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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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June 17, 1961
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15815590].pdf509.86 KB
T� 12 SECREU 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 17 June 1961 Copy No, C CENTRAL C-c?" INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 'FOP SECRE7 1,,,,,,M7/7/441/1111,Approyed for 2020/9811 c 5973643 yr/1/M Z fr, /7/Z A CApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973643_,\ I 'Jr OCUIRIG II ..._.--1 --Thia�err�Agar�Z Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973643 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973643 17 June 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Laos. (Page i) 2. USSR- Tvura Tam 16 June_ICBM launch attemnt. (Page i) 3. Dominican Republic: Trujillo elements may feel strong enough to override President Balaguer. (Page 4. Congo: Gizenga indicates increasing receptivity to con- vening parliament in Leopoldville. (Page it) 5. Britain: Commonwealth reaction may slow down UK's gradual progress toward bid for Common Market mem- bership. (Page itt) 6. Philippines: Foreign secretary hints at consideration of neutralist policy. (Page iii) TOP SECRET A=Tri=a1SCCErTSCiggar A 1/4.)010,t Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973643 Cw.) 4ORTH VIETH M I Ban Houei .) Sol ���� / Nuong So i ....� Nom Bac x ; :-//1 Sa\rn Ntualii I I Dien Bien Phu 1 / ...,_.........--VI... % -- 1 Na...m Thial liti'lr�RI... -..,/ i i ..,_. �--- NAM1THA ; � \ , ... --"../.........oe� i ' C'< Muong Ho uang Prabang .........Z6M. N E U A / LUANG1 PRABANG .... \I. ' ,j..?�\.. ....iii,y �%-....--� X I E N G 0 II% SAYABOURY 41:1 (.4 .Flaine ('KHOUANG \ uon; SOW ar re 0 41!;tho boy / � hong So van � Phou K oun � .....). .�Xieng Kh ng Muon Ka 'N./ N". '� O o Don ... 1 Tha Tho ong �in VI Es}s/ T I ANE 4 BorikhaneS ),Bon i4Jate2p Pak Sane ...3 � Nong Khai THAI L AND NORTHERN LAOS illoP GOVERNMENT Forces 'MO KONG LE - PATHET LAO ri KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS e GOVERNMENT (MEO) BASE AREAS ROAD 0 50 100 -- TRAIL STATUTE MILES 0 ROUTE NUMBER � 610617 K H AM homm Thakhek � Lab So OUANE at � tAo axoy 9bvannakhe Pho Lone Dong Hoi woo.- SOUTH 17 June 61 .CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973643 Ver AND roved for Release:2020/08/11 CO5973643/ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 17 June 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: The Namone tripartite talks continue to be stalled' over the role of the ICC. The scheduled 16 June session was X0 never formally convened because of the dispute over the partici- pation of ICC representatives in the meetings. The government delegation walked out when the Pathet Lao and the Souvanna Phouma group refused to seat the ICC as observers in either the political committee or the military subcommittee. [King Savang has rejected, apparently on constitutional grounds, Phoumit suggestion that the King's name be advanced at the upcoming Zurich talks as premier in a government of national union. Meanwhile it has prepared itself inade- quately for the meeting with Souvanna and Souphannouvong. certain political party chiefs in the Boun Oum party may maneuver for persona/ deals once the talks get un- der wayj Dathet Lao - Kong Le forces have resumed mortar fire on government positions to the south of Ban Hat Bo, about 25 miles northeast of Pak Sane. Ban Hat Bo and another nearby post fell to the enemy on 13 June. Scattered skirmishing continues to be reported elsewhere in the country.) Bloc airlift operations continue to be scheduled through 17 June. (Backup, Page 1) (Map) 430zxe.&.� USSR: [Analysis of additional data on the ICBM test opera- tion conducted at Tyura Tam early on 16 June (reported in yes- terday's bulletin), indicates that either the launching may have been canceled at the last moment or the vehicle may have been launched but failed in flight shortly afterwards. If in-flight fail- ure is confirmed, it was the seventh failure in Soviet ICBM test launches to Kamchatka this year. During this period there havO ,s TOP SECRET A,!ferae_d_f2,r_R_te_a,sz_2_020/08/11,,C05973643V A Approved for Release: 2020/68/11 C05973643 ke. CONGO Brazzaville Pointe 1- Noire o�-�- --, Banify. Republic of the Congo nTh1n1/2 AFRICAN IMZE3 k.Bengassou �Monga N� Z:4 Ths , Bond� � �Gemena eft LIBERIA NIGERIA 400 scatted for MOBU1U 3.400 Inn EQOATEUR Coehatville � Boende ETHIOPIA ( 200 �-) I � 7.200 Scattered-force � MOBUTU OBUTU 9,9 EOPOLI5VILLE Francqui Leopoldo' A Bu Alcetie.RIE TALE GIZENGA 7,000 MALAYA 900 uluabourg LIBERIA Ba ga. 230. GHANA 1:600 ; ,Approximate area nominally controlled by: Luanda Kasavubu�Mobutu Gizenga Kalonji Tshombe Cgil United Nations Forces (Service Forces � Selected road � not included) Selected railroad Selected airfield STATUTE MILES 400 I U Bukav ETHIOPIA A LAY A 500 INDIA 300 K A T A INDIA 2 900 FEDERATION 000313 Albertville Man ono TSHOMBS 2:000 Lote Albert UGANDA IGERIA RUANDA URUNDI isabothville. RHODES' NY ASAL ATID Usumbura TANGANYIKA Lake Tonganyrko IRE LAND 650 SWEDEN 870 1.7aiiile-2 611 r F.W.T`TrA TNTF.LT sr.w.wr E BUELE TIN 1 Map-Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973643 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973643C iff J.LAAIG Lad libeen 10 successful ICBM tests. In addition there have been three operations, the results of which are undetermined:7 Dominican Republic: President Balaguer is evidently al- ready succumbing to pressures from Trujillo elements, who now may feel strong enough to override him if he should com- mit himself to a course of action desired by the United States. Trujillo aides urged the special OAS subcommittee to leave the country after only one week, in the face of known US de- sires for a longer investigation. In addition, the Dominican foreign minister reneged on Balaguer's commitment that the subcommittee could return at any time. The President on 13 June had instructed the foreign minister, in the presence of the subcommittee chairman, to provide such assurances in writing. The next day, however, the foreign minister refused to give even an oral assurance. The American consul also notes that, at least for the moment, the government has abated the efforts it had been making to establish better contacts with the consulate. Congo: Ambassador Timberlake believes that Gizenga has further moderated his security demands for reconvening parlia- ment and now insists primarily on the evacuation of Leopold- ville proper by central government forces and a build-up of UN forces there to 10,000 men. Gizenga originally had demanded a "neutral" site, and subsequently insisted that wherever parlia- ment meets, all Congolese forces must be cleared from an ex- tensive surrounding area. The US Embassy now believes a com- promise acceptable to both Kasavubu and Gizenga is possible. Reports of concessions by Gizenga coincide with evidence of new resistance to his regime. Tribal clashes have recurred in Bakavu, Kivu Province, where more than 100 anti-regime 17 June 61 DAILY BRIEF Ii TOP SECRET A Fr,'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973643 ur JEC,rtc, 1 kal Bashi tribesmen were killed by.Gizenga soldiers early this month, and indications of anti-Gizenga activity have appeared in northern Kasai. [The Ghanaian Foreign Ministry on 12 June instructed its UN representative to advise Hammarskjold that a Ghanaian aircraft en route to Uganda would land at Stanleyville during the week of 19 June carrying medical supplies and personnel to staff a Ghanaian embassy at Stanleyville. Although the UN has insisted that all aid to the Congo be channeled through its headquarters in Leopoldville, a Yugoslav transport�apparently carrying relief supplies--reached Stanleyville via Khartoum on 5 June and was unloaded after a UN examination limited to in- specting the markings on unopened crates7 Britain:Tritaint gradual nfovement toward a formal bid for membership in the Common Market may be delayed. Mac- millan has announced that in coming weeks cabinet members will be sent to consult with Commonwealth countries on the problems such membership would pose for them. London may feel that recent expressions of alarm from New Zealand, Canada, and Australia could reverse the apparently favorable trend of British public opinion regarding British membership. There may be renewed Commonwealth demands for special ministerial meetings or even for postponement of any decision until after the regular fall meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers_] (Backup, Page 3) Philippines:CRecent remarks of Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Serrano suggest that he may be seriously consider- ing the advisability of a neutralist foreign policy. On 13 June he implied to Ambassador Hickerson that in the absence of firmer US action in the Far East, anti-Communist Asians might have to consider some measure of neutralism as the only means of pro- tecting their own interests. Serrano, who has expressed concern over a softening of American policy in the Laotian crisis, appar- ently is interpreting US moves toward recognition of Mongolia as a step toward a broader shift of policy. (Backup, Page 4) 17 June 61 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973643' A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973643 JLAJIM I Developments on Laos The Boun Oum delegation to the Zurich talks is composed of various members of the government, whose most influential spokesman will be General Phoumi, and the heads of the five political parties which have been endeavoring to get seats at the Geneva conference on a basis of parity with the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) and the Souvanna group. These are the party for Democ- racy and Social Progress, headed by former Premier Tiao Som- sanith and controlling about 35 votes in the 59-member national assembly; former Premier Phoui's Rally of the Lao People, with about 10 assembly votes; the Democratic party, a small regional party organized around the Voravong family of southern Laos; the National Union party, which is largely the personal vehicle of Bong Souvannavong, an old-time politician whose affiliations have frequently shifted; and the Committee for the Defense of the Fatherland, a new name for Phoumi's civic action group, the Committee for Defense of National Interests. These groupings are essentially artificial and tentative, and once the Zurich talks get under way, the facade of unity in the Boun Oum camp could quickly disintegrate. Many of Laos' politicians now nominally supporting Boun Oum and Phoumi would probably feel more comfortable supporting Souvanna, par- ticularly if Souvanna can convince them that he remains a free agent and has not been taken over by the Communists. [Phoumi, therefore, may find himself increasingly isolated if he persists in his professed intention to charge a high price for agreement on a coalition government; in that case he would be faced with ale choice of making substantial concessions or of bearing the onus for breaking off the talks: j units in southern Laos cite reports of the presence of from two to three North Vietnamese battalions in the Mahaxav area to the east of Thakhek. Savan- nakhet and the nearby French Seno military base as the objective of these forces, their intention is to invade South Vietnam. There have been frequent reports of the presence -SECRET- 17 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973643 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C059736, -,L13 of North Vietnamese elements in Pathet Lao - Kong Le - con- trolled territory in this area. There were 16 airlift and airlift-associated sorties on 15 June, of which 10 were into Laos. One of these flights may have been to Pa Dong; 17 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973643 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973643 Britai and the Co on Market [Adjustment of Commonwealth tariff preferences to British membership in the Common Market has loomed as an increas- ingly large problem in recent weeks, as other difficulties have receded. Several of Britain's partners in the Outer Seven have indicated their readiness to make the necessary adjustments if Britain decides to bid for membership, and British farm groups have reacted relatively mildly to government suggestions that other devices might pro- tect domestic agriculture just as well as the present deficiency payments .3 Erhe Commonwealth issue has been brought to the fore by New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake's warnings of disastrous consequences to his country's economy, Australian predictions of possible ruin to certain exports, the Canadian finance minis- ter's threat of possible retaliation against British goods, and Prime Minister Diefenbaker's call for a Commonwealth prime ministers' conference on the subject. Although British officials for some time have judged that specific Commonwealth trading problems could be solved, they fear that the old Commonwealth countries' pleas for special consideration may so stir the Brit- ish public as to force the government to take so extreme a posi- tion on Commonwealth preferences as to prevent negotiations with the Common Market from getting started. A recent opinion poll showed the British public more interested in maintaining Common- wealth ties than strengthening ties with Europe, even though it overwhelmingly endorsed joining the Common Market:3 Macmillan apparently hopes that by dealing with the wealthCommon- countries individually, he can keep their pressures from growing into a complete roadblock to British participation in the Common Market. The delays involved in consultation, however, and the continued British uncertainty regarding France's attitude toward Britain's joining, suggest that a clear announcement of the government's intentions may not be made before Parliament ad- journs for the summer in early Augustj CONFIDENTIAL 17 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973643 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973643 LC C Philippine Concern Over Western Policy in Asia [Secretary Serrano's expressions of "deepest concern" over the possibility of US recognition of Mongolia and its admission to the United Nations apparently followed diplomatic consultations with Nationalist China. This demarche is nonetheless consistent with Philippine views that any US accommodation with Communist Asia would make Philippine policy against diplomatic and com- mercial relations with bloc countries untenable. Serrano stated that while he is not unalterably opposed to admission of Commu- nist China to the UN, he opposed any piecemeal approach to a major shift of policy without prior consultation and in the ab- sence of a general disarmament agreement.] [Serrano in recent months has expressed increasing alarm over the trend of events in Laos and particularly over the inabil- ity of the SEATO alliance to influence the situation. He attributes this primarily to the weakness of the British and French in Asia, which he believes is prompting them to follow a policy of disen- gagement. A meeting of four anti-Communist Asian foreign min- isters held in Manila in January was called by Serrano primarily to create pressure for a firmer US posture in Asia, through bi- lateral arrangements if not through SEAT9.3 EIn recent weeks, Serrano's concern over a possible relax- ation of US commitments in Asia has been echoed by prominent Philippine legislators as well as by President Garcia. In a press conference in late May, Garcia urged the US to stand firm "before it is too late," stating that "if we give up Asia by default, it will only speed up the Communist seizureD lthough expressions of concern over US intentions and of the desirability of a more neutralist policy have long been used to back up demands for greater material assistance, Philippine officials appear to be increasingly concerned over Philippine vulnerability and possible changes in American policy) 17 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973643 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973643 'LA./INF itizim I UAL. THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973643 /,p