AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05632922
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: October 18, 1985

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Africa Review
18 October 1985
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18 October 1985
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Africa Review
18 October 1985
Page
Articles South Africa: Moderates Seek a Middle Ground
A group of mostly white, English-speaking South Africans and
moderate Zulu leaders has launched a "Convention Alliance" to
work for an eventual national convention in which all sides would
meet to create a new constitution.
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Ethiopia: Mengistu's Sudanese Dissident Gambit
Social and political turmoil in Sudan and its debilitating civil war in
the south have prompted Ethiopia to continue its sponsorship of the
Sudanese insurgency.
5
Tanzania: Nyerere's Legacy of Economic Decline
President Nyerere, who steps down as leader of Tanzania following
elections on 27 October, will bequeath to his successor, Vice
President Mwinyi, a moribund economy created by a combination of
external forces and disastrous socialist policies.
7
Liberia: Potential Rifts in the Military
As the transition to civilian rule approaches, the future role of the
military remains uncertain, adding to a growing undercurrent of
frustration.
11
Ghana: The Uneasy Calm
Radicals, led by pro-Soviet security and foreign affairs adviser Kojo
Tsikata, are working behind the scenes to dampen the moderate,
populist policies of Head of State Rawlings. The recent US
espionage incident has strengthened the radicals' hand.
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West Africa: Burkina-Mali Territorial Dispute 17
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begins to mediate their
Mali and Burkina are trading
increases in foreign
only minor border
As the International Court of Justice
longstanding border dispute, both
charges of aggression. Without considerable
military assistance to both sides, however,
skirmishes are likely.
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Cuba: Outpost in Cape Verde
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Havana provides military and security
advisers, and health,
education, and agricultural aid to
Cape Verde, reflecting a need to
protect the Cuban aerial resupply link
to Angola.
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Briefs
Madagascar: French Naval Visit
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Comoros: Cabinet Shuffle
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Guinea-Bissau: Pressures on Vieira
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Swaziland: Power Struggle Continues
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this
publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Ste Office of African
and Latin American Analysis,
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Articles
MM.
South Africa: Moderates
Seek a Middle Ground
A group of predominantly white, English-speaking
South Africans in alliance with moderate Zulu
leaders has agreed to promote the idea of a negotiated
future for South Africa. Concerned that the country
is becoming increasingly polarized by the advocates of
violent revolt and those who favor repression, they will
launch a "Convention Alliance" to work for an
eventual national convention in which all sides would
meet to create a new constitution. Convention
Alliance organizers have tried to attract diverse racial
and political elements by broadly defining the
potential membership as one committed to "a single
constitution based on a common citizenship in one
undivided country." NR
Convention Alliance promoter and leader of the
official opposition in the House of Assembly, Frederik
Van Zyl Slabbert, notes that, while only the
government can call a national convention, the
Alliance can pave the way by structuring
constitutional debate and organizing nationwide
petitions. Slabbert acknowledges that the country
probably is not ready for a national convention at this
point, but believes that the Alliance can serve to focus
debate on the critical issues dividing South Africa.
NR
Difficult Beginnings
Efforts to attract broad-based support for the Alliance
have been unsuccessful thus far. Because the idea of a
formal alliance first was put forth by Progressive
Federal Party (PFP) leader Slabbert at the Inkatha
youth conference on 24 August and immediately
endorsed by Kwazulu Chief Minister and Inkatha
head Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, the movement is widely
regarded as a joint venture between the PFP and
Inkatha. This impression has been reinforced by PFP
debate and approval of the Alliance at a party
congress on 31 August.
1
Convention Alliance Steering Committee
Ibrahim Bawa, Islamic Council
Alex Boraine, PFP-MP
Colin Elgin, PFP-MP
Raymond Ackerman, Businessman
Tony Ardington, Businessman
Oscar Dhlomo, Kwazulu Education Minister (and
right-hand man of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi)
Joyce Harris, Black Sash
Denys Shreiner, Academic (University of Natal)
Jules Browde,a Attorney (National Chairman of
Lawyers for Human Rights)
David Bosch, Theologian
M. S. Mogoba, Theologian
a Steering Committee Chairman
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An organizational meeting on 22 September attracted
about 150 mostly white, liberal South Africans who
are prominent representatives of business, church
organizations, the law, academics, sports, and politics.
However, many of those in attendance cautioned that
their presence indicated personal interest in the idea
only, rather than a commitment of their organizations
to the Convention Alliance, according to the US
Consulate in Johannesburg. A reporter who attended
the September meeting also noted the absence of
Colored participants and the fact that there seemed to
be only one Asian present, and the US Embassy
reported that only one non-PFP Afrikaner was there
and he abstained from voting. Nevertheless, the group
did select a Steering Committee, chaired by well-
known businessman Jules Browde, who hopes to have
a formal launching of the Convention Alliance at the
end of October. (b)(3) NatSecAct
Suspicions among some that the Alliance is being
pushed by the PFP for narrow political reasons may
be responsible for the distinct lack of enthusiasm
among white liberals, according to US Embassy
reporting. A participant in the 22 September meeting
told our Consulate in Johannesburg that the PFP
imprint on the Alliance was clear�from minor details
to major policy statements. Some have seen the
Alliance as an effort by the PFP to regain the
members it lost by opposing the 1983 constitutional
referendum. Slabbert has acknowledged that in order
to attract leading Afrikaners and members of the
left�particularly the United Democratic Front�
both he and Inkatha would have to fade into the
background, but most observers think this is unlikely,
according to the US Consulate in Johannesburg.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Opposition Holdouts
Most nonwhite organizations have voiced opposition
to the Convention Alliance based either on a rejection
of negotiations on principle or because of Inkatha's
visible role. The Soweto Civic Association and the
Federation of Cape Civic Associations have both
rejected invitations to join the Alliance, according to
press accounts. The Cape group saw it as another
effort to preserve white rule; the Soweto group has
said that there can be no negotiations while black
leaders are jailed and the townships are occupied by
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security forces. At least one group, the Colored Labor
Party, has refused to join because of longstanding
animosity toward the PFP. (b)(3) NatSecAct
African National Congress (ANC). Recent press
statements by both Nelson Mandela and Oliver
Tambo confirm ANC opposition to negotiations with
the white government, calling instead for "mass
struggle." Some of the white South African
businessmen who met with ANC representatives in
Zambia on 13 September came away with the belief
that the ANC would not interfere with others joining
the Convention Alliance, according to the US
Consulate in Durban. However, based on subsequent
statements and reporting from our Embassy in
Lusaka, we believe that the ANC will work actively
against the Alliance. For example, the Azanian Youth
Unity National Council and Azanian People's
Organization have publicly hailed ANC rejection
the Convention Alliance.
of
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United Democratic Front (UDF). This anti-
government group probably will continue to reject
participation in the Convention Alliance because of
the key role played by Chief Buthelezi and its bitter
and sometimes bloody rivalry with his Inkatha.
According to the US Consulate in Johannesburg, the
Front's Treasurer, Cassim Saloojie, pointed out to
Slabbert that, although some of its affiliates have
supported the idea of a national convention in the
past, it will be difficult to do so now that the
movement has become entangled with an apartheid
institution (the Kwazulu homeland). Chief Buthelezi
meanwhile has noted that Front unwillingness to
participate only proves that it is under orders from the
ANC, a charge that he has leveled often. (b)(3) NatSecAct
Outlook
The Convention Alliance probably cannot attract
wide support and achievement of its goal�a national
convention�will not come in the short term.
Progressive Federal Party and Inkatha leadership
limits the Alliance's appeal to both blacks and whites,
in our view. As currently formed, the Alliance
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excludes the primary actors. Neither National Party
leaders nor militant black groups are likely to think
their interests will be served by such an organization,
in our judgment. Perhaps most important, a national
convention is a dim prospect as long as the Botha
government refuses to negotiate with blacks unwilling
to renounce violence and these black groups reject
talks unless the government accedes to preconditions
it finds unacceptable.
Nevertheless, the prominence and wealth of the
individuals involved could generate considerable
publicity for the idea of a negotiated future for South
Africa. It is possible that, by promoting the idea, the
Convention Alliance could plant a seed that would
grow to a ground swell of support for a National
Convention over time. In order for this to happen,
however, we believe that groups with broader
representation would have to emerge and include
Afrikaners and such black organizations as the UDF.
Given the present attitudes of these groups toward
mutual discussions, such a scenario seems a long way
off.
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Ethiopia: Mengistu's Sudanese
Dissident Gambit
Social and political turbulence in Sudan and its
debilitating civil war in the south have prompted
Ethiopia to continue its sponsorship of the Sudanese
insurgency. In our view, Ethiopian Chairman
Mengistu may now believe he holds a powerful card in
the southern Sudanese dissidents, and he may
increase his demand that Khartoum deny Ethiopia's
northern insurgents access to Sudanese territory.
Moreover, we believe that Mengistu may have
concluded that continued support for the southern
Sudanese opposition will eventually provide Ethiopia
with opportunities to shift the ideological posture of
the Khartoum Government.
NR
A Legacy of Suspicion
Ethiopian support for the Sudanese dissidents is based
in large part on Mengistu's long-held suspicion of
Sudan's role in supporting Eritrean and Tigrean
insurgents from northern Ethiopia. Mengistu believes
Sudan provides refuge, arms, and logistic support to
these groups, and holds Khartoum responsible for his
inability to achieve a military solution in the north,
according to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa. We do
not believe Sudan provides any significant quantity of
weapons, ammunition, and supplies to the dissidents,
NR but insurgents use
Sudan as a base of operations, logistic corridor,
sanctuary, recruiting ground, and center of
propaganda�all factors which nurture Mengistu's
deep mistrust of Sudan. NR
To retaliate against Khartoum for its help to the
northern rebels, Ethiopia in the mid-1970s began
cooperating with Libya in supporting the southern
Sudanese dissidents, now led by Col. John Garang's
Sudanese People's Liberation Army. The extent of
' The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), the primary
Eritrean fighting force, numbers between 20,000 and 24,000
combatants, with a stated goal of an independent Eritrea organized
along Marxist lines. The Tigrean insurgency is led by the Tigrean
People's Liberation Front (TPLF), with some 15,000 combatants
whose stated goal is the transformation of Ethiopia into a civilian-
led federation or, failing this, complete internal autonomy or full
independence for Tigray Province.
5
Addis Ababa's aid fluctuated, however, and until this
year the Mengistu regime allowed Libya to take the
lead in arming and funding the group. Garang's army
has grown into a formidable force of 12,000 to 15,000
men, operating primarily from western Ethiopia.
Strained Relations
Despite vows to improve relations with Sudan
following the coup in April that toppled President
Nimeiri, Mengistu remains profoundly suspicious of
the Transitional Military Council that replaced him,
according to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa.
Recent Embassy rep. orting indicates tensions between
Ethiopia and Sudan are growing, in spite of
Mengistu's pledge that the new government in
Khartoum would "not be held responsible" for the
strained relations of the past. After several months of
taking stock of the new regime, however, we judge
that Mengistu believes the new Sudanese leaders
intend to continue the policy of Ethiopian
destabilization begun by the Nimeiri regime.
Although Ethiopia has limited options for
direct military reprisals against Sudan, we believe
Mengistu will not hesitate to increase aid to the
Sudanese rebels, particularly if his efforts to attain a
military solution in the north continue to flounder.
Khartoum, for its part, maintains that it provides only
humanitarian assistance�food and medicine as
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sanctioned under international law�to Eritrean and
Tigrean groups in Sudan.
The Sudanese insurgents have increased their
dependence on Ethiopia following Libya's recent
rapprochement with Sudan and Tripoli's suspension of
economic and military assistance to the rebels. We
agree with the US Embassy's view that Ethiopia now
exerts considerable control over the rebels and that
their goals�a socialist, secular, and unified Sudan�
essentially parallel those of Mengistu. Although the
full extent of Ethiopian aid is unclear, we believe
Addis Ababa's support is considerable and includes
advisers, logistic support, and training facilities, as
well as undetermined amounts of small arms,
ammunition, and funding. In recent months the
Garang army has expanded its operations in southern
Sudan, a move likely to improve significantly its
bargaining position with Khartoum.
We agree with the assessment of the US
Embassy in Khartoum that Libya's recent courtship
of Sudan and Somalia is only likely to increase
Mengistu's suspicions of a plot by Muslim states
against "Christian" Ethiopia.
Outlook
In our judgment, Ethiopia probably will continue to
support the Sudanese insurgents and try to keep them
a viable fighting force. While Mengistu's goal is to
end Sudan's support for Ethiopia's northern
insurgents, we also believe he may be convinced that
the Sudanese insurgency can help him bring down the
current regime in Khartoum, and allow one that is
more ideologically compatible with his own to come to
power. The US Embassy in Addis Ababa states that
Ethiopia does not believe the present regime in
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Khartoum will last, and Mengistu may reason that
Garang has the military strength to force an eventual
settlement in Sudan favorable to Ethiopia. Further,
we believe Mengistu wants a government in
Khartoum that will not only shut off assistance to the
Ethiopian insurgencies but that will also actively
cooperate with Addis Ababa in quelling them.
In the short term, we judge there is little prospect of
any meaningful Ethiopian-Sudanese agreement that
would end assistance to their respective insurgencies.
Scant room for negotiation exists, because Mengistu
views the insurgencies as incomparable. Mengistu has
consistently claimed that Ethiopia's northern
insurgents are merely "bandits," while Embassy
reporting indicates he views Sudan's civil war as
based on deep-seated political, ethnic, and religious
animosities. In any event, with Sudan militarily
incapable of closing the border and denying the
Ethiopian insurgents access to Sudanese territory,
Mengistu's mistrust of Khartoum is likely to continue.
While occasional Ethiopian military incursions into
Sudan are likely, we believe Mengistu will probably
remain careful to avoid a serious military
confrontation with Sudan, fearing such a flareup
could provoke Libya into providing significant
military assistance to Khartoum.
In our judgment, Mengistu's leverage with Khartoum
has never been greater, and we believe he is unlikely
to let his strongest card�Garang and his rebels�out
of his grasp. We expect Mengistu to continue to
stonewall negotiations between the rebels and
Khartoum by denying Sudanese and third-party
access to Garang. Mengistu believes he can control
Garang, whereas he probably calculates that
Khartoum cannot control the Eritrean and Tigrean
insurgents. In our view, Mengistu relishes the role of
insurgent benefactor, and probably reasons that such
activities raise his status in Soviet eyes. For the
present, however, we expect Mengistu to bide his time
and maintain pressure on Khartoum, while at the
same time continuing to exploit the Sudanese rebels
as a negotiating lever to end Khartoum's support for
the Ethiopian insurgents.
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Tanzania: Nyerere's Le
of Economic Decline
President Julius Nyerere, who steps down as
President of Tanzania following elections on 27
October, will bequeath to his successor, Vice
President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, a moribund economy
created by a combination of external forces and
disastrous socialist policies. We concur with US
Embassy reporting that the economy is stagnating at
a level that is inadequate for self-preservation above
subsistence levels. Restoration of economic growth is
unforseeable in the near term because the country has
depleted its foreign exchange reserves, relies heavily
on foreign assistance, and remains far from an
agreement with the IMF. NR
Although he is likely to try to initiate domestic policy
reforms as he did while President of Zanzibar,'
Mwinyi will be hampered by the near total breakdown
of the country's infrastructure, a thriving unofficial
economy, low productivity, and 25- to 30-percent
inflation. All of these have been firmly ingrained by
chronic currency overvaluation, mismanagement of
state-run enterprises, and negative real producer
returns.
NR
Roots of Decline
Most observers agree that Tanzania, which began
independence with a diversified agricultural export
economy, has suffered reverses from its military
intervention in Uganda from 1978-82, droughts in the
1970s that made it a net food importer, and the sharp
rise in oil prices at a time when Tanzania's industrial
demand for oil was rising. In our view, however,
Nyerere's socialist domestic policies, starting with the
self-sufficiency concept of Ujamaa, have been the
primary causes of the country's economic decay.
NR
Nyerere's Policy Failures
The Ujamaa village development program, Nyerere's
principal effort to establish a workable social
1 As President of Zanzibar from 1984 to 1985, Mwinyi also
automatically held the position of Vice President of TanzaniS.
Zanzibar, which comprises the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba,
merged with mainland Tanganyika in 1964 to form the United
Republic of Tanzania.
NR
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economic model, was launched in 1967. We believe it
set in motion the decline in agricultural production
initially by uprooting peasants from their traditional
homelands and relocating them in unfamiliar and
underdeveloped areas. Moreover, the government
failed to support the program adequately.
the government,
from start to finish, was unable to provide the
transportation to ship crops to market.
necessary agricultural equipment
was lacking, and pesticides and fertilizers were not
supplied in sufficient quantities to allow the villages
meaningful profit incentives.
Tanzania's four-year involvement in Uganda diverted
manpower and money from the Ujamaa program.
Government interventionist policies have also put a
damper on production. Artificially low producer
prices�set periodically by the government�are
major disincentives for farmers. The low producer
prices provide negative real returns to farmers who
supply the state-run organizations, thus discouraging
production.
shortages of foreign exchange, caused by shrinking
output, have restricted expansion in all sectors and
have required periodic downward adjustments of the
government's budget. Government pricing policies
have encouraged black-market activity, and we
believe the majority of the population, especially in
the cities, are unable to purchase enough amounts
from the state-run businesses.
The government-owned enterprises, which control
almost all legal trade, have long been one of the
biggest drains on the economy. Their ever-spiraling
operating costs have traditionally absorbed rising
percentages of profit. For example, the Tanzanian
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SELECTED TANZANIAN ECONOMIC INDICATORS; 1980-84
COP
AT CONSTANT OM RC= COST DEBT SERVICE RA110
ARV& PERCExr CHANGE PERCENT OF EXPORIS OF GOODS AND NOM= SERVICES
X4.9
3.1
lei� lin 234am
TRADE BALAME.
DIPORIS F.O.B. MD WORTS CV.
BILLIONS OF U.S. DOUARS
EMS
GOVERMENT SPEPCMG
1101. MORAL GOVT. EXPENDITURE AND IET LENDING
EMMONS OF TANZMAN SHILLINGS
23.4
IOU
20-
6-
0
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Sisal Authority, according to US Embassy reporting,
has failed to purchase and market goods adequately,
and has provided little incentive to workers; at the
same time it has allowed production and maintenance
to decline sharply. These businesses have frequently
not paid farmers at all for their crops, although
producer prices are fixed by law.
the 90 percent of the population
that is engaged in agricultural production is
increasingly turning to subsistence farming.
corruption and
graft in the state-run organizations have grown to
gigantic proportions and, we believe, may be in part
responsible for the oil crisis Tanzania is now
experiencing. NR
An overvalued currency has increased the operating
and capital costs for agricultural exporters, and has
made Tanzanian commodities considerably less
competitive on the world market. Thus, Tanzania
finds it difficult to earn hard currency for purchases
of oil, chemical, seed, and machinery and is unable to
pay debts to oil suppliers and international aid donors.
Nyerere's continued resistance to devaluation was the
major obstacle to an IMF standby agreement last
spring
Nyerere's program for recovery in the early 1980s
called for mild reorganization of the country's
infrastructure and reallocation of some resources.
Results fell far short of projections, however, because
of foreign exchange shortages, mismanagement, and
inadequate planning.
NR
Impact on Society
The economic downturn has severely damaged the
country's fragile infrastructure. Even the much
vaunted socialist medical and health care services
have deteriorated, according to US Embassy
reporting, and malaria and other endemic diseases are
again on the rise. The transportation sector operates
erratically; schedules of the Chinese-built Tazara
railroad linking Tanzania and Zambia are determined
by fuel supplies, according to press reporting. Road
repair and maintenance of the congested facilities at
the port of Dar es Salaam are neglected, and potential
9
revenue from port activity is often lost because of
theft of goods waiting transshipment, or spoilage in
warehouses and on wharves, according to press
reports.
'The economic slide has fostered a subculture of
corruption, according to press reports. The military,
riddled with corruption, loses thousands of dollars
yearly from stolen payrolls, weapons, clothing, and
food. Peasants take food across the Kenyan border to
sell or to barter for soap or cooking oil, which are
difficult to get in Tanzania. According to press
reports, in Dar es Salaam and other larger cities,
meals in restaurants are obtained faster and cheaper
by bribing the waiter to steal from the kitchen. We
believe the apathetic, defeatist, and cynical attitude
that permeates the lower classes will make it difficult
to gain their support for economic reform.
Mwinyi's Prospects
Pragmatists in the government already are pressing
Mwinyi to institute economic reforms when he takes
over the presidency. Mwinyi, a lackluster party
stalwart who was a compromise choice for president
by the country's sole political party, favors the
Chinese development model and trade liberalization
measures he enacted on Zanzibar. He lacks a solid
base of support on the mainland, however, and we
believe he will proceed with caution for the first six to
12 months he is in office.
Minister of Finance Msuya, who we believe will be
retained in the new goverment, may help to spearhead
effective policies, such as an IMF agreement,
devaluation, trade liberalization, producer price
increases, and reorganization or privatization of some
state-run enterprises.
Nyerere and like-minded officials have thwarted
Msuya's previous attempts at pragmatic fiscal
policies. Defeated presidential contender Salim may
also prove to be a valuable ally if Mwinyi chooses to
press ahead with reforms. Salim has been Prime
Minister since 1984 and was previously Foreign
Minister but his role in the future government is
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unclear. No Cabinet changes will be made until after
the inauguration on 4 November.
The success of any new public policies will hinge to a
great extent on the degree of Nyerere's influence over
the new president and the political strength of senior
party members, who still cling to Nyerere's tenets of
African socialism. Nyerere willl continue as party
chairman, with de jure authority over the President
until 1987, when that position will again be combined
with the presidency, as under Nyerere.
Meanwhile, Mwinyi will be dealing with party and
government bureaucracies formed under his
predecessor's long tutelage. Although Nyerere's
socialist policies have been disastrous, we believe his
philosophy and charisma have earned him many
followers who remain loyal to his inspiring, if naive,
economic rhetoric.
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Liberia: Potential Rifts
in the Military
As the transition to civilian rule approaches, the
future role of the military remains uncertain, adding
to a growing undercurrent of frustration. In recent
months, the combined effects of a deteriorating
economy, delinquent salary payments, constant
political uncertainty, and a reorganization of the
military have contributed to low morale and a lack of
discipline in the 6,635-man armed forces. We believe
the unity of the military will be strained as it attempts
to monitor and control the transition process and to
protect its economic and political interests.
The military will remain a central actor throughout
the transition and ultimately will determine its
success or failure. Despite Head of State Doe's efforts
to increase security, the military's preparedness is
poor, and its ability to handle a major crisis is in
serious doubt. In our view, Doe's ability to control and
appease the military over the next several months will
be a critical barometer of his support.
Grievances
Several sources of tension have caused frequent
military grumbling and coup plotting. For the past
two years, salaries have been almost always two to
three months in arrears, deductions have been levied
to help finance government projects, and living and
working conditions have been of poor quality. A
member of the 815-man Executive Mansion Guard
responsible for Doe's security says a housing shortage
exists for enlisted men,
klthough many in the military view the
Executive Guard as preferred duty, Guard members
have complained to Embassy officials of long hours
and nonexistent logistic support when traveling with
Doe. Another source of grumbling is the widespread
use of retirements, dismissals, and transfers by
military leaders following the assassination attempt
on Doe this past April; these tactics were probably
designed to lessen the threat of continued plotting.
NR
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Tribalism
When Doe overthrew former President Tolbert's
Americo-Liberian government in 1980, many
members of the country's 16 other ethnic groups
believed they would finally be given an opportunity to
participate in governing Liberia. Members of Doe's
Krahn tribe, however, have become a new elite,
especially within the military. The US Embassy
reports that ethnic jealousies are directed against
Krahns, who are believed to have disproportionately
benefited from the coup in terms of recruitment,
promotion, and assignment to favored units. Although
most of the armed forces are still from the Loma and
Kpelle tribes of the northwest, Krahns now dominate
the officers corps, particularly in the higher ranks. A
in the
Executive Guard consider themselves to be the
"chosen few" and have little respect for authority.
Doe, who is well aware of festering tribal tensions,
appears to believe that he can only trust his fellow
Krahns. Since coming to power, he claims to have
thwarted 15 military coup attempts motivated at least
in part by personal and tribal grievances. The
implication of several of Doe's fellow tribesmen in the
assassination attempt left in doubt the once-
unquestioned loyalty of the military,
In our view, after five years in power, Doe is
unlikely to change his policy of relying on Krahn
tribesmen, especially when it involves his own
security. Ethnic tensions have not yet erupted into
open conflict; however, they could provide a powerful
rallying point for dissent.
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18 October 1985
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Population Density and Ethnic Composition of Liberia
ETHNIC COMPOSITION
(percent of total population)
WEST
ATLANTIC Settlers �ther
Kiss i (2.8) (1.2)
Dey Cola (3.4),
(0.4)
Belle
(0.5)
Krahn
(4.7)
Kru
(8.0)
Grebo
(8.0)
:(Fal
Kpelle
(19.9)
Gio
(8.7)
Mano
(7.4)
Loma MANDE
. Mandingo
Mende Gbandi 6a.;) (3.9)
(0.6) (2.6) '
702865(A02839) 6-84
Secret
Mande
ETHNO-
LINGUISTIC Kru
GROUPS
West
Atlantic. I_
POPULATION DENSITY PER
SQUARE MILE
under 40 ' 40-90 over 00
1 none
Mixed, over 90
inhabitants per
sq. mile
DEY Tribe name
Sarpo Subtribe name.
4441
Zwedru�
�KRAHN
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The Armed Forces at a Glance
Number of persons
Total
6,635
Army
6,105
Coast Guard
442
Air Reconnaissance
88
Of which:
Enlisted personnel
5,657
Warrant officers
181
Commissioned officers
797
Organization
The Armed Forces include the Army and the Coast
Guard. The air wing is subordinate to the Army. The
Army's major units are six infantry battalions, an
armor scout unit, and the Executive Mansion Guard
battalion.
The Executive Mansion Guard, which includes a
Special Bodyguard unit and a Special Antiterrorist
Unit (Israeli trained), and the Military Police have
responsibility for presidential security. The Guard is
equipped to carry out its responsibilities, but
organizational and disciplinary problems still limit
its capability.
Officer Corps
About 90 percent of all first and second lieutenants
were enlisted men before the 1980 coup. Most
captains and above were officers before the coup.
Traditional Americo-Liberian domination of the
officer ranks is quickly giving way to more diverse
tribal representation. Krahns�Doe's group�
dominate certain units, such as the Executive
Mansion Guard.
Education
Of the total force, only about 500 have at least a high
school education; only nine are college graduates.
US Training
About 4 percent have received some formal training
in the United States, although about 5,000 have been
exposed to US influence through military training
teams. In 1985, 96 officers and enlisted men are
scheduled to take part in IMET programs, compared
with 55 in 1984.
Israeli Assistance
Israel provided a six-week training course in basic
counterterrorist techniques in 1984-85. Of 150 initial
Liberian participants, 85 completed the course. Doe
requested further Israeli security assistance following
the assassination attempt against him in April 1985.
Attitudes Toward Civilian Rule
would like
the military to get out of the business of running the
government and concentrate on improving its
capabilities. The US Embassy reports that Allison
and Dubar have on several occasions warned soldiers
against political activity, indicating their continued
reluctance to give up the Army's traditionally
apolitical role. Although neither is involved in party
13
politics, both enjoy easy access to Doe and discuss a
wide variety of issues with him. They have been
instrumental in keeping a multiparty process alive to
provide a veil of legitimacy for Doe's continued power,
according to the US Embassy. Dubar and Allison are
strong supporters of close ties to Washington, and
they are concerned that Doe's erratic behavior could
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jeopardize much-needed US financial assistance.
NR
In our view, junior officers and enlisted men appear
more concerned about securing additional financial
benefits and a prominent role for the military in
running the country. Military personnel are conscious
of political issues, share many of the same grievances
with civilians, and do not unanimously support Doe's
party, according to the US Embassy. Although
participation in opposition parties is not prohibited, it
is discouraged by the government.
The Embassy
reports that many in the military, particularly junior
officers and enlisted men, see a civilian government as
a threat to their interests but will reluctantly turn over
power to a civilian government headed by Doe. The
military views Doe as a guarantor of their political
and economic interests and knows that Doe will
depend on their support to guarantee his continued
rule. Nevertheless, we believe Doe will find it
increasingly difficult to meet increasing demands for
benefits to the military. We further believe that junior
officers are likely to begin coup plotting if the civilian
government is unable to slow economic decline. NR
Preparedness
The military, facing no external threat, amounts to
little more than an armed militia.
much
of the Army's ammunition has not been properly
maintained and is probably useless.
insubordination has increased to disturbing levels,
with frequent instances of absence without leave,
petty thievery, extortion, and harassment of civilians,
Additional security measures during the transition
period are unlikely to improve conditions because
officers will be working longer shifts with a minimum
amount of rest,
the
Executive Guard Commander stated that the military
is riddled with apathy and incompetence. Even where
competent officers can be found, there appears to be a
general tendency among commanders to avoid being
Secret
too visible, competent, or popular, for fear that Doe
will feel threatened, according to the US Embassy.
Although we believe the military could probably
handle localized demonstrations, it would probably
prove unable to plan, coordinate, and support efforts
to control major outbreaks of unrest.
Outlook
We believe the military is likely to hold together and
permit a civilian government�headed by Doe�to
take power. The situation is fragile and volatile,
however, and we cannot discount the possibility of a
coup by easily radicalized enlisted men that would at
the very least delay the transition. We believe the
military is poorly equipped to play a stabilizing role
during the transition. We expect divisions within the
military along ethnic lines and over its future political
role to become more intense as the pace of political
events increases.
In our judgment, Doe will have no choice but to spend
large portions of Liberia's scarce resources on trying
to balance the diverse political and ethnic interests in
the military and to meet its most basic economic
needs. We believe there is little likelihood that he will
be able to placate or control all factions, however, or
that he dare take the loyalty of the military for
granted.
If the economic and political situations continue to
deteriorate, as we expect they will, disaffected
members of the military could attempt a sudden,
hastily organized coup similar to the one that brought
Doe to power.
The US Embassy reports
that anti-Doe feelings among Gio and Mano troops,
growing.
14
are still strong and
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Ghana: The Uneasy Calm
Although radicals, led by pro-Soviet security and
foreign affairs adviser Kojo Tsikata, may seek to
capitalize on the US espionage incident, moderates
recently appointed to the ruling Provisional National
Defense Council (PNDC)�including Army
Commander Quainoo�may hamper their efforts.
Quainoo, headstrong and staunchly anti-Soviet,
probably will quietly attempt to limit radical
ambitions, and may come into conflict with Tsikata
over the regime's direction. In our view, the radical
Tsikata will work behind the scenes to dampen the
moderate, populist policies that Head of State Jerry
Rawlings has pursued since 1983 and try to develop
his own base of power that he could eventually use to
overthrow Rawlings.
NR
The Espionage Incident
The Ghanaian press, which reflects radical opinion,
gave prominent and vitriolic coverage to the arrests in
mid-July of a CIA employee and a Ghanaian
national, Michael Soussoudis�Rawlings's cousin and
possibly an intelligence officer�on espionage
charges. No violent anti-American incidents occurred,
however, and the PNDC called on Ghanaians not to
harass or intimidate Americans, according to the US
Embassy and press reports. While some 200
Ghanaians turned out at the Embassy in mid-July
ostensibly to protest US policy in Nicaragua, the
police prevented some 800 other protesters from
reaching the compound, according to the Embassy. In
our view, the government probably allowed the press
attacks and the demonstration as a safety valve for
the more militant Ghanaians to express their anti-US
sentiments. So far, Accra has played down the
incident, but we believe that anti-American rhetoric is
likely to increase when Soussoudis goes on trial in
mid-November.
NR
The Moderates
The US Embassy reports some moderates fear that
the espionage incident has weakened their position,
and that they must assume a lower profile for a while.
One moderate told the Embassy in July that
15
portrayed as "US puppets." Moreover, Tsikata
probably used the incident to settle old scores and
arrest some mid- and low-level regime moderates.
According to the Embassy, at least 20 Ghanaians
were arrested in July and August for "espionage."
Nevertheless, the appointments of Commander
Quainoo and Brigadier Mensah-Wood�pro-Western
commandant of the military academy�to the ruling
PNDC in September probably stemmed from
Rawlings' desire to maintain the support of the
Western-trained military
retains the support of
enlisted men and NC0s, and, since he was appointed
Army Commander in 1982, he has emphasized
greater discipline and professionalism in the military.
In our view, Quainoo could eventually challenge
Tsikata's influence within the PNDC.
The Radicals
In mid-July Tsikata was elevated from his post as
"special adviser" to the ruling Provisional National
Defense Council, according to press reports. Since
then, he has become more vocal, using his platform to
attack the West and to press for closer ties to radical
states. The US Embassy reports that Tsikata made a
one-week visit to Iran in early August; signed an oil
agreement; and, in contrast to earlier Ghanaian
policy, voiced support for Iran's war with Iraq.
Moreover,
Europe. Tsikata has long sought closer ties to Libya,
while Rawlings has preferred to keep Tripoli at arm's
length.
In our view, the espionage incident probably has
convinced Rawlings of Tsikata's importance and
cemented their relationship at least for the near term.
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According to Embassy reporting, Tsikata believes he
can run Ghana through Rawlings, and that he has a
"mesmerizing" effect on the head of state. The
Embassy also reports that Rawlings is reluctant to
remove or subdue Tsikata because he considers him
the only official capable of organizing an effective
security apparatus. NR
We believe Tsikata will try to work behind the scenes
to establish his own base of support without
Rawlings's knowledge. Tsikata is developing an
Eastern Bloc�trained intelligence apparatus under his
absolute control, which he may someday use to topple
Rawlings. Aware of US concerns about Soviet
influence in Ghana, Tsikata dispatches his officers to
East European countries and Cuba in relatively small
numbers.
It is also possible that some
of the estimated 600 Ghanaian students undergoing
training in Cuba may serve eventually as Tsikata's
"revolutionary guard."
Economic Constraints
Accra's continued reliance on Western economic
assistance may complicate Tsikata's quest for more
radical policies. Western bankers believe a debt crisis
will occur in 1987 without rescheduling and
continuing aid from Western donors, according to the
US Embassy. Despite economic growth this year
estimated at 5.5 percent, Ghana still faces several
years of austerity, according to the Embassy. A
World Bank official estimates it will take until 1995
before Ghana's per capita income returns to 1972
levels. Moreover, economic growth has not been
translated into any obvious benefits for the average
Ghanaian. According to the Embassy, under-
employment is widespread, wages have not kept pace
with inflation�estimated to be 40 percent last year�
and the industrial sector is plagued by a shortage of
spare parts.
Secret
Outlook
The espionage incident has hampered at least
temporarily Ghana's improving relations with the
West and strengthened the radicals' hand. Tsikata
probably will seek to manipulate Rawlings toward a
more revolutionary course. Although Rawlings
probably hopes that Quainoo will be a moderating
force within the PNDC, he may underestimate
Tsikata's ambitions and probably assumes Quainoo
will be a countervailing force within the PNDC. In
our view, Tsikata may not attempt to seize power
until the economy has improved sufficiently and
adequate numbers of loyal operatives are in key
positions within the bureaucracy and the military.
Nevertheless, should an opportune moment appear�
if Quainoo is out of the country and Rawlings appears
vulnerable�Tsikata's newfound influence could
prompt him to move.
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West Africa: Burkina-Mali
Territorial Dispute
Relations between Burkina and Mali remain strained
as the International Court of Justice begins to
mediate their longstanding border dispute.
Burkinan Head of State Sankara's
fears of Malian aggression have been heightened by
what he views as growing Malian-French military
cooperation, according to the US Embassy. Neither
side has moved troops into the disputed area,
according to US Embassy reporting. According to
press reports, both countries have made preliminary
depositions before the Court, although no timetable
for a settlement has been announced.
The border dispute has simmered since the early
1960s. Hostilities over the ill-defined border briefly
flared up in 1974 and in June 1975. The Organization
of African Unity unsuccessfully sought to mediate the
conflict. According to US Embassy reporting,
Burkina blocked Mali's reentry into the West African
franc zone until 1983, when Bamako agreed to
international arbitration of the dispute.
Legal Maneuvering
According to US Embassy reporting and press
reports, Burkina has a strong legal case based on
historic claims to the area that are supported by
French colonial maps. According to the joint
communique signed in 1983, a court chamber
comprised of five jointly proposed judges will settle
the dispute. The basis of Mali's claim is that the
people in the disputed zone are of Malian origin.
According to past Embassy reporting, Burkina argues
that territorial claims founded on ethnic homogeneity
17
would undermine Africa's present boundaries. The
US Embassy in Bamako reports that Mali has agreed
to accept an unfavorable decision.
The disputed territory is some 19 kilometers long and
144 kilometers wide, and is nominally administered
by Malian authorities, according to the US Embassy.
Most of the 3,000 to 5,000 residents are seminomadic
tribesmen, with loyalty to neither country. The US
Embassy reports that there has been speculation the
territory has at least small deposits of phosphate,
uranium, and manganese. Nevertheless, much of the
region is marshy swampland that would make
economic development and mineral exploitation
difficult.
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The Military Balance
In our view, both countries are incapable of mounting
a sustained military attack in the border area.
According to US Embassy and
while Mali can at best make a limited
incursion across the border. Burkina's Army lacks
vehicles, communications equipment, ammunition,
and experienced officers. About one-third of its 7,000
Army troops�including the best equipped units�is
stationed in or near Ouagadougou.
Moreover, there are no pilots
capable of flying the single MIG-17 and the two
SF-260s in the Burkinan Air Force,
Mali's 7,500-man Army also suffers from a lack of
resources, fuel reserves, and equipment necessary to
mount a sustained attack. Despite Sankara's fears,
France has not provided military aid to Mali.
Strained Political Ties
We believe the territorial dispute is another
manifestation of long-strained bilateral ties.
According to the US Embassy in Bamako, Malian
authorities view Sankara as naive and immature, but
admit he has appeal to the country's urban youth and
some junior officers. The Embassy also reports that
President Traore fears Sankara will export his
populist "revolution" to Mali.
Sankara regards President Traore as a weak leader
who is mismanaging his country's affairs. In the past
year ties were strained further after Traore's wife and
General Diarra, Traore's second in command, were
implicated in a scheme to embezzle some $12 million
in franc zone development agency funds, the US
Embassy reports. Sankara, who is the president of the
agency, has pledged to recover the money, and we
suspect he may have threatened to expose high-level
Malian corruption if the funds are not returned.
Secret
Outlook
Without a considerable increase in foreign military
assistance, we believe that only small-scale border
skirmishes are possible. While Traore has promised to
accept the Court's decision, Mali's slight military
advantage and pressures from his military
commanders may persuade him to occupy the region
if his country loses the case. In the event of Malian
intervention, we believe that Sankara would probably
look to Libya for assistance. Although Burkina's
relations with Libya have been strained in the past
year over Tripoli's failure to provide substantial
development aid, Qadhafi probably would welcome
the opportunity to make new inroads in Burkina and
offer limited military aid.
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Cuba: Outpost in Cape Verde
Cuban interest in Cape Verde and its influence in the
government of this small group of islands off the
northwestern coast of Africa have been strong for over
a decade
Havana, which has cultural and ethnic
similarities with Cape Verde and provides health,
education, and agricultural aid, exercises far more
influence with Praia than Moscow does.
Cuban advisers are active
in nearly every department of the Cape Verdean
NR Government the total Cuban
contingent in Cape Verde as of August 1985 at 34 to
40 personnel, including as many as 19 military and
security advisers. Moreover, most of Cape Verde's
government ministers and many of its citizens
reportedly have received free education and political
and technical training in Cuba.
NR
NR
Cuban influence appears to be heaviest in the
military.
Cape Verde's 300-man
security service has eight Cuban advisers, and three
Cuban military advisers assist the 1,500-man Army.
all Cape Verdean military
and police officers go to Cuba for training, and that
the security services are closely tailored after the
Cuban model.
In our view, Havana's desire to maintain warm
relations with Praia most likely stems from the need
to protect its aerial resupply link to Angola, where
some 35,000 Cuban troops support the Luanda regime
against antigovernment forces. All flights carrying
Cuban personnel to and from Angola make their
necessary refueling stops in Cape Verde. Although
most of the arms, ammunition, and other supplies
destined for Angola are now routinely flown or
shipped in by the Soviets, limited quantities of
supplies�including arms�evidently are still carried
aboard Cubana Airlines military flights transiting
Cape Verde. According to information recently
NR obtained as recently as February
19
1984, some Cubana military flights passing through
Sal Island Airfield on Cape Verde were devoted
exclusively to arms shipments bound for Angola.
'We believe Havana probably will continue to cultivate
close ties with Praia so long as its commitments on the
African continent, particularly in Angola, remain
high. Even so, given the small size of the country, the
Cubans probably will opt to keep their presence at or
near current levels, lest they wear out their welcome
with Cape Verdean officials.
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18 October 1985
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RIB EIRA
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reflect 1981 changes for which infatuation
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0 40 Kilometers
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Secret
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Africa
Briefs
Madagascar French Naval Visit
The visit last month of a French Navy frigate to Diego Suarez suggests that left-
leaning President Ratsiraka is working to improve relations with the West, while
also attempting to preserve the nonaligned image he has cultivated since he
assumed power in 1975. The port call by Madagascar's former colonial power
marks the first time in over 10 years that the regime has permitted a naval
combatant from a major country to make an official call at Diego Suarez, where
Malagasy naval facilities are located. Diego Suarez is one of the largest and best
natural deepwater harbors in the world.
While Malagasy foreign policy proscribes official visits by naval combatants from
countries that do not border on the Indian Ocean, the regime apparently has made
an exception in the case of France. To justify the action, however, Ratsiraka can
claim that France is an Indian Ocean littoral state because Paris administers the
neighboring island of Reunion. Ratsiraka otherwise has refused to make
exceptions to his policy on ship visits for nonlittoral states, including his principal
source of military assistance�the Soviet Union�which long has sought access to
Diego Suarez. Ratsiraka, however, did allow a US Navy repair ship to call at
Diego Suarez in April 1984 to provide cyclone disaster relief, but emphasized the
humanitarian nature of the visit to preempt any Soviet requests for a naval port
call and to maintain Madagascar's nonaligned image.
Comoros Cabinet Shuffle
President Abdallah's sudden decision last month to reorganize his Cabinet may
have temporarily strengthened his hand over his political rivals but, over the longer
term, could add to the growing ranks of the opposition. Abdallah dropped four
longtime political opponents and heads of powerful Comoran families and
abolished their portfolios. The move came only months after he had appointed
them to head newly created ministries of state�known as "superministries." The
four�Ali Mroudjae, Said Hassane Said Hachim, Ali Bazi Salim, and Ahmed
Abdou�had exercised equal responsibilities and enjoyed equal standing in the
Cabinet.
It is unclear why Abdallah acted so precipitately, but his action is consistent with
past maneuvers to strengthen his authority. For example, last December he pushed
through the Federal Assembly a constitutional amendment that abolished the post
of Prime Minister, then held by Ali Mroudjae, and altered the presidential
succession to ensure that another longtime rival, Federal Assembly President
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18 October 1985
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Guinea-Bissau
NR
Mohamed Taki, could not assume power. Abdallah also has not allowed the
legislature to vote this month on a constitutional amendment that would permit
elections for a vice president.
The US Embassy reports that Comoran political observers are pessimistic about
the long-term prospects for the Abdallah regime following the Cabinet shuffle.
According to Embassy reporting, the President's decision to sever all political ties
to the four ex-ministers could threaten the tradition of oligarchical control that has
supported the seven-year rule of the staunchly pro-West Abdallah. In our view, the
dismissal of these influential ministers will add to growing popular discontent with
the President over the country's dire economic straits and the presence of the
European mercenary contingent that installed Abdallah in 1978. The dismissed
ministers now are in a position to exploit such discontent, and could decide to join
forces with either the pro-right or pro-left illegal opposition. Mohamed Taki, for
example, is in France working with a small dissident group based there, according
to press reports. For his part, however, Abdallah appears confident that he has
weakened his rivals, and that the mercenary-led Presidential Guard can contain
unrest, and he since has departed on a four-week visit to France and the United
States.
Pressures on Vieira
President Vieira, who seized power in 1980, last
month fended off a coup attempt by Vice President Paulo Correia. According to
the US Embassy, Correia may have tried to demand more jobs for his majority
Balante tribe, which probably has withdrawn its support of Vieira following the
unsuccessful challenge. The Balantes, who are believed to be the largest tribe
represented in the Army, did the majority of fighting during the independence
struggle against the Portuguese and claim they have not benefited from Vieira's
rule. The Embassy also reports that Vieira may have replaced his predominantly
Balante bodyguard with members of his own Pepel tribe.
Although US Embassy reporting suggests that Vieira still maintains the support of
the Soviet-trained and -equipped 6,000-man military, we believe its backing for
him may weaken as he expands contacts with the West. Vieira has expressed
interest in joining the African franc zone; pursued closer relations with Portugal,
France, and the United States; and sought to diversify Bissau's military aid and
training over the past year, according to US Embassy reporting. Moreover, during
his visit to Pakistan in July, Vieira signed a joint communique calling for the
withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, and he has pledged to vote at the
United Nations against the Soviet occupation, according to Embassy reporting.
Guinea-Bissau's stagnant economy�which prompted Vieira's overtures to the
West�also has eroded his popularity. The US Embassy reports rice shortages and
frequent power outages in the capital. His ruling council reportedly is divided over
the economic reforms, which include planned reductions in the state sectors, trade
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liberalization, successive devaluations, and the encouragement of foreign
investment. According to the Embassy, Vieira argues that meaningful economic
improvement depends on substantial Western aid, and that the Soviets are unlikely
to match, much less exceed, this funding.
Swaziland Power Struggle Continues
In an effort to reestablish the monarchy as the dominant political force in the
country, the Queen Regent has dismissed Prince Mfanasibili and George Msibi�
key members of the Supreme Council of State�and has fired the police
commissioner. Following the death of King Sobhuza in 1982, Swaziland was
plunged into a protracted power struggle in which the Council emerged as the
winner over the monarchy. However, the 15-member Council, comprised of senior
princes and prominent traditional figures who advise the Queen Regent on state
affairs, recently has been racked with infighting, and its leaders have lost
grassroots support.
Previous attempts to strip Council leaders of their authority failed, but the Queen
Regent now has the backing of a coalition of government and military leaders. A
ministerial reshuffle is likely and those Council members with close ties to
Mfanasibili�Education, Foreign Affairs, Health, and Agriculture Ministers�
will probably be replaced first. According to US Embassy reporting, these changes
probably will not take place until after the coronation of the Crown Prince,
expected sometime early next year. Swaziland's foreign policy was fixed by the
late King and it is not expected to change.
NR
NR
NR
NR
23 Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05632922
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05632922
Secret
Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C05632922