SOUTH AFRICA: HAVE PROSPECTS FOR ACCESSION TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREAY IMPROVED?

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• Publication Date: April 1, 1988

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Directorate of �Strret--
Intelligence
South Africa: Have Prospects
for Accession to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty
Improved?
An Intelligence Assessment
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South Africa: Have Prospects
for Accession to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty
Improved?
An Intelligence Assessment
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This paper was prepared by loffice
of Global Issues. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Geographic
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 19 February 1988
was used in this report.
South Africa: Have Prospects
for Accession to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty
Improved?
We believe South Africa has decided to take steps toward formally
accepting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is unlikely to
become a party to the treaty before the General Conference of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in September 1988. In our
view, State President Botha has concluded that the political, technical, and
economic incentives to join the treaty warrant eventual accession, but that
doing so before the nationwide municipal elections on 26 October would
generate damaging political backlash against his government.
Pretoria will probably begin negotiations on the NPT and then prolong the
consultations while it seeks concessions from current nuclear suppliers and
commitments from the IAEA, calculating that "good faith" discussions
will forestall its expulsion from the IAEA for another year. Once the
elections are over and South Africa judges it has exhausted the possibilities
for delay, we think Pretoria will become a party to the treaty even if it is
not completely satisfied with the concessions and commitments it has
engineered in the meantime. After NPT accession, Pretoria is likely to
protract negotiations on an IAEA safeguards agreement
Even with the NPT, we doubt that South Africa will sacrifice any
capability to construct a nuclear weapon. National defense and security
will prevail over other equities, and the Afrikaners' siege mentality�now
solidly entrenched�will probably dictate maintenance of the capability.
Thus, we suspect that President Botha, who is the ultimate decisionmaker,
will reason that the NPT is an unavoidable prerequisite for the long-term
well-being of South Africa's civil nuclear program and that, by sequester-
ing a portion of its highly enriched uranium stockpile, South Africa can re-
tain its nuclear weapons option.
South Africa's current exclusion from the nuclear community stems
largely from sanctions imposed because of apartheid,
As a result, treaty accession will not assure for Pretoria the
benefits normally available to an NPT party, such as technical cooperation.
We believe it is likely, however, that Pretoria's desire to preserve its
membership in the IAEA, to improve its prospects as a nuclear importer(b)(1 )
and exporter, and to regain international recognition as an advanced (b)(3)
nuclear state will outweigh its concern about achieving only a limited
payoff from joining the NPT.
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From a nonproliferation perspective, South African participation in the
NPT has pluses and minuses. On the positive side, accession would make
South Africa considerably less attractive to other proliferant states as a
collaborator on a clandestine weapons program. It would also attenuate a
source of polarization within the IAEA that has diverted the Agency from
its vital safeguards and safety functions. On the negative side, because
South Africa probably has the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons,
assuring its commitment to the treaty presents a difficult political and
technical challenge to NPT supporters and to the IAEA. Unless that
challenge can be met, Pretoria's membership could damage the credibility
of the treaty by seeming to tolerate de facto nuclear weapons states,
contrary to the goals of the NPT
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Contents
Page
Page
Key Judgments
111
Background
1
Incentives to NPT Accession
1
Access to Nuclear Technology and Fuel for Peaceful Purposes
2
Preservation of Uranium Export Markets
5
Continued Membership in the IAEA
7
Looking at the Costs
7
Bureaucratic Dynamics in Pretoria
7
Outlook for NPT Accession, Safeguards, and the
Highly Enriched Uranium Stockpile
9
NPT Accession
9
The Safeguards Question
10
The HEU Stockpile
10
Implications
11
. . . For the IAEA
11
. . . For South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program
11
. . . For the Nonproliferation Regime
12
. . . For the US-USSR Bilateral Relationship
13
Appendix
South Africa: Chronology of Nuclear Developments
15
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South Africa: Have Prospects
for Accession to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty
Improved?
Background
South African State President P. W. Botha publicly
announced in September 1987 Pretoria's readiness to
negotiate with the nuclear weapons states on the
possibility of joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). By timing his announcement to coin-
cide with the opening of the General Conference of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
making the negotiations contingent upon the confer-
ence's outcome, Botha kindled suspicion that the
announcement was a ploy to prevent Pretoria's ouster
from the Agency. A resolution calling for suspension,
sponsored by Nigeria and backed broadly by the
nonaligned states, was subsequently withdrawn in
favor of a resolution deferring debate until the next
General Conference in September 1988.
Several factors suggest, however, that South Africa's
calculus on the NPT may have changed: delays in
starting up the Semi-Commercial Uranium Enrich-
ment Plant at Valindaba, the continuing need for
access to nuclear technology and fuel, the real pros-
pect of Pretoria's expulsion from the IAEA, and its
desire to preserve export markets for its uranium.
Furthermore, Botha's willingness last year to make a
statement that was certain to result in intensified
pressure for accession from all quarters indicated a
readiness to take positive steps toward joining the
NPT.
This paper examines and evaluates these conflicting
signals to assess whether Pretoria's announcement
was a sincere statement of intent or solely a stalling
tactic to preserve its membership in the IAEA for yet
another year.
Incentives to NPT Accession
We believe South Africa has weighed a number of
technical, economic, and political incentives and con-
cluded that, on balance, they warrant taking steps
toward accession at this time:
� Access to nuclear technology and fuel for peaceful
purposes.
1
Press Release by State President P. W. Botha
at IAEA General Conference, 21 September 1987
The Republic of South Africa is prepared to com-
mence negotiations with each of the nuclear weapon
states on the possibility of signing the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty. At the same time the Republic of South
Africa will consider including in these negotiations
safeguards on its installations subject to the NPT
conditions. The nature of these negotiations will
depend on the outcome of the 31st General Confer-
ence of the IAEA which is being held in Vienna as
from 21 September.
South Africa hopes that it will soon be able to sign
the NPT and has decided to open discussions with
others to this end. Any safeguards agreement which
subsequently might be negotiated with the IAEA
would naturally be along the same lines as, and in
conformity with, agreements with other NPT
signatories.
� Preservation of export markets for its uranium.
� Continued membership in the IAEA.
Treaty accession will not guarantee for Pretoria all of
the benefits that would normally accrue to an NPT
party, particularly technology exchange. Sanctions
against nuclear cooperation with South Africa stem
largely from its maintenance of apartheid, according
to a broad range of diplomatic ources.
As a result, we expect Pretoria to see rm commit-
ments to nondiscriminatory treatment when, accord-
ing to US diplomatic reporting, it sends a team to
Washington, London, Bonn, and Paris to discuss the
NPT issue. In the end, though, we suspect Pretoria
will risk a modest payoff in exchange for improved
prospects as both a user and a supplier of nuclear
services, materials, and technology
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The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Opened for Signature:
Entered Into Force:
Depositary States:
Number of Parties:
1 July 1968
5 March 1970
United States, United Kingdom, USSR
137 (including Taiwan)
Key Provisions:
� Non-Nuclear-Weapon States
� Will not receive, acquire or manufacture a
nuclear explosive device.
� Will accept safeguards on all peaceful nuclear
activities (waiver for material used for nonex-
plosive military purposes such as naval
propulsion).
� Will conclude a safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency within 18
months of depositing instrument of accession.
� Have inalienable right to develop and use nu-
clear energy for peaceful purposes.
� Nuclear-Weapon States
Will not transfer nuclear weapons or explosive
devices to another state or encourage or assist
another state to manufacture such weapons or
devices.
Will facilitate exchange of nuclear equipment,
material and technology with other parties.
Will pursue negotiations in good faith toward
ending the nuclear arms race and achieving
nuclear disarmament.
� Each Party Shall ... Have the Right to Withdraw
From the Treaty
� If it decides that extraordinary events, related
to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeop-
ardized the supreme interest of its country.
� It shall give notice of such withdrawal three
months in advance.
Any state that did not sign the NPT before its entry
into force in 1970 may accede to the treaty. Such
states deposit instruments of accession rather than
instruments of ratification and are not referred to as
signatories. The treaty defines nuclear-weapon states
as states that had manufactured and exploded a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device
before 1 January 1967. Thus, even if South Africa
were so inclined, it could not accede as a nuclear-
weapon state.
Access to Nuclear Technology and Fuel
for Peaceful Purposes
In our view, the most important technical incentive
for joining the NPT at this time is the long-term
prospect of obtaining foreign assistance for the next
phase in South Africa's nuclear power program
a site selection
study for South Africa's second nuclear power station
is under way along the south coast, and the Electric
Supply Commission wants to start construction by the
Seerct
mid-1990s. Although its capabilities have improved
dramatically during the 1980s, industry experts point
out that South Africa still lacks the technical infra-
structure to embark independently upon nuclear pow-
er plant construction projects and will need foreign
assistance to complete the project on schedule.
2
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Figure 1
South Africa: Civilian Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Development
Uranium
mining
Uranium ore
concentration
Operational
_ii Under construction
Research/development
a Foreign-supplied
Uranium
dioxide
conversion
Pilot
uranium
enrichment
Research
reactor fuel
fabrication
UF6
conversion
Semicommercial
uranium
enrichment
Research
reactor a
Power
reactor fuel
fabrication
Power
reactor a
Spent fuel
reprocessing
Indigenous
power reactor
development
3
Sccrct
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Secret
Figure 2
South African Nuclear-Related Facilities
Angola
WINDHOEK
Namibia
r'
Botswana
*HARARE
Zimbabwe
--\Mozambique
Valindaba uranium
enrichment facility
� Pilot plant
7� Semi-commercial plant
- J PRETORIA
Pelindaba National Nuclear .Johannesburg Swaziland
Research Center
� Hot cell complex
� SAFARI research reactor
Kalahari underground
c41�
nuclear test site
Upington
Vaalputs waste
storage site
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Koeberg Nuclear
Power Station\ii
Units I and 2
Cape Towel
Boundary representation Is
not necessarily authoritative
South
Africa
MBABANE
Indian
Ocean
*MAPUTO
0 100 200 Kilometers
0
100 200 Miles
Secret
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A more immediate technical incentive arises from the
need to import low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for
the two nuclear power reactors at Koeberg.
Koeberg will
face a fuel shortage between 1988 and 1990. Now
that startup of the Semi-Commercial Plant at Valin-
daba, which will serve Koeberg's needs, has been
delayed again until later this year, Pretoria's dilemma
may be growing more acute. Unless new fuel arrange-
ments can be concluded soon, Pretoria may be forced
to resort to a combination of expedients to meet its
domestic need for LEU:
� Further reducing the output of its two power reac-
tors at Koeberg.
� Invoking the extension clause in its fuel contract
with France (the fabrication contract is due to
expire in 1989 but permits five more reloads beyond
that date).
� Producing LEU at its Pilot Enrichment Plant at
Valindaba to supplement available supplies
(b)(3) � Purchasing LEU on the spot market.
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Although NPT accession will not guarantee South
Africa full access to nuclear fuel and technology, it
would remove an obvious political hurdle for any
potential supplier. France probably would be most
willing to undertake new contracts in that it already
has a vested interest in Pretoria's nuclear program
and its large nuclear
industry has concluded only one reactor export deal in
the last five years. NPT accession would not eliminate
all political and legal obstacles to cooperation with the
United States, though it would permit a waiver of the
ban against nuclear exports in the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA)
Preservation of Uranium Export Markets
In addition to access to technology and fuel, resolution
of South Africa's NPT status will affect its ability to
export uranium worldwide. South African and
5
Figure 3
Free World Uranium
Production, 1987 a
Percent
Canada 33
Rest of Free World 1
Gabon 3
Niger 8
Europe 10
Australia 11
United States 12
South Africa/ 22
Namibia
a Estimated.
316641 388 (b)(3)
Namibian exports to utilities in Europe, Taiwan,
Japan, the Middle East, and, until enactment of the
CAAA in 1986, the United States have totaled about
$500 million annually. South Africa�which ranks
second in non-Communist uranium production after
Canada and just ahead of the United States�would
be forced to compensate its British and Namibian
consortium partners should the Rossing Uranium
Mine in Namibia be closed as a result of market
losses.
South Africa may be reasoning that acceding to the
NPT will relieve the pressure on its West European
and Asian clients to follow Washington's lead and
prohibit imports of South African ore and oxide.
(Accession would not affect the CAAA ban on im-
ports of South African ore and oxide into the United
States for domestic use or for enrichment and re-
export to third countries.) According to US Embassy
reporting, the precedent set by the CAAA has clearly
worried South Africa's leaders, and they are seeking
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to mitigate the legislation's contagious effect. In June
1987, for example, South Africa shipped a large
inventory of uranium to Western Europe for storage,
to avoid potential
future sanctions on its sales there
in 1986 South Africa sped
up shipments of nearly 6,500 metric tons of uranium
oxide for clients in Japan, Taiwan, and the United
States to complete deliveries before CAAA sanctions
against US enrichment and reexport of South African
uranium went into effect
Continued Membership in the IAEA
Aside from the critical issues of technology and trade
access, we suspect that Pretoria values highly its
IAEA membership and views the NPT as critical in
preserving its links to the Agency. South Africa is one
of the founding members of the IAEA and, in our
judgment, wishes to regain its full rights of member-
ship and recognition as the most advanced nuclear
nation in Africa (see appendix).
Pretoria wishes to continue to have
access through the Agency to a body of expertise and
information on nuclear safety, science, and technology
that is denied it elsewhere. We doubt, however, that
joining the NPT would enable Pretoria to regain its
seat on the Board of Governors
some in South
Africa believe that accession to the NPT is not likely
to ensure lasting benefits in the IAEA. According to
reporting from the US Mission in Vienna, South
Africa's problems in the organization over the last
decade can be traced to three issues: apartheid,
mining of Namibian uranium, and unwillingness to
accept safeguards on its entire nuclear program.
Acce2tance of the NPT will resolve only tie third
issue
Looking at the Costs
South Africa would pay both a technical and a
political price for joining the NPT. In our view,
however, Pretoria could, and probably would, mitigate
the technical. consequences by retaining a clandestine
stockpile of weapons-grade uranium and offset the
domestic political costs by timing an NPT decision to
generate the least possible backlash in the 26 October
1988 nationwide municipal elections
From a technical perspective, application of full-scope
safeguards under an NPT agreement would constrain
only marginally Pretoria's nuclear weapons capability
unless measures exceeding the norm for NPT parties
are applied. Safeguards at its Pilot Enrichment Plant
would limit future availability of enriched uranium
for weapons production. They would not, however,
eliminate the potential to produce explosive devices
should Pretoria withhold for contingency purposes
even a portion of the material it has produced since
1978. Furthermore, South Africa was conducting
basic research on a nuclear explosive design some
years ago
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On the political front, NPT accession before the 26
October elections could hurt President Botha's gov-
ernment, which is facing opposition from the resur-
gent right wing. The opposition favors maintaining
the nuclear weapons option and, according to press
reporting, has already criticized Botha for his appar-
ent willingness to forsake the option.
Bureaucratic Dynamics in Pretoria
It is clear from US diplomatic reporting that dis-
agreement exists throughout the bureaucracy, and we
believe Botha will try to build a consensus on the NPT
question to reduce domestic political risks. The De-
partment of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Econom-
ic Affairs and Technology Steyn favor moving ahead
on the treaty and improving nuclear links to the West,
according to the US Embassy in Pretoria, whereas
Minister of Defense Malan favors retaining the nucle-
ar weapons option and opposes the treaty. Steyn
apparently prevailed at a late January 1988 Cabinet
meeting where it was agreed, over Malan's objections,
to proceed with international consultations on the
NPT, according to US diplomatic reporting. Al-
though Botha appears to be leaning toward accession,
he has a vested interest in the weapons option since he
was Defense Minister when Pretoria embarked on the
program
%Jr
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Figure 5
South Africa: Nuclear Bureaucrats
Executive Chairman
of Atomic Energy
Corporation
Magnus Malan
Minister of Defense
Dani��
Mznzsterof Economic
Affairs and chno1ogy
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The buck stops with President Botha on the NPT,
according to State Department reporting
Minister of Economic Affairs and Tech-
nology Steyn, who oversees the nuclear industry,
seems to have his ear, but other nuclear officials and
South Africa's representatives in Vienna are able to
influence the President only on technical matters and
have not been key figures in nuclear decision making.
The decision to make last September's announcement
came directly from Botha,
and was not discussed in advance with Atomic
Energy Corporation Executive Chairman De Villiers.
Constitutionally, Botha has virtually total control over
any NPT decision. The power to enter into and ratify
international treaties is vested in the State President,
who exercises this power in consultation with the
Cabinet. Botha himself heads the Cabinet committee
that formulates foreign and defense policies, the State
Security Council, and its recommendations typically
are rubberstamped by the full Cabinet
Botha is
feeling both external and internal pressure on the
NPT issue. When he made the September 1987
announcement, he was probably influenced by a
desire to improve Pretoria's image on the eve of
sanctions reviews by the United States and the Com-
monwealth states, as well as to avoid South Africa's
suspension from the IAEA. In the final analysis,
however, we think the timing of any decision on
accessions to the NPT will be swayed most by domes-
tic political considerations. With elections in the
offing, we think it likely Botha will search for some
strategem�short of accession�that will salvage
South Africa's membership in the IAEA for one more
year without damaging his image as a protector of
South Africa's security. With the elections over,
Botha would then be free to pursue accession more
vigorously.
Outlook for NPT Accession, Safeguards, and the
Highly Enriched Uranium Stockpile
On balance, we believe South Africa has decided to
take steps toward NPT accession but will not join the
treaty before the IAEA General Conference in Sep-
tember 1988. Pretoria routinely employs the stall as a
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diplomatic tactic, either by agreeing to talks and then
introducing issues designed to create an impasse or by
making its compliance with an agreement subject to
conditions unlikely to be met, thereby transferring the
onus to the other parties. The South Africans have
used these techniques in negotiations on Namibian
independence and on safeguards at the Valindaba
Semi-Commercial Enrichment Plant.
NPT Accession
What is most likely, in our view, is that Pretoria will
prolong the NPT negotiations while it seeks conces-
sions on nuclear trade, commitments on restoring its
rights of membership in the IAEA, and consensus
within its own government. Pretoria also might try to
make accession by its frontline neighbors�Angola,
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe�a condition for its own
acceptance of the treaty. Once the tolerance of its
adversaries and its proponents in the IAEA is deplet-
ed and the elections are over, South Africa will
probably accede to the NPT, even if it is not fully
satisfied with the concessions and commitments it has
engineered in the meantime.
The most compelling factor dictating South African
behavior under the NPT will be national defense and
security. We judge that the Afrikaners' siege mental-
ity�now more solidly entrenched than in the 1970s�
will prevail because of the increasing need, as they
perceive it, to maintain a self-sufficient, flexible de-
fense. Although South Africa now holds clear-cut
conventional military superiority in the region and the
perceived threat of Soviet force penetration that
motivated its pursuit of a nuclear capability is dimin-
ished (though Pretoria remains concerned about Sovi-
et-Cuban intentions in Angola), we believe Pretoria's
isolation will dictate maintenance of its nuclear weap-
ons capability
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Overall, therefore, we remain wary of South Africa's
intentions with respect to the NPT. We believe Botha
will calculate that accession is a distasteful but un-
avoidable prerequisite for the long-term well-being of
South Africa's civil nuclear progran (b)(1)
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The Safeguards Question
Negotiations with the IAEA on a full-scope safe-
guards agreement would probably be difficult even
after South Africa joins the NPT. Pretoria could
procrastinate on negotiating an agreement�a delay
with ample precedent among NPT parties, according
to the US Mission in Vienna�earning yet another
grace period. Negotiations would be complicated fur-
ther by the fact that South African nuclear officials
distrust the Agency, according to US Embassy report-
ing, believing it discriminates against them. Minister
Steyn, for example, doubts IAEA Director General
Blix's neutrality on the safeguards question. Steyn
accused him in summer 1987 of failing to transmit to
the Board of Governors a communication from the
Government of South Africa explaining it considered
safeguards on the Valindaba Semi-Commercial En-
richment Plant as a step toward NPT accession. It
was at its June 1987 meeting that the Board recom-
mended to the General Conference that South Africa
be suspended from the IAEA
� Safeguards required by the United States as a
condition for supplying the SAFARI-1 research
reactor are also in place.
� Arrangements for voluntary safeguards at the Hot
Cell Complex at the Pelindaba National Nuclear
Research Center were agreed upon with the IAEA
in 1987.
� Voluntary safeguards are in place at the Vaalputs
Waste Storage Site.
� A satisfactory technical approach for safeguarding
the Semi-Commercial Enrichment Plant at Valin-
daba was agreed upon in 1986. Pretoria offered to
submit this facility to safeguards, but negotiations
were tedious because of Pretoria's fear of technol-
ogy compromise.
� Pretoria's state system of accounting and control is
compatible with the NPT safeguards model.
Pretoria's announcement in September 1987 also sug-
gests it would insist on a condition that is unaccept-
able to the IAEA: termination of the agreement if
South Africa's rights in the Agency are curtailed. The
IAEA rejected such a link during the negotiations on
Valindaba that derailed in late 1986, according to the
US Mission in Vienna. Safeguards agreements with
NPT parties include the other two demands Pretoria
made in 1986: permission to withdraw nuclear materi-
al from safeguards for naval propulsion reactors and
termination of the agreement if South Africa's securi-
ty interests are threatened.
Once an agreement is negotiated, application of safe-
guards should not be difficult from a technical stand-
point
� Safeguards required by France as a condition for
supplying the Koeberg power reactors are already in
place.
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The HEU Stockpile
Prospects for a full-scope safeguards agreement that
provides assurance against a sequestered stockpile of
HEU are uncertain. We believe it is likely that
Pretoria, which has never publicized the capacity of
its pilot plant, would declare only part of its inventory
to the IAEA, reserving a portion for contingency
purposes. It could avoid admitting past production of
weapons-grade HEU by declaring to the IAEA only
the 45-percent-enriched, research-reactor-grade HEU
it has produced to fuel the SAFARI Research Reac-
tor. The IAEA is obliged to accept Pretoria's declara-
tion at face value and has no authority to search for a
possible cache of HEO
or, should Pretoria assert it is closing the
pilot plant, to demand the plant be declared.
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ensuring the credibility of Pretoria's declaration will
probably require extraordinary methods. London has
told Washington, according to US diplomatic report-
ing, that it is considering suggesting some type of
audit�a first for NPT safeguards agreements�by
the IAEA or others. Pretoria's NPT statement leaves
no doubt that it would object to any requirements that
exceed the norm for NPT parties and, in our view, so
would the IAEA. The IAEA, however, may be willing
to undertake an investigation in the unlikely event it
were asked to do so by Pretoria.
Implications
... For the IAEA
Should South Africa fail to follow through on its
announced intention to join the NPT, the most imme-
diate effect probably would be to revitalize the move-
ment to expel it from the IAEA. Unless Pretoria can
demonstrate progress, it will face an unfavorable vote
at next September's General Conference, according to
the US Embassies in Moscow and European capitals.
If negotiations commence this year, advocates of
universal membership might be able to defeat the
anti-Pretoria lobby in September, according to the US
Mission in Vienna; the votes of Argentina and Brazil,
which influence the Latin American bloc, are, howev-
er, far from assured. Both states oppose the NPT and
are likely to find it politically untenable to accept
accession as a condition for any state's membership in
the Agency. US diplomatic reporting suggests the
Soviet Union views prospects for progress skeptically
and would not block a suspension attempt again if
South Africa has not joined the NPT or taken some
other concrete action by September
South Africa's longer term prospects for membership
in the Agency are more difficult to judge. In our view,
however, acceptance of the NPT would preserve its
11
membership beyond 1988 by eliminating the most
relevant argument mustered against it by the African
Group�failure to accept full-scope safeguards. The
most vocal critics of apartheid and mining of Namib-
ian uranium would continue to rail against Pretoria,
but, without support from the West, the East, or the
moderate nonaligned states, they would almost cer-
tainly fail to rejuvenate the expulsion issue
South Africa's status in the IAEA has ramifications
for the integrity of the Agency itself. On the one
hand, resolution of the perennial debate over Pretor-
ia's membership would eliminate one source of dam-
aging politicization that has preoccupied the Agency
in the 1980s and diverted it from its critical safe-
guards and safety roles. On the other, an ouster of
Pretoria would set the stage for a renewed challenge
to Israel's membership, which has also been at peril
for six years, according to State Department report-
ing. Should Israel be expelled, the United States, in
accordance with 1987 Congressional legislation,
would be required to withdraw from the Agency and
withold financial support from all its programs except
safeguards.
... For South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program
Even if South Africa becomes a party to the NPT, its
willingness to abide fully by the nonproliferation
regime is open to question.
We judge
that, in joining the NPT, it would defer additional
weapons research and development and refrain from
weapons production but maintain its nuclear option
by witholding a portion of its HEU stockpile. Should
its security position deteriorate intolerably in its view,
we believe Pretoria would exercise the NPT with-
drawal clause (see NPT inset on page 2) or simply
violate the treaty outright. Such a calculus is consis-
tent with the Afrikaners' view that their diplomatic
isolation and pariah status force them to be prepared
to face alone the Soviet threat they perceive in
southern Africa
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How Moscow Views the Prospects
As a depositary government for the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and a strong supporter of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Soviet
Union has a keen interest in the outcome of the South
Africa�NPT question but remains unconvinced thus
far of Pretoria's sincerity. Moscow took political heat
for having opposed the IAEA ouster in September
1987, according to State Department reporting, and
its demarche in November indicates Moscow expects
Washington to expend political capital of its own to
influence South Africa to follow through on its
declaration. Moscow's opposition to the motion to
expel South Africa�and its lobbying in Vienna and
in capitals to that end�was driven by its interest in
sustaining pressure on Pretoria as well as a desire not
to introduce tension into the US-Soviet relationship
before the December 1987 summit.
The Soviets are concerned that a failure to show
progress will lead to South Africa's expulsion from
the IAEA in September 1988, according to US diplo-
matic reporting, and endanger the Agency's effective-
ness as an instrument of nonproliferation. The Sovi-
ets also want to preserve the IAEA 's strength and
credibility as an instrument of disarmament; they
have been encouraging an expanded role for the
IAEA in arms control verification for several years, a
role touted by Director General Blix just after the
INF agreement was signed
Accession would undercut the rhetoric of Pretoria's
neighbors, which have repeatedly urged South Africa
to sign the NPT, but we do not believe they would feel
assured Pretoria had abandoned the nuclear option as
a result. Skepticism might be reduced were Pretoria
also to begin discussions with its neighbors on a
proposed treaty declaring Africa a nuclear-weapons-
free zone. South Africa stated its readiness to consider
such a treaty for the first time in September 1987,
according to the US Mission in Vienna, simultaneous-
ly opening the door for discussion and placing an onus
on other non-NPT African states like Angola, Mo-
zambique, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Even if it en-
tered into such talks, however, we suspect Pretoria
would obstruct real progress or otherwise play for
time.
... For the Nonproliferation Regime
In our view, South African accession to the NPT
would be a mixed blessing for the nonproliferation
regime. On the positive side, it would make South
Africa considerably less attractive to other proliferant
states
South Afriea might try to extract concessions from
the Soviets by means of direct discussions, according
to US diplomatic reporting. Such an objective would
explain the peculiar phrasing of Botha 's announce-
ment on negotiating with "each of the nuclear weapon
states." At the very least, Pretoria probably expects
that direct talks would be useful symbolically and
might establish a precedent that it could exploit in
dealing with other issues, such as South Africa's
regional security concerns. The Soviets have not been
receptive, however, to the idea of official contacts or
direct talks with the South Africans
On the negative side, without extraordinary measures
to verify South Africa's commitment, its accession
could damage the credibility of the NPT and the
nonproliferation regime itself by spotlighting�and
seeming to tolerate�the existence of de facto nuclear
weapon states. The same dilemma would ensue were
Pakistan, India, or Israel to join. When the NPT was
negotiated in the late 1960s, only five nuclear weapon
states existed, their capabilities were public, and three
of them�the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union�signed the treaty. The reality
of the 1980s is that, despite international controls
against proliferation, several non-NPT parties proba-
bly have attained, though not publicly admitted
capability to fabricate nuclear explosive devices.
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Because South Africa probably has the technical
capability to construct such devices, ensuring its
commitment to the treaty presents a difficult political
and technical challenge to NPT supporters and to the
IAEA. Should no reliable way be found to verify
South Africa's compliance with both the spirit and the
letter of the NPT, its accession would give momentum
to critics of the treaty's effectiveness and present
treaty supporters with a new and complex challenge
when they meet in 1990 to review whether the goals of
the NPT are being realized
... For the US-USSR Bilateral Relationship
We do not expect the US-Soviet relationship on
nonproliferation to suffer more than temporary dis-
comfort as a result of the South Africa�NPT issue.
As depositary states of the treaty and coguarantors of
its integrity, however, both have a stake in resolution.
According to the US Embassy in Moscow, the Soviets
Reverse Blank
13
have already warned that, unless concrete results are
achieved, they could not be counted on again to
oppose suspension and that the consequences for the
IAEA would be "catastrophic." The Soviet Union has
called on Washington to press Pretoria to join the
NPT and will publicly blame the United States should
no tangible progress take place before September.
Regardless of whether progress is made, Moscow will
probably continue public accusations that Washing-
ton is aiding Pretoria's nuclear program. In February,
for example, a Pravda correspondent in Zambia
accused the "Western powers" of responsibility for
the alleged complicity between Israel and South
Africa in nuclear weapon development.
�See
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Appendix
South South Africa:
Chronology of Nuclear Developments
Membership in the IAEA
1954-57
June 1957
1959-68
Serves on eight-nation commission that negotiates International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) statute.
Ratifies statute and becomes charter member with permanent seat on Board of
Governors as most advanced nuclear state in Africa.
IAEA technical assistance totals $107,800, all in form of fellowships.
1968 Receives last technical assistance.
1976
June 1977
September 1979
1979
General Conference asks Board to review membership on Board, taking into
account "the inappropriateness and unacceptability of the apartheid regime."
Voted off Board and replaced by Egypt as "most advanced nuclear nation in
Africa."
Credentials to General Conference rejected on grounds that government did not
legitimately represent majority of people (this situation continues).
Terminates contributions to IAEA's Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund.
September 1981 Excluded by Board from participation in its Committee on Assurances of Supply.
October 1983
January 1984
October 1985
August 1986
General Conference calls on members to end all nuclear cooperation with South
Africa and on Agency to consider excluding South Africa from its technical
groups.
Announces decision to require IAEA safeguards on its uranium exports and to
begin safeguards negotiations on Semi-Commercial Enrichment Plant at
Valindaba.
General Conference calls on Agency to exclude South Africa from activities that
could help it "persist with its exploitation of Namibian uranium."
Safeguards negotiations on Valindaba break down.
September 1986 Suspension vote at General Conference avoided; resolution passes calling on Board
to consider recommending suspension.
June 1987 Board recommends suspension of South Africa.
September 1987 Suspension vote avoided following Botha statement; issue placed on agenda of
1988 General Conference.
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Nuclear Explosives Development
1948 Atomic Energy Act�Atomic Energy Board formed.
1961 Research on aerodynamic enrichment process begins.
1963 Accedes to Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits atmospheric testing.
1968 Work on peaceful nuclear explosives.
1969 Work on design of enriched uranium pilot plant.
1970 Public announcement of uranium enrichment capability.
1971 Construction of Pilot Enrichment Plant begins.
1975 Pilot Enrichment Plant begins limited operation.
1977
1978
1979
�Seer. eL
Kalahari nuclear test site discovered. Prime Minister Vorster decides to halt
nuclear explosives development.
Mothballs but does not decommission Kalahari test site
US nuclear test detection satellite detects optical signature over South Atlantic;
Intelligence Community cannot associate event conclusively with nuclear testing.
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