CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/06/30

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05973653
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: June 30, 1961

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30 June 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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30 June 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1, Special Watch Committee findines on the Iraqi threat
to Kuwait. I (Page t)
2. Congo: Tshombe's followers appear convinced Katanga
can maintain independence. (Page it)
3. Jordan: King Husayn appointing new cabinet; he is un-
decided over new elections. (Page it)
4.
Venezuela: Security officials believe confederates of
Barcelona dissidents may act again soon.
(Page it)
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TURKEY
SAUDI ARABIA
SELECTED ROADS
STATUTE MILES ISO
UNCLASSIFIED
31156
610630
Kirkuk
BAGHDAD
NEUTRAL ZONE
KU IT Persian
Gulf
KUWAIT
30 June 61
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
30 June 1961
DAILY BRIEF
LThe Watch Committee at a special meeting on 29 June
considered the Iraqi threat to Kuwait and issued the follow-
ing statement of its findings:3
[Premier Qasim of Iraq laid claim to the newly independ-
ent Sheikhdom of Kuwait on 25 June. Kuwait has responded
by declaring an emergency, alerting its troops and announc-
ing its determination to defend its territory. The UK Ambas-
sador in Baghdad has warned Iraq of British determination
to honor its commitment to defend Kuwait if requested. Saudi
Arabia had declared that any aggression against Kuwait will be
considered an aggression against Saudi Arabia and is moving
troops to its borders with Iraq. Iran, the UAR and other Arab
States have declared their support for Kuwait. Public Soviet
reaction has been limited to a factual report of Qasim's 25 June
statement, and there is no evidence of any Soviet or other Bloc
support or encouragement of Qasim's positionj
[An Iraqi military buildup of sufficient size for an attack
on Kuwait is planned and may be underway around Basra about
40 miles from the Kuwait border. Qasim's forces could be in
position to launch sudden military action against Kuwait at any
time after 30 June. Qasim may attack Kuwait despite opposi-
tion from the rest of the Arab world if he feels he can occupy
Kuwait city before effective British support can reach the area.
In this case, Saudi Arabia will almost certainly become involved,
and the possibility exists that other Arab states and Iran may be-
come embroiled as well. Dissident groups in Iraq may seize
this occasion to launch a coup or attempt to assassinate Qasim..1
CSoviet military intervention in this situation is highly unlikely
(Map)
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Potnte
Noire
13andi41
CONGO
� Brazzaville
Ki lona
Tunisia
:too
Republic of the Congo
SUDAN
Tunisia
Leosioldville
\LEOPCADVILIE
T ysville irz/
Ghana
120
Bangasiou
Liberia Pakistan
240 20
� paTi% K A
ancq.
Liberia
Ghana
420
ApproXimate area nominally controlled by:
(=. Kasavubu-Mobulu
Gizenga � '
GE) Kalonji
in Toombs
' 1651 United Nations Forces
Selected road
Selected railroad
Qat Selected airfield
Luputa
ORIENTALE
Fa
VC-7�iir
Malaya'.
100
G tango
7000
Ethiopia
1190
thiopia
640
, Malaya
vu
Bukavu
La e
Albert
Niger
600
Malaya
zo
UANDA
-URUNDI
Tahambe
7000
Eli ethville
FEDERATION OF RHODES!
AND NYASALAND
TANGANYIKA
' � � - � - � , ..� - -
. . ,
� . .. -. .
30 June 61
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11
Congo: Tshombets return to Elisabethville and his sub-
sequent statements denouncing accords reached earlier with
the Ileo government appear to have convinced his followers
that Katangan "independence" can be successfully maintained.
This attitude in Elisabethville will pose a problem to the UN,
which hopes for Katanga's participation in the Congo parlia-
ment but does not regard Katanga as entitled to as large a
role in any new government as either the Leopoldville or
Stanle ville faction.
a preference for a government led by Cyrille
Adoula, comprising five ministers from Leopoldville, five
from Stanleyville, and five others to be drawn from Kasai,
Katanga,a.nd other areag
Forays into northern Katanga by Congo Army soldiers
nominally loyal to Gizenaa have lately become more frequent.
150 Katanga Army troops
were flown to Kongolo on 28 June to meet an "invasion threat"
from the north. While there is no evidence that the Stanley=
yule regime is encouraging such forays at this time, they
pose a continuing threat of clashes involving UN or Katanr
forces
Jordan: 1A new cabinet appointed by Kingilusayn on 26J-une
may serve only in an interim capacity pending general elec-
tions, The King has
been undecided,- however, about whether to hold elections in
the near future because he fears that Nasir, who interfered
effectively in the Jordanian elections of 1956, would again at-
tempt to subvert Husaynts regime. Husayn has eliminated
three of the most reactionary, corrupt, and unpopular mem-
bers of the previous cabinet:3
(Backup, Page 1)
Venezuela:
the pocket revolt of right-
ist military dissidents which occurred in the provincial city of
30 June 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Barcelona on 26 June "has larger extension and strength."
other, conspirators "may act
again" soon. The Barcelona uprising is illustrative of the
continuing political unrest, which is compounded by Vene-
zuela's acute economic problems.
The quickly suppressed Barcelona uprising was led by
two exiled officers who had re-entered the country clan-
destinely. Two other prominent rightist officers, long con-
nected with Dominican-supported plotting against the Betan-
court regime, are known to be still at large in the country
SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Nasser and the future of Arab nationalism: outlook for
Arab nationalism generally; problems and prospects of the
UAR leader and his country including its political and eco-
nomic conditions and foreign policy. U.S.I.B. ME 36-61,
June 27`61..(S):
Outlook for retention of US Azores base rights in the event
of certain courses of US action, i. e., continued pressure on
Portugal to make reforms in its African territories. U.S.I.B.
SNIE 27.2-2-61. June 27'61. (S)
Likelihood of major Communist military intentions in main-
land Southeast Asia. U.S.I.B. SNIE 10-2-61. June 27'61.
0036930. (TS)
30 June 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Aew Jordanian Cabinet
C:For some time King Husayn has been planning to reorgan-
ize the cabinet to give it a more progressive and liberal appear-
ance in hopes of inspiring greater popular support for his re-
gime. The elimination of the corrupt Faleh Madadha as interi-
or minister, of Muhammed Amin Shanqiti, also widely regarded
as corrupt, as education minister, and of the arch-conservative
Mohammed Ali Jabari as justice minister is at least a step in
that direction. The omission of former Foreign Minister Musa
Nasir from the new cabinet presumably reflects Husayn's res-
ervations about the enthusiasm with which Nasir, a Palestinian,
would expound Husayn's views on the Palestine issues currently
prominent in inter-Arab relations.2
..The prime minister will again be Bahjat Talhuni, who will
also hold the foreign minister's portfolio. When Talhuni suc-
ceeded Hazza Majalli after the latter's assassination in August
1960, there were indications he would serve only in an interim
capacity. Husayn, who functions to some extent as his own
prime minister, apparently has decided to retain Talhuni at
least until parliamentary elections are helsg
Elections were to have been held in October 1960, but they
were postponed after Majalli was assassinated. The King has
expressed a desire to reschedule them for this summer, as fur-
ther evidence of his liberal intentions, but Talhuni has opposed
him on this. The prime minister reportedly sees no prospect
of getting a parliament which would be any more subservient to
the government's wishes and he believes there is a good chance
that any new parliament would be less manageable:3
Husayn wants to
overhaul and improve the efficiency of certain ministries before
undertaking general elections. One of these is the Ministry of
Interior which Madadha headed and which is especially impor-
tant during an election. The King's choice of the popular and
capable former mayor of Jerusalem, Hasan Katib, for this post
seems well designed to further this 0b1ective77,
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30 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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CONFIDENTIAL 0
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
rnivrinrivrtAt.
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