BRIEFING DOCUMENTS FOR MR. AMORY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05850276
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2021
• Case Number: F-2014-00454
• Publication Date: May 15, 1961

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15 May 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Louis Marengo
SUBJECT: Briefing Documents for Mr. Amory
IRAN TASK FORCE
1. The final draft of the paper was completed
late Saturday evening; Sunday was left for reproduction.
2. The paper will closely follow the attached
drafts. It will be organized as follows:
Section I - The Need for Action
Section II - Recommendations for Immediate
Action
Section III - Recommendations for Further
Action
PLUS
3 back-up papers -- political, military and
economic. (These were all subject to some
revision Saturday night.)
PLUS
The Intelligence Paper.
3. The members of the Task Force assume responsi-
bility for Sections I, II and III. Although the back-up
papers and the intelligence paper were considered in
various forms during the week, the final version of each
was left to the Working Group originating the paper.
4. Distribution of the final paper will be made
today.
CRITCHFIELD
ief, ear East and
South Asia Division
Attachments - 6
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swamp rosen No. 414
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Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO : Mr. Marengo
FROM :
SUBJBCT: Comment on Iran Task Force Paper
DATE: 15 May 1961
We have no problems with the basic judgments or
recommendations of this paper -- although somehow they seem to
be less crisp than one would have hoped. Certainly, we approve
of what appears to be the main message: net us get behind Amini
and see what we can do to promote evolutionary development in
Iran." The following few comments are inspired more by what seem
to be loose ends in the paper =Miler-than by significant substantive
disagreements.
3..2: The paper assumes throughout that a military coup would
inevitably constitute a rightist conservative reaction. The
possibility of a military coup with nationalist participation
should not be so thoroughly excluded. Indeed, the nationalists,-9"
as such seem to be ignored to a fair degree. Thus, there is
considerable emphasis on the need to keep the Shah off Aminits
neck; there is little mention of the urban nationalist pressure on
Amini. After all, it was this kind of pressure which caused the
recent crisis.
_3. The Political Badk-Up begins with objectives; adds
that neither US nor Iran have the instruments to guarantee
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111,'
.)
success of these, but concludes that the recommendations of the
report have sufficient promise of success to justify their adoption.
This seems a rather peculiar way of coming at the problem. However,
it does raise a question of interest. NIE 34-61 said that "the
nature of Iranian politics and the personal characteristics of the
Shah appear to make gradual evolution unlikely." In context, the
NIE suggests that change is more likely to be revolutionary.
Assume for the moment, the NIE is correct. How sure can we be
that the kind of support the paper proposes the US give Amini
will swing the balance?
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X. It seems that two points need to be mentioned, or at
least stressed more, in this paper. The first is that Iran
made quite rapid progress between 1954 (when oil began flowing
again) and 1980. GNP increased by about 5% annlially, the
number of banks and factories more than doubled, and investment
rose to about 18 percent of GNP. Thus when Iran encountered
difficulty beginning in 1958 it already had four years of progress
behind it. The paper gives the impression that the Iranian
economy encountered trouble as soon as it began to make some
progress, whereas it encountered difficulty only when a sharp
rise in private investment was piled on top of the rapid growth
of expenditures for public investment, the armed forces, and
social services.
40.
,2: Eqmirly as important as the need for foreign aid is the
need to modernize the country's economic institutions and
practices. A start has already been made along these lines, and
it is fortunate that Iran has quite a number of capable people
available, concentrated in the Plan Organization, but also in
other branches of government, who have not as yet been allowed to
use their talents fully. More emphasis might well be placed on
this point, as it suggests that there is room for considerable
improvement in the management of the economy and a good chance
to achieve it if we act wisely.
seem-
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