CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/06/17

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05973643
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: June 17, 1961

T� 12 SECREU 3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
17 June 1961
Copy No, C
CENTRAL
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INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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17 June 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos. (Page i)
2. USSR- Tvura Tam 16 June_ICBM launch attemnt.
(Page i)
3. Dominican Republic: Trujillo elements may feel strong
enough to override President Balaguer. (Page
4. Congo: Gizenga indicates increasing receptivity to con-
vening parliament in Leopoldville. (Page it)
5. Britain: Commonwealth reaction may slow down UK's
gradual progress toward bid for Common Market mem-
bership. (Page itt)
6. Philippines: Foreign secretary hints at consideration of
neutralist policy. (Page iii)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
17 June 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: The Namone tripartite talks continue to be stalled'
over the role of the ICC. The scheduled 16 June session was X0
never formally convened because of the dispute over the partici-
pation of ICC representatives in the meetings. The government
delegation walked out when the Pathet Lao and the Souvanna
Phouma group refused to seat the ICC as observers in either
the political committee or the military subcommittee.
[King Savang has rejected, apparently on constitutional
grounds, Phoumit suggestion that the King's name be advanced
at the upcoming Zurich talks as premier in a government of
national union. Meanwhile
it has prepared itself inade-
quately for the meeting with Souvanna and Souphannouvong.
certain political party chiefs in the Boun Oum
party may maneuver for persona/ deals once the talks get un-
der wayj
Dathet Lao - Kong Le forces have resumed mortar fire on
government positions to the south of Ban Hat Bo, about 25 miles
northeast of Pak Sane. Ban Hat Bo and another nearby post fell
to the enemy on 13 June. Scattered skirmishing continues to be
reported elsewhere in the country.)
Bloc airlift operations continue to be scheduled through
17 June. (Backup, Page 1) (Map) 430zxe.&.�
USSR: [Analysis of additional data on the ICBM test opera-
tion conducted at Tyura Tam early on 16 June (reported in yes-
terday's bulletin), indicates that either the launching may have
been canceled at the last moment or the vehicle may have been
launched but failed in flight shortly afterwards. If in-flight fail-
ure is confirmed, it was the seventh failure in Soviet ICBM test
launches to Kamchatka this year. During this period there havO
,s
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CONGO
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Luanda Kasavubu�Mobutu
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STATUTE MILES 400
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libeen 10 successful ICBM tests. In addition there have been
three operations, the results of which are undetermined:7
Dominican Republic: President Balaguer is evidently al-
ready succumbing to pressures from Trujillo elements, who
now may feel strong enough to override him if he should com-
mit himself to a course of action desired by the United States.
Trujillo aides urged the special OAS subcommittee to leave
the country after only one week, in the face of known US de-
sires for a longer investigation. In addition, the Dominican
foreign minister reneged on Balaguer's commitment that the
subcommittee could return at any time. The President on
13 June had instructed the foreign minister, in the presence
of the subcommittee chairman, to provide such assurances in
writing. The next day, however, the foreign minister refused
to give even an oral assurance. The American consul also
notes that, at least for the moment, the government has abated
the efforts it had been making to establish better contacts with
the consulate.
Congo: Ambassador Timberlake believes that Gizenga has
further moderated his security demands for reconvening parlia-
ment and now insists primarily on the evacuation of Leopold-
ville proper by central government forces and a build-up of UN
forces there to 10,000 men. Gizenga originally had demanded a
"neutral" site, and subsequently insisted that wherever parlia-
ment meets, all Congolese forces must be cleared from an ex-
tensive surrounding area. The US Embassy now believes a com-
promise acceptable to both Kasavubu and Gizenga is possible.
Reports of concessions by Gizenga coincide with evidence
of new resistance to his regime. Tribal clashes have recurred
in Bakavu, Kivu Province, where more than 100 anti-regime
17 June 61
DAILY BRIEF Ii
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Bashi tribesmen were killed by.Gizenga soldiers early this
month, and indications of anti-Gizenga activity have appeared
in northern Kasai.
[The Ghanaian Foreign Ministry on 12 June instructed its
UN representative to advise Hammarskjold that a Ghanaian
aircraft en route to Uganda would land at Stanleyville during
the week of 19 June carrying medical supplies and personnel
to staff a Ghanaian embassy at Stanleyville. Although the UN
has insisted that all aid to the Congo be channeled through its
headquarters in Leopoldville, a Yugoslav transport�apparently
carrying relief supplies--reached Stanleyville via Khartoum on
5 June and was unloaded after a UN examination limited to in-
specting the markings on unopened crates7
Britain:Tritaint gradual nfovement toward a formal bid
for membership in the Common Market may be delayed. Mac-
millan has announced that in coming weeks cabinet members
will be sent to consult with Commonwealth countries on the
problems such membership would pose for them. London may
feel that recent expressions of alarm from New Zealand, Canada,
and Australia could reverse the apparently favorable trend of
British public opinion regarding British membership. There
may be renewed Commonwealth demands for special ministerial
meetings or even for postponement of any decision until after the
regular fall meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers_]
(Backup, Page 3)
Philippines:CRecent remarks of Philippine Foreign Affairs
Secretary Serrano suggest that he may be seriously consider-
ing the advisability of a neutralist foreign policy. On 13 June
he implied to Ambassador Hickerson that in the absence of firmer
US action in the Far East, anti-Communist Asians might have to
consider some measure of neutralism as the only means of pro-
tecting their own interests. Serrano, who has expressed concern
over a softening of American policy in the Laotian crisis, appar-
ently is interpreting US moves toward recognition of Mongolia as
a step toward a broader shift of policy.
(Backup, Page 4)
17 June 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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JLAJIM I
Developments on Laos
The Boun Oum delegation to the Zurich talks is composed
of various members of the government, whose most influential
spokesman will be General Phoumi, and the heads of the five
political parties which have been endeavoring to get seats at the
Geneva conference on a basis of parity with the Neo Lao Hak Sat
(NLHS) and the Souvanna group. These are the party for Democ-
racy and Social Progress, headed by former Premier Tiao Som-
sanith and controlling about 35 votes in the 59-member national
assembly; former Premier Phoui's Rally of the Lao People, with
about 10 assembly votes; the Democratic party, a small regional
party organized around the Voravong family of southern Laos;
the National Union party, which is largely the personal vehicle
of Bong Souvannavong, an old-time politician whose affiliations
have frequently shifted; and the Committee for the Defense of the
Fatherland, a new name for Phoumi's civic action group, the
Committee for Defense of National Interests.
These groupings are essentially artificial and tentative,
and once the Zurich talks get under way, the facade of unity in
the Boun Oum camp could quickly disintegrate. Many of Laos'
politicians now nominally supporting Boun Oum and Phoumi
would probably feel more comfortable supporting Souvanna, par-
ticularly if Souvanna can convince them that he remains a free
agent and has not been taken over by the Communists. [Phoumi,
therefore, may find himself increasingly isolated if he persists
in his professed intention to charge a high price for agreement
on a coalition government; in that case he would be faced with
ale choice of making substantial concessions or of bearing the
onus for breaking off the talks: j
units in southern Laos cite reports of the presence of from two
to three North Vietnamese battalions in the Mahaxav area to the
east of Thakhek. Savan-
nakhet and the nearby French Seno military base as the objective
of these forces, their intention is to invade
South Vietnam. There have been frequent reports of the presence
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of North Vietnamese elements in Pathet Lao - Kong Le - con-
trolled territory in this area.
There were 16 airlift and airlift-associated sorties on
15 June, of which 10 were into Laos. One of these flights
may have been to Pa Dong;
17 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
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Britai and the Co on Market
[Adjustment of Commonwealth tariff preferences to British
membership in the Common Market has loomed as an increas-
ingly large problem in recent weeks, as other difficulties have
receded. Several of Britain's partners in the Outer Seven have
indicated their readiness to make the necessary adjustments if
Britain decides to bid for membership, and
British farm groups have reacted relatively
mildly to government suggestions that other devices might pro-
tect domestic agriculture just as well as the present deficiency
payments .3
Erhe Commonwealth issue has been brought to the fore by
New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake's warnings of disastrous
consequences to his country's economy, Australian predictions
of possible ruin to certain exports, the Canadian finance minis-
ter's threat of possible retaliation against British goods, and
Prime Minister Diefenbaker's call for a Commonwealth prime
ministers' conference on the subject. Although British officials
for some time have judged that specific Commonwealth trading
problems could be solved, they fear that the old Commonwealth
countries' pleas for special consideration may so stir the Brit-
ish public as to force the government to take so extreme a posi-
tion on Commonwealth preferences as to prevent negotiations with
the Common Market from getting started. A recent opinion poll
showed the British public more interested in maintaining Common-
wealth ties than strengthening ties with Europe, even though it
overwhelmingly endorsed joining the Common Market:3
Macmillan apparently hopes that by dealing with the wealthCommon-
countries individually, he can keep their pressures from
growing into a complete roadblock to British participation in the
Common Market. The delays involved in consultation, however,
and the continued British uncertainty regarding France's attitude
toward Britain's joining, suggest that a clear announcement of the
government's intentions may not be made before Parliament ad-
journs for the summer in early Augustj
CONFIDENTIAL
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Philippine Concern Over Western Policy in Asia
[Secretary Serrano's expressions of "deepest concern" over
the possibility of US recognition of Mongolia and its admission to
the United Nations apparently followed diplomatic consultations
with Nationalist China. This demarche is nonetheless consistent
with Philippine views that any US accommodation with Communist
Asia would make Philippine policy against diplomatic and com-
mercial relations with bloc countries untenable. Serrano stated
that while he is not unalterably opposed to admission of Commu-
nist China to the UN, he opposed any piecemeal approach to a
major shift of policy without prior consultation and in the ab-
sence of a general disarmament agreement.]
[Serrano in recent months has expressed increasing alarm
over the trend of events in Laos and particularly over the inabil-
ity of the SEATO alliance to influence the situation. He attributes
this primarily to the weakness of the British and French in Asia,
which he believes is prompting them to follow a policy of disen-
gagement. A meeting of four anti-Communist Asian foreign min-
isters held in Manila in January was called by Serrano primarily
to create pressure for a firmer US posture in Asia, through bi-
lateral arrangements if not through SEAT9.3
EIn recent weeks, Serrano's concern over a possible relax-
ation of US commitments in Asia has been echoed by prominent
Philippine legislators as well as by President Garcia. In a press
conference in late May, Garcia urged the US to stand firm "before
it is too late," stating that "if we give up Asia by default, it will
only speed up the Communist seizureD
lthough expressions of concern over US intentions and of
the desirability of a more neutralist policy have long been used
to back up demands for greater material assistance, Philippine
officials appear to be increasingly concerned over Philippine
vulnerability and possible changes in American policy)
17 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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'LA./INF itizim I UAL.
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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