NOTE FOR THE BOARD

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05850279
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2021
• Case Number: F-2014-00454
• Publication Date: May 11, 1961

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� 111
cJ
ONE - 04)e
11 May 1961
7.� a- -
Note for the Board:
The attached has gone forward to the Iran task force as the
"CIA Draft) Superseding the Previous CIA Contribution'? and
responsive to those portions of the Iran paper which CIA was
requested to write. This draft now represents an agreed DDP �
ONE paper worked out on 11 May between the Board Panel) NE
staff) and DD/P representatives*
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I. MASIC ELEMENTS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION
10 The final meaning of the events which led up to the
fall of Sherif Emamits government and the Shahts appointment of
Ali Amini is not yet clear. These developments musts however: be
viewed in the context of long-term trends in Iran, which were
assessed in the recent NIE 34-61: Prospects for Iran, 28 February
1961. The relevant portions follow:
Goojran is still largely traditionalist in its social
and political structure, with authority concentrated almost
exclusively in the hands of the Shahs who relies for support
on the army, the security forces, the large landowners, tribal
chieftains, the old line leaders of commerce and finance, and
the senior bureaucracy. The "establishment" and many of its
policies are unpopular with most intellectuals and with much of
the growing middle class. It is out-of-step with the dynamic
political ideas and movements which are afoot in other parts of
Asia and Africa. The nationalist forces remain unwilling to
cooperate to any significant degree with the present "establish-
ment" but as yet lack the power to supplant it and probably even
the ability to run the country in its stead. (Para. 17)
"....profound political and social change in one form
or another is virtually inevitable; this, we believe, is the
most important estimate to stress in regard to Iran. It is
possible that the change will be evolutionary with the Shah
making concessions to the urban groups and bringing some of
the more moderate nationalists into the governmental and
administrative apparatus. The nature of Iranian politics and
the personal characteristics of the Shah, however, appear to
make gradual evolution unlikely. (Para. 18)
"The Iranian Communist Party (the Tudeh) remains
neutralized under the constant surveillance and harassment of SAVAK.
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� .SgoFit:.:ET
Practically all its leaders are in jail or in exile. In these
circumstances, Moscow is apparently relying more on direct
propaganda and political pressure to promote its objectives in
Iran than on the internal activities of the Tudeh. We do not
believe that for some time to come the Tudeh will be able to
exert much influence on the Iranian scene. The possibility %ill
remain that it may over the loner term be able to manipulai,e
nationalist groups. In the event of a sustained political
disturbance, the party probably would be able to reconstitute
itself.� (Para, 15)
In the present situation, the Tudeh will probably become more
active in penetrating nationalist groups but it will not come out
in the open as it did in 1953. The Soviets realize that they
made serious errors in overestimating the strength of Tudeh in
Iran in 1945-1946 and 1953 and will probably direct it initially
to merge itself in the general agitation against the status quoo
II. THE RECENT CRISIS
24 The growing political unrest of the urban middle class
has been manifested openly in the past year. The first set of
elections for the 20th Majlis held in August 1960 were cancelled
by the Shah in response to widespread dissatisfaction over the
blatant rigging. Despite strong professions of his good intentions
in regard to permitting a relatively free second round of elections,
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L. ALLA'
the January-February 1961 elections were as thorouchly controlled
by him as those in Au :ust. This resulted in lopalar demonstrrtions
in some provincial centers and in Teheran and the arrest of a
considerable number of students and some nationalist leaders� k
teacher's strike for hi her pay on 2 May precipitated the recent
crisis.
3. In the demonstrations that followed, a teacher was
killed and several others w:,unded by the police. On 3 hay, a
demonstration estimated at between 15 and 30 thousand persons
carried the corpse of the "martyred'? teacher through the streets
of Teheran� On 4 May E similar demonstration was joined by
workers. National Front Or ups were scheduled to join the
demonstrations on 5 May, but these plans were cancelled when
Ali Amini was appointed Prime Minister.
4. On 3 or 4 May General Tiemur Bakhtiar� former SAVAK
Chief, was closeted several hours with the Shah. General H2san
Alavi-Iia, Deputy Chief of SAVAK, conferred with the Shah for
three hours late t May and is sul�,osed to have pressed for the
appointment of Ali Amini. Relortedly extremely upset and ready
to flee the country, the Shah offered Amini the Prime Minister's
post late that night. It was accepted the next mornin:, 5 May,
on Amini's conditions that he be iven broad powers.
SEGRET
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GR.Vr-
III.41g$B-79.TS FOR AU. GOI.:1JCLIZiE30
Background:
5. For several years various �i-cups have tried tt c.nvince
the Shah that he should rei:n and not rule; that by rulinr- he
draws hostile criticism to hims:lf as the person solely respon-
sible for the shortcomin's of the ,-overnment. They have likewise
urged that he transfer the burden of government to a strong
Prime Minister who would be rc,si,onsible, as the constitution
provides, for the conduct of government, and replaced if he
fails. It is possible that the Shah followed this line of
reasoning when he selected Amini, because it is clear that he was
genuinely frightened by the deteriorating situation and realized
that a "conventional" prime minister i.e., one dominated by him,
could not establish cuntact with and accommodate opposition
elements at this time.
6. Amini has been grooming himself to be prime minister
for many years but only in recent years cut of public office has
he been able to devote full time to accomplish this enC, The
image of himself which Amini has fostered has three facets:
1) the smart, energetic administrator with a special competence
in finance and ec_nomics; 2) the man who is so rich he can afford
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to be honest and will co all cut cllainst corruption; and
3) the man who is uniquely qualified to act as the bride between
the moderate nationalists and the gwernment. He is certain to
project these three facets by tryirr: to take effective steps to
control the financial crisis, by trying; to make examples of
corrupt elements in high places and by attemptirk; to satisfy
certain nationalist demands.
70 Amini
does not possess a commanCinc
presence, and is not an inspirin speaker. He is not a master
politician, and has no organized devoted followin-, but in the
past two years he has systematicrIlly made contacts among both
nationalist and conservative elements, and obviously mcde pro rress
in selling himself as a bold administrator whose 1:ro-ram coincides
with the self-interest of these I.s.ups.
81 He will work with moderate but not with extremist
nationalist elements. He will probably not lead an attrck
on the oil consortium, but will talk behind the scenes to obtain
special favors which can be presented publicly as nationalist
victories. He will be reluctant to make significant concessions
to the old power elite to win its support.
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9. Amini
likely
make a
more serious effort than his predecessors to play an independent
role as prime minister. In the event of a deadlock with the
Shah, he might resi T. in the holes of maintaininr, his political
stature for a later return to pover0
100 Aminits tenure will probably depend to a lare dezree
on the Shahts willingness to withdraw from the coy to day conduct
of government business. Although the Shah has been fri!jitened
in i.elitical crises before, and relaxed his control of the
aoverement, experience has shown that after regaining equilibrium
he has always succeeded in dominating the prime minister� Since
Hossabegh, none have been able to stand up to the prestie of the
thnJne and the Shahts skill at manipulatin factions and leaders.
The fact that Iran is now in serious economic difficulty may
induce the Shah to allow Dr. Amin!, who is a competent economist
and financier, initial independence of action in these fields.
110 Aninits position will also be influenced by his success
or failure in winning the support of the military. Amini is
known to hove hod friendly contact with a number of senior
officers. Apart from this, there are several Freups within the
military who have for some time been contemplatin an effort to
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eriieittr,
chanRe the governmental structure: altheu-h not necessrily
to elimirrte the Shah. In add iti n, many of the junior and
middle rrade officers are probebly symatl,etic to the kind of
reform overnment represented by Amini. However, many of the
upper echelons of the military have acquired a vested interest
in the status quo and are apt tc be hostile to Amini to the
extent he tries to introduce drastic reforms.
120 Nationalist groups, which have been increasincly
active politically in the past year, are unlikely to identify
their cause directly with that of Amini. However, the more
moderate of them at least will probably be prepared to c,oporate
with them as lon as they retain hope that he will implement part
of their objectives, Should they become convinced that he is
not movinr: rapidly enough, they are likely to oppose him as
well as the Shah.
130 US policy toward the nel, Ironie 'overnment will hove
an important effect on future devolcdments. Should the Shah
become convinced that the US is str,n-ly supporting Amimi as
an independent prime ministc/ to the detriment cf his awn
position, his reaction would be sharp.
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14. It is impossible to estimate precisely the form this
would take. The Shah
is constantly haunted by
the fear that the US miht abandon him for one reason or another
and has been particularly uneasy over the new US administrative
attitude toward 111m. It is possible that he might move rapidly
to disengage Iran from its close ties with the US, Ve believe
it more likely that for some time at least he would accept the
situation. However, he is unlikely for very long willingly to
permit to Anini a position of primacy in dealin2, with the United
States.
l50 As far as Aminils continuatien in office is concerned,
the Shah faces a difficult problem. He has now taken a significant
step toward liberalization of the government. To try to cancel
it by replacing kmini with Iqbal or some other old line politician
-would merely increase the unrest which brought Amini to lower.
It mi-ht also provoke a move by military elements to take control
of a deteriorating situation. If, on the other hand, the Amini
government were to move sharply left or to he replaced by a more
radical nationalist one, this too might provoke a military and
conservative reaction. Neither development wculd make for stability
in Iran.
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