THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06084662
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• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2019
• Case Number: F-2019-00101
• Publication Date: August 1, 1962

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8 AUG
NIE 85-2-62
1 August 1962
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 85-2-62
(Supplements NIE 85-62)
The Situation and Prospects in Cuba
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
1 AUGUST 1962
1
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.
Concurring:
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director of the National Security Agency
Abstaining:
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, the subject being
outside of his jurisdiction.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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.6EGRET:=.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 85-2-62
The Situation and Prospects in Cuba
.SECREF1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM 1
CONCLUSIONS 1
DISCUSSION 4
I. CASTRO AND THE COMMUNISTS 4
II. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 6
The Ground Forces 6
The Air Force 7
The Navy 7
Prospects 7
III. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 8
IV. POPULAR ATTITUDES 9
V. RESISTANCE 10
VI. EXTERNAL RELATIONS 12
ANNEX
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�TOTTFIBEN-T-T-ILL�
THE SITUATION AND
PROSPECTS IN CUBA'
THE PROBLEM
To analyze the situation in Cuba and to estimate the pros-
pects over the next year or so, with particular reference to
Castro's relations with the Communists and to the potential
for resistance to his regime.
CONCLUSIONS
A. Fidel Castro has asserted his primacy in Cuban commu-
nism; the "old" Communists have had to accommodate them-
selves to this fact, as has the USSR. Further strains may
develop in these relationships, but they are unlikely to break
the ties of mutual interest between Castro and the "old" Com-
munists and between Cuba and the USSR. (Paras. 1-10)
B. By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever
more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro
regime. The USSR, however, has avoided any formal com-
mitment to protect and defend the regime in all contin-
gencies. (Para. 11)
C. The Cuban armed forces are loyal to the personal lead-
ership of the Castro brothers. Their capabilities have been
and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc's provi-
sion of military equipment and instruction. Cuban military
capabilities, however, are essentially defensive. We believe
it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capa-
bility to undertake major independent military operations
1 This estimate is designed to bring up-to-date NIE 85-62, "The Situation
and Prospects in Cuba," dated 21 March 1962. The background informa-
tion contained in that document remains generally valid.
,SEGRE
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overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will sta-
tion in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least
for the period of this estimate. (Paras. 12-29)
D. The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate
the general population and to suppress any popular insur-
rection likely to develop in present circumstances. They are
probably capable of containing and controlling any threat
to the regime through guerrilla action and of repelling any
invasion short of a direct US military intervention in
strength. (Paras. 22-23)
- E. The Cuban economy is in deep trouble, in part because
of the US embargo and a consequent shortage of convertible
foreign exchange, in part because of agricultural and indus-
trial mismanagement. Despite remedial measures, it is un-
likely that agricultural and industrial production can be sig-
nificantly increased within the next year or so. The ex-
pected increase in capital imports from the Bloc is unlikely
to produce a net growth of the economy before the end of
1963. (Paras. 30-35)
F. The Castro regime retains the positive support of about
20 percent of the population, but disaffection is increasing.
This trend is manifested in growing passive resistance and in
occasional open demonstrations of resentment. Few, how-
ever, dare to accept the risks of organized active resistance
in present circumstances, for fear of the regime's massive
apparatus for surveillance and repression. (Paras. 36-41)
G. If arms and supplies became available and if confidence
were created in the likelihood of outside support for a major
Cuban uprising, resistance activity and potential would in-
crease. Even so it is unlikely that the regime could be over-
thrown unless events had already shaken the regime and
brought into doubt its capacity for survival, and unless sub-
stantial outside support for the insurgents were forthcoming.
(Paras. 42-51)
H. The Castro regime still seeks to lead the "inevitable"
revolution throughout Latin America, but its preoccupation
with domestic problems tends to limit its activity in this
2 "SECRET
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respect. In Latin America there is widespread disillusion-
ment regarding the Cuban revolution. Nevertheless, mili-
tant pro-Castro groups exist in several countries, and Cuban
subversive activity could prove effective in certain unstable
situations: e.g., in Guatemala or Venezuela. The appeal of
the Cuban example will increase in Latin America if reform
lags there and hopes and promises remain unfulfilled.
(Paras. 52-59)
3
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I. CASTRO AND THE COMMUNISTS
1. Developments in 1962 have tended to
define more clearly the relationships between
Castro and the leaders of the prerevolutionary
Cuban Communist Party (PSP) and between
Castro and the USSR. For the time being, at
least, Castro has established his primacy in
Cuban communism, and the PSP and USSR
have been constrained to accommodate them-
selves to that situation.
2. Differences between Castro and the "old"
Communists of the PSP developed in 1961 and
reached a climax in early 1962. Castro had
accepted "old" Communists in every branch
of his government and had relied heavily on
them for their expertise. However, he was
anxious to preserve his own authority as
leader of the Cuban revolution and wanted
the "new" Communists�his followers of the
26th of July Movement�to play a role at least
equal to that of the veteran PSP members.
Castro was also anxious to have Cuba ac-
cepted as a member of the "Socialist camp"
and resented the appellation of "national
democracy" (as opposed to "socialist democ-
racy") which was invented for Cuba in 1960
at a world congress of Communist Party
leaders in Moscow. The Soviets were reluc-
tant to make these concessions to a regime
that they did not consider to be Communist
and that was not under their firm control.
3. Castro kept up the pressure for full rec-
ognition, proclaiming Cuba a socialist state
and himself a Marxist-Leninist. Meantime
elements of the PSP pushed ahead as rapidly
as possible to establish "old" Communist con-
trol of Cuba through the machinery of the In-
tegrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) ,
an interim party set up to bring together the
various political forces behind the regime and
C ONF
.SEGR&T
TIAL
DISCUSSION
create a single dominant political party. Vet-
eran Communist Anibal Escalante, the organ-
izing secretary of ORI, was the key figure in
this effort.
4. The result was a head-on clash between
the "old" Communists and Castro, who real-
ized that they were threatening his position
and that of his loyal followers of the 26th of
July Movement. After careful maneuvering a
new National Directorate for the ORI was
agreed upon, in which power was shifted from
"old" to "new" Communists. Then on 26
March Castro denounced Anibal Escalante
and by implication all "old" Communists for
seeking to dominate the Cuban revolution.
5. Further reorganization of the ORI and
of other elements of the regime's political ma-
chinery followed, with the general effect of
strengthening the position of the "new" Com-
munists. These changes, however, can by no
means be described as a wholesale purge of
the veteran Communists. Many, including
Blas Roca, the PSP chairman, have remained
in important positions and Castro has made
it clear that the differences between "old" and
"new" Communists are not over the goal of
communizing Cuba. The overall effect of the
"Escalante affair," and of the changes in the
regime which followed, was the assertion of
Castro's personal leadership of Cuban com-
munism.
6. Neither the PSP nor the Soviets proved
willing to contest the issue with Castro. Both
moved quickly to acknowledge his authority
and to reaffirm their close ties with him.
Bias Roca gave his approval to Castro's move
against Escalante. There followed an article
in Pravda which expressed firm support for
Castro as the leader of the Cuban revolution
and granted the most forthright recognition
to date of the Cuban regime's claim to be
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Communist. Moscow then proceeded to ele-
vate Cuba in the "socialist" hierarchy by plac-
ing it next after the Bloc states and ahead of
Yugoslavia on the list of May Day greetings
and by such minor but significant moves as
referring to the Cuban premier as "Comrade
Fidel."
7. In yielding to Castro's desire to have
Cuba brought into a closer relationship with
the Bloc, the Soviet leaders have made a sig-
nificant concession. That they should have
done so, fully aware of Castro's undisciplined
nature, is a measure not only of the impor-
tance they attach to Cuba, but also of the
narrow field of choice open to them.
8. The Soviet Union has also made a con-
siderable concession in its agreement to sup-
ply a line of credit for the purchase of con-
sumer goods. It has, in effect, reaffirmed its
willingness to pay the increasing costs of keep-
ing Cuba afloat, despite the Cubans' failures
in the field of economic reorganization and
development. In exchange for this conces-
sion the Soviets are apparently insisting on
more influence over the management and di-
rection of the Cuban economy. The Soviets
probably continue to believe that Cuban eco-
nomic development should be based primarily
on Cuban resources, effort, and sacrifice, and
are likely to show restraint in their response
to Cuban appeals for relief from a situation
better than that which prevails in many Bloc
countries. Questions relating to the manage-
ment of Cuba's economy are now a major
source of friction between the Soviets and the
Castro regime.
9. We believe that the USSR is likely to
concentrate on the problem of the economic
restructuring of Cuba. For the present, the
Soviets have committed themselves to getting
along with Castro and have had to accept the
risks involved. They would prefer a better
disciplined and more orthodox Communist
and may hope some day to replace him, but
they recognize that he will remain, on the
whole, an asset for some time to come. Mos-
cow, the PSP, and Castro are all moving over
unfamiliar and hazardous ground, and we ex-
pect that disagreement and even conflict will
flare up among them from time to time.
Such conflicts are unlikely, however, to de-
stroy the ties of mutual dependence linking
Castro to the PSP and Cuba to the USSR.
10. On balance, Castro is in a stronger posi-
tion now than appeared likely a few months
ago. He has asserted his leadership and it
has been accepted by the USSR and by the
"old" Communists in Cuba. He has demon-
strated remarkable political skills and an abil-
ity to engage in carefully calculated maneu-
vers which had been obscured by his generally
erratic and bombastic behavior. He seems
to be well in control of the apparatus of gov-
ernment and security. His attack on Esca-
lante and the efforts of the "old" Communists
and the reshuffling of the top leadership of
the ORI and the armed forces have appar-
ently satisfied the majority of the "new" Com-
munists, who were becoming restive. At the
same time he has retained the cooperation of
the "old" Communists and the USSR. He
probably believes that he can handle them
and that both the "old" Cuban Communists
and Moscow must continue to accept him
as the indispensable man in Cuba.
11. The USSR is becoming more deeply
committed to the preservation and advance-
ment of the regime in Cuba. However, the
Soviets have made no formal commitment to
ensure Cuba's security and would almost cer-
tainly never intend to hazard their own safety
for Cuba's sake. They have sought to create
the impression that Cuba was under the pro-
tection of their missile power, but they have
carefully avoided a categorical commitment
to protect and defend the Castro regime in all
contingencies.
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II. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
12. The capabilities of the Cuban armed
forces to suppress insurrection or repel in-
vasion have been greatly enhanced by the
Bloc's provision of military equipment 2 and
instruction and by a thoroughgoing reorgani-
zation initiated in the fall of 1960. This re-
cirganization and concomitant training pro-
grams are now well advanced, although not
completed.
13. Up to 350 Bloc military advisers and
instructors are believed to be now in Cuba.
Bloc advisers are probably assigned to the
principal staffs throughout the military estab-
lishment. Most of the instructors are sta-
tioned at established military schools and
training areas. In addition, several hundred
Cuban military personnel have received or are
receiving military instruction in Bloc coun-
tries.
14. Almost certainly the present military
establishment as a whole is politically reli-
able. Successive defections and purges have
eliminated the seriously disaffected elements.
The principal commanders have been selected
for their personal loyalty to the Castro
brothers. Great attention has been paid to
the political indoctrination of the troops.
Morale probably has been adversely affected,
in some instances, particularly among reserve
components, by the discontent of the general
population. However, the military establish-
ment as a whole will almost certainly support
and defend the Castro regime, unless its over-
throw seems imminent.
2See the tables in the Annex for inventories of
Cuban ground force arms and equipment, aircraft,
and naval ships from all sources, including the
Bloc. (The bulk of heavy equipment from the Bloc
arrived in Cuba between September 1960 and Feb-
ruary 1962. Shipments since then are believed to
have been largely replacement parts, small arms,
and ammunition.)
6
The Ground Forces
15. The Cuban ground forces are believed
to consist of a standing army of about 75,000
men and a ready reserve of about 100,000 men.
Some of the standing army personnel serve
as full-time cadres in ready reserve units. In
addition, there are homeguard type militia
units numbering about 100,000 men.
16. The standing army has received inten-
sive training in the use of Bloc-supplied arms
and equipment and tactical training through
the battalion combat team level. It has ac-
quired capabilities for the combat employment
of armor and artillery (including antiaircraft
and antitank weapons) hitherto unknown in
any Caribbean country.
17. The ready reserve battalions are less
heavily armed and less thoroughly trained.
Each has a full-time cadre varying from 40
to 150 men. The remaining personnel are
available for only one or two drills a week and
a month of active duty training each year.
The arms are kept in the custody of the full-
time cadre. These battalions are based on
places of employment and are generally capa-
ble of rapid mobilization.
18. The homeguard militia units have no
significant combat capability. Their function
is to augment the police as necessary to con-
trol the population.
19. For operational purposes, Cuba has been
divided into three territorial commands desig-
nated as the armies of the West, the Center,
and the East. Each has operational control
over all standing army, ready reserve, and
tactical air units within its area and is in-
tended to be logistically self-sufficient. The
basic combat unit is the battalion combat
team. Active operations are conducted by
task forces established according to the re-
quirements of the occasion and operating un-
der the direct control of the appropriate ter-
ritorial army command.
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20. Within the three armies there are corps
and division headquarters having administra-
tive and training responsibilities, but as yet no
apparent operational role�although the divi-
sions, as territorial commands, probably do
have internal security and static defense re-
sponsibilities within their respective districts.
As the reorganization of the ground forces
progresses further, the divisions may be de-
veloped as operational units.
21. There are believed to be some 265 bat-
talions in the Cuban ground forces. A full-
strength standing army battalion probably
numbers about 1,000 men; a full-strength
ready reserve battalion, about 600, including
the full-time cadre. However, they all now
vary greatly in strength and efficiency. At
present we are unable to determine how many
battalions are standing army and how many
are ready reserve.
22. The Cuban ground forces are well able
to intimidate the general population and to
suppress any popular insurrection likely to
develop in present circumstances. They have
not been able to eliminate the low level of
sporadic guerrilla activity which now exists
in Cuba, but they are probably capable of con-
taining and controlling any threat to the re-
gime through guerrilla action.
23. The equipment, organization, and train-
ing of the Cuban ground forces appears to be
designed primarily to prepare them to resist
an anticipated invasion from abroad. They
could probably repel any invasion short of a
direct US military intervention in strength.
Their plans for that contingency evidently
contemplate a strong initial resistance, fol-
lowed by a determined defense of preselected
key points and finally by protracted guerrilla
warfare.
The Air Force
24. In the emergency of April 1961, the
Castro regime could get only six aircraft into
the air. Since then, a virtually new air force
has been in process of creation through Bloc
delivery of jet fighter aircraft and related
ground equipment and Bloc training of pilots
and ground personnel. This process is not as
far advanced as is the rehabilitation of the
Cuban ground forces. Cuban air defense and
ground support capabilities remain very lim-
ited. However, the new Cuban Air Force in-
cludes about 45 MIG jet fighters and about
60 fighter pilots with some Bloc training.
The Navy
25. As in the case of the air force, a new
navy is now in the process of creation.
Hitherto, coastal patrol has been accomplished
chiefly by militiamen in confiscated fishing
and pleasure craft. Recently, however, the
USSR has provided six submarine chasers
(PC's) and 12 motor torpedo boats (PT's) and
several hundred Cuban naval personnel have
received training in the Bloc.
Prospects
26. The capabilities of the Cuban armed
forces will continue to improve through fur-
ther training and experience. The Bloc will
almost certainly continue to support this de-
velopment through the provision of equip-
ment, instruction, and advice.
27. It is notable that Bloc military deliv-
eries to date have been such as to enhance
Cuba's capabilities for defense against exter-
nal attack and for the maintenance of inter-
nal security, but not such as to contribute pri-
marily to the development of an independent
offensive capability. Although the Cuban
ground forces have been made formidable by
Caribbean standards, Cuba lacks the air and
naval capabilities required for major over-
seas operations, even at Caribbean distances.
The bomber force is still limited to a few in-
herited B-26's.
28. We believe that the Bloc will continue
to limit its military assistance to Cuba in this
way. Such a policy would not preclude the
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provision of more advanced jet fighters, sur-
face-to-air missiles, and modern radars, or
even the provision of a token number of IL-28
jet light bombers to replace the B-26's now in
service.
29. We also believe it highly unlikely that
the Bloc would station in Cuba Bloc combat
units of any description. This attitude would
not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc ad-
visers, instructors, service, and intelligence
personnel. It is likely that special Soviet
communications and intelligence facilities
have been or will be established in Cuba.
III. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
30. Mid-year 1962 finds the Cuban economy
in deepening trouble. A highly vaunted eco-
nomic plan and the record budget officially
announced for 1962 have by now, for all prac-
tical purposes, been abandoned. The perva-
sive disruption which was evident in industry
and transportation last year manifested itself
this year in the agricultural sector as well,
most conspicuously in the sugar industry, the
very heart of the economy and the principal
earner of foreign exchange.
31. Cuba's foreign exchange earnings in
1962 will be reduced substantially because of
declines in both volume and value of sugar
exports. The 1962 sugar crop was hard hit
by a prolonged drought, growing apathy and
passive resistance among the cane-cutters,
and bad managerial judgment�such as the
decisions to reduce the rate of replanting and
to divert cane land to other crops. Produc-
tion of 4.8 million metric tons not only fell
far short of last year's extraordinary harvest,
but also came to only 83 percent of the aver-
age annual crop during 1957-1960. Because
the total supply of sugar available in 1962 is
less than in 1961, exports will decline. Ex-
ports to the Bloc will be somewhat below 1961
levels, but the major reductions will be in ex-
ports to Free World countries. Convertible
exchange income from sugar will also be re-
8
duced because world sugar prices averaged
less during the first half of 1962 than during
1961.
32. With respect to other agricultural prod-
ucts Cuba has clearly not achieved the much
needed expansion called for under the re-
gime's plans. Cuba's own production of food
has remained insufficient to support the popu-
lation, and food rationing has become neces-
sary. Meanwhile, in the industrial sector the
deterioration of plants, equipment shortages,
poor quality of raw materials, and gross mis-
management continue. Because of the US
embargo and the shortage of foreign ex-
change, the Cubans have not been able to find
adequate sources for the machinery and parts
formerly imported from the US and other
Western countries. Only the first beginnings
have been made in the reconstruction of Cuban
industry with Bloc equipment; though an-
nounced Bloc development credits total $457
million, few deliveries have yet been made.
Mismanagement of plants by unqualified per-
sonnel, often selected for their political reli-
ability, continues to be the rule.
33. The regime has responded to the agri-
cultural crisis with a series of changes in policy
and organization. The National Agrarian Re-
form Institute (INRA) , the chief instrument
of government direction over agriculture, has
been taken over by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez,
an old-line Communist with considerable com-
petence in economics. New regulations have
been announced easing governmental controls
over private farmers and tightening controls
over the collectivized sector of agriculture.
34. However, the chief immediate effect of
Cuba's economic troubles has been to increase
its dependence on the Bloc. In the spring of
1962, Cuba began a new series of negotiations
with Bloc countries concerning the 1962 trade
protocols signed several months earlier. In
May, a supplemental protocol was signed with
the USSR providing for an increase of $50
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million in the proposed level of trade for 1962�
the increase to cover Soviet shipments of food,
raw materials, and capital goods. New agree-
ments were also signed with the European Sat-
ellites, but there is no evidence indicating that
significant changes were made in the original
protocols. Since the new USSR protocol does
not call for increased Cuban exports, it ap-
pears that the additional Soviet exports to
Cuba will be financed by a commodity credit.
The Soviet decision to finance current pur-
chases on credit, rather than to confine itself
to developmental loans, is a new departure in
Soviet relations with Cuba, and in fact is con-
trary to general Soviet practice. It almost
certainly reflects Moscow's recognition of the
seriousness of the Cuban situation.
35. Cuban economic prospects for the re-
mainder of 1962 and for 1963 are bleak. Cuba
will not be able to build up significantly its
dangerously low holdings of convertible for-
eign exchange. The expected increase in
capital imports from the Bloc is unlikely to
bring about net growth of Cuba's economy in
the next 18 months, although it may establish
preconditions for some improvement over the
longer run. The effect of the new agricul-
tural policy remains uncertain; in any case
it could not result in a significant increase
in production within the next year or so.
Supply and management problems will con-
tinue to plague industry; transportation dif-
ficulties will probably get worse. No sub-
stantial overall improvement in the Cuban
economy is likely to occur for several years.
IV. POPULAR ATTITUDES
36. Active support for the Castro regime
has declined to about 20 percent of the pop-
ulation, but this includes a high proportion
of the youth of the country (ages 15-30) .
The hard core of this support consists of those
who have a vested interest in the revolution,
especially the new managerial class and the
Communists. Others support the revolution
because they have been influenced by indoc-
trination and participation in the mass or-
ganizations. A substantial proportion of sup-
porters are persons who still see in Castro the
personification of their awakened national
consciousness.
37. Disaffection is increasing primarily be-
cause of the growing inability of the regime
to provide the goods and services to which
most of the Cuban people have been accus-
tomed. The shortages of food, ordinary
household items, medicines, public transpor-
tation, etc., have underscored, in terms under-
standable to the individual Cuban, the re-
gime's failure to live up to its original prom-
ise. Others have become bored with years
of repetitious propaganda. One factor which
is likely to have an increasingly adverse effect
on public attitudes is the deterioration of pub-
lic health conditions and services.
38. The majority of the Cuban population
has for some time been indifferent toward the
regime. In the past few months, however,
there has been an increase in passive resist-
ance, including absenteeism and slowdowns,
and in the open expression of disaffection by
public protests and demonstrations.
39. In the past four months Fidel Castro
and other regime spokesmen have themselves
acknowledged two causes of popular discon-
tent and have begun corrective measures.
One of these is the dissatisfaction and inse-
curity aroused by the increasingly obvious
"old" Communist takeover which threatened
to destroy the loyalty of a large segment of the
"new class" until Castro took action in March.
The other is the fear of collectivization on the
part of farmers, which the regime has also
taken steps to allay. Public hostility to Com-
munist regimentation is likely to continue to
be a factor in the ability of the regime to con-
trol the population, but it is the effect of such
regimentation on them personally, rather
than communism itself, that seems to arouse
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the Cubans. Increasing communization is
likely to continue to provoke discontent, but
it is unlikely to produce much active resist-
ance.
40. Many people still in Cuba hate and de-
test the regime, but few of them are willing
to take the risks involved in resistance activ-
ity of any kind. The number who are willing
to do so is strongly influenced by what appear
to be the chances of engaging in resistance
activity and coming out alive, as well as the
chances of achieving some effective result
against the regime.
41. The outlook is for the steady increase
of popular dissatisfaction, but it is likely to
continue to find expression largely in passive
resistance or unorganized and sporadic op-
position at a level that can be controlled by
the regime. Yet such resistance may provoke
the regime to use force on such a scale as to
alienate greater numbers of the population.
A cycle of disaffection-repression-resistance
might be set in motion, but would be unlikely
to cause major difficulties for the regime in
the absence of substantial external support.
V. RESISTANCE
42. There has been some increase in active
resistance to the Castro regime despite its
massive and expanding security apparatus
and its constant efforts to intimidate, harass,
and immobilize those who take action against
the government. The armed forces are used
extensively to guard against sabotage, to con-
trol public demonstrations against the re-
gime, and to sweep areas of rebel activity.
The Ministry of Interior, run by a loyal Castro
follower, exercises checks and controls over
the Cuban public through its extensive police
apparatus, its network of informants in the
Committees of Defense, and the antisabotage
People's Defense organization. Between 400
and 500 thousand Cubans�one in every 14�
are involved in this elaborate security ma-
chinery.
10
43. This widespread security effort by the
Castro government does effectively limit and
harass the active opponents of the regime.
Nevertheless, there are at least six nationwide
resistance groups in Cuba,' with a claimed
membership ranging from a few hundred to
a few thousand, only a small part of whom
are active at any one time. In addition there
are a number of small guerrilla bands and
local groups which operate on their own with-
out effective communication or liaison with
the national groups. Guerrilla activity has
been greatest in the mountains of central
Cuba, including the Sierra del Escambray, but
some has occurred in the mountains of east-
ern Cuba, including the Sierra Maestra, and
in western Pinar del Rio Province. In plains
areas, like Matanzas Province, and in urban
areas, resistance groups are smaller than in
the mountainous areas and tend to live sepa-
rately, coming together only occasionally.
Many individuals who are not members of
organizations or of guerrilla bands engage in
occasional actions against the regime.
44. The � activity of resistance groups re-
flects the operating situation and their re-
sources, human and material. Activity fell
off markedly after the massive roundup of
suspects following the April 1961 invasion at-
tempt. It has increased since April 1962
primarily in response to the rise of popular
resentment of shortages of foodstuffs and
other consumer goods. This increase in ac-
tivity has been limited, however, by govern-
ment drives to clean out areas in which guer-
31. The People's Revolutionary Movement (Movi-
miento Revolucionario del Pueblo�MRP) ;
2. The 30 November Movement (Movimiento 30
Noviembre) ;
3. The Christian Democratic Movement (Movie-
miento Democratico Cristiano�MDC) ;
4. The Revolutionary Recovery Movement (Movi-
miento de Recuperacion Revolucionario�
MRR) ;
5. The Student Revolutionary Directorate (Di-
rectorio Revolucionario Estudiantil�DRE) ;
6. Rescue Movement (Rescate) .
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rillas have been active and the capture of sev-
eral important resistance leaders. The size
of many guerrilla bands is limited by their
lack of arms with which to equip potential
recruits.
45. There is some coordination of the activ-
ities of the national organizations and there
have been reports of a recent agreement
among them for unified action. In practice,
however, activities tend to be planned, di-
rected, and carried out on a local level. In
frequent instances members of several dif-
ferent organizations have cooperated to carry
out an operation. These operations are still
largely limited to sabotage (particularly set-
ting fire to cane fields, government buildings,
and public conveyances) , attempts to obtain
arms, and the operation of an "underground
railroad" to get persons sought by the govern-
ment out of Cuba. In recent months resist-
ance organizations have been fostering cam-
paigns of planned waste of electricity, city
water, etc.
46. The effectiveness of the guerrillas is
extremely limited; confronted by large and
well-equipped security forces, the small guer-
rilla groups lack arms, food, medical, and
other supplies. One of their principal prob-
lems is keeping Castro agents and informers
out of their ranks. They just barely survive,
if they survive at all. Their activities are
made possible by their superior familiarity
with the terrain and with hiding places.
Effective government security measures im-
pede coordination between groups in different
geographical areas. Noncombatant opposi-
tion elements maintain some liaison with
guerrillas operating in nearby territory and
provide some support, mostly intelligence.
Guerrilla forces have at times escaped cap-
ture because of the lack of interest, inepti-
tude, or passive disloyalty of segments of the
forces sent against them. Some of the guer-
rilla bands claim actually to have recruited
some of their membership from the militia.
47. At present the primary effect of resist-
ance operations is psychological: they are an
embarrassment to the regime and force it to
commit large resources to meet security re-
quirements. To a lesser extent they are an
inspiration to the civilian opposition, proof
that the regime's forces of oppression are not
all-powerful.
48. The national resistance organizations
have representatives in the US who are au-
thorized to speak on certain matters f6r the
groups in Cuba. Effective collaboration in
Miami and between groups there and in
Cuba is complicated by factionalism, personal
feuds, general politicking, and the difficulty
of communications. There is also a tendency
on the part of those who remain in Cuba to
distrust the exiles and to condemn them for
their failure to supply those who are con-
tinuing the fight in Cuba with the arms and
equipment they so badly need.
49. The Cuban Revolutionary Council (Con-
sejo Revolucionario Cubano�CRC) seeks to
represent the combined views of the resistance
organizations, but it now represents only half
of them and is relatively ineffective. The CRC
actively propagandizes its anti-Castro position
through representatives in most Latin Ameri-
can countries. In June 1962, CRC President
Jose Miro Cardona traveled through Central
America for this purpose.
50. Several other exile groups have under-
taken to coordinate resistance activities in
Cuba and to organize "armies of liberation"
among the exiles. One of them has sought to
establish a government-in-exile in collabora-
tion with President Ydigoras of Guatemala
and to develop an armed force to invade Cuba.
None of these efforts has made much progress.
51. In present circumstances, the prospects
for a resistance effort in Cuba capable of
threatening the government are nil. If arms
and supplies became available and if confi-
dence were created in the likelihood of out-
--seeRa_
11
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SBGRE.T0
side support for a major Cuban uprising, re-
sistance activity and potential would increase
substantially. Even so it is unlikely that the
regime could be overthrown unless events had
already shaken the regime and brought into
doubt its capacity for survival, and unless sub-
stantial outside support for the insurgents
were forthcoming.
VI. EXTERNAL RELATIONS
52. 'Castro seems to have no doubts about
the desirability of facing the rest of the world
as a member of the "Socialist camp." He will
continue to associate Cuba with the Bloc and
to seek to make the most of Soviet commit-
ments. For their part, the Soviets must re-
gard the situation in Cuba as a net gain for
their international position, despite the mis-
givings they must feel about the Latin Ameri-
can reaction to the proclamation of an
avowedly Communist regime in Cuba and
about the attendant risks in Soviet-US rela-
tions. The Soviets are aware of the psycho-
logical and political influence, actual and
potential, of a revolutionary Cuba on Latin
American states on the brink of revolution,
and will seek opportunities to make use of it.
53. Castro's vitriolic anti-US position con-
tinues unchanged. Anti-Americanism is
deeply ingrained in the regime and in much
of the Cuban populace. The authority of the
regime depends in significant part on its so-far
successful defiance of the US, and the regime
is unlikely to see any advantage to be gained
by changing its attitude toward the US. Op-
ponents of the regime hope for help from the
US, but their expectations of assistance are at
a very low ebb.
54. The Cuban regime continues to try to
appeal to the Afro-Asian neutralist bloc, even
while proclaiming its adherence to Marxism-
Leninism. It seeks to play a role at such neu-
tralist-sponsored conferences as the "World
without the Bomb" meeting in Ghana and the
underdeveloped nations economic conference
12
in Cairo. However, the conduct of the Cuban
emissaries at these meetings has generally
been such as to antagonize the Afro-Asian
neutrals.
55. The appeal of Castroism has dimmed
considerably in other Latin American states
as a consequence of the Cuban leader's avowal
of Marxism-Leninism, his obvious toadying to
the Bloc, and the self-acknowledged failings of
the regime. After a period in which Castro
and Cuba were the focus of attention through
the area, Latin Americans have turned back
to their own problems. However, there are
militant pro-Castro minorities in several Latin
American states and many neutralists and
protagonists of reform who look with favor on
Castro. In Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico there
are significant elements in government who
sympathize with the Castro regime.
56. Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Uru-
guay are now the only Latin American coun-
tries maintaining diplomatic relations with
Cuba. Relations between Cuba and Uruguay
have been strained on account of the nearly
400 asylees in the Uruguayan Embassy in
Havana. The Mexican Government has been
irritated by the use of the Cuban news agency
office in Mexico City to foster anti-US activity
during President Kennedy's visit there in June.
57. Cuban leaders, although preoccupied
with domestic problems, still seek to assert
Cuban leadership of the "inevitable" revolu-
tion in Latin America. They have been very
active in attempts to organize a new and os-
tensibly neutral Latin American labor organi-
zation. Cuba operates schools for indoctri-
nating and training in guerrilla warfare Latin
American students who eventually return
home to apply what they have learned. The
first half of 1962 has seen an increase in re-
ports of Cuban arms shipments to other coun-
tries in the area, but no such shipments have
been confirmed. There is firm evidence that
Cuba has provided at least $10,000 to Guate-
"SEMI'
TOVFITIEN-T-7-4-11--
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uCIST 7
SfiGRE-T
malan revolutionaries�the 13th of November
group�in Mexico City.
58. Communist parties in other Latin
American states have been disturbed by
events in Cuba, and particularly by the So-
viet Union's acceptance of Castro as a Com-
munist, because they feel that the role and
the prerogatives of veteran Communists have
been cast in doubt. Uruguayan Communists
were disturbed by statements made by Bias
Roca at a Communist Party meeting in Mon-
tevideo to the effect that it had been demon-
strated that a non-Communist could lead a
successful revolution against the capitalists
and imperialists. There has been dissatis-
faction among Guatemalan Communists over
the Cubans' support of the 13th of November
group, which includes Communists but is
not Communist-dominated.
`ftraNil;
59. The present image of the Castro regime
in Latin America is that of a client of the Bloc
and a failure in the conduct of its own af-
fairs, particularly in the important area of
economic development. Nevertheless, the
Cuban regime has proven that violent social
revolution and a break with the US is possi-
ble in Latin America and probably impressed
many would-be revolutionaries with the possi-
bility of gaining Soviet support without ac-
cepting Soviet control. The appeal of the
Cuban example will increase in Latin America
if reform lags there and if hopes and promises
remain unfulfilled. Cuba is also a danger
because its subversive activities might provide
the spark that would set off explosions
in unstable countries such as Venezuela and
Guatemala.
13
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coNFIDENTINd
ANNEX
INVENTORIES INVENTORIES OF THE CUBAN ARMS AND EQUIPMENT
TABLE 1: GROUND FORCES
TABLE 2: AIR FORCE (CRAAF)
TABLE 3: NAVY
..SECeReT.-
7-ermirrytN-Tzuz,_
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-5-5a-Tytti-T-LAIL
.4fireftEr-
TABLE 1
GROUND FORCES
Estimated
Type Item Quantity
Mortars:
60mm (US)
39
81mm (US, It)
106
82mm (Bloc)
600
4.2-in (US)
7
102mm (Bloc)
180
Rkt and Rcl:
RPG-2 AT Launcher (Bloc)
1,000
3.5-in Rkt Launcher (US, It)
145
57mm Rd l Rifle, M-18 (US)
27
RM-130 Rkt Launcher (Bloc)
24
132mm Rkt Launcher, M-13 (Bloc)
12
Arty:
Quad 14.5mm ZPU (Bloc)
50
75mm Pack How (US)
8
76mm Fld Gun M-1942 (Bloc)
150
85mm Fld Gun D-44 (Bloc)
110
105mm How (It)
4
122mm How M-1938 (Bloc)
75
122mm Gun M-1931/1937 (Bloc)
60
37mm Gun, M-6 (US)
9
57mm AT Gun M-1943 (Bloc)
270
Quad 12.7mm AA MG (Bloc)
350
25mm Hotchkiss AA Gun (Fr)
16
Twin 30mm AAA Gun M-53 (Bloc)
60
37mm AAA Gun, M-1939 (Bloc)
90
57mm AAA Gun (Bloc)
60
152mm Gun-How, M-1937 (Bloc)
55
Armor:
Lt Tk, M-3A1 (US)
12
Med Tk, M-4A1, w. 76mm Gun (US)
12
Med Tk, Comet w. 77mm Gun (UK)
15
Med Tk, T-34 (Bloc)
130
Hv Tk, JS-2 (Bloc)
30
Aslt Gun, SU-100 (Bloc)
50
Scout Car, M-3A1, White (US)
19
Lt Armored Car, M-8 (US)
20
Armored Pers Carrier, BTR-152 (Bloc)
25
MT:
1/4-Ton Truck (US, Bloc)
1,300
Tractors, AT-S TPM (Bloc)
50
Tractors, AT-L TPM (Bloc)
90
Misc. Wheeled Transport (Bloc)
2,500
Trucks, misc. (US)
160
2-Ton 4 x 4 Truck (Bloc)
600
3.5-6 Ton 6 x 6 Truck (Bloc)
300
10-Ton Truck, 6 x 6 (Bloc)
25
Sedans (US)
175
.4yEelktift 15
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Thr-
SERE-T.
TABLE 2
AIR FORCE (CRAAF)
AIRCRAFT INVENTORY
Basic Type
Model Designation
Estimated Inventory
Fighter:
Jet
Prop
Remarks
Day
FAGOT/FRESCO (MIG-15/17)
35
(1 derelict)
FARMER (MIG-19)
10-12
F-51
1
Ftr-Bmr
F-47
3
(1 derelict)
Sea Fury Mk-1
10
(2 derelict)
Subtotal
45-47
14
Lt/Tac/Attack Bmr:
B-26
17
(6 derelict)
Subtotal
T.'7/
ASW:
Carrier Type
TBM-3S
5
Subtotal
Transport
C-82
1
(derelict)
C-47
7
(2 derelict)
C-46
S
4
(2 derelict)
C-54
2
Lockheed Lodestar
1
Utility
COLT (AN-2)
10
Subtotal
25
Helicopter:
Transport
H-19
1
HOUND (Mi-4)
12
Utility
H-13
9
HARE (Mi-1)
11
UH-12
2
Subtotal
35
Trainer:
T-33
4b
T-6
6
N2S
6
Z-326
15
Subtotal
4
27
Miscellaneous:
Subtotal
35
GRAND TOTAL 207
This aircraft inventory is estimated; it does not include over 50 light aircraft reportedly confis-
cated from private owners.
Eleven I1-14's belonging to CUBANA are probably used in emergency by the CRAAF.
'Have been used as fighters.
o This total includes approximately 5 L-20 Morava and 15 L-60 Brigadyr liaison-type aircraft
assigned to INRA installations and cooperatives, and also used by CRAAF to carry out patrol
activities.
16
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rfttl r4-1414--
TABLE 3
NAVY
Type Quantity
PF (Patrol Escort) (US) 5
PGM (Motor Gunboat) (US) 1
PC (Subchaser) (USSR) 6
PT (Motor Torpedo Boat) (USSR) 12
AG (Miscellaneous Auxiliary) 2 ,
ATR (Rescue Ocean Tug) 2
YAG (Auxiliary Service Craft) 9
YP (Patrol Craft) 29 b
"Undergoing repairs.
b Total may be considerably greater as a number
of fishing boats and pleasure craft have been armed
for patrol use.
$1,MILL 7
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GREAT INAGUA
Approved for Release: 2019/02/26 006084662
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This
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...SECRET-
i.
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