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January 31, 2017
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November 9, 1962
1.:Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 SECRET CONTROLLED SEM SNIE 85-4-62 Advance Copy of the Estimate 9 November 1962 SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA � NOTE: This is an advance copy of the estimate as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The printed text will be circulated within five days of this issuance. MEXICO dd BA O rOREMP luNBI Ct. REPUBLIC MONO. AITI ' �� � WEST HONDURAS � INDIES GUATEMALA EL NICARAGUA ; FEDERATION SALVADOR COSTA RICA PA NA BRITISH GUIANA SURINAM FRENCH GUIANA ECUADOR PERU CHILE URUGUAY ARGENTINA Central Intelligence Agency ET CONTROLLED Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELAI,lz ENCE The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA. � Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE' BOARD on 9 November 1962. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Direc- tor, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of _Investigation; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Repre- sentative to the USIB, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction. CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE IS OFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN USED SEPARATELY GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited. Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 -Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 S-E-C-R-E-T CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 9 November 1962 SUBJECT: SNIE 85-4-62: CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA THE PROBLEM To describe and evaluate Castro's capabilities, with Soviet help, for carrying out subversion and sabotage in Latin America after satisfaction of all US conditions relative to the withdrawal of strategic weapons systems from Cuba and a consequent US commit- ment not to invade. NOTE: In this estimate we have considered Castro's raw cap- abilities, taking note of, but not working out in de- tail, US and Latin American capabilities for counter- action. SMEARY A. The dangerously unstable situation that prevails through- out much of Latin America is the product of fundamental inequities S-E-C-R-E-T GROUP I Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 ci Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 S-E-C-R-E-T and historic circumstance; it is not the creation of Castro and the Soviets. Castro's efforts, with Soviet help, to exploit this situation by means of subversion and sabotage have not produced significant results. Propaganda exploitation of Castro and Cuba as symbols of revolution has probably been more effective to date than other subversive activities. Castro's influence in Latin America had waned by the time of the missile base crisis and was further reduced by the revelation that he had accepted Soviet strategic missile bases on Cuban soil and by the manner of the Soviet decision to withdraw them. B. Implementation of an agreement between the US and the USSR whereby the strategic weapons systems would be withdrawn and the US committed not to intervene in Cuba with force will leave Castro with a new immunity and a greater freedom for subversive actions throughout Latin America. The extent to which this potential is realized will depend upon the situation in Cuba, Soviet policy toward Cuba, and the policies and performance of the other Latin American governments and of the US with respect to the Castro threat. There are many targets in the hemisphere vulnerable to Castro-Communist subversion and sabotage, and the Soviets are likely to assist Castro in reaching them by contributing both to his security at home and to 2 S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 pproved for Release: 2017/01/24 CO6085155 c..) S-E-C-R-E-T his capability for action overseas. As in the period before the missile base crisis, the effect of Castro's 'Plibversive activities will depend not only upon his capabilities but upon the attractive- ness of the Cuban example and the willingness of the American govern- ments to take determined counteraction. This willingness will prob- ably be weakened by fulfillment of the US commitment not to in- vade Cuba. C. We have examined how Castro's subversive potential would be affected by alternative courses of Soviet policy regarding Cuba: (1) virtual withdrawal of support; (2) continuation of economic and military support ranging from present up to substantially in- creased levels. We believe that course (1) would considerably re- duce Castro's subversive potential, and that the Soviets are un- likely to elect it. We conclude that Soviet course (2) would main- tain Castro's potential for subversive action at least at present levels or actually raise it to the point where he could undertake amphibious and/or airborne subversive operations against close-in targets. S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 Qproved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 THE ESTIMATE I. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE MISSILE BASE CRISIS* Aims Aims 1. From the time of his accession to power Fidel Castro has sought to gain acceptance of the Cuban revolution as a model for others and of himself as the leader of revolutionary forces through- out Latin America. He has constantly sought to foment revolutions in other Latin American States. Moreover, Castro has generally had the support of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the pursuit of these aims. Means 2. Castro began his career of sponsorship for revolutions in Latin America in 1959 with landings of small rebel forces in Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. None of these vomsuccessful and he turned to other means. 3. From the beginning, propaganda has been one of the principal instruments on which Castro has relied. In addition to the main trans- missions of Radio Havana for external listeners, which have had a * See Aruaex A. S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 cApproved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 S -E -C -11-E -T great deal of revolutionary content, he has beamed special programs devised to stimulate revolutionary action to each of half a dozen selected countries.* A major effort has been made through Prensa Latina, the Cuban news service, to disseminate Castro-Communist propaganda. Printed propaganda has also been sent from Cuba into most other Latin American States, and Cuban diplomatic missions and personnel have actively disseminated it. Students returning from indoctrination in Cuba have helped establish Cuban Institutes for Friendship among Peoples which have functioned as propaganda out- lets. 4. Thousands of Latin Americans have been brought to Cuba; about 1,200 foreign trainees are believed to be there now. Many hundreds have been trained in revolutionary techniques and guerrilla warfare. Cuba has been made a main transit point for travel be- tween Latin America and the Bloc. 5. Financial support has been provided by Cuba to revolutionary groups in a number of countries, although the cases, on which we have reports involved relatively small sums of money. Arms shipments have also been reported but the evidence is unclear as to quantities * Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. S -E -C -R-E -T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 C;)Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 O shipped and the extent of Cuba's role in these transactions. We believe that there is an extensive agent net in Latin America directed from Havana. 6. Castro has associated himself with revolutionary activist groups throughout Latin America. In most cases these have been Communist, but where the regular Communist Party favored a legal or parliamentary line he has not hesitated to support dissident Communist groups, e.g., in Brazil, and non-Communist revolutionaries, e.g., in Guatemala and El Salvador. In some cases he has sponsored new revolutionary organizations, e.g., in Panama, Colombia, and Peru. In Chile he has endorsed a popular front coalition made up of Communist and moderate leftists. Evaluation 7. Instances of financial and material support sent by Cuba to revolutionaries in other countries which have come to our atten- tion are probably only a part of the total effort. Even so, the effort seems to have been relatively small and ineffective. Yet along with the political and psychological stimulus which Castro's influ- ence has provided, Cuban subversive activities have perceptibly strengthened activist revolutionary groups. Dangerous situations -6 S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 Opproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550 S-E-C-R-E-T subject to exploitation by Castro and the Communists exist in a number of Latin American countries -- notably Venezuela, Brazil, British Guiana, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia. These dangers arise from political and social tensions which existed long before Castro came to power. They might lie dormant for some time; but with Castro as a potential detonator, they are more likely, to blow up. The detonative compound will exist as long as Castroism sur- vives, whatever may happen to Castro personally. 8. The most dangerous aspect of Castroism has been its broad appeal as a symbol of revolutionary change and nationalist asser- tiveness in Latin America. Propaganda from Cuba has taken advan- tage of this fact and has almost certainly been a more important American influence in the Latin/situation than Castro's other subversive ac- tivities. During 1960 and 1961 Castroism became a force to be reckoned with politically in a number of Latin American countries. Certain governments felt obliged to move in the direction of neu- tralist and leftist positions. This influence waned, however, after Castro identified himself with the Bloc in late 1961. Nevertheless, the appeal of Castro's movement continued to be a source of major concern to almost all governments and seriously restricted their willingness to associate themselvespat least publicly, with the US. - 7 - S -E -C -R -E -T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 �Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C060851550 S-E-C-R-E-T II. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL IN THE Are6RMATH OF AN AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW TEEIR STRATEGIC MISSILES AND THE US GIVE ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD NO INVADE CUBA 9. Castro's subversive capabilities -- and his disposition to use them -- will be enhanced by the sense of security provided by such sophisticated weapons as are retained in Cuba after the withdrawal of Soviet strategic missiles. The IL-28 bombers, if re- tained, and Other modern equipment noted in Annex B, would be im- portant in this regard. A US commitment not to invade Cuba will further strengthen his sense of immunity from reprisal and almost certainly encourage him to intensify subversive activities in other Latin American countries. Response of Castro Supporters to Missile Ease Crisis 10. Castro's supporters throughout Latin America, with few though important exceptions (e.g., sabotage of oil facilities in Venezuela), failed to respond to the missile base crisis with effective acts of sabotage or with impressive public demonstrationse Two important limiting factors should be taken into account in judging this response, however. US action to alert Latin American governments led them to make extensive advance preparation, in- cluding deployment of security forces and the roundup of suspects, a condition of readiness which is unlikely to be maintained indefinitely. - 8 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 �Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 S -E -C -R -E -T There also may have been some uncertainty among the activist followers of Castro whether they should make their big effort in response to the announcement of the US blockade, or wait for the anticipated US invasion. Moscow's apparent failure to provide guidance may have contributed to the confusion. It is our judg- ment, however, that the response to Castro's appeal for attacks on the US and its friends indicates that his power to command revolu- tionary action, at least in the circumstances of the missile base crisis, is limited. Support Which Castro Can Expect in the Future 11. The range of Castro's support has been, we believe, con- siderably narrowed by events since Castro declared himself a Communist. Revelation of the fact that he had allowed the Soviets to establish offensive bases under exclusive Soviet control has alienated many non-Communist nationalists, genuine neutralists, and even revolutionaries seeking social and economic betterment. San Tiago Dantas, formerly Foreign Minister under President Goulart and an author Of Brazil's nonalignment policy, and leading Mexican of- ficials have publicly expressed their disenchantment. 12. The activist revolutionaries are probably the only im- portant force on which Castro can now count, but even their support - 9 - S -E -C -E -E -T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 Opproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0 060851550 S-E-C-R-E-T has apparently been rendered less effective by differences on the question of Soviet relations with Castro and with Latin American Communist parties. Castro's Resources for Continued Subversive Activity 13. Arms. (See Annex B.) Castro has substantial stocks of arms. In addition to Soviet Bloc materiel there are stores of arms inherited from the Batista regime not being used by Castro forces and available for distribution outside Cuba. In the past he has apparently been hampered in his efforts to use arms for subversive purposes by problems of transport and delivery. He has at his disposal, however, 11 IL-14 transports belonging to Cubana air- lines which could be used to deliver arms under certain circum- stances. The IL-28's now in Cuba are inappropriate for subversive purposes. However, they could be used for air drops. Cuba has many small craft suitable for infiltration of men and arms. The 6 Khronshtadt subchasers, 16 P-6 motor torpedo boats, and 12 Komar missile boats Obtained from the Bloc could also be used for arms deliveries. If the projected trawler base is built up, trawlers --both Cuban and Soviet -- could be used for arms deliveries. If Soviet submarines call at the trawler base or at other Cuban ports, they, too, could be used in support of subversive activities. We -10- S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 6pproved for Release 2017/01/24 0060851550 S-E-C-R-E-T see no evidence that Cuba has or is developing a sophisticated amphibious warfare capability, and all the means of delivery of arms by sea noted above would be vulnerable to precautionary mea- sures by Latin American military and naval forcesa 14. Propaganda apparatus. Castro's propaganda machine re- --- mains intact. For the time being, however, his diplomatic missions are likely to find it harder to disseminate propaganda than in the past, both because of new precautions by local governments and be- cause of a reduction in the numbers of cooperative volunteers out- side the organized Communist groups. 15. Money and equipment. Despite differences between Castro and the USSR concerning dismantling of the missile bases, we be- lieve that the Soviets will continue to supply Castro with money, supplies, and equipment for subversive activity. The Soviets have certainly supplied Castro with sophisticated instruments of intel- ligence collection, sabotage, and clandestine communications. -11- S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 6 pproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550 S-E-C-R-E-T 16. Organization. The organization of Castro's subversive assets throughout Latin America was shown by the recent crisis to be loose and otherwise faulty. We estimate that Castro will make. a strong effort to strengthen and improve it, and that he will con- tinue to receive support in this effort from the Soviet apparatus, both in Cuba itself, where the Soviet Ambassador is a veteran officer of the KGB, and in other important centers of Soviet activ- ity such as Mexico City and Montevideo. Other Factors on Which Castro's Subversive Capability Will Depend 17. If the US and USSR reach and implement the agreement stated in the problem Castro will gain an immunity which he lacked before the missile base crisis. He will, furthermore, still have most of the arms and equipment which were delivered in the post- July buildup, as well as enhanced capabilities provided by acceler- ated training. Presumably his enemies will have about the same, or less, freedom to engage in propaganda, sabotage, support for resistance activities, and other actions designed to overthrow Castro than they had before the crisis -- almost certainly not more. Unless Castro is gravely endangered by internal political and eco.- nomic problems, there is no reason to believe that anti-Castro activities are any more likely to jeopardize his position than they did before the crisis. -12- S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 S-E-C-R-E-T 18. Situation in Cuba. Castro's ability to engage in subver- sive activities will be influenced significantly by the strength and stability of his position at home. Heightened political and economic difficulties in Cuba would restrict Castro's subversive effort, while the more secure he is at home, the more freedom and strength he is likely to have for subverting other governments and re-establishing his prestige and influence. Castro's position in Cuba will depend in part on his own policies, but is likely to de- pend even more upon those of the Soviets. lg. Alternative Soviet policies. There are several courses of action with respect to Cuba which the Soviets are likely to consider. Some leaders may argue that the whole policy of economic and military support for Castro should be abandoned along with the plan for the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba. We believe, however, that the Soviet stake in Cuba as an ally and as a Soviet center in Latin. America is still too high to abandon. The stake in Castro as a person, however, is questionable. If the Soviets did make a decision to withdraw support either from Castro or from Cuba, we believe that Cuban capability for subversion in Latin America would be greatly reduced, at least for a time. This capability would be reduced more in the case of the Soviets' withdrawing sup- port from Cuba than in the case of their abandonment of Castro alone. -13- S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 f-Approved for Release 2017/01/24 0060851550 S-E-C-R-E-T 20. An alternative course would be for the Soviets to continue to extend economic and military assistance. Such assistance could range all the way from the amounts necessary to maintain Cuba in its present condition, including support of the expanded military estab- lishment, to substantial increases. Such a policy would probably reduce considerably Castro's internal problems and thus give him additional freedom to engage in external subversion and sabotage. Additions to Castro's stocks of small arms would not in themselves change his capability for subversive activity, as he already has supplies of surplus arms. However, if the Soviets were to provide substantial additional air and sealift capability, the Cubans would be able to mount large scale subversive interventions in neighboring countries. Furthermore, whatever degree of success is achieved in improving Cuba's position and in expanding its physical resources, Cuba's met capability for subversion and sabotage will in the last analysis largely be determined by the overall situation in Latin America. 21. We do not believe that Castro or the Soviets can yet fore- see what the effects of the recent crisis will be over the long term on their relationship. The crisis has probably created difficulties of a political and psychological nature that neither of them can readily solve, however determined theymaybe to do so. Castro may S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 0 S-E-C-R-E-T have been moved by the treatment he has received at the hands of the Soviets to Consider modifying his relationship with them and seeking to improve his relatiOns with the CAS and possibly even the US. this would be most likely if the Soviets chose to pursue course one or two above. We believe, however, that he is unlikely to find feasible ways of reducing his dependence Upon them. The Soviets certainly must consider that they have effective means of exercising contra Over Castro. Furthermore, his repeated assertions of con- tinued loyalty to Marxism-Leninism Make it unlikely that he is seriously Contemplating a restoration of relations With the OAS, or that he could succeed if he tried. 22. Policy of other American nations. Castro's subversive cap- abilities will be greatly influenced by the policies and actions of other Latin American nations, as by those of the US. We believe that the high state of security alert that has prevailed since 22 October and the show of unity that marked the recent crisis are unlikely to last. There is sure to be a revival of nationalist sen- timents. On balance, however, we believe that the prospects for -15- S -E -C -R -E -T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 S -E -C -R -B -T countersubversive action by Latin American States, on their own and in conjunction with the US, are improved. Many responsible Latin Americans will have interpreted recent events to mean that firm and united action can be effective against the Soviet threat from Cuba. However, Latin American governments will probably be less willing to take coordinated action against Communist inroads if the US commits itself not to invade Cuba. Likely Future Targets for Cuban Sabotage. 23. The extent of Castro's capabilities for sabotage and other clandestine activity in Latin America will depend upon the complicated factors noted above. Whatever his capabilities are, he will not be at a loss for targets against which to use them. Some of the more Obvious targets are: a. US missions and personnel. US missions and personnel all over Latin America were designated as targets for attack in the various calls for action which went out during the recent crisis. Action against such targets has a primarily political and propec;anda value to Castro in that it tends to show public opposition to US policy. It is also relatively easy for Castro to promote attacks against official US installations in a crisis situation and to get help from all the various elements which are opposed to American - 16 - S-B-C-R-E -T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 � Opproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550 influence in the area. Future attacks may be anticipated in situa- tions in which Castro feels that public resentment of US policy exists or can be stirred up. b. Physical targets vulnerable to a limited sabotage effort. Prime targets for sabotage will be mining, industrial, and business installations in which there is a large proportion of US capital, which are otherwise associated with the US, or which are so important to the local economy that damage to them would create difficulties for governments which are anti-Castro and cooperating with the US. Oil facilities in Venezuela, including the oil and water pipelines to the refineries on the Paraguana Peninsula, and similar facilities are likely to be chosen as targets for Cuban sabotage. InstallationB for the handling of Venezuelan iron ore are also likely objectives. US installations in Panama might be attacked. c. Port and communications facilities are generally vul- nerable to sabotage and are appealing targets to Cubans and other Latin American Communists particularly in countries which are coop- erating with the US and whose communications media are taking an anti-Castro line. Telephone, telegraph, radio and television facili- ties, and most public utilities, particularly electric power and -17- S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550 S-E-C-R-E=T transformer stations, are potential targets. Selection of targets for sabotage will depend on the importance of particular facilities but even more on the varying access of Castroites and Communists to them. d. Political targets susceptible to exploitation. Po- litical instability throughout Latin America in almost every case characterized by pressures from below upon relatively conservative and generally anti-Communist government, provide Castro with op- portunities for subversive political activity. Particularly un- stable situations include the following: (1) Venezuela where Communist-inspired disorders have been kept in check by the government, but where continued Communist and leftist violence may lead the military to take control. In a country such as Venezuela, where the stability of an anti-Castro and anti-Communist government depends heavily upon one man, assassination is another danger. (2) Nicaragua, where Communist-led groups, in antici- pation of coming elections, may seek to incite or exploit violence against the Somoza regime. S-E-C-R-E=T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 6 pproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550 __ S-E-C-R-E-T (3) Guatemala where President Ydigoras' position is weak and uncertain. (4) The Dominican Republic, where the problems of political reconstruction after a generation of dictatorship have proved almost more than the caretaker government can handle, and where some political groupings amenable to Castro's influ- ence are seeking to gain a footing. ( 5) Bolivia, where the struggle for dominance within the ruling MNR Party between the moderates and those on the far left is ready made for exploi- tation by Castro. � (6) Brazil) where Communists have penetrated the government and military to some limited extent, the tide of nationalist and anti-US feeling is strong, and depressed socio-economic conditions and inefficient government administration pro- vide Castro many opportunities, especially in the northeast. _19- S -E -C -R -E -T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 S-E-C-R-E-T AEIMC A HIGHLIGHTS OF CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN OTHER LATIN ANERICA COUNTRIES TO DATE 1. Cuban subversive activities of one sort or another have been directed toward virtually every other Latin American State. Cuban Embassies have been without exception centers for propaganda and efforts to cultivate receptive local groups, whether they be Castroite, regular Communist, leftist, or sipply disgruntled with the existing regime.* The Cuban Embassy is commonly a disburser of funds for subversive purposes. Radio propaganda from Havana has been and is beamed at each of the Latin American States, some.!, times tailored to have particular local impact. Sympathetic nationals from the other Latin American States have been encouraged and given financial support to come to Cuba for varying lengths of time for training, goodwill visits, or for purposes of instruction and co- ordination of subversive programs* 2. The above represents a general pattern. There are, of course, significant variations and different degrees of effort, * Only five countries still have Cuban Embassies: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 1\4xico, and Uruguay. GROUP 1 S-E-C-R-E-T Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 dpproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550 S-E-C-R-E-T ANNEX A depending on how Castro's regime views the importance and vulner- abilities of the target country. The following represents a summary, country by country, of the most typical reports of Caen subversive activity available to us, (See paragraphs 7-8 of subject memorandum for evaluation of Castro's subversive activities to date.) A. Argentina (1) A "Cuban-Argentine Friendship institute" exists for recruiting and sending Argentine citizens to Cuba. Some 150 have been sent by way of Uruguay and Mexico for training in guerrilla warfare. (2) There is continued Cuban contact with Argentine Peronist-Communist groups. (3) In July 1962, police in Buenos Aires discovered a quantity of explosives and propaganda which were subsequently linked to Cuban Communists and Peronist activists. B. Bolivia (1) Between 130 and 150 Bolivians will receive "scholar- ships" in Cuba during 1962. - A2 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 dpproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550 S-E-C.R-E=T ANNEX A (2) The Cuban Embassy has attempted to incite extreme leftist members of the governing JCR Party to leave the party, and presumably assists the Bolivian Communist Party in its program to penetrate the peasant and labor rdlitia units. (3) The Cuban Embassy has cultivated relations with the Bolivian campesino� and given finnncial assistance to the peasant union in the Cliza Valley of Bolivia. C. Brazil (1) Castro has close ties with Francisco Juliao, self- proclaimed Marxist and leader of the Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil. %Tadao has traveled to Cuba several times; his wife and children live in Cuba; a number of his associates and rank and file League members have gone to CUba for flargicultural" training; and Brazilian CorromIst leaders have stated that Juliao's Leagues have received arms and money from Cuba. -A3- S-E-C4q-E4r Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 0 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 o S-E-C4R.Z.JT (2) AMEX A Castro supports and has personally encouraged the insurrectionary policy of the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), which split from the regular Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), in 1961 with a netbership of about 1,000. D. British Guiana (1) The Castro regime has been hospitable to the leader- ship of the dominant People's Progressive Party (PPP) in Guiana, and Premier Cheddi Jagan, his wife, and other members of the PPP have traveled to Cuba and made enthusiastic comments about the Castro regime. (2) Cuba has provided the PPP with a printing press, the people to install it, and possibly some small arms. (3) As many as 60 Guianans nay be in Cuba on scholarship and receiving mtlitary training there. (4) Cuba last Awe wanted to set up a permanent trade commission office in British Guiana; the UK was wiliIng to let a Cuban trade group visit but not establish a permanent office and finally refused the Cubans visas. S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 oApproved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 (1%) S-E-C-R-E-T AMEX A E. Chile (1) Senator Salvador Allende, leader of Chile's Communist-dnminated Popular Front and a leading presidential aspirant, has made at least two trips to Cuba. He has been an outspoken defender of Castro. (2) In March of 1962, Cuban Minister of Education Armando Hart went to Chile for an international conference and took With him several sacks of propaganda. In early October 1962 the Cubans were caught smuggling propaganda material into Chile. (3) A nunber of students fram Chile have undergone Communist indoctrination in Cuba. (4) The Chilean pro-Corr-wrist labor confederation, CUTCH, has tried, along with Cubans, to promote a Communist-daminated Latin American Labor Federation. F. (1) Castro's principal instrument is the United. Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)� organized by pro-Castro -A5- S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 approved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550 S-E-C-R-E4 ANNEX A extremists in early 1962 to create a guerrilla move- ment aimed at overthrowing the present government. (2) Castro reportedly gave the FUR $15,000 last aline and promised more financial aid on a semiannual basis. (3) The FUAR has recruited members from the Revolutionary Liberal Movement: the Worker-Student Peasant Movement, and the Colombian Ca=mist Party's extremist wing Which is dissatisfied with the party's reluctance to engage in armed. revolutions. (4) The FUAR is also flaking efforts to penetrate the many armed bandit groups that have operated in rural areas of central and. western Colombia since l948 and to coordinate these groups into a unified insurgency movement. G. Costa Rica The small Communist "Popular Vanguard Party" (VP) haA sent several members to Cuba for training, and there are plans to organize guerrilla training pro- grams in Costa Rica nnder the dtractiou of these members. S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 Opproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550 S-E-C-R-E-T H. The Dominican Republic AMEX A (1) Under its provisional Council of State the Dominican Republic has been a major target for Caen subversion, aria regular radio broadcasts to the Dominican Republic from Cuba have helped incite the frequent riots in Santo Domingo. (2) A cadre of Dominican Communists is headquartered in Cuba. (3) The Communist-dominated 114th of Jane Party (PCJ) has plans for executing guerrilla warfare in the event of government persecution, has reportedly stored away arms for such use, and expects Cuban material and financial support it any such effort. (4) A government roundup during the Cuban crisis of pro-Castro political leaders turned up a cache of arms, propaganda, materials, and radio equipment. I. Ecuador (1) Castro has assets both in the Commnnist Party of Ecuador (kCE) nna in the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE). - A7 - S-E-C-R-E4 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 approved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550 ANNEX A (2) The nucleus of a guerrilla organization was begun last sumer by dissident 7eCE elementsdraminz on members of the URJE. Representatives of both groups have received guerrilla training in Cuba, and are stockpiling arms in rural areas. The URJE has prdb- ably gotten some Cuban finenr*ial support and may have received arms from Cuba. (3) Manuel Araujo Hidalgo, a pro-Communist former Ecuadorean Minister of Interior, who has recently visited Cuba, China, and the USSR reportedly has received a considerable amount of money from the Cuban�GoveLuwent for his work with the URJE. (4) Ecuador has received substantial ayantities of Communist propaganda. J. El Salvador On 1 March 1961, the Salvadoran Government broke relations with the Castro regime after receiving evidence that the Cuban charg�as urging increased revolutionary activity on the part of Salvadoran Communists. A8 - Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 kia)c____s4Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 ANNEX A K. Guatemala (1) Castro given financial support, training, and propagandaassistance to the Communist-influenced "13 November" Croup, which lannched sporadic guer- rilla fighting early this year (some 1*-60 active fighting men And several hundred collaborators). (2) Castro was also in touch early this year with leaders of the orthodox Guatemalan Communist Party urging them to take a more militant revolutionary role similar to the "13 November" Group. (3) (Leaders of both groups are normally in exile in Mexico.) L. Haiti A cadre of Haitian Communists is resident in Cuba, and many thousands of Haitian citizens living in eastern Cuba are being subjected. to Communist regi- mentation and indoctrination. - A9 S-E-C-R.E4 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 cA)pproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550 S -T AMEN A M. Honduras (1) Prior to the break in Cuban-Honduran diplomatic re- lations in April 1961, Cubaxi personnel under the cover of consular and diplomatic offices were active in the north coast region of Honduras. (2) Many Hondurans are in Cuba under the "scholarship" 13rOgrallao (3) Honduras now is the target of a particularly vicious regular rallio program beamed especially to Honduras by Radio Havana. N. Jrunei ca (1) The limited Cuban subversive efforts of which we have knowledge are directed through the "Peoples Freedom Movement" (the de facto Communist Party), the Caen Consulate, and a "Friends of Cuba Convittee." (2) Same 25,000-40,000 jarnicans are currently living In Cuba, and considerable travel between Cuba and the rest of Latin America goes through JOnnica. - A10 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 approved for Release: 2017/01/24 CO60851550 ANNEX A 0. Mexico (1) Mexico is the most important outside base for Cuban propaganda and subversive operations into the rest of Latin America. (2) The Cuban Etbassy in conjunction with the large Soviet Ebbassy, the Cuban Consulate in Merida: and the "Cuban-Mexican Cultural Center" in Merida have been particularly active in support of the Connunist-influencedNatiOnal Liberation Movement (D11.). (3) Cuban Embassy officials helped to incite the anti-US demonstrations by Mexican students in July and August 1960. P. Nicaragua (l) A cadre of Nicaraguan Communists is based in Cuba, and it has sporadic contact with pro-Castro elements in Nicaragua and in exile in other Caribbean countries. (2) Annmber of Nicaraguans have received guerrilla training in Cuba, and have later been among the - AU - S-E-C41-E.JT Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 6, \pproved for Release 2017/01/24 0060851550 S-E-C-R-E-T A NIM A small guerrilla bands that have infiltrated Nicaragua from Honduras. Q, Panama Cuban financial assistance is believed to be chan- neled to the pro-Communist National Action Vanguard NANO in Panama, a revolutionary group of Marxists active among the peasants; one of the VAN leaders frequently travels to Cuba and claims to be a per- sonal friend of Fidel Castro. R. Paraguay (1) Cuban efforts with regard to Paraguay take the form of financial support and direction to exiled opposi- tion groups, notably in Uruguay and Argentina. (2) The principal recipient of such aid is the United Front for National Liberation (MIRA), some of whose leaders are in Uruguay or Argentina, and whose rank and file (2,500-5,000) is mostly in Argentina. (FU1NA members in Argentina also receive arms and supplies from Brazilian Communists.) - Al2 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 pproved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 ANNEX A (3) FUINA has persistently sought to penetrate and direct other exile activities, and has been implicated in or responsible for several invasion attempts since 1959. S, Peru (1) In June 1962, at least eight Peruvians traveled to Cuba via Mexico to receive training and indoctri- nation, and other Peruvian Communists or pro-Communists have long resided in Cuba. (2) Although still in the organizational stage, pro- Communist guerrillas and other leftist extremist groups have been operating intermittently in Peru for many months, and the Peruvian Communist Party is intensifying efforts to organize scattered ex- tremist groups and Indians into a subversive move- ment, including incitement to invade private property in central and southern Peru. T. Trinidad The local Communist-front party has been more active since the May visit of a Cuban representative from Jamaica. - A33 - Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 SZ -C.41 -E4 AENEX A U. Uruguay (1) Uruguay is the next most important center of opera- tions after Mexico for both Castro and the Soviets. (2) The activities of the Cuban Embassy in Montevideo in promoting pro-Castro propaganda led the Uruguayan Government in January 1961 to declare the Cuban Atbassador persona non grata for interference in internal Uruguayan affairs. V. Venezuela (1) The Castro regime has been particularly vitriolic in its propaganda attacks on the Betancourt government. (2) There is in Venezuela the most active and best sup- ported Communist guerrilla :movement in Latin Anerina, apparently directed by the Venezuela:nen/In--mist Party with the aid of the Movement of the Revolutionary ' Left (MIR). (3) Pro-Castro elements were probably involved in recent violence, during the Cuban crisis, which resulted in the blowing up of US-owned oil facilities in Venezuela. - A3.4 - Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 o S-E-C-R-E-T ANNEx B ESTIMATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN CUBA AFIER WITHDRAWAL OF STRATEGIC MISSILESY ARMOR Bloc AS OF 1 AUG.= DELIVERED STE mb 1 AUGUST../ AS OF 9 NOVEMBER 130 30 o 175 10 some 305 (about 1/3 are T-54/100mm) 40 some Medium tanks (T-54/100mm and T-34/85mm) Heavy tanks (JS-2/122mm) Amphibious tanks (PT-76) Assault guns (SU-100) 50 Armored personnel carrier (BTR-152) 25 Armored personnel carrier (BTR-50P) o Armored personnel carrier (8 wheel) 0 25 15 4o 28 75 4o 4o 28 Amphibious Armored Scout Car Non-Bloc BRDM 0 13 13 Light tank, M-3A1 (US) Medium tank, M-4A1, with 76mm gun (US) Medium tank, Comet with 77mm gun (UK) 12 12 15 0 o 0 12 12 15 Scout car, 140-3A1, white (US) 19 0 19 Light armored car, M-8 (US) 20 0 20 9./ The inventory of non-Bloc equipment does not reflect any attrition which may have occurred as a result of normal usage or a lack of spare parts. I/ Cost of Military Equipment in Cuba received from the Sino-Soviet Bloc since 1 August 1962: We estimate that the total value of these military shipments since 1 August, including the other equipment, spare parts, and ammunition usually associated with these weapons, would exceed$550 million, of which about 50 to 60 million would be related to the IL28's. These estimates do not include the cost of the services of Soviet "technicians." GROUP 1 S-E-C-R-E-T Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 approved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550 S-E-C-R-E-T ANNEX B AS OF 1 AUGUST ARTIWRY DELIVERED SINCE AS OF 1 AUGUST 9 NOVEMBER Bloc Quad 14.5mm ZPU 50 50 100 76mm field gun M-1942 150 50 200 85mm field gun D-44 110 190 300 122mm How. M1938 75 45 120 122mm gun m-1931/1937 60 60 120 57mm AT gun M-1943 270 30 300 Quad 12.7mm AA MG 350 0 350 Twin 30mm AAA gun NI-53 60 - 60 120 37mm AAA gun, M-1939 90 30 120 57mm AAA gun 60 60 120 152mm gun-How. M-1937 55 125 180 FROG (ArtyKton PT-76 0 4 4 Non-Bloc chassis) 75mm Pack How, (US) 8 0 8 105mm How. (IT) 4 0 4 371com gun, ti-6 (us) 9 0 9 25mm Hotchkiss AA gun (Fr) 16 0 16 MORTARS Bloc 0 600 -EGM 600 122mm 180 0 180 160mm 0 some some Non-Bloc 0 39 --60mm (Us) 39 81mm (us, IT) 106 0 106 4.2-in (us) 7 0 7 INFANTRY ROCKET LAUNCHERS Bloc RP67-2 AT 1,000 0 1,000 RMf130 24 26 50 RM-132 12 13 25 B2 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C060851550 S-E-C-R-E-T ANNEX B AS OF DELIVERED SINCE AS OF 1 AUGUST 1 AUGUST 2 NOVEMBER INFANTRY ROCKET LAUNCHER (contid) Non-Bloc 0 0 14.5 27 3.5-in rocket launcher (US, 1T) 145 57mm recoilless rifle, 1/1-1.8 (US) 27 SMALL ARMS 300,000 (Most were manufactured in Belgiumpsome in the US? and a few in the Bloc.) MOTORIZED TRANSPORT Bloc �174 to 10 ton trucks 3,800 4,000-6,000 70500-10,000 Tracked amphibian K.-61 0 30 30 Non-Bloc 0 1,300 1/4 ton truck (US)aJ 1,300 Trucks, misc. (US) 160 0 160 Sedans (US) 175 0 175 MISSILES Bloc SA-2 Guideline Sites 0 24 24 Launchers 0 144 144 Est. missiles possibly a few 500 500 Coastal defense cruise (35 n.m.) Sites 0 4-5 4-5 Launchers 0 8-10 8-10 Est. missiles 0 40 40 el/ An unknown number of this total are Bloc trucks. - B3 - S-E-CrR-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085150 S-E4M1-E-T AS OF 1 AUGUST MISSILES (cont'd) Non-Bloc None RADARS DELIVERED SINCE 1 AUGUST ANNEX B AS OF 9 .NOVEMBER Bloc 0 15 15 TOKEN KNIFE REST 0 15-20 15-20 SPOON REST 0 30-40 - 30-40 FRUIT SET 0 24 24 FIRE CAN 0 20 20 BAR LOOK 0 15 15 FLAT Floing o 15 15 0 unknown unknown WHIFF ROCK CAKE 0 unknown unknown Non-Bloc None HELICOPTERS Bloc -R1=4 (Hound) MI-1 (Hare) 24 about 45 about 70 Non-Bloc 1 9 2 35 0 o 0 15 1 9 2 50 H-19(US) H-13 (us) VH-12 (us) JET FIGHTERS Bloc MIG-15/17 MIG-19 O 12 12 MIG-21 Non-Bloc O 39 39 4, T-330 trainer (us)1 Have been used as fighters. - B - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155Q S-E-C-L-E-T AS OF 1 AUGUST DELIVERED SINCE 1 AUGUST ANNEX B AS OF 9 NOVEMBER JET LIGHT BOMBERS Bloc 0 142 42 IL-284ri Non-Bloc None CTEER PROPELLER AIRCRAFT Bloc IL-14, transport, (USSR) 14-16 0 14-16 LI-2, transport, (USSR) 0 4 4 Non-Bloc:12/ F-51, fighter (US) 1 0 1 F-47, fighter-bomber (US) 3 o Sea Fury MK-1, fighter- bomber (UK) 10 o lo B-26, lt/tac/attack/bmr(US) 17 o 17 TBM-35, Carrier type torpedof Plume, WIT (US) 5 o 5 C-82, transport US) 1 0 1 C-470 transport US) 7 o 7 C-46, transport US) 4 o 4 C-54, transport (US) 2 0 2 Lockheed Lodesters, transport (US) T-6, trainer .(1S) MS, trainer (us) 1 6 6 o o o 1 6 6 NAVAL SHIPS Bloc Subchasers (Khronshtadt) 6 o 6 Motor torpedo boats 12 4 16 MAR cruise-missile boats 0 12 12 (2 missiles per boat) Patrol and service craft 0 several several a/ At San Aaiun Airfield: IL-28s, 24 in crates,_ 5 completely assembled, 2 partially apsedbied (fuselages and tails assembled), 2 UIL-26s (the trainer model) completely assembled. b/ This inventory does not include over 50 light aircraft reportedly confiscated from private owners. - B5 - SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 QApproved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 S-E-C-R-E-T ANNa B AS OF DELIVERED SINCE AS OF 1 AUGUST 1 AUGUST 9 NOVEMBER NAVAL SHIPS (cont'd) Bon-Bloc 5 0 5 PF (Patrol Escort) (us) PGM (Motor Gunboat) (US) Misc. Patrol and Service- craft/ 1 42 0 0 1 42 ****** NOTE: The sudden increase in military equipment deliveries began in late July. We are mable to determine, however, whether our estimate of the amount of Bloc equipment in Cuba as of 1 August is significantly lower than it should be. If so, this may be low in the category of land armaments. We feel fairly sure that the great bulk of the most sophisticated weapons did arrive after 1 August. A possible exception is that some SA-2 missiles and associated equipment arrived in the last week of July. Some 150 Bloc ships have arrived in Cuban ports since 1 August. Of these over 120 are believed to have carried arms and military- related equipment. The full breakdown of these cargoes by type of arms is not known, and the types and quantity of arms which the other ships may have carried is not known. The estimate of Bloc arms currently in Cuba is based partly on solid evidence of the presence of known quantities of some types of arms and partly on estimated requirements for T/O&E in other categories. Total may be Greater as a nmber of fishing boats and pleasure craft hove boon ared for patrol use. S-E-C-R-E-T Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155