations in the private and public sectors well suited him to reorganize the Agency's melange of scientific and technical offices. He believed strongly that to compete with an aggressive Air Force in the area of space reconnaissance, the CIA had to strengthen its scientific and technical capabilities. He and his first Deputy Director of Science and Technology (DDS&T), Albert Wheelon, gave the new Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) the personnel, budget, and mission to assert influence inside the Agency and the Intelligence Community. By successfully carrying out the larg- est rearrangement of human, financial, and material resources of his tenure, McCone�with Wheelon's indispensable help�went far toward regaining for the CIA the stature it had lost after the Bay of Pigs disaster. The two technically minded outsiders also initiated a change in the Agency's culture that diluted the influence of clandestine operators and Eastern-educated intellectuals and raised the profile of experts in esoteric disciplines who entered the secret world from outside the usual social and professional circles. (c) 147 Se/et (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley Edwin H. Land (u) The Seeds of the DS&T (U) The idea that the CIA needed a separate science and technology component originated with a little known but influential study group called the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP), convened in 1954 by President Dwight Eisenhower out of concern that the United States was vulnerable to a Soviet surprise nuclear attack. He authorized the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, James R. Kil- lian, to organize a group of experts to study the problem. One of the S/e t 148 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1-17 group's subcommittees, headed by Polaroid's chairman Edwin Land, investigated the nation's intelligence capabilities. The TCP report, enti- tled "Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack," declared up front that "We obtain little significant information from classical covert operations in- side Russia.... We cannot hope to circumvent these elaborate [Soviet se- curity] measures in an easy way. But we can use the ultimate in science and technology to improve our intelligence take." The TCP recom- mended "adoption of a vigorous program for the extensive use, in many intelligence procedures, of the most advanced knowledge in science and technology.. .a research program producing a stream of new intelligence tools and techniques." Land's subcommittee encouraged construction of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, a proposal that soon led to the development of the U-2. ' (s) The CIA responded to the TCP's recommendation by forming a Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) comprising mainly former members of the TCP. The board, which came to be called the Land Panel after its chairman, substantially influenced the Agency's scientific and technical activities, especially in the area of overhead reconnaissance. Adminis- tratively, the SAB was attached to the office of the DCP s Special As- sistant for Planning and Coordination, Richard Bissell. Bissell ran the Development Projects Staff and oversaw the U-2, CORONA, and OX- CART programs. He was the CIA's point man in exploiting science and technology for collection purposes and got along well with the SAB.2 Nonetheless, the Agency did not have a distinct entity to coordinate sci- entific and technical intelligence activities that the three existing direc- torates were pursuing independently. DC1 Allen Dulles did not act on a proposal made in 1957 to create a science and technology directorate� probably because it got no support from Bissell, who wanted to keep tight control over his projects and opposed any such consolidation as long as he remained at the Agency.' (s) When Bissell became Deputy Director of Plans (DDP) in 1958, he took the Development Projects Staff with him, renamed it the Develop- ment Projects Division, and used it�along with the Technical Services ' Donald E. VVelzenbach, "Science and Technology: Origins of a Directorate," Studies in Intelligence, 30;2 (Summer 1986), pp. 13-16 (S); Helen H. Kleyla, "The Directorate for Science and Technology, 1962-1970," 5 vols., DDS&T Historical Series no. 1, 1972, 1:3-4 (TS; material used classified S). Even before the TCP's report was released in February 1955, Land privately urged DCI Allen Dulles to "assert your right to pio- neer in scientific techniques for collecting intelligence." Land and Killian were also in- strumental in promoting the joint CIA-Air Force reconnaissance satellite program, CORONA, a few years later. (s) 2 Welzenbach, "Science and Technology," pp. 16, 22. (s) Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 1:4-5. (s) 149 Se[ret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p roved for/ Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley John A. McCone (II) Staff�to support espionage and covert action operations. This rear- rangement upset Land and Killian, who believed the CIA's technologi- cal research and development should stay separate from its clandestine activities. They were especially distressed to learn that Bissell had used the U-2 during the Bay of Pigs operation�to them a perilous extension of the aircraft's primary mission of gathering strategic and tactical military intelligence. In his final months as DDP, Bissell found himself in a tussle with Land and Killian�the two most influential members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), a panel of eminent private citizens that counseled the President on the perfor- ma9ce and problems of the Intelligence Community, At Land's and Se ret 150 pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7� Killian's urging, the PFIAB strongly advocated centralizing all CIA sci- entific and technical programs in one component and separating scientific collection from covert operations. Bissell resisted, but his position grew untenable after his chief ally, DCI Dulles, was forced to resign in December 1961 and was replaced by John A. McCone.4 (S) The DCI With a Slide Rule Mind (U) John A. McCone was better prepared than any previous DCI to lead the Agency fully into the realm of science and technology because he had experience managing large engineering and transportation enter- prises and US military and energy bureaucracies. President John Kennedy chose McCone, a wealthy Republican from California, to be DCI because of his reputation as a decisive executive who could control farflung organizations, and his connections to the GOP that would help protect the CIA from attacks by the Administration's critics in Congress. McCone had graduated from the University of California's College of Engineering in 1922. Classmates regarded him as hard- working and humorless; one of them described him as "a man with a slide-rule mind." After working for the next 15 years in the steel indus- try, he and fellow California graduate Stephen Bechtel formed the engi- neering firm Bechtel-McCone and designed and built factories, refineries, and power plants. Astute investments in shipbuilding, lucra- tive war contracts, and hard-driving management made McCone a mil- lionaire by 1945, and as of the late 1940s, he was one of the world's premiere shipping magnates.' (U) Nonetheless, McCone found himself, in his own words, "a little restless" and increasingly attracted to government work�particularly involving national security and technology. In 1947 he accepted an in- vitation to serve on the presidential Air Policy Commission, charged with devising ways to revive the moribund postwar aircraft industry. McCone wrote the military recommendations in the Commission's re- port, published in January 1948 with the attention-grabbing title 4 Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974 (Washington, D.C.: CIA History Staff, 1992), pp. 191-92; Welzenbach, "Science and Technology," p. 22.(s) Laton McCartney, Friends in High Places: The Bechtel Story: The Most Secret Corpo- ration and How It Engineered the World. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), p. 52; Current Biography, 1959, s.v. "McCone, John A(lex)," pp. 272-74; "Atomic Energy's McCone: A Private Dynamo in the Public Service," Time, 71(16 June 1958) 'p. 16. (u) 151 S/et Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved f7.1/Rp lease: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley "Survival in the Air Age." He suggested that American aviation scrap the piston engine and convert to jet propulsion, and that the United States start stockpiling nuclear weapons.6 (u) McCone's brief tenure as Under Secretary of the Air Force (1950- 51) helped him learn how to run a public organization, but the bureau- cratic controversy and personal tension he engendered demonstrated the limits of his brusque leadership style. His dealings as a defense contrac- tor during World War II enabled him to exert some control over the Air Force's byzantine procurement system and public works budget. He pushed for intensive research and development in missiles and wanted to reorganize the armed services' separate missile programs according to a Manhattan Project model under the direction of a "missile czar." McCone overreached with this proposal, however; interservice rivalries precluded it, and President Truman rejected it. Moreover, McCone, who saw his primary role as the Air Force Secretary's general manager, ran- kled Air Force officials and commanders when he tried to employ the same strict administrative techniques he used to run his own companies. According to one assistant secretary, McCone was guilty of "throwing his weight around," and a senior member of the Air Staff regarded him as a "know-it-all" who treated high-ranking officers with contempt. McCone returned to the private sector after less than a year-and-a-half, ostensibly for personal reasons. Presumably he took with him some les- sons about how, and how not, to shake up a federal bureaucracy.' (U) McCone's technical background and conservative Republican credentials recommended him to the Eisenhower Administration for the post of Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), vacated by the controversial Lewis Strauss in early 1958. Strauss had battled con- tinually with New Deal Democrats in Congress over issues ranging from public development of nuclear energy to a nuclear test ban. The Administration saw McCone as a strong-willed pacificator who would espouse the GOP's pro-business policies without antagonizing congres- sional Democrats. Like Strauss, McCone preferred that the private sector take the lead in developing nuclear power, but he was not as doc- trinaire or pugnacious as his predecessor. He viewed the Commission's business largely in technical and economic terms, sought ideas from many sources, and successfully avoided most of the political and per- sonal controversies that marked Strauss's tenure. According to the de- finitive study of the AEC during the 1950s, McCone "made significant 'Ibid.; McCartney, Friends in High Places, pp. 97-98; George M. Watson, Jr., The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1947-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1993), p. 106. (u) 'Ibid., pp. 110-11, 114-15, 124-27. (u) teet 152 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 strides in in bringing systematic evaluation and planning to bear on the Commission's amorphous and inflated programs." He also directed the AEC's scientists to conduct applied research that advanced the Com- mission's objectives instead of investigating pet ideas and projects. The AEC study notes that: lais an engineer, McCone tended to take a jaundiced view of sci- entists...he understood the indispensable role that scientists played in establishing the base for technological innovation, but he did not quite accept the idea that turning scientists loose in the laboratory to pursue their own interests in basic research was always a good investment for the federal government.' (u) McCone's attitude would prove useful in ensuring that the CIA di- rected its scientific and technical efforts toward intelligence collection and operational support. By the time he became DCI, traditional forms of intelligence collection�covert agents and clandestine operations� were losing their primacy to technical means. The CIA's achievements with the U-2 and CORONA in targeting the Soviet Union and Cuba demonstrated the value of technical collection and underscored the lim- itations of HUMINT. McCone knew little about espionage and counter- intelligence, doubted the efficacy of covert action, and delegated more responsibility to his deputies in those areas than in any others. In con- trast, he regarded technical systems as more vital to the Agency's mis- sion and set out to overhaul the CIA' s scientific and technical programs, which he regarded as inefficiently organized and suffering from poor management by Agency leaders captivated by clandestine operations. His preference for technical intelligence fit neatly with the White House's predisposition after the Cuban missile crisis to trust "hard in- telligence," such as photographs and signals intelligence, more than hu- man sources and experts' assessments.9 (u) Corbin Allardice and Edward R. Trapnell, The Atomic Energy Commission (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 176; Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley: Uni- versity of California Press, 1989), eh. 18 passim, quotes at pp. 514, 522-23. (u) 'John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 415. (u) 153 Se/et Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley James R. Killian (u) Confronting Bureaucratic Resistance (u) When McCone took office, pressure from the PFIAB to consoli- date the CIA's scientific and technological capabilities had peaked. Killian and Land were particularly concerned that the post-Bay of Pigs shakeup would damage the Agency's technical collection programs.'� McCone's own agenda conformed closely with Land's and Killian's, and he had the White House's general endorsement to make major Transcript of Albert Wheelon lecture at CIA Headquarters, 19 September 1984, p. 13, CIA History Staff. (s) S7(et 154 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Nret changes at Langley. As an outsider taking over at a time of leadership disarray and low morale, however, he had to act with due deliberation. Land and Killian could remain above the fray, expressing dissatisfac- tion at the pace with which McCone implemented their ex cathedra recommendations, but the DCI knew he had to move cautiously to pre- serve his authority. (s) McCone found the CIA' s scientific and technological operations scattered among several offices. The reconnaissance program was in the Directorate of Plans (DDP) under the Development Projects Division (DPD). The Technical Services Division (TSD), was also part of the DDP, as was The Office of Scien- tific Intelligence (OS I) in the Directorate of Intelligence (DDI) analyzed foreign research. Under McCone' s original conception, a new director- ate for scientific research would pull together all of these components in one place where the Agency's technical talent could exchange ideas and information, interact with private industry and other government agencies, and serve as a large organizational "magnet" to attract highly qualified personnel to careers in technical intelligence." (S) In one of his first meetings with the PFIAB, McCone heard Killian and Land strongly express their concern that continued association with the DDP would harm the CIA's scientific and technical development programs. After this meeting, McCone set up the Working Group on Organization and Activities, chaired by Inspector General Lyman Kirk- patrick, to review the Agency's structure and activities. The Working Group gave special attention to the idea of setting up a new directorate of research and development. The DCI asked all deputy directors to comment on the idea. Bissell vehemently opposed it. Among other points, he argued that the DDP by the DDP. Bissell might have felt embold- ened to resist because McCone, depressed and uncertain whether he would remain as DCI after his wife of many years died in December "McCone to McGeorge Bundy, 12 February 1962, National Security Files, Depart- ments and Agencies, Box 27, "Central Intelligence Agency, General, 1/62-2/61," JFK Library (C); McCone, "Discussion with Attorney General Robert Kennedy," 27 De- cember 1961, P. 1, DCI Files, Job 87-01032R, Box 2(S); Walter Elder, "John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence," manuscript dated 1973, 1:173, DCI Files, Job 87- 01032R, Box 4. (s) 155 ,Zet (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1 (b)(3 (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley rret 1961, had asked Bissell to delay resigning�indicating that the new DCI needed the veteran DDP's judgment and influence. 12 (S) McCone soon decided to stay on, however, and in late January� unconvinced and undaunted by Bissell's dissent�he told PFIAB that he intended to appoint a new deputy director to supervise technical col- lection and consolidate CIA's scientific activities. Bissell sent the DCI additional objections in early February that, along with those he had raised earlier, presaged the internal opposition McCone would soon face. The DDP now criticized the proposed movement of the OSI and the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) from the DDI to the new directorate. He also contended that activities that appropri- ately could be taken from the DDP and DDI�aerial and space recon- naissance�could be assigned to a special assistant and did not require the attention of a deputy director. Responding to McCone's earlier re- quest that he run the new directorate, Bissell now said that accepting the offer "would mean a long step backward," and he resigned from CIA in mid-February. '3 (S) On 16 February, McCone issued a Headquarters Notice creating the Directorate of Research (DDR), effective on the 19th. He appointed Herbert "Pete" Scoville, then Assistant Director of the OSI, as the first Deputy Director for Research. Before joining CIA in 1955, Scoville had been a senior scientist at Los Alamos and technical director of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project; colleagues considered him one of the nation's leading experts on warheads. He lacked Bissell's force- ful character and bureaucratic clout, however, and soon found himself in the middle of an organizational conflict without the means or support to wage it effectively.'4 (s) McCone' s 16 February notice stated "other activities in Research and Development will be placed under DD/R as appropriate." What "as appropriate" meant soon became apparent when Scoville circulated a draft proposal describing the responsibilities and structure of the new directorate. He recommended placing three types of activity in the DDR: research and development on technical collection and data reduc- tion systems, production of intelligence on foreign scientific and tech- nical capabilities, and operations that used either technical collection '2 Welzenbach, "Science and Technology," p. 22; Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 1:7. (s) '3 Ibid. (s) '4 HN 1-9, 16 February 1962, in Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 3: Appendix A, tab 2; biographic profile of Scoville in ibid., 3: Appendix B, tab 26; Welzenbach, "Science and Technology," p. 24. (s) Siteret 156 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C055 Wizards of Langley 7ret 00084 methods or human assets collecting on science and technology targets. Scoville specifically wanted the DDR to take over the Special Projects Branch of the DDP's Development Projects Division; the research, development, and laboratory component of the DDP's Technical Ser- vices Division; the DDI's Office of Scientific Intelligence; all ELINT activities; and the Office of Communication's research and develop- ment work on COMINT and agent communications.'s (S) McCone's notice establishing the DDR and Scoville's proposed restructuring evoked such intense reactions from several senior Agency managers that the DCI had to curtail the pace and scope of his plan. The most vigorous resistance came from DDI Robert Amory and his succes- sor, Ray Cline. They opposed the transfer of the OSI, maintaining that jurisdiction for intelligence assessments of foreign countries�particu- larly the Soviet Union�should not be subdivided, and that another of- fice would have to be created to replace the OSI' s intelligence production and contributions to estimates. Cline, well known for his bluntness, contended later that McCone wanted to put the OSI in the DDR "to give some warm bodies and an appearance of bulk to the Di- rectorate," and that because of the shift, "CIA advocacy of its own sci- entific collection techniques became mixed up with its objective analysis of all scientific and technical developments. The appearance of objectivity was hard to maintain when analysis and collection were su- pervised by the same staff." After the reorganization went into effect, Cline fought what he called a "rearguard action" to regain the OSI' s an- alytic function. Kirkpatrick's Working Group also weighed in on the is- sue in its report in early April, recommending that the DDI keep the OSI but give up NPIC to the new directorate. IS (s) McCone's new DDP, Richard Helms�known in the Agency as a calculating intellicrat apparently saw early compromise as the best tactic. He agreed to relinquish elements of the TSD but fought tenaciously to retain those that did. Helms may have figured that McCone contrary to the Kirkpatrick '5 FIN 1-9, 16 February 1962, in Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 3: Appendix A, tab 2; ibid., 1:10. (s) Ibid., 1:11-13; Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1976), pp. 199-200; Ray S. Cline interview with Mary S. McAuliffe, tape recording, Washington, D.C., 30 June 1989, pp. 3-4, CIA History Staff. (s) 157 S/et (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7et Wizards of Langley Group's recommendation that the DDR be given some operational re- sponsibilities�would defer to his judgment on this issue as on others related to clandestine activities. � (S) After three months of high-level opposition, Lyman Kirkpatrick, the new Executive Director, recommended to McCone that he accept less than a full measure of success. Kirkpatrick had spent several fruitless weeks working with Scoville on a draft Headquarters Notice setting forth the DDR's terms of reference. In the face of the Amory- Cline-Helms resistance, the Executive Director concluded that it was "preferable to allow the DD/R to grow by evolution and accretion rather than any drastic surgery on either DD/I or DD/P." Kirkpatrick's group regarded OXCART, the projected successor to the U-2, as the DDR's most important project and warned that the new directorate "must be re- strained from taking on collateral activities so fast that OXCART will suffer." (S) A few more weeks of piecemeal progress followed. McCone ap- proved personnel allocations for the DDR staff and the appointment of an Assistant Director, Col. Edward B. Giller. Giller was trained as an engineer, worked on Air Force weapons projects in the 1950s, and most recently was deputy chief of TSD. McCone and Scoville may have se- lected Giller�his qualifications notwithstanding�as a way to placate the DDP.'9 (S) By this time, the DCI and the DDR wanted to get the new director- ate up and running and deferred action on unresolved issues. McCone later wrote that forcing the DDI and DDP to turn over the OSI and TSD, respectively, "would incur great risk of impairing the [directorates'] fun- damental missions." The long-awaited Headquarters Notice describing the DDR' s mission and responsibilities came out in late July. The DDR would have authority over scientific and technical research and develop- ment that supported intelligence collection, but the DDP The DDR would provide overall guidance of ELINT activities but would not delve into related operational matters. Three new components were Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 1:10-11; McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 29 March 1962, concerning Kirkpatrick Working Group report, Exec- utive Registry Files, Job 80B01285A (hereafter referred to as McCone Papers), Box 2, folder 1, tab 36; HN 1-15, 16 April 1962, in Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Tech- nology," 3: Appendix 1, tab 3. (s) 18Ibid., 1:14-15; McCone, "Notes on Discussion.. Review of Report of the Kirkpatrick Committee," 29 March 1962, p. 3, McCone Papers, Box 2. (s) '9 Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 2:15-17; biographic profile of Giller in ibid., 3: Appendix B, tab 13. (s) Sirtet 158 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley Sret created: the Offices of Research and Development (ORD), Electronic Collection (OEL), and Special Activities (OSA).2� (S) McCone' s actions during the DDR' s several months of gestation typified an important element of his leadership style. According to his executive assistant, Walter Elder, McCone was much less interested in the formal structure of the Agency than in the results it produced. As in most of his prior management positions, he was content to lay down general guidelines at the outset and leave administrative details� especially jurisdictional conflicts�to others. McCone regarded this de- tachment as consistent with his successful approach to running his sprawling corporate enterprises and more appropriate to his function as DCI. As an industrialist, he operated more in the manner of a chairman of the board than a chief executive officer, delegating administration to handpicked subordinates, and he adopted the same approach as DCI. He took his responsibilities as head of the Intelligence Community very se- riously and made sure soon after his appointment that President Kennedy explicitly gave him all the authority he thought he needed to be a true coordinator of national intelligence. According to an informal time study conducted after he took office, McCone spent 80 percent of his workday on Intelligence Community matters and only 20 percent on subjects specific to the CIA. Consequently, he did not believe he should involve himself in day-to-day administration of the Agency, including the implementation of the DDR directive. Instead, as he told Kirkpatrick, one of his management objectives was "assigning respon- sibilities and then insisting that subordinates measure up."2 (s) McCone was willing to take bureaucratic risks, but in a way that helped contain potential damage. Creating the DDR inevitably would be controversial because, as Elder later put it, "you could do it only by carving it out of the flesh and blood of existing components."22 By del- egating turf battles to his DDCI, Gen. Marshall Carter, and Kirkpatrick, McCone gave the new directorate's critics, such as Cline and Helms, opportunities to obstruct implementation and mobilize allies. However, 2" McCone personal memo, "Organization of DD/R," 24 July 1963, quoted in ibid., 1:17; EN 1-23,30 July 1962, in ibid., 3: Appendix A, tab 4. The directorate's new com- ponents are described in ibid., 1:19-29. Ironically, considering the importance the DCI placed on the concept and the clamor it raised, the notice was issued under DDCI Mar- shall Carter's signature, not McCone's. The DCI probably was busy preparing for his upcoming wedding. (s) 2' Walter Elder interview with Mary S. McAuliffe, tape recording, Washington, D.C., 14 April 1989, p. 13, CIA History Staff; Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., The Real CIA (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 240; Lyman Kirkpatrick interview with Mary S. McAuliffe, tape recording, Middleburg, VA, 22 June 1989, p. 3, CIA History Staff, (s) " Elder interview, pp. 12-13. (s) 159 S/ret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 CL Wizards of Langley TI the DCI�belying his reputation as a brusque, heavy-handed boss�ap- pears in this case to have concluded that a major organizational change could best be achieved by letting bureaucratic politics and tempers run their course instead of imposing the new arrangement by fiat. McCone took a more guarded approach than in the management shuffle he quick- ly carried out during his first hundred days because far more serious and extensive equities now were at stake. (s) Disarray, Distractions, and Disputes (U) The new arrangement that McCone's deputies had worked out soon proved unsatisfactory. Even with its more limited mandate, the DDR as approved by McCone in July 1962 "never had a fighting chance," a former CIA historian and DS&T officer has concluded. "Pete Scoville's writ ran long on the tasks his new directorate was sup- posed to accomplish and short on the manpower needed to achieve such goals." Besides some officers in the OSA, which took responsibility for the old DPD' s reconnaissance projects, most of the Agency's scientific and technical talent remained in the OSI. In addition, delays in securing enough space in the new Headquarters Building, transferring personnel from other components, and setting up a new career service with a special pay structure made the DDR seem like an organizational step- child.23 (s) Difficult, high-profile technical intelligence problems that arose during the DDR's first months diverted McCone's and Scoville's time and attention from building the new directorate. Most important was the discovery of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba in October 1962. The DCI, the DDR, and the ADDR�along with NPIC director Arthur Lun- dahl�were the primary Agency participants in numerous briefings and discussions with the Kennedy Administration on the fast-breaking cri- sis. A less well-known distraction was determining whether a newly discovered Soviet missile installation near Tallinn, Estonia was intend- ed to shoot down aircraft or missiles.24 (s) " Welzenbach, "Science and Technology," pp. 23-24; Herbert Scoville, Jr., interview with Donald Welzenbach, tape recording, McLean, Va., 27 January 1989, p. 17, CIA History Staff (TS; material used classified S); Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Tech- nology," 1:29-37. Years later, Scoville disparaged the OSA as an attempt "to try and bring together some of the cats and dogs." The DDR career service finally was instituted in February 1963. DDR Directive 20-1, 19 February 1963, in ibid., 3: Appendix A, tab 5.(s) " Welzenbach, "Science and Technology," p. 24. (s) S cret 160 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley Sitret Moreover, throughout late 1962 and early 1963 McCone and Scoville continually clashed with the Defense Department over control of the recently created National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the nature of the satellite reconnaissance program. The high-level, informal collaboration between then-DDP Bissell and the Air Force�notably with Under Secretary Joseph Charyk�that had existed during the first years of the CORONA program ended with the establishment of the NRO in September 1961 and the leadership changes at the CIA soon after. The departure of Bissell, then-DDCI Charles Cabe11, and other senior CIA officers removed the Agency's top representatives in the re- connaissance area. Combined with the CIA's low prestige after the Bay of Pigs, this situation gave the Air Force�which provided most re- sources for the satellite program�a chance to seize the NRO and direct space reconnaissance toward tactical military uses. McCone, however, saw the NRO as a national strategic asset, not just as a military tool, and he resolved to keep the CIA's hand in developing, tasking, and manag- ing reconnaissance satellites and assessing their intelligence take. DDI Ray Cline recalls that "only a few people really understood what [satel- lite collection' was all about, but [McCone] understood it. He never lost sight of it." Scoville, unaware of the personal involvement Bissell had enjoyed with the Air Force, delegated Agency representation to depu- ties who found themselves outmatched by their uniformed counterparts. In the short term, the development of the new directorate and Scoville' s standing with McCone suffered from this steadily escalating conflict with the Defense Department." (S) High-level Frustrations (u) By late 1962 the halting development of the DDR and Scoville's ineffectiveness plainly displeased McCone. He thought that the CIA's entire scientific effort was unimaginative and sluggish, and that Scov- ille was too passive in projecting the Agency's viewpoint in the Intelli- gence Community. He thought, for example, that the DDR' s diffidence " McCone, Memorandum for the File, 3 January 1962, concerning meeting with Gilpat- ric and Charyk about NRO on 28 December 1961, McCone Papers, Box 2, folder 1, tab 7; Cline interview, p. 4; Gerald K. Haines, The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO): Its Origins, Creation, & Early Years (Washington, D.C.: National Reconnaissance Office, 1997), pp. 17-22; Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 2: chap. 5 passim. McCone later claimed that the intractability of the CIA-NRO dispute caused Scoville nearly to have a nervous breakdown and prompted his resignation. Transcript of McCone-Clifford telephone conversation, 6 April 1964, McCone Papers, Box 10. (s) / 161 S/ ret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley 7et caused the White House to assign responsibility for evaluating Soviet nuclear tests to an outside group of experts, the Bethe Panel, instead of to Agency officers. The DDP' s and DDI' s footdragging over the reor- ganization also annoyed McCone, and he complained that the two dep- uty directors never raised scientific matters with him. He later said he had told Helms and Cline: If you would only come in and talk to me just once about science I'd feel better about [the] scientific end of your business. But you come in and talk to me about clandestine operations, and about reports, and about studies, and about every other damn thing, but you never come in and talk to me about science.... Ray [Cline] will sit up all night and talk about history, but he won't talk about [science]. For his part, Scoville was frustrated at what he regarded as McCone's lack of support, and he was weary of all the turf battles. Some DDR staff members considered Scoville "too gentlemanly" to be assertive in his Agency and Intelligence Community roles, but he believed that McCone had undercut his position by failing to resolve the feud with the Air Force over the NRO. The DDR thought that he could not simulta- neously represent the CIA's interests in governmentwide programs and administer its own scientific and technical activities without the full backing of the Agency's top managers, especially the DCI.26 (s) Killian and Land of the PFIAB were not satisfied with the DDR ei- ther and raised their concerns with McCone in January 1963. The DCI explained that under current circumstances, the massive organization Killian had in mind could not be brought about "unless by direct order from me against the objections from [DDCI] General Carter and virtual- ly the entire organization within CIA." Two months later, the PFIAB is- sued a paper, "Recommendations on Technical Capabilities," which criticized the Intelligence Community for inadequately exploiting sci- ence and technology. Two of the board's many detailed proposals related directly to the new directorate's shortcomings. Establishing "an admin- istrative arrangement in the CIA whereby the whole spectrum of modern science and technology can be brought into contact with major programs and projects of the Agency," would remedy "present fragmentation and " Transcript of McCone-Wheelon meeting, 16 July 1963, p. 7, McCone Papers, Box 7; Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 1:38-39; Welzenbach, "Science and Technology," 24; Jeffrey T. Richelson, "The Wizards of Langley: The CIA's Director- ate of Science and Technology," Intelligence and International Security, 12:1 (January 1997), 86. (s) S ret 162 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley Approved for Release: 2018/616/27 C05500084 rem IL compartmentation." The board also called for "clear vesting of these broadened responsibilities in the top technical official of the CIA, oper- ating at the level of Deputy Director." In effect, Killian and Land were telling McCone how to overhaul the Agency's scientific and technical efforts. In April McCone responded to the PFIAB report through Presi- dent Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Mc- George Bundy. He could only make some general claims of progress but declared that the "period of observation" of internal reaction "has now lapsed," and that he would "move ahead with additional changes" that in- cluded giving the DDR "expanded responsibilities."27 (S) Ten days after McCone replied to the PFIAB, Scoville resigned. At the time he cited the other deputy directors' intransigence and the DCI' s indecisiveness. Years later, Scoville added that he left because McCone held him responsible for the performance of scientific and technical components over which he had no authority. "McCone would go around town saying I was responsible for all scientific activity in the Agency, and yet he refused to transfer to me the biggest scientific group, my old group of people with whom I had worked [the �Si]." The DDR asked that his resignation take effect 1 June (later extended to the 14th).28 (s) McCone's New Chief Wizard (U) McCone earlier had said he did not care who ran the DDR as long as it was organized and managed properly, and after Scoville's resigna- tion he moved to ensure that it was by asking Albert Wheelon, the acting director of the OSI, to take charge of it. Wheelon, a technical wunder- kind who earned a doctorate in physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology at age 23, had worked as a space reconnaissance design engineer at TRW and as a consultant to US Government scientific boards before joining the Agency as the OSI' s deputy director in June 1962. He had impressed the Agency's leadership with briefings on the nuclear test ban negotiations that he gave at morning staff meetings. When asked to become DDR, the brilliant and brash, 34-year-old " McCone, "Discussion with Dr. Killian, January 21st," memorandum dated 22 January 1963, McCone Papers, Box 2, folder 4; Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technolo- gy," 1:42-46; Welzenbach, "Science and Technology," pp. 24-25. (s) " Scoville interview, pp. 18-19; Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 1:46- 47. At the time Scoville resigned, he also was serving as Deputy Director of the NRO. After he left the Agency, he became Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarma- ment Agency. Welzenbach, "Science and Technology," p. 26; Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 2:213-15. (s) 163 Sylret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 1 p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 -/ Wizards of Langley Albert Wheelon (t) Wheelon told McCone that "we shouldn't screw a good light bulb into a burned out socket"�i.e., he was not interested unless the directorate controlled all of the CIA's scientific and technical efforts�and made several demands before he would agree to serve. He did not want the DDR to be a staff component, like the research and engineering compo- nent of the Defense Department, but "a real honest-to-God line organi- zation to carry out assigned responsibilities." He insisted on bringing the OSI with him, wanted full authority over research and development, and asked for a computer center and a missile intelligence center. Wheelon may have believed that he could drive a hard bargain because Sferet 164 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084� Wizards of Langley Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 - the DCI' s aide, Walter Elder, had already assured him that McCone would back him against the other deputy directors.29(s) McCone saw "great advantages" in Wheelon' s general plan, which fit his own preference for centralizing Agency scientific and technical functions, but also "dangers...unless Cline, Helms, and [Deputy Direc- tor for Support Lawrence K.] White are all aboard 100%." The DCI again left the details and negotiations to the DDCI and the Executive Director�Cline once more proved the most implacable�but by the end of July an agreement was ready. Wheelon got most of what he initially wanted, and a few other things besides. At his insistence the DDR would be renamed the Directorate of Science and Technology, and the PFIAB ' s March 1963 recommendations would constitute its charter of operation. The reorganization went into effect on 5 August.3� (s) In Wheelon, McCone had the hard-driving, steely infighter he needed to make the new directorate work. Wheelon saw officials in the Intelligence Community either as colleagues with whom he could coop- erate or as adversaries against whom he must compete, and during his rapid ascent through academe and the defense industry he had rarely ex- perienced defeat. He consistently outmaneuvered his Agency rivals in internal empire building. One colleague recalled that "When you take on Bud Wheelon, you're taking on a bureaucratic master, and Bud Wheelon ripped Ray [Cline] to shreds" in the dispute over the OSI. Agency veterans viewed Wheelon as an upstart outsider, but he did not seem to care. Before he joined the Agency, he told McCone and Kirk- patrick that he did not plan to make a career at Langley and was not bothered at the prospect of antagonizing colleagues at the Agency and in the Intelligence Community. McCone, perhaps seeing some of his own traits reflected in his assertive new deputy director, must have judged that Wheelon's determination and intelligence outweighed his faults and helped the intelligence process produce the results that he and policymakers demanded always the DCI' s ultimate test of how well programs or personnel worked. Wheelon, in turn, thought McCone had 2' Ibid., 1:40,47-50, 58-59; biographic profile of Wheelon in ibid., 3: Appendix B, tab 32; transcript of McCone-Wheelon meeting, 16 July 1963, pp. 4, McCone Papers, Box 7; Wheelon lecture, p. 16; Welzenbach, "Science and Technology," p. 26; Elder interview, p. 12. (S) In 1956 Wheelon was selected to assess the results of a "major breakthrough of heretofore denied intelligence on the Soviet missile program"�U-2 photography of previously unknown facilities�for the NSC. Richelson, "Wizards of Langley,' p. 88. (u) 3" Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 1:50-57; HN 1-36 and HN 20-111, 5 August 1963, in ibid., 3: Appendix. A, tabs 10 and 11. (s) 165 S/ret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley "the finest analytical mind I had ever seen" and regarded him less as a manager than as "an extraordinarily intelligent entrepreneur, accus- tomed to changing course rapidly as events and opportunities presented themselves."" (s) Wheelon achieved several of McCone's goals during nearly two years of service under him (McCone resigned in April 1965). Using the DS&T's expanded charter and special pay scale, Wheelon fashioned what possibly was the nation's most powerful development and engineering establishment, which by the end of the decade would de- sign, build, and deploy technical collection systems that gave the United States a substantial intelligence advantage over its adversaries. During his first year, Wheelon integrated the DDI's OSI and the DDS's Office of Computer Support into his directorate; established a missile and space analysis center over the vituperative opposition of powerful Air Force commanders, including Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay; recruited senior personnel, mostly from industry; acquired sufficient space and budget during a period of fiscal stringency; organized a network of sci- entific boards and panels; and produced a new internal publication on current scientific intelligence, the Daily Surveyor. By 1964 the DS&T comprised six offices: Computer Services, ELINT (renamed SIGINT Operations in 1978), Research and Development, Special Activities (re- named Development and Engineering in 1973), Scientific Intelligence, and the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center. (The two principal scientific and technical components still not included within the direc- torate were the DDP's TSD and the DDI's NPIC.) DS&T personnel re- spected Wheelon's brilliance, drive, and watchful oversight, but his demanding and sometimes harsh management and zealous protection of directorate prerogatives alienated many subordinates, officers else- where in the Agency (especially in the DDI), and other Intelligence Community components. McCone supported Wheelon' s ends (in the same position he probably would have used most of the same means), backed his DDS&T in most internal disputes, and favorably represented Wheelon's accomplishments to the PFIAB.32 (s) 31 Ibid., 1:60; Ranelagh, The Agency, p.491; Wheelon lecture, pp. 13-14; Elder inter- view, p. 10. (s) 32 Welzenbach, "Science and Technology," p. 26; Richelson, "Wizards of Langley," pp. 88-89; Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 1;61-75, 84-87, 97-100, 107- 23, 129-30; HN 20-115, HN 20-116, HN 1-39, and HN 20-125, dated 13 and 25 Sep- tember and 7 and 13 November 1963, in ibid., 3: Appendix A, tabs 12, 13, 16, and 18; Headquarters Regulation 20-24, 5 November 1964, in ibid., 3: Appendix. A, tab 26. (s) Siiret 166 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7 Wizards of Langley Approved for Release: 2018Z96/27 C05500084 The creation of the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center (FMSAC) exemplifies McCone's resolute way of getting what he want- ed. He was dissatisfied with the Intelligence Community's analysis of foreign missile and space activity and in late 1962 discussed forming a joint intelligence center with the Defense Department. The DCI partic- ularly was irked because he first learned of a Soviet space event from a wire service, not Agency intelligence sources. The Pentagon raised jurisdictional objections, so after a few months McCone told Defense officials that the CIA would establish its own all-source analysis facility that would serve as a national component and not duplicate any other organization's activities. The FMSAC came into existence on 7 Novem- ber 1963 under the direction of Carl Duckett, who came to the Agency from the Army's Redstone Arsenal. Not to be outdone, the DOD estab- lished the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center in April 1964, but McCone spurned McNamara' s suggestion that the two agen- cies form a joint committee. By the following March, FMSAC operated 24 hours a day, and in 1965 it was elevated to Office status." (s) Fight for the Sky Spies (U) McCone, with Wheelon's assistance, turned back the Air Force's attempt to take over space reconnaissance for tactical intelligence pur- poses. According to Walter Elder, no issue besides Cuba and Vietnam occupied more of McCone' s time as DCI than the protracted dispute over managing the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). McCone regarded the CIA-Air Force conflict as one of the low points of his tenure as DCI; he once de- scribed the bureaucratic row as "confusing... and absolutely disgust- ing." McCone and Wheelon hewed to the principle that overhead reconnaissance is the responsibility of the DCI in the discharge of his statutory duties. Moreover, they believed the fate of satellite reconnais- sance�widely viewed then as the future foundation of US intelligence collection�was at stake, and they were determined to overcome what McCone termed the Air Force's "almost unbelievable phobia over [its] position in space." The DCI was well-versed in the engineering areana of the NRP, such as camera apertures and booster rocket thrust, and " Ibid., 2:335-38. (s) 167 yiet Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley sought to enhance the program's technical accomplishments as well as its organizational protocols.34 (s) By the time McCone became DCI, the Air Force was developing its own reconnaissance satellite, the SAMOS, and working to establish itself as the primary player in the field.35 From its perspective, the Air Force saw much more at stake in the NRO controversy than control of a single program: it was fighting for an essential primary mission. The manned bomber was losing its importance in the age of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administra- tion had been assigned at least a coequal role in space. The Air Force was reluctant to have satellite reconnaissance taken away from it, especially by a civilian agency, and feared losing the ability to use sat- ellites to gather targeting intelligence for its strategic bombers. As Mc- Cone later observed, "the Air Force, having suffered from being removed from any space activities except military [ones]...had to scoop up everything they could.. .and one of the things was to become a single instrument in this [overhead reconnaissance] field."35 (s) McCone's limited authority over the Intelligence Community complicated the Agency's standing. McCone did not have the final say over all intelligence matters, notwithstanding the power he believed President Kennedy had given him in early 1962. He shared responsibil- ity for space reconnaissance with the Defense Department. Under the first NRP agreement in 1961, the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the DDP jointly managed the program�an arrangement that Bissell's " Walter Elder, "John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence, 1961-1965," manu- script dated 1986, P. 95, CIA History Staff; Elder interview, p. 1; transcript of McCone meeting with PFIAB members on 2 March 1964, p. 2, McCone Papers, Box 7; transcript of McCone-McMillan meeting on 27 November 1963, p. 10, McCone Papers, Box 7. (s) " The Air Force's mission-building carried over from satellites into aircraft reconnais- sance. Arguing that the CIA's cover for the U-2 Cuban overflight program was weak, it succeeded in taking over the flights in the days before the Cuban missile crisis. McCone kept CIA control of overflights of other denied areas. In late 1962 and early 1963, the Air Force pressed for surfacing a fighter version of the OXCART. At first the Agency believed doing so would compromise its own reconnaissance version, but by early 1963 McCone had come to accept the Air force's arguments. Pedlow and Welzenbach, CIA and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 292-94; McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 8 January 1963, concerning meeting with McNamara on same date, McCone Papers, Box 2; McCone, "Memorandum for the Files�Various Activities," 3 January 1963, McCone Papers, Box 2; McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 4 June 1963, con- cerning various discussions with Gilpatric, and McCone letter to Gilpatric, 11 June 1963, both in Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 4: Appendix D; Mar- shall Carter letter to Eugene Fubini, 20 August 1963, in ibid. (s) 36 Haines, National Reconnaissance Office, p. 19; William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security, paperback ed. (New York: Berkeley Books, 1986), pp. 196, 201; Elder interview, p. 8; transcript of McCone-Land-Wheelon meet- ing on 25 June 1964, p.10, McCone Papers, Box 7. (s) "let 168 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/04/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley orv. departure in early 1962 rendered moot. In May 1962, McCone and Dep- uty Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, who had known each other since McCone's stint at the Pentagon over a decade earlier, signed a sec- ond NRP agreement that more clearly enumerated the responsibilities of the NRO and established a single NRO director (DNRO) to be appoint- ed by the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. McCone regarded Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph Charyk as "unusually capable" and consented to have him as the first DNRO, but he was reluctant to let any successors come from the Defense Department. In exchange, McCone demanded assurances that the CIA would continue to control research, development, contracting, and targeting of the satellites. The new agreement did not provide for a deputy director, which McCone appar- ently thought would create a superfluous layer of management. Without that position, however, the CIA had no senior representative at the NRO. At first the Agency's position in the NRP seemed secure because of its successes with the U-2, CORONA, and OXCART, but the DCI soon recognized that the program's center of gravity was shifting to- ward the Pentagon. McCone suggested to McNamara that the only way to end the dispute was to remove the NRO from the purview of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and put it under either the Deputy Sec- retary of Defense for Research and Engineering or a new Assistant Sec- retary of Defense for Intelligence. McNamara responded positively, but nothing came of McCone' s ideas at that time.37 (s) After DNRO Charyk set up several programs that appeared to lim- it the CIA, McCone and Wheelon questioned the ability of the Air Force and the NRO to run satellite reconnaissance. They pointed out that the Air Force was responsible for most launch mishaps in the CORONA program and had failed to develop the SAMOS. McCone accused Mc- Namara and Gilpatric of being "entirely preoccupied" with defending weapons systems on Capitol Hill instead of managing the complex space intelligence program.35 Longstanding animosity between " Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 2: ch. 5; Haines, National Recon- naissance Office, pp. 21-22; McCone, "Memorandum for the File," 3 January 1962, concerning meeting with Gilpatric and Charyk on 28 December 1961, McCone Papers, Box 2, folder 1, tab 7; Walter Elder, "Memorandum for the Record," 2 July 1962, con- cerning CIA meeting with Bureau of the Budget on 29 June 1962, McCone Papers, Box 2, folder 2, tab 59; McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 15 December 1962, con- cerning meeting with Gilpatric on 14 December 1962, McCone Papers, Box 2. (s) " McCone had different working relationships with McNamara and Gilpatric. Gilpatric recalled that McNamara "didn't like to deal with McCone unless he had to, because Mc- Cone was another very strong-minded person who wasn't going to easily be overridden by the Secretary of Defense. But with McCone, McNamara just left it up to me. I'd worked for McCone, knew him very well, and we'd just, you know, sit down and nego- tiate...a modus vivendi." Gilpatric oral history interview, 1970, JFK Library, p. 91. (u) 169 SiZet Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley Wheelon and Brockway McMillan, Charyk's successor as Under Sec- retary of the Air Force and DNRO, further roiled the waters. McMillan came to the Pentagon in March 1963 from Bell Telephone Laboratories determined to break the CIA's hold on designing and procuring satel- lites; ultimately, he wanted to take over all management of space recon- naissance. He proceeded to undercut DDR Herbert Scoville, with whom he had served on Killian's Technological Capabilities Panel in the mid- 1950s, and then took on Wheelon after the embittered Scoville left. McMillan and Wheelon�both smart, strong-willed, prideful, and am- bitious�let an old disagreement about a technical subject grow into a personal feud that distorted their perspective on the bureaucratic contro- versy. Richard Bissell recalled Wheelon' s conflict with McMillan and the Air Force: Bud Wheelon, essentially, was battling to maintain the [A]gency's influence in the reconnaissance programs, and also to have the [Algeney designated by the NRO as the procurement agency for a lot of the payloads. The Air Force was battling for the exact oppo- site. They wanted to do as much as possible of the procurement and have as much influence as possible on the technical decisions and operational matters. And that was really the essence of Bud's continuing battles. What kind of programs will receive what kind of funding? Who will be the procurement agency for this or that? And [the battles] went on, and on, and on....39 (s) McCone's relationship with McMillan became just as acrimoni- ous as Wheelon's and hampered implementation of the third NRP agreement that McCone and Gilpatric had signed in March 1963. That accord established a deputy director position (with the expectation that a CIA officer would fill the slot)40 and gave both the DCI and Secretary of Defense responsibility for managing the NRO, with the latter having " Scoville memorandum to Carter, "Recent DD/R Problems with the DOD," 21 January 1963, in Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 4: Appendix D, tab 12; ibid., 2:246-49; McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 22 March 1963, concerning meet- ing with McNamara and Gilpatric on same date, McCone Papers, Box 2, Haines, Na- tional Reconnaissance Office, pp. 22-23; McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 11 January 1963, concerning meeting with McGeorge Bundy on 10 January 1963, McCone Papers, Box 2; Elder interview, pp. 6-7, 10; Burrows, Deep Black, pp. 199-200. At first McCone did not know that the feud between Wheelon and McMillan went back so far or was so deeply personal. (s) " Eugene Kiefer of the DS&T's Office of Special Activities became DD/NRO in July 1963 but never was a significant player in CIA-NRO affairs and asked to be reassigned after one year. Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 2:219, 266-67. (s) ,teet 170 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley pvret final authority over it. Personal and bureaucratic antagonism wors- ened�Elder recalled the DCI accusing the DNRO of "lying.. .deceit and fraud"�and caused disabling conflicts over contracting, funding, and delegating tasks. McCone chastised McMillan for being too obedi- ent to the Defense Department, turning the program into a "handmaid- en" of the Air Force, failing to include CIA in decisionmaking, and giving priority to development projects over intelligence collection. He asserted that McMillan could not properly manage the NRO while serv- ing simultaneously as Air Force Under Secretary and called one of the DNRO' s management proposals "damned foolishness." After months of futile infighting, McCone complained to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Eugene Fubini, that: I never knew the first damn thing that's going on. I have yet to see the 1NRO's] budget. (The NRP agreement] just isn't functioning at all as I anticipated in any respect and as near as I can see the whole thing is moving ever and ever closer and closer into becom- ing an instrument of the Air Force. McCone threatened to see Defense Secretary McNamara and the Presi- dent about getting McMillan removed unless matters changed to his (s) The situation appeared to improve in January 1964 when McCone agreed to Fubini's compromise proposal, under which CIA would have responsibility for research, development, engineering, and early flights of new reconnaissance payloads and then would turn over their opera- tion to the Air Force. The DCI and the Secretary of Defense (through the DNRO) would share authority over the satellite program. It was soon evident, however, that the agreement was failing, largely because personal rancor kept the principals apart. McMillan and Wheelon con- tinued to blame each other for communication lapses. McCone lost his temper in a phone conversation with Fubini, saying he was "just about 4' McCone, personal memorandum, 3 June 1963, in ibid., 4: Appendix D; transcript of McCone-Fubini meeting on 22 July 1963, p. 10, McCone Papers, Box 7; transcript of McCone-McMillan meeting on 11 September 1963, McCone Papers, Box 7; transcript of McCone-McMillan telephone conversation on 7 June 1963, McCone Papers, Box 7; transcript of McCone-McMillan telephone conversation on 29 October 1963, McCone Papers, Box 10; transcript of McCone-McMillan meeting on 27 November 1963, p. 37, McCone Papers, Box 7; McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 11 February 1964, concerning meeting with McMillan on same date, McCone Papers, Box 2; transcript of McCone-McMillan meeting on 10 December 1963, p. 9, McCone Papers, box?; tran- script of McCone-Fubini meeting on 17 August 1963, McCone Papers, Box?; transcript of McCone-Fubini meeting on 16 October 1963, McCone papers, Box 7; Haines, Na- tional Reconnaissance Office, pp. 23-24; Elder interview, pp. 10-11. (s) 171 Seiret Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 71 CI Wizards of Langley ready to tell the Secretary of Defense and the President [that] they can take NRO and shove it.. my patience is gone!" In a contentious meeting with the DNRO, McCone called McMillan's failure to include Agency officers in his investigation of recent CORONA failures "criminal" and said the DNRO was "just grabbing for power.. .you don't want to work with people�all you want to do is say, 'Give it to me and the hell with you.'" 42 (s) The PFIAB weighed into the controversy with an investigation, begun in March 1964 and completed the following June. McCone usu- ally regarded the board's monitoring activities as a nuisance, and, much to his consternation, it did not reach the conclusions he had wanted.43 Although the board acknowledged the need for the DCI to have a voice in NRO matters, it recommended that the Air Force receive substantial- ly greater authority�relegating the DCI' s role "maybe to be advised about something someplace along the line," as McCone deprecatingly put it. He thought that implementing PFIAB' s conclusions would re- duce the space reconnaissance program to "a single instrument resting with the Air Force." He countered with his own set of recommenda- tions, assigning program decisions and the allocation of responsibility to the DCI and Secretary of Defense, and placing the DNRO organiza- tionally under the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In June and July McCone discussed his ideas with Bundy, McNamara, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance. They all supported his general po- sition, but the latter two had reservations about the potential bureaucrat- ic and political fallout of his proposals:" (S) 42 Transcript of McCone-Fubini meeting and Fubini's accompanying memorandum for the record, 13 January 1964, McCone Papers, Box 7, folder 7, tab 111; transcript of Mc- Cone-Fubini telephone conversation on 13 February 1964, McCone Papers, Box 10, folder 5; transcript of McCone-McMillan meeting on 28 May 1964, pp. 12ff., McCone Papers, Box 7. (s) 43 The previous June, the PFIAB had appeared more critical of the NRO. Edwin Land in particular was perturbed to learn that the NRO staff consisted almost entirely of Air Force personnel. Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 2: 227-28. (s) 44 Ibid., 2:263-64; transcript of McCone-Fubini meeting on 19 June 1964, McCone Pa- pers, Box 7; McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 1 June 1964, concerning PFIAB report, McCone Papers, Box 8; McCone, "Evolution of the National Reconnaissance Organization and Certain Proposals," 17 June 1964, and "Memorandum for the Record," 18 June 1964, concerning meeting with McNamara, 17 June 1964, both in Mc- Cone Papers, Box 8; McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 12 July 1964, concern- ing meeting with Bundy and Vance on 9 July 1964, McCone Papers, Box 2. McCone had known since at least late 1962 that Bundy agreed with his overall perspective vis- a-vis the NRO. McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 11 January 1963, concerning meeting with Bundy on 10 January 1963, McCone Papers, Box 2. The political fallout Vance had in mind was "a possible flare-up by [Secretary of the Air Force Eugene] Zuckert and [Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis] LeMay which would be some- what embarrassing, and furthermore McMillan would quit." McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 12 July 1964, concerning meeting with Bundy and Vance on 9 July 1964, McCone Papers, Box 2. (s) S/e t 172 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C0550004' Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards qf Langley Srt Despite the policy-level concord on the need for change, nothing had improved by mid-1964. The CIA and the NRO�the latter echoing the Air Force's position�still differed fundamentally on the purpose of satellite reconnaissance. McCone and Wheelon were concerned with collecting strategic intelligence and husbanding the intelligence budget, so they stressed lower cost, lower resolution systems. The DCI told the DNRO that "left in the hands of the Air Force, [the space reconnais- sance program] would not be taking a picture of the Soviet Union to- day." McMillan and Fubini, less worried about funding and focused on the military's tactical mission, argued for more expensive, higher reso- lution satellites. They saw Wheelon's entry into developmental engi- neering a field the Air Force had hitherto considered its own�as especially threatening, and so McMillan tried even harder to limit CIA involvement in space reconnaissance. The DCI became especially ran- kled when he learned that the DNRO had obligated funds to meet the military's requirements without discussing the matter with him. To Land, he vented his frustration over his lack of authority to resolve these wearisome bureaucratic battles: Hell! I was the Director of the Standard Oil of California and we had no problems of this type with that company. I was also Direc- tor of Caltex, which is owned jointly by the Standard Oil of Cali- fornia and the Texas Company, and there the Directors spent all their time on allocating responsibilities: who's going to be respon- sible for the sales in France.... Who's going to be responsible for the next group of tankers? [Now] I can tell you in the six compa- nies when we built the Boulder Dam, this is what we had to do: who is going to be responsible for the gravel plant, is it going to be Kaiser, is it going to be Shay? This is the kind of thing that the Directors of the six companies had to deal with. Wherever you've got an integrated company you don't have that problem. Manage- ment can handle the problem." (s) McCone finally ran out of patience in late June 1964 when Mc- Millan told him that he wanted to transfer CORONA' s systems engi- neering contract from Lockheed to an NRO-managed research center Transcript of McConc-McMillan meeting on 11 February 1964, p. 39, McCone Pa- pers, Box 7; McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 14 January 1964, concerning meeting with Gilpatric and Vance on same date, p. 1, and McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 11 February 1964, concerning meeting with McMillan on same date, both in McCone Papers, Box 2; Fubini, "Memorandum for the Record," 13 January 1964, and transcript of McCone-Fubini meeting on same date, both in McCone Papers, Box 7; transcript of McCone-McMillan-Fubini-Wheelon meeting on 26 June 1964, pp. 43- 48, McCone Papers, Box 7; transcript of McCone-Land-Wheelon meeting on 25 June 1964, p. 11, McCone Papers, Box 7. (S) 173 S7oZt Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 'p roved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 yet Wizards of Langley called Aerospace. Claiming he was through trying to work with Fubini and McMillan, the DCI went to McNamara and Vance to plead his case. He charged that the DNRO ignored intelligence considerations, did not communicate with the Agency or use the DDNRO meaningfully, "lacked integrity," and exhibited "an element of dishonesty [that] made him totally unsatisfactory." McNamara conceded that the DNRO' s be- havior was "indefensible," and at last agreed to McCone's recommen- dation to take NRO out of the Air Force and make it a coordinating rather than a line organization. He told McCone, however, that he would do nothing until after the November elections. Meanwhile, McMillan temporarily backed down, suspending the transfer of the Lockheed con- tract.46 (S) Shortly afterward, in a last-ditch attempt to make the current ar- rangement work, McCone, Vance, Fubini, McMillan, and DDCI Carter began meeting weekly as an NRO Executive Committee�a format McCone supported but which, he commented to Vance, would not be necessary if "a properly oriented DNRO was running the show." At the first meeting, it quickly became clear that McMillan and Fubini resent- ed the DS&T's aggressive personnel recruitment and overall dynamism under Wheelon; Fubini went so far as to insinuate that the CIA was "try- ing to create another NASA." McCone tried to quell this suspicion, al- though he conceded later that the Agency's growing in-house capability seemed to be "worrying a lot of people around town." He informed the committee that much of the CIA' s recent effort responded to PFIAB 'S recommendations after the Cuban missile crisis. The DCI, however, lost out on the transfer of the CORONA contract from Lockheed to Aero- space when Vance and Fubini sided with McMillan. At a later meeting, McCone�perhaps to highlight McMillan' s obstinacy�offered "any ript -McMillan telephone conversation on 27 June 1964; cable 1423 o Director, 27 June 1964; and McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 29 June 1964, concerning meeting with McNamara and Vance on 29 June 1964, all in McCone Papers, Box 2; John McCone interview with Mary McAuliffe, 16- 18 May 1989, tape recording, Pebble Beach, CA, pp. 12-13,47, CIA History Staff. Clar- ence "Kelly" Johnson of Lockheed appealed directly to McCone to work against the transfer. Johnson to McCone, 6 July 1964, McCone Papers, Box 8. (s) peret 174 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084� Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Lan,cley Stet and all of CIA's technical capability," including Wheelon and his staff, to assist the DNRO in finding out why the failure rate of CORONA missions had increased recently. McMillan did not respond, as McCone presumably had expected.''' (s) Following the elections, McCone pushed for the idea, promised by McNamara in August, of putting the NRO under the Defense Secre- tary's office. Besides raising it with Vance, he also tried to gain support on Capitol Hill, particularly from Congressman Mendel Rivers, the new Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Vance was unre- sponsive, however, and Rivers did not commit himself. By this time, McCone had set a date for leaving the CIA and was preparing to turn the problem over to his successor. He nevertheless continued to com- plain about McMillan's actions to Vance and McNamara. In January 1965, for example, he told them that McMillan had released money to a contractor without informing him and had warned the contractor not to divulge the arrangement to the CIA. The DCI said this was the "last straw" and that if the top two officials in the Defense Department would not straighten out the NRO, he "intend[edl to take it to higher authori- ty."" (s) McCone had hoped that McMillan would become frustrated with the infighting and leave, and, according to Walter Elder, did what he could to bring that day closer. (Elder has denied, however, that McCone and Vance agreed that Vance would fire McMillan if McCone fired Wheelon.) As it turned out, the DNRO outlasted the DCI on the job. McCone had most of the last word on the NRO, however, as his reorga- nization scheme became the basis for a fourth, and much longer lasting, NRP agreement signed in August 1965 by his successor, Vice Adm. William Raborn, and Vance. It established the NRO as a separate agen- cy within the Defense Department; designated the Secretary of Defense as the executive branch agent of the space reconnaissance program; set up a new Executive Committee, to include the DCI, that would manage the program and report to the Secretary of Defense; and recognized the 17 McCone, "Memorandum or the Record," 12 August 1964, concerning NRO ExCom meeting on 12 August 1964; McCone to Vance, 14 August 1964 (with penciled nota- tion, "Not sent�discussed in meeting"), attached to McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 18 August 1964, concerning NRO ExCom meeting on same date, both in Mc- Cone Papers, Box 2; McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 17 December 1964, con- cerning discussion with Vance on 16 December 1964, McCone Papers, Box 2; McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 23 October 1964, concerning meeting with NRO Ex- Corn meeting on same date, McCone Papers, Box 2. (s) McCone, "Discussion with Mr. Vance, 16 December 1964," 17 December 1964, p.2, McCone Papers, Box 2; McCone, "Memorandum for the Record," 21 January 1965, concerning meeting with Vance on same date, McCone papers, Box 2. (5) 175 Se/et Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 p proved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 7ret Wizards of Langley DCI' s right as head of the Intelligence Community to establish collec- tion requirements for spy satellites. The DNRO and DDS&T were excluded as voting members of the Executive Committee, and two per- sonnel changes eliminated much of the rancor: Wheelon, although still DDS&T, would no longer be the Agency's NRO representative, and McMillan stepped down as DNRO in September 1965. The agreement, a compromise between the CIA and the Air Force, led to their success- ful cooperation on several satellite collection projects and worked well as a decisionmaking structure. The two organizations still competed and occasionally overreacted to real or perceived slights, and the Agency still was underrepresented in the NRO. Despite the history of distrust, however, the CIA and the Air Force gradually smoothed out the rough- est spots in their relationship and avoided the internecine fighting and personal clashes that had threatened to derail the US space reconnais- sance effort. 49 (s) McCone's and Wheelon's Legacy (U) McCone resigned and returned to the private sector in 1965, and Wheelon did so the next year. The CIA's "chairman of the board" and his "chief technology officer" left it with a science and technology directorate much like what Killian and Land had called for more than a decade before: a bureaucratically formidable concentration of research, development, collection, and analysis that secured the Agency's inter- national preeminence in technical espionage and strategic assessment. McCone's and Wheelon's organizational and administrative changes proved vital to the development of generations of satellites that enabled the Intelligence Community to monitor events in denied areas, provide warning to policymakers, watch unfolding crises, and oversee arms control. The styles and personalities of the DCI and the DDS&T�ac- tivist and determined to their allies, aggressive and intractable to their opponents�helped preserve the CIA's role in technical collection. It is not at all clear that a more conciliatory approach would have accom- plished as much against the concerted effort of the NRO and the Air Force to take over the satellite reconnaissance program. (C) " McCone interview, pp. 11-12; Haines, National Reconnaissance Office, p. 25; Elder interview, pp. 10-11. Wheelon advised Rabom not to sign the agreement. Kleyla, "Directorate of Science and Technology," 2: 254. (s) Siiret 176 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 C05500084 Wizards of Langley Sefret McCone and Wheelon, two technically minded outsiders, also ef- fected a culture change at the Agency by diluting the influence of the "bold Easterners," "prudent professionals," and Ivy League intellectuals who dominated its clandestine and analytical components. With the emergence of the DS&T, "New men, with family names un- familiar to the Eastern establishment, began to move into positions of prominence in the Agency," NPIC analyst Dino Brugioni has written. "They were experts in such disciplines as optics, electronics, chemistry, physics, engineering, and photography. Many were World War II vet- erans educated under the provisions of the GI Bill." OSS veterans, ca- reer spyhandlers, and graduates of elite liberal arts schools still set the social and intellectual tone at Langley, but the growing emphasis on technical collection ensured that the Agency would have a more diverse cadre of experts than ever before.'" (c) Looking back from the vantage point of nearly a quarter century, McCone expressed some reservations about selecting Wheelon as his head wizard: "I would have been more comfortable with a man that could be more reasonably adjusted to changes." The structure they de- veloped for the new directorate worked inside and outside the Agency, however, and in 1973, when the DS&T acquired the TSD from the Directorate of Operations and NPIC from the DI, it finally assumed the shape its creators had envisioned years before.51 (s) " Dino Bru