CUBAN SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN GUERRILLA GROUPS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05632261
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-02132
• Publication Date: May 2, 1979

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2 May 1979
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT.: Cuban Sumert for Central American Guerrilla
Groups rs,
Key Judgments
The Castro regime apparently concluded by at least last
fall that prospects for revolutionary upheaval in Central
America over the next decade or so had markedly improved
largely because of the weakened position of Nicaragua's
Somoza and the ripple effect his removal would have on other
countries in Central America. As a result Cuba has intensi-
fied its attempts to unify insurgent groups not only in
Nicaragua--where Cuba has concentratqd its efforts--but in
Guatemala and El Salvador as well.
While tailoring the extent of its support to the
realities of the situation in each country, Cuba has stepped
up its on-island training of guerrillas from each of these
countries and--in the case of Nicaragua�has on at least two
and probably three occasions supplied arms--for the first
time in many years--to the Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN). Cuba has also made a concerted effort to
persuade leftist movements and parties in the region to
increase their assistance to the FSLN and has used these
groups to funnel aid to the Sandinistas. (S)
Havana's approach to events in Central America,
however, reflects a far more sophisticated and selective
revolutionary doctrine than that which guided Cuba's actions
during the 1960s. Cuba clearly believes it has a stake
in preserving its improving image with many governments
in the hemisphere and wants to avoid provoking a US
counterresponse. As a result, Cuba has used third country
intermediaries to deliver its assistance to the Sandinistas
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and has taken care that its aid 'not differ in kind from the
material support supplied to the FSLN by several other
governments in the region. (S)
While optimistic that trends in Central America favor
the left, Havana has counseled patience and has urged its
friends to prepare for a protracted struggle, even in
Nicaragua. Cuban support, therefore, can be expected to
continue to be geared toward helping the Sandinistas and
other regional guerrilla groups develop the military and
political infrastructure necessary to win a war of at-
trition, and the widespread grass roots support necessary
to consolidate the victory. (S)
Given the low-,key approach Cuba has employed in
Central America, Havana is likely to do its best to avoid
being placed in a situation where it might be called upon
to intervene directly with its own military units and thus
risk a military confrontation with the US. (S)
Nicaragua
The Cuban Government has long felt a deep enmity
toward the Somoza regime in Nicaragua and has looked
forward to its ouster not only because of the implications
that such an event would have for Nicaragua but for the
sake of revolutionary change throughout the region. As
Somoza's position appeared to grow shakier last year,
Havana intensified its effort to strengthen his opponents
by urging unity among the various Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN) factions. By early fall Cuba was
sufficiently satisfied that this had been accomplished to
increase significantly its support to the Sandinistas. (S)
Arms Supplies
Since late September our information indicates that
Cuba has on .at least two and probably three occasions
supplied arms to the FSLN. On each occasion Havana has
limited its own direct involvement by relying on the
Panamanian government to transport the arms.'
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Circumstancial evidence indicates that the Cubans were
involved in the recent reactivation of the Panamanian-
Costa Rican resupply route to the FSLN.
On-Island Training
Training in Cuba of FSLN guerrillas--which has con-
tinued at low levels for years--has apparently been on the
upswing, especially since January. Early that month a
Panamanian emissary reached an agreement with Fidel Castro
to send to Cuba FSLN exiles who formerly would have been
granted safehaven in Panama.
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Evidence on the total number of FSLN guerrillas who
have received training in Cuba is spotty.
Encourasing Support for the FSLN From Neighboring Countries
A major element in Cuba's approach to the Nicaraguan
situation has been its effort to encourage leftist groups in
neighboring Central American countries to aid the FSLN.
Havana especially wants regional Communist parties to
support to the Sandinistas. Toward that end the Cubans in
early February promoted a meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica
that was attended by the Communist parties from the Central
American countries as well as from Mexico and Panama. Cuban
delegates used the occasion to urge their counterparts to
bolster their assistance to the FSLN by creating safehavens
in their countries, providing facilities for military
training, and supplying arms and other equipment. Plans
were also discussed for a follow-up meeting later this
spring probably in Havana that would prepare a strategy for
assisting revolutionary activity through out Central America.
In part because of Cuba's urging, Central American
leftist groups have for some time been developing support
mechanisms responsive to Sandinista needs. For example,
late last summer at Havana's direction the Honduran Communist
Party established a support apparat that has been responsible
for finding sites in Honduras to train FSLN guerrillas. The' ;
apparat has relied on sporadic Cuban financial aid to
purchase arms, radios, and other equipment for the FSLN, and
Honduran Communists have assisted the Sandinistas in border
crossings. Since last fall, however--despite frequent
prodding by'Honduran Communist Party leaders--the Cubans
have dragged their feet in providing promised financial aid
for the apparat.
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Cuba reportedly also funnels assistance to the FSLN
through two groups in Costa Rica.
The Cubans may also be helping to fund a
"Committee of Solidarity with the Sandinista Front" headed
by self-professed FSLN member Eristo Cardenal. a Nicaraguan
priest who resides in Costa Rica.
Promoting FSLN Unity
Fidel Castro's recent discussions with FSLN leaders
may lead to more active Cuban support to the FSLN. In
early March, leaders of the three major FSLN factions
traveled to Cuba to meet with Castro. The Cuban leader is
said to have spent nearly 40 hours over a four day period
helping to hammer out a basis for cooperation. As a result
of the meeting a unified FSLN directorate was established
containing three members from each faction.
Havana has repeatedly urged leaders of the disparate
Sandinista factions to cooperate in a unified effort
against Somoza; their failure to do so has been a major
, deterrent to increased Cuban assistance and will likely
continue to be so should the current unity effort falter.
Outlook
The Cuban leadership shares the belief of the Popular
Prolonged War and the Proletarian Tendency factions that
the Sandinistas are likely to achieve power only after a
nrotrarted qtrnanle
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Castko took a similar position in early December when
he reportedly urged leaders to abandon plans
for a large scale military offensive because he did not
believe that the FSLN had the necessary logistical and
organizational capability to sustain conventional operations
against the Guard. Moreover, in mid-January two diplomats
assigned to the Cuban embassy in Panama stated that Cuba no
longer believed that the FSLN would be able to topple
Somoza before his term expires in 1981.
Cuban support, therefore is likely to continue to be
intended to help the Sandinistas develop the military and
political infrastructure necessary to triumph in a war of
attrition. The Cubans probably expect that--as was the
case with the Batista army--popular sentiment will grad-
ually turn against the National Guard and eventually render
it ineffective. To make the FSLN a more potent guerrilla
force, Havana can be expected to continue to emphasize the
development of safehavens, training sites, and logistics
bases in neighboring countries. Cuba is also likely to
continue to provide arms and on-island training to FSLN
members.
The Cubans have urged the Sandinistas to combine their
efforts to intensify the guerrilla struggle with a highly
pragmatic political approach designed to broaden the FSLN's
base of popular support for a movement to oust Somoza.
FSLN
leaders have taken steps to comply with his request.
Given the low-key approach Cuba has pursued regarding
the Nicaraguan situation, it is likely that Havana will do
its best tO.avoid being placed in a situation where it
might be called upon to intervene directly with Cuban 4
military units. One possible scenario in which Havana
might be confronted with such a choice is if the Sandinistas
captured a portion of Nicaraguan territory and then--as a
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"provisional government"--requested Cuba to send troops.
The sending of military personnel to Nicaragua by Honduras,
El Salvador, or Guatemala would also raise the possibility
of Cuban military intervention. In neither of these situ- .
ations, however, do we believe that Havana would be likely
to commit its troops for fear that this, action woufl
provoke aNS counterresponse. (S)
Guatemala
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The focus of Cuban attention in Central Atherica has
been on Nicaragua, but Cuban contacts with Guatemalan
leftists have also increased in recent months. The main
thrust of Cuban policy at this point--as it has been for
several years--is to encourage the various insurgent groups
.to join together in a common effort to undermine the govern-
ment. Havana .continues to insist that greater unity be,
achieved before Cuba undertakes any major increase in its
support. Nonetheless, Cuba seems to be laying the ground-
work for increasing its assistance to these groups. (S)
Havana's closest links are to the Guerrilla Army of .
the Poor (EGP), and the Cubans have used it as a hub to
broaden their ties with other insur ent �rou�s. Accordln
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or some years e u�ans ave
trained EGP guerr las in Cuba, and--impressed with. that
group's initial success in recruiting members of Guatemala's
Indian population--Havana began early this year to train
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some ok these recruits. The. Cubans may also plan to train
members of a new guerrilla group; which is located in
western Guatemala and .1cd by Rodrigo Asturias, a former FAR
member. Asturias reportedly has visited Cuba on ueveral
occasions and his group was invited to attend Cuba's revo-
lutionary celebrations in January.
There is Some evidence to suggest that the Cubans may
be willing to take a more direct role in counsolinu Guatemalan
insurgents.
The Cubans--to the best of our knowledge--have not
been involved in Central America in assisting local groups
to carry out political assassinations at least in the
recent past. Nonetheless, the Castro regime contends that
in some circumstances the use of counterterrorism is a
legitimate weapon in the effort to promote the cause of
revolution, and it may well believe that the current
situation in Guatemala justifies such an approach. (S)
The Cubans have also worked hard to encourage the
orthodox faction of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) to
lend its support to local insurgent groups.
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The Cubans clearly feel no urgency in promoting revo-
lutionary activity in Guatemala; rather, their efforts seem
designed to prepare local insurgent groups for the long
haul. I
The nature of Cuban training
of Guatemalan guerrillas also reflects a lack of urgency.
El Salvador
While Havana has in the past given less attention to
El Salvador than to Nicaragua or Guatemala, Cuban activities �
with Salvadoran insurgents have recently been on the up-
swing. The Castro regime's interest in El Salvador has
doubtless quickened as it has observed the spiraling violence
and growing political polarization there, and Cuba's willing-
ness to lend support has presumably increased because of the
demonstrated willingness of the various guerrilla groups to
cooperate in at least an informal alliance. (S)
Cuba has also had links with at least one of the two ,
smaller Salvadoran terrorist groups, the Armed Forces of
the National Resistance (FARN). Eduardo Sancho Castaneda--
reportedly the FARN's leading strategist--has apparently
been his organization's chief conduit to the Cubans. He
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For some time the Cubans have also been pushing for
greater cooperation between the El Salvadoran Communist
Party and the various insurgent groups.
Personal antipathy
between the leaders of the FPL and the local Communist
Party, as well as disagreements regarding the means and
timing of staging a revolution in El Salvador have continued
to prevent any meaningful cooperation between these two
groups, however.
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