SOUTH AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF RACIAL REFORM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05629424
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: January 1, 1981

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
South Africa: The Politics
of Racial Reform
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Secre
NI JIM 81-10003
January 1981
Copy 237
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SOUTH AFRICA: THE POLITICS
OF RACIAL REFORM
Information available as of 28 November 1980 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD v
SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS 1
DISCUSSION 5
The Legacy of Apartheid 5
Forces for Change 6
The Debate Over Reform 7
Reform Under Botha 9
Botha's Commitment 13
Reform and the New Politics 14
Nonwhite Reaction 16
Prospects for Change Through 1982 19
Implications for Stability 21
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FOREWORD
This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum represents the Intel-
ligence Community's first in-depth assessment of internal South African
political dynamics as they pertain to the process of racial reform. The
ruling Afrikaner minority's thinking on the need for reform of the
apartheid system is in a state of flux. Hence, the memorandum's projec-
tions are limited to a relatively short period of time: the next two years.
Follow-on assessments by the Intelligence Community will probably be
required within this time frame.
The memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the Na-
tional Intelligence Officer for Africa. The Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
and the Central Intelligence Agency participated in its drafting. It has
been coordinated with Intelligence Community representatives at the
working level. Research was completed on 28 November 1980.
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SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS
The United States has a longstanding interest in the responsiveness
of White South Africans to Nonwhite aspirations for political, economic,
and social equality. At stake are declared American principles as well as
US objectives in preventing racial conflict in South Africa from jeop-
ardizing US economic and strategic interests there and from creating
openings for the Soviets throughout the region.
The pressures for change in South Africa's racial policies are the
product of a complex dynamic. The major external forces for reform
have been increasingly hostile international opinion and the steady ad-
vance of Black nationalism in southern Africa. However, the main ef-
fect of foreign criticism and the threat of international sanctions has
been to spur the South African regime to greater efforts toward military
and economic self-sufficiency.
Internal factors have been more telling in their impact:
� Apartheid as a doctrine has been seriously undermined by its
failure to achieve the physical separation of the races. This goal
has become increasingly unrealizable in the face of a growing
Black population and the influx of unemployed Blacks to the
urban areas.
� Blacks are increasing in economic importance as low White
birth rates and decreasing immigration make the pool of Black
labor the more necessary to maintain economic growth.
The Soweto riots of 1976 accelerated the breakdown in the White
and particularly Afrikaner consensus on apartheid. The government
saw the need for a more coherent strategy to maintain White control.
The subsequent relaxation of some of the restrictions of petty apartheid
stimulated a debate over the necessity for far-reaching changes in racial
policies.
As the debate has continued it has become clear that there is virtu-
ally no quarrel within the Afrikaner community over the long-term
objective�continued White political control and protection of
Afrikaner privilege and identity. But three main lines of argument have
emerged regarding the strategy and tactics for maintaining this
objective:
Conservative Afrikaners, the verkramptes, oppose any sig-
nificant tinkering with a system they believe has served Whites
well.
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� Moderate Afrikaners, the verligtes, would approve a broad lift-
ing of restrictions in the economic and labor fields and a vague
promise of eventual limited Nonwhite participation in the po-
litical realm.
� The more progressive among the moderate Afrikaners advocate
reshaping the political structure into a confederal system with
decisionmaking powers granted to Nonwhites, albeit in very re-
stricted areas.
The scope and pace of change over the next two to three years will
in large part depend on the attitudes of the Afrikaner community at
large. Although Afrikaners as a group appear more receptive to change
now than at any time in the past, the conservative Afrikaner establish-
ment remains powerful enough to hinder any push for reform under-
taken by Prime Minister Botha's government.
Botha has categorically rejected a one-man, one-vote formula in a
unitary state. He and his supporters believe, however, that apartheid
must be modernized in order to assure White survival and have moved
in a variety of ways to signal the seriousness and urgency of their push
for change. It is clear that Botha is not working from a blueprint and is
moving in an ad hoc manner that gives him the flexibility to press or
back off from given policies as circumstances require.
Nonwhites have grown pessimistic about the prospects for mean-
ingful change and have, as a result, rebuffed new government initiatives
and rejected most of their leaders who have consulted with White
authorities. Urban Blacks, as well as the younger generation of Asians
and Coloreds who identify with them, have demonstrated their lack of
respect for the government's timid reforms by consumer boycotts, labor
unrest, and student demonstrations.
The pace of reform over the next two to three years will not be
sufficient to satisfy Nonwhite demands, particularly if reforms are un-
dertaken without consultation. Racial tensions will rise in urban areas as
Nonwhite expectations continue to outpace the ability of government to
deliver reforms. Indeed, reforms will likely stimulate more strident
Nonwhite demands for change. Prospects, then, are as follows:
� An overall pattern of urban unrest, interspersed with sporadic
and spontaneous violence, will mark the next few years. Vio-
lence will remain at a lower level in rural areas, but the growing
poverty of the government-established homelands may result in
increasing rural unrest. Rising urban and rural unrest can prob-
ably be contained but only at the cost of harsher repression.
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� Black insurgent groups, primarily the African National Congress
(ANC), which is backed by the Soviets, will continue to pull off
spectacular terrorist operations. The ANC may also expand its
activities in rural areas and will increase its efforts to infiltrate
Nonwhite student and labor organizations. Government security
forces, however, probably will be able to prevent ANC activities
from becoming a serious threat to stability.
� Faced with racial unrest and conservative resistance to his poli-
cies, Botha will be tempted to move away from parliamentary
institutions to concentrate power in his own hands. He will be
aided by a new elite, dominated by the military but also includ-
ing businessmen and technocrats, who see change as the only
way to maintain a strong economy and national security. Whites
would probably acquiesce, albeit reluctantly, in this shift of
power if Botha found it necessary to deal forcefully with rising
Nonwhite violence and White obstructionism.
� Botha is not likely to find himself under pressure to this degree
before the end of 1982, but he appears to be positioning himself
to rule South Africa as a strongman at some point in the future.
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DISCUSSION
1. The United States has a longstanding interest in
the responsiveness of White South Africans to Non-
white aspirations for political, economic, and social
equality. At stake are declared American principles as
well as US objectives in preventing racial instability in
South Africa from jeopardizing US economic and
strategic interests there and from creating openings for
the Soviets throughout the region. US relations else-
where in Africa are also involved.
2. This memorandum will address the question of
whether Prime Minister P. W. Botha's administration
and the ruling Afrikaner-dominated National Party
are willing and able to push reforms far enough and
fast enough to keep racial violence from escalating.
The Colored riots in mid-1980 near Cape Town,
mounting Black labor and student unrest throughout
South Africa, and Botha's recent unwillingness to buck
the right wing of his party have all given special point
to this question.'
3. The memorandum will review Botha's reform
policies as they have unfolded since he took office two
years ago, discuss his style and strategy, analyze the
reaction of Nonwhites and Whites to the program, and
draw conclusions about the prospects for change over
the next two to three years. Special emphasis will be
given to the implications for internal stability. This
paper focuses on the domestic South African political
scene. It is in many respects a follow-on to IIM 79-
10025, December 1979, which discussed South Africa's
overall strategy for survival in an increasingly hostile
world. The memorandum's projections are based on
assumptions that external pressures for reform will not
' This paper uses conventional terminology in referring to South
Africa's racial groups. Specifically, it uses the term -Blacks" when
referring to South Africans of tribal lineage and the term -Non-
whites- as a collective label for Blacks, Asians (mostly Indians), and
Coloreds (persons of mixed race). Usage of these terms among
observers of South Africa is changing. The term -Africans" is being
applied increasingly to South Africans of tribal lineage, and the term
"Blacks" is used as a collective label for all the Nonwhite ethnic
groups�including Coloreds and Asians. Such broad usage of the
term -Blacks," however, could be confusing to an American au-
dience. Similarly, although the label "Nonwhite" is being increas-
ingly avoided because of its possible pejorative connotations, it is
arguably the least confusing term to use when referring collectively
to Blacks, Asians, and Coloreds.
increase dramatically over current levels and that Pre-
toria will continue to believe in the efficacy of the
economic, military, and foreign policy aspects of this
overall strategy.
The Legacy of Apartheid
4. The National Party rose to power in South Africa
in 1948 on a pledge to extend patterns of White
supremacy and racial segregation�both statutory and
customary�that had developed over the previous two
centuries. The party, in fact, coined the word "apart-
heid," meaning "apartness" or "separation," to encap-
sulate its pledge and to serve as its campaign slogan.
The appeal of that pledge and slogan reflected the rise
of Afrikaner identity and the depth even then of
White concerns over the impetus that post-World
War II forces of industrialization, urbanization, and
nationalism gave to pressure from other racial groups
for wider political, economic, and social rights.
5. During the 1950s, successive National Party gov-
ernments enacted laws that more strictly codified ra-
cial separation in the social, economic, and residential
spheres. Under Prime Minister Verwoerd, the party
embraced as doctrine the concept of -grand apart-
heid.- Verwoerd's theory centered on the notion that
the tribal reservations that had already been set aside
for exclusive use of the main African tribes could be-
come nominally independent states where Blacks
could fulfill their political aspirations. In essence, the
theory proposed that Blacks provide labor for the
White areas of South Africa but return to their re-
serves or -homelands" upon completion of their con-
tract. No plan was offered for even theoretical auton-
omy for Coloreds or for Asians, who had no
historically or geographically defined territorial bases.
6. Working from Verwoerd's blueprint, successive
Nationalist governments by the early 1970s had de-
vised the complex and interwoven policies of eco-
nomic, political, and social discrimination and control
known as -separate development." The main features
of apartheid are by now well known:
� As the result of the process of enforced territorial
segregation, most Blacks have been made legal
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residents of 10 rural and economically deprived
tribal homelands. These homelands make up
about 13 percent of South Africa's territory.
� Blacks are permitted to exercise basic political
rights only within the homelands in which they
hold citizenship. The government operates sepa-
rate and inferior health facilities and educational
systems, for Nonwhites, and public transportation
is generally segregated. Interracial marriages are
prohibited, and mixed social activities are
discouraged. -Petty apartheid- regulations nor-
mally bar Nonwhites from restaurants, hotels,
theaters, and other public facilities.
� Within -White areas,- Coloreds and Asians must
live in specially zoned residential areas; with a
few exceptions, Blacks qualifying for residency
outside the homelands must live in designated
Black townships.
� -Influx control- laws stipulate that Nonwhites
can be in White areas only by permission; the
burden of proof that they are authorized to be in
the areas rests upon them.
� Two separate labor markets exist: one for Whites
made up largely of skilled and management posi-
tions, in which there are personnel shortages; and
one for Blacks consisting of unskilled and
semiskilled jobs, in which there are massive
personnel surpluses. Pay scales for Nonwhites
tend to be lower than for Whites, even for com-
parable work.
The police and a large bureaucracy enforce the repres-
sive laws, including sweeping powers of arrest and
detention, which shore up the system. Under influx
control alone, for example, Nonwhites are subject to
more than 2,000 laws and regulations; the government
acknowledges having arrested more than 5 million
Blacks over the past decade for violating the pass laws.
Forces for Change
7. Political Pressures. The pressures for racial re-
form that South Africans are feeling today are the
product of a complex dynamic. External pressures in
the form of increasingly hostile international opinion
and the steady advance of Black nationalism in south-
ern Africa have helped bring about a reappraisal of
racial policy, but they have not by themselves been
sufficient to bring about significant change. In fact,
one major effect of criticism from abroad and the
threat or actual imposition of sanctions has been to
spur Pretoria to embark on a program to make South
Africa militarily and economically independent�and
thus less susceptible to outside leverage.'
8. External pressures have been accompanied by in-
ternal unrest. Indeed, as Blacks have become urban-
ized and consequently less divided along tribal lines,
they have also become more aware of the world be-
yond South Africa's borders. The decolonization proc-
ess in Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s encour-
aged many Nonwhites in South Africa to believe that
historical trends improved the prospects for the even-
tual destruction of the apartheid system. During this
period the African National Congress (ANC) and the
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) organized large-scale
antiapartheid demonstrations which culminated in the
Sharpeville massacre of 1960. Subsequently both or-
ganizations were banned, and Black political activity
in general was suppressed. A long period of quiescence
ended with the Soweto riots of 1976, which were par-
tially linked to the coming to power of Black majority
governments in Angola and Mozambique.
9. Apartheid has also been undermined by its fail-
ure to meet its own goals, particularly the physical
separation of the races. An annual growth rate of al-
most 3 percent in the Black population and the meager
job opportunities in the homelands have resulted in
increased migration of Blacks to urban areas�a rever-
sal of the flow Verwoerd envisioned. Blacks out-
number Whites in almost all urban centers, and the
relative numerical position of Whites continues to de-
cline. (See population estimates in figure 1.)
10. Economic Pressures. When the National Party
came to power in 1948, agriculture and mining
contributed more to the economy than did manufac-
turing and commercial interests. In 1979, the situation
had reversed: industry and commerce were respon-
sible for more than half of the national product. This
has created a demand for Black skilled labor that can-
not be filled within the constraints of apartheid. Low
White birth rates and a decline in White immigration
have significantly slowed the expansion of the White
labor pool. In 1975, 41,000 new White jobseekers en-
tered the labor market; in 1979, there were only
26,000 new White workers. The increasingly acute
shortage of skilled labor has resulted in the elimination
of job reservations in all but two sectors of the econo-
'See IIM 79-10025 for a detailed discussion of South Africa's ef-
forts to make itself more immune to foreign economic pressures and
to enable it to act with greater independence in the political and
military fields.
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Figure 1
SOUTH AFRICA:
Population Estimates by Percent, 1 July 1980
Total: 28,468,000
Black tribes
71.5
583402 1.81
Blacks: 20,351,000
South Sothos 6.9
Xhosas(Ciskei) 4.1
Shangaans 3.5
Swazis 2.4
Others 5.1
Afrikaans speakers
9.8
English speakers
6.5
Coloreds 9.4
Asians 2.8
The figure for the total population is derived from a projection by the US Department of
Commerce Foreign Demographic Analysis Division. Figures for the individual ethnic
groups were calculated from official South African percentages for each group. The
figures for the Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking communities were calculated
from the generally used ratio of 3:2 for Afrikaans speakers to English speakers.
Differing natural growth rates among South Africa's racial communities, accompanied by
likely changes in emigration and immigration patterns, will produce a change in racial
composition of the country's population in the decades ahead. The South African
Department of Statistics projects an overall population of about 47,000,000 by the year
2000, of which 14 percent would be Whites, 73.4 percent Blacks, 9.9 percent Coloreds,
and 2.7 percent Asians.
The South African Blacks are currently about evenly divided between those living in the
homelands and those in the White areas (not counting about 1,500,000 migrant workers
who take temporary employment in the White areas) . Of those living in the White sector,
55 percent are in the towns and cities, 45 percent in rural areas.
my and has led businessmen to work around many of
the codified apartheid restrictions on Black labor.
11. The growing economic importance of Blacks�
who now comprise 80 percent of the new entrants into
the labor market and 64 percent of the labor force in
the industrial heartland around Johannesburg�is
beginning to give some skilled Black workers leverage.
Since 1973, when traditionally docile Black labor
shocked the White community by engaging in more
than 200 strikes nationwide, urban Blacks have been
making use of this leverage to demand better working
conditions, higher pay, union recognition, and,
in-
creasingly, a general easing of apartheid restrictions.
12. Moreover, one of the major lessons the govern-
ment drew from the riots in 1976 was that high levels
of unemployment pose a serious danger to internal
stability. Pretoria currently estimates that the econo-
my needs to maintain an annual growth rate of 5.5
percent' just to hold unemployment at the current
level. Thus, continued economic expansion, once
deemed important largely because of the material
benefits derived by the White community, has now
become vital in helping to keep Nonwhite frustrations
in check.
13. When the National Party first came to power,
these economic problems would have been mainly the
concern of English speakers, who then owned most
industries. By 1975, Afrikaner private business owner-
ship, excluding agriculture, had grown from less than
10 percent in 1946 to almost 30 percent. Furthermore,
the National Party, to counter English domination of
the economy, has created or expanded 22 public cor-
porations that control, among other sectors, the iron,
steel, and coal industries, electrical production, and
the manufacture of armaments and synthetic fuels.
Afrikaner commercial and industrial leaders, who rep-
resent an increasingly significant segment of the
Afrikaner elite, now comprehend that the continued
adherence to separate development hampers economic
growth.
The Debate Over Reform
14. Despite the steady erosion of apartheid's
foundations, the broad Afrikaner consensus against
any significant modification of the system did not start
to break down until after the Soweto riots of 1976. The
upheaval in this large Black township outside Johan-
nesburg contributed to the undercurrent of unease set
in motion by the emergence of hostile Black regimes
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in Angola and Mozambique with close ties to the
USSR, the onset of the worst recession since the 1930s,
and increased Western activism against apartheid.
15. Viewing itself threatened by a -total onslaught"
of hostile external and internal forces, Prime Minister
Vorster's government sought to rationalize and or-
chestrate domestic and foreign policies in order to de-
vise a more coherent strategy for maintaining White
control. As part of this effort, the government allowed
a relaxation of apartheid restrictions in such areas as
sports, urban home leaseholds by Blacks, penalties for
passbook violations, job discrimination, and segrega-
tion of public facilities. These measures were a prag-
matic response to the rising external and internal pres-
sures and to the prospect of increasing isolation from
the West. The main impact, however, was to stimulate
a debate, conducted until then largely within intellec-
tual circles, over the necessity of more far-reaching
changes in racial policies.
16. As the debate has intensified and spread within
Afrikaner elites during the past few years, it has be-
come clear that the quarrel is not over long-term
objectives; Afrikaners remain collectively committed
to maintaining White political dominance and protect-
ing their privileges and identity. Progressive and con-
servative Afrikaners alike rule out any one-man, one-
vote formula in a unitary state, believing that Whites
would quickly lose control regardless of any guar-
antees. Three main lines of argument have developed,
however, over issues of strategy and tactics.
� Conservative Afrikaners, popularly labeled ver-
kramptes (literally, cramped ones) oppose any
significant tinkering with apartheid. Ver-
kramptes contend that even minor modifications
in the principles of separate development will
eventually undermine the entire system. Even
among the verkramptes there are gradations.
Some of them believe that certain aspects of
petty apartheid can and should be eased to pla-
cate international critics. Others would improve
the livelihood and general well-being of Non-
whites but strictly within the dogma of separate
development. If the Verwoerdian model proves
unattainable, there are verkramptes who believe
that Afrikaners should retreat to a White home-
land rather than experiment with modifications
of the present system.
� The more politically moderate members of the
Afrikaner elite, called verligtes (enlightened
ones), recognize that the Verwoerdian model is
seriously flawed and that domestic and interna-
tional pressures for change will continue to build.
They are prepared to throw up various facades of
reform and of consultation and collaboration
with Nonwhite elites but refuse any compromise
on the fundamental principle of maintaining the
White political monopoly. Their program in-
cludes not only a rollback of much of petty
apartheid and a broad lifting of restrictions in the
economic and labor fields, but also vague prom-
ises of eventual political concessions in return for
the cooperation and collaboration of Nonwhite
leaders. Reforms, the mainstream verligte ar-
gument goes, should be dispensed on a tactical
basis to maximize their political impact interna-
tionally and within the Nonwhite communities
while minimizing the practical effect on White
power and on National Party unity.
� Progressives in the verligte camp�who can be
termed the verligte vanguard and who are
mainly journalists and academics�are prepared
to experiment cautiously in the political realm.
They would reshape the South African political
structure by involving Coloreds and Asians in a
limited form of decisionmaking and would in-
clude urban and homeland Blacks in a broader
political confederation with consensus decision-
making powers over certain matters. Whites
would maintain authority over the great bulk of
national resources and a veto over any policy that
might adversely affect White interests.
17. The verligtes seek to co-opt Coloreds, Asians,
and limited numbers of urban Blacks into a new Non-
white middle class that would act as a buffer against a
Black revolution. Verligte arguments, or at least the
mainstream strategies, have found sympathetic au-
diences within important sectors of the Afrikaner
community. Businessmen want freedom from govern-
ment regulations that hamper industrial efficiency,
including apartheid restrictions on the mobility, train-
ing, and employment of Black labor.
18. The largely Afrikaner officer corps in the De-
fense Force also has embraced verligte views. The
Soweto riots, coupled with the disappearance of
friendly White buffer states, have created the specter
of what South African defense planners fear most�a
combination of internal revolt and external attack.
Having embarked on a program of force expansion
that involves increasing recruitment of Nonwhites and
progressive elimination of petty apartheid within the
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services, the military has made plain its concern that
civilians are lagging behind in making changes to
dampen domestic and international discontent.
19. Verligte views have also found a sympathetic
audience in the increasing numbers of urbanized and
educated Afrikaners. This growing upper middle class
has drifted away from traditional culture and values
into an increasingly affluent and more relaxed
lifestyle. These Afrikaners are willing�even anx-
ious�to have the government devise more flexible
and pragmatic approaches to race relations. Verligte
views are also making inroads among some younger
clergymen in the Dutch Reformed Church, hitherto a
bastion of verkrampte doctrine, as well as on campuses
of the traditionally conservative Afrikaner universities.
20. The verkrampte argument appeals to a power-
ful quarter in the Afrikaner community: lower-level
civil servants, including the police; blue-collar work-
ers, primarily in the mining sector; and farmers. These
groups, which feel most intensely the need for either
job protection or the supply of cheap Black labor that
apartheid has assured, once formed the dominant
strand of the National Party, although their influence
is declining. Led by Transvaal party chief Andries
Treurnicht (see figure 2), the verkrampte faction in
the party�estimated to command the loyalty of up to
40 of the 135 Nationalist members of Parliament�has
been able to block some verligte initiatives by cap-
italizing on Afrikaner traditions of consensus de-
cisionmaking and the party's historic fear of a split. In
addition, the Treurnicht faction could probably count
on the support of as many as 40 other members of the
party caucus on some issues.
Reform Under Botha
21. When he took office two years ago, P. W. Botha
(see figure 3) had been in the public eye for more than
12 years as Defense Minister and head of the National
Party's Cape Province branch. Cape politicians have a
relatively moderate tradition within the National Par-
ty, and during the years Botha held the defense portfo-
lio the military had begun to drop racial barriers in the
defense forces. But Botha was generally regarded as a
hardliner because of his role as architect of South Af-
rica's intervention in Angola in 1975 and because of
his clashes with government leaders over this and
other issues, and most observers placed him on the ver-
krampte side of the debate over racial reform.
22. His previous reputation notwithstanding, Botha
has led the way in changing the style and tone of gov-
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ernment dealings with the Nonwhite community,
adopting the rhetoric of change, and becoming the
first South African prime minister to visit a Black
township�Soweto�and a homeland. He has con-
sulted with some Blacks�homeland leaders and mod-
erate urban spokesmen�and has introduced a series of
reform proposals with considerable fanfare.
23. New Constitutional Structures. Efforts at
constitutional reform began in 1976 under Prime Min-
ister Vorster when Botha, then Minister of Defense,
chaired a Cabinet committee that drew up a plan to
create separate Colored and Asian parliaments at the
national level that would have limited autonomy in
local affairs. This plan was endorsed by the National
Party but rejected by Coloreds and Indians on the
grounds that it ignored the political aspirations of
Blacks.
24. After moving up to the prime ministership in
1978, Botha scrapped this plan and set up a commis-
sion under then Interior Minister Schlebusch to find
alternative solutions. Botha's new plan for constitu-
tional reform was revealed early in 1980 in an interim
report by the Schlebusch commission and given legal
life in a constitutional amendment passed by Par-
liament last May. The principal institutional innova-
tion was the President's Council, a deliberative body
of 60 Whites, Coloreds, and Asians under the chair-
manship of State Vice President Schlebusch, whose
new post was created by the amendment.
25. The Council, whose members are appointed for
five-year terms, was officially installed on 6 October
1980, with 44 Whites, 10 Coloreds, five Asians, and
one Chinese South African agreeing to serve on it;
most of the Nonwhite members are not recognized
leaders of their communities. Botha appears intent on
making the Council an important component of the
government. To enhance their prestige, Council mem-
bers will receive the same salaries as members of Par-
liament and will be housed in new, impressive offices
in Cape Town, the country's legislative capital. The
Council has five subcommittees�constitutional, sci-
entific, economic, planning, and community re-
lations�in which specific problems between the races
are to be discussed.
26. The Schlebusch proposal also envisioned a Black
advisory council of urban representatives and home-
land leaders, on which the President's Council could
call at its discretion for advice and consultation. Botha
dropped the concept altogether after major Black
leaders objected to the secondary status it conferred on
Blacks. Blacks still have no representation on the na-
tional level.
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27. Homelands Policy. Under Botha, the govern-
ment has continued to push the homelands (see figure
4) toward political -independence." Botha recently
admitted that the homelands are not economically vi-
able, thereby tacitly acknowledging that for all prac-
tical purposes the classic homelands policy of apart-
heid has failed. The homelands, however, are central
to Botha's revamped -constellation of states" plan�a
concept devised originally to strengthen and reinforce
existing economic links and to create a system of alli-
ances and informal arrangements for military
cooperation between South Africa and its relatively
dependent neighbors in southern and eastern Africa.
Following Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe, Pre-
toria scaled down the plan's geographical limits to the
Republic and its homelands.
28. In 1979 Venda became the third nominally in-
dependent homeland. Ciskei will probably soon be-
come the fourth. The government has failed, however,
to persuade the vast majority of Blacks that there are
political and economic benefits to be derived from res-
idence in the homelands.
29. Politically, one major sticking point has been
the question of citizenship. As Transkei, Bophu-
thatswana, and Venda have become independent,
their residents along with tribally related urban Blacks
have lost South African citizenship and attendant
rights. This has aroused bitter opposition among
Blacks, who contend that the government is trying to
make them aliens within their own country.
30. The issues of land consolidation and economic
aid have been equally contentious. The consolidation
of the geographically disparate homelands�the non-
independent homeland of KwaZulu alone is made up
of at least 30 fragments of land�would require the
acquisition of large amounts of White-owned prop-
erty. Aside from commissioning new studies of the
problem, the Botha administration is unwilling to ac-
cept the considerable economic and political costs that
a serious consolidation program would incur.
31. Botha's economic aid program for the home-
lands has not differed significantly from Vorster's.
Pretoria continues to provide operating expenses�and
seconded White bureaucrats�for the homelands
administrations, but development aid remains scanty.
Botha's efforts to persuade the South African private
sector to assume some of the burden for improving
economic conditions in the impoverished homelands
have been unproductive so far.
32. Limited Autonomy for Urban Black Commu-
nities. Despite his unwillingness to countenance a di-
rect consultative role for Blacks in the new constitu-
tional machinery, Botha has continued Vorster's
cautious program for extending limited autonomy to
some Black townships. In October 1980 the govern-
ment published legislation it intends to submit to Par-
liament which would establish municipal authorities
that would replace the 312 existing community coun-
cils. These new local Black authorities would have le-
gal status equivalent to that of local White govern-
ments. The decisions of the Black municipalities
would, however, be subject to the veto of the Depart-
ment of Cooperation and Development. Unless the
government wins the approval of key Black leaders, its
new legislation will suffer the fate of past solutions
proposed from above: it will be made meaningless and
unworkable by the suspicions and passive resistance of
the township residents.
33. Family Housing. An acute shortage of Non-
white housing throughout South Africa has led the
government to relax enforcement of the Group Areas
Act for Coloreds and Asians. The Act requires segrega-
tion of residential areas and is one of the most impor-
tant pillars of apartheid. Estimates of the shortfall in
housing are now around 4,300 units for Asians, 10,000
for Coloreds, and perhaps as many as 400,000 for
Blacks. In the Black township of Soweto alone, there is
a shortage of at least 32,000 units.
34. The 1980 budget, which reflected the dramatic
increase in gold prices, provided for a 20-percent cap-
ital increase for the national housing fund, but this
does not begin to meet the pressing needs of Nonwhite
communities. While admitting the need for the diver-
sion of greater resources to housing, government of-
ficials have expressed hope that much of the slack will
be taken up by the private sector�for example, by
employers underwriting the mortgages of their work-
ers. Botha's administration has tried to ease Black
frustrations by following through on Vorster's promise
to extend 99-year leaseholds to those few Blacks who
qualify for -permanent residence" in the townships. If
legislation proposed for the 1981 parliamentary session
passes, more Blacks would Qualify for leaseholds. In
addition some inheritance rights for qualified depend-
ents could be strengthened, making home ownership
more attractive.
35. Education. In 1980, the government has in-
creased spending on Black education and training pro-
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South Africa: Homelands
*Windhoek
NAMIBIA
.Keetmanshoop
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Cape To
628804 12-80
ington
.Bitterfontein
Figure 4