CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06085155
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-02757
• Publication Date: November 9, 1962

1.:Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
SECRET
CONTROLLED SEM
SNIE 85-4-62
Advance Copy of the Estimate
9 November 1962
SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES
IN LATIN AMERICA
�
NOTE: This is an advance copy of the estimate as approved by the
United States Intelligence Board. The printed text will be circulated
within five days of this issuance.
MEXICO dd BA
O
rOREMP luNBI Ct. REPUBLIC
MONO.
AITI ' �� � WEST
HONDURAS � INDIES
GUATEMALA
EL NICARAGUA ; FEDERATION
SALVADOR
COSTA RICA
PA NA
BRITISH GUIANA
SURINAM
FRENCH GUIANA
ECUADOR
PERU
CHILE URUGUAY
ARGENTINA
Central Intelligence Agency
ET
CONTROLLED
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELAI,lz ENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.
� Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE' BOARD
on 9 November 1962. Concurring were the Director of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Direc-
tor, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy;
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director
for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant Director, Federal
Bureau of _Investigation; and the Director of the National
Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Repre-
sentative to the USIB, abstained, the subject being outside
of his jurisdiction.
CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE IS OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WHEN USED SEPARATELY
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
-Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
S-E-C-R-E-T
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
9 November 1962
SUBJECT: SNIE 85-4-62: CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES
IN LATIN AMERICA
THE PROBLEM
To describe and evaluate Castro's capabilities, with Soviet
help, for carrying out subversion and sabotage in Latin America
after satisfaction of all US conditions relative to the withdrawal
of strategic weapons systems from Cuba and a consequent US commit-
ment not to invade.
NOTE: In this estimate we have considered Castro's raw cap-
abilities, taking note of, but not working out in de-
tail, US and Latin American capabilities for counter-
action.
SMEARY
A. The dangerously unstable situation that prevails through-
out much of Latin America is the product of fundamental inequities
S-E-C-R-E-T
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
ci Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
S-E-C-R-E-T
and historic circumstance; it is not the creation of Castro and
the Soviets. Castro's efforts, with Soviet help, to exploit this
situation by means of subversion and sabotage have not produced
significant results. Propaganda exploitation of Castro and Cuba
as symbols of revolution has probably been more effective to date
than other subversive activities. Castro's influence in Latin
America had waned by the time of the missile base crisis and was
further reduced by the revelation that he had accepted Soviet
strategic missile bases on Cuban soil and by the manner of the
Soviet decision to withdraw them.
B. Implementation of an agreement between the US and the USSR
whereby the strategic weapons systems would be withdrawn and the US
committed not to intervene in Cuba with force will leave Castro
with a new immunity and a greater freedom for subversive actions
throughout Latin America. The extent to which this potential is
realized will depend upon the situation in Cuba, Soviet policy toward
Cuba, and the policies and performance of the other Latin American
governments and of the US with respect to the Castro threat. There
are many targets in the hemisphere vulnerable to Castro-Communist
subversion and sabotage, and the Soviets are likely to assist Castro
in reaching them by contributing both to his security at home and to
2
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
pproved for Release: 2017/01/24 CO6085155 c..)
S-E-C-R-E-T
his capability for action overseas. As in the period before the
missile base crisis, the effect of Castro's 'Plibversive activities
will depend not only upon his capabilities but upon the attractive-
ness of the Cuban example and the willingness of the American govern-
ments to take determined counteraction. This willingness will prob-
ably be weakened by fulfillment of the US commitment not to in-
vade Cuba.
C. We have examined how Castro's subversive potential would
be affected by alternative courses of Soviet policy regarding Cuba:
(1) virtual withdrawal of support; (2) continuation of economic
and military support ranging from present up to substantially in-
creased levels. We believe that course (1) would considerably re-
duce Castro's subversive potential, and that the Soviets are un-
likely to elect it. We conclude that Soviet course (2) would main-
tain Castro's potential for subversive action at least at present
levels or actually raise it to the point where he could undertake
amphibious and/or airborne subversive operations against close-in
targets.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
Qproved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
THE ESTIMATE
I. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE MISSILE BASE CRISIS*
Aims
Aims
1. From the time of his accession to power Fidel Castro has
sought to gain acceptance of the Cuban revolution as a model for
others and of himself as the leader of revolutionary forces through-
out Latin America. He has constantly sought to foment revolutions
in other Latin American States. Moreover, Castro has generally had
the support of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the pursuit of these aims.
Means
2. Castro began his career of sponsorship for revolutions in
Latin America in 1959 with landings of small rebel forces in
Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. None of
these vomsuccessful and he turned to other means.
3. From the beginning, propaganda has been one of the principal
instruments on which Castro has relied. In addition to the main trans-
missions of Radio Havana for external listeners, which have had a
* See Aruaex A.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
cApproved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
S -E -C -11-E -T
great deal of revolutionary content, he has beamed special programs
devised to stimulate revolutionary action to each of half a dozen
selected countries.* A major effort has been made through Prensa
Latina, the Cuban news service, to disseminate Castro-Communist
propaganda. Printed propaganda has also been sent from Cuba into
most other Latin American States, and Cuban diplomatic missions and
personnel have actively disseminated it. Students returning from
indoctrination in Cuba have helped establish Cuban Institutes for
Friendship among Peoples which have functioned as propaganda out-
lets.
4. Thousands of Latin Americans have been brought to Cuba;
about 1,200 foreign trainees are believed to be there now. Many
hundreds have been trained in revolutionary techniques and guerrilla
warfare. Cuba has been made a main transit point for travel be-
tween Latin America and the Bloc.
5. Financial support has been provided by Cuba to revolutionary
groups in a number of countries, although the cases, on which we have
reports involved relatively small sums of money. Arms shipments have
also been reported but the evidence is unclear as to quantities
* Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras, and the Dominican
Republic.
S -E -C -R-E -T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
C;)Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
O
shipped and the extent of Cuba's role in these transactions. We
believe that there is an extensive agent net in Latin America
directed from Havana.
6. Castro has associated himself with revolutionary activist
groups throughout Latin America. In most cases these have been
Communist, but where the regular Communist Party favored a legal
or parliamentary line he has not hesitated to support dissident
Communist groups, e.g., in Brazil, and non-Communist revolutionaries,
e.g., in Guatemala and El Salvador. In some cases he has sponsored
new revolutionary organizations, e.g., in Panama, Colombia, and
Peru. In Chile he has endorsed a popular front coalition made up
of Communist and moderate leftists.
Evaluation
7. Instances of financial and material support sent by Cuba
to revolutionaries in other countries which have come to our atten-
tion are probably only a part of the total effort. Even so, the
effort seems to have been relatively small and ineffective. Yet along
with the political and psychological stimulus which Castro's influ-
ence has provided, Cuban subversive activities have perceptibly
strengthened activist revolutionary groups. Dangerous situations
-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
Opproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550
S-E-C-R-E-T
subject to exploitation by Castro and the Communists exist in a
number of Latin American countries -- notably Venezuela, Brazil,
British Guiana, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia. These dangers
arise from political and social tensions which existed long before
Castro came to power. They might lie dormant for some time; but
with Castro as a potential detonator, they are more likely, to blow
up. The detonative compound will exist as long as Castroism sur-
vives, whatever may happen to Castro personally.
8. The most dangerous aspect of Castroism has been its broad
appeal as a symbol of revolutionary change and nationalist asser-
tiveness in Latin America. Propaganda from Cuba has taken advan-
tage of this fact and has almost certainly been a more important
American
influence in the Latin/situation than Castro's other subversive ac-
tivities. During 1960 and 1961 Castroism became a force to be
reckoned with politically in a number of Latin American countries.
Certain governments felt obliged to move in the direction of neu-
tralist and leftist positions. This influence waned, however, after
Castro identified himself with the Bloc in late 1961. Nevertheless,
the appeal of Castro's movement continued to be a source of major
concern to almost all governments and seriously restricted their
willingness to associate themselvespat least publicly, with the US.
- 7 -
S -E -C -R -E -T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
�Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C060851550
S-E-C-R-E-T
II. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL IN THE Are6RMATH OF AN AGREEMENT
UNDER WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW TEEIR STRATEGIC MISSILES
AND THE US GIVE ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD NO INVADE CUBA
9. Castro's subversive capabilities -- and his disposition
to use them -- will be enhanced by the sense of security provided
by such sophisticated weapons as are retained in Cuba after the
withdrawal of Soviet strategic missiles. The IL-28 bombers, if re-
tained, and Other modern equipment noted in Annex B, would be im-
portant in this regard. A US commitment not to invade Cuba will
further strengthen his sense of immunity from reprisal and almost
certainly encourage him to intensify subversive activities in other
Latin American countries.
Response of Castro Supporters to Missile Ease Crisis
10. Castro's supporters throughout Latin America, with few
though important exceptions (e.g., sabotage of oil facilities in
Venezuela), failed to respond to the missile base crisis with
effective acts of sabotage or with impressive public demonstrationse
Two important limiting factors should be taken into account in
judging this response, however. US action to alert Latin American
governments led them to make extensive advance preparation, in-
cluding deployment of security forces and the roundup of suspects,
a condition of readiness which is unlikely to be maintained indefinitely.
- 8 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
�Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
S -E -C -R -E -T
There also may have been some uncertainty among the activist
followers of Castro whether they should make their big effort in
response to the announcement of the US blockade, or wait for the
anticipated US invasion. Moscow's apparent failure to provide
guidance may have contributed to the confusion. It is our judg-
ment, however, that the response to Castro's appeal for attacks on
the US and its friends indicates that his power to command revolu-
tionary action, at least in the circumstances of the missile base
crisis, is limited.
Support Which Castro Can Expect in the Future
11. The range of Castro's support has been, we believe, con-
siderably narrowed by events since Castro declared himself a
Communist. Revelation of the fact that he had allowed the Soviets
to establish offensive bases under exclusive Soviet control has
alienated many non-Communist nationalists, genuine neutralists, and
even revolutionaries seeking social and economic betterment. San
Tiago Dantas, formerly Foreign Minister under President Goulart and
an author Of Brazil's nonalignment policy, and leading Mexican of-
ficials have publicly expressed their disenchantment.
12. The activist revolutionaries are probably the only im-
portant force on which Castro can now count, but even their support
- 9 -
S -E -C -E -E -T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
Opproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0
060851550
S-E-C-R-E-T
has apparently been rendered less effective by differences on the
question of Soviet relations with Castro and with Latin American
Communist parties.
Castro's Resources for Continued Subversive Activity
13. Arms. (See Annex B.) Castro has substantial stocks of
arms. In addition to Soviet Bloc materiel there are stores of arms
inherited from the Batista regime not being used by Castro forces
and available for distribution outside Cuba. In the past he has
apparently been hampered in his efforts to use arms for subversive
purposes by problems of transport and delivery. He has at his
disposal, however, 11 IL-14 transports belonging to Cubana air-
lines which could be used to deliver arms under certain circum-
stances. The IL-28's now in Cuba are inappropriate for subversive
purposes. However, they could be used for air drops. Cuba has
many small craft suitable for infiltration of men and arms. The
6 Khronshtadt subchasers, 16 P-6 motor torpedo boats, and 12 Komar
missile boats Obtained from the Bloc could also be used for arms
deliveries. If the projected trawler base is built up, trawlers
--both Cuban and Soviet -- could be used for arms deliveries. If
Soviet submarines call at the trawler base or at other Cuban ports,
they, too, could be used in support of subversive activities. We
-10-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
6pproved for Release 2017/01/24 0060851550
S-E-C-R-E-T
see no evidence that Cuba has or is developing a sophisticated
amphibious warfare capability, and all the means of delivery of
arms by sea noted above would be vulnerable to precautionary mea-
sures by Latin American military and naval forcesa
14. Propaganda apparatus. Castro's propaganda machine re-
---
mains intact. For the time being, however, his diplomatic missions
are likely to find it harder to disseminate propaganda than in the
past, both because of new precautions by local governments and be-
cause of a reduction in the numbers of cooperative volunteers out-
side the organized Communist groups.
15. Money and equipment. Despite differences between Castro
and the USSR concerning dismantling of the missile bases, we be-
lieve that the Soviets will continue to supply Castro with money,
supplies, and equipment for subversive activity. The Soviets have
certainly supplied Castro with sophisticated instruments of intel-
ligence collection, sabotage, and clandestine communications.
-11-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
6 pproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550
S-E-C-R-E-T
16. Organization. The organization of Castro's subversive
assets throughout Latin America was shown by the recent crisis to
be loose and otherwise faulty. We estimate that Castro will make.
a strong effort to strengthen and improve it, and that he will con-
tinue to receive support in this effort from the Soviet apparatus,
both in Cuba itself, where the Soviet Ambassador is a veteran
officer of the KGB, and in other important centers of Soviet activ-
ity such as Mexico City and Montevideo.
Other Factors on Which Castro's Subversive Capability Will Depend
17. If the US and USSR reach and implement the agreement
stated in the problem Castro will gain an immunity which he lacked
before the missile base crisis. He will, furthermore, still have
most of the arms and equipment which were delivered in the post-
July buildup, as well as enhanced capabilities provided by acceler-
ated training. Presumably his enemies will have about the same,
or less, freedom to engage in propaganda, sabotage, support for
resistance activities, and other actions designed to overthrow
Castro than they had before the crisis -- almost certainly not more.
Unless Castro is gravely endangered by internal political and eco.-
nomic problems, there is no reason to believe that anti-Castro
activities are any more likely to jeopardize his position than they
did before the crisis.
-12-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
S-E-C-R-E-T
18. Situation in Cuba. Castro's ability to engage in subver-
sive activities will be influenced significantly by the strength
and stability of his position at home. Heightened political and
economic difficulties in Cuba would restrict Castro's subversive
effort, while the more secure he is at home, the more freedom and
strength he is likely to have for subverting other governments and
re-establishing his prestige and influence. Castro's position in
Cuba will depend in part on his own policies, but is likely to de-
pend even more upon those of the Soviets.
lg. Alternative Soviet policies. There are several courses
of action with respect to Cuba which the Soviets are likely to
consider. Some leaders may argue that the whole policy of economic
and military support for Castro should be abandoned along with the
plan for the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba. We believe,
however, that the Soviet stake in Cuba as an ally and as a Soviet
center in Latin. America is still too high to abandon. The stake in
Castro as a person, however, is questionable. If the Soviets did
make a decision to withdraw support either from Castro or from Cuba,
we believe that Cuban capability for subversion in Latin America
would be greatly reduced, at least for a time. This capability
would be reduced more in the case of the Soviets' withdrawing sup-
port from Cuba than in the case of their abandonment of Castro alone.
-13-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
f-Approved for Release 2017/01/24 0060851550
S-E-C-R-E-T
20. An alternative course would be for the Soviets to continue
to extend economic and military assistance. Such assistance could
range all the way from the amounts necessary to maintain Cuba in its
present condition, including support of the expanded military estab-
lishment, to substantial increases. Such a policy would probably
reduce considerably Castro's internal problems and thus give him
additional freedom to engage in external subversion and sabotage.
Additions to Castro's stocks of small arms would not in themselves
change his capability for subversive activity, as he already has
supplies of surplus arms. However, if the Soviets were to provide
substantial additional air and sealift capability, the Cubans
would be able to mount large scale subversive interventions in
neighboring countries. Furthermore, whatever degree of success is
achieved in improving Cuba's position and in expanding its physical
resources, Cuba's met capability for subversion and sabotage will
in the last analysis largely be determined by the overall situation
in Latin America.
21. We do not believe that Castro or the Soviets can yet fore-
see what the effects of the recent crisis will be over the long term
on their relationship. The crisis has probably created difficulties
of a political and psychological nature that neither of them can
readily solve, however determined theymaybe to do so. Castro may
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155 0
S-E-C-R-E-T
have been moved by the treatment he has received at the hands of
the Soviets to Consider modifying his relationship with them and
seeking to improve his relatiOns with the CAS and possibly even the
US. this would be most likely if the Soviets chose to pursue course
one or two above. We believe, however, that he is unlikely to find
feasible ways of reducing his dependence Upon them. The Soviets
certainly must consider that they have effective means of exercising
contra Over Castro. Furthermore, his repeated assertions of con-
tinued loyalty to Marxism-Leninism Make it unlikely that he is
seriously Contemplating a restoration of relations With the OAS, or
that he could succeed if he tried.
22. Policy of other American nations. Castro's subversive cap-
abilities will be greatly influenced by the policies and actions
of other Latin American nations, as by those of the US. We believe
that the high state of security alert that has prevailed since
22 October and the show of unity that marked the recent crisis are
unlikely to last. There is sure to be a revival of nationalist sen-
timents. On balance, however, we believe that the prospects for
-15-
S -E -C -R -E -T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
S -E -C -R -B -T
countersubversive action by Latin American States, on their own and
in conjunction with the US, are improved. Many responsible Latin
Americans will have interpreted recent events to mean that firm
and united action can be effective against the Soviet threat from
Cuba. However, Latin American governments will probably be less willing
to take coordinated action against Communist inroads if the US commits
itself not to invade Cuba.
Likely Future Targets for Cuban Sabotage.
23. The extent of Castro's capabilities for sabotage and
other clandestine activity in Latin America will depend upon the
complicated factors noted above. Whatever his capabilities are,
he will not be at a loss for targets against which to use them.
Some of the more Obvious targets are:
a. US missions and personnel. US missions and personnel
all over Latin America were designated as targets for attack in the
various calls for action which went out during the recent crisis.
Action against such targets has a primarily political and propec;anda
value to Castro in that it tends to show public opposition to US
policy. It is also relatively easy for Castro to promote attacks
against official US installations in a crisis situation and to get
help from all the various elements which are opposed to American
- 16 -
S-B-C-R-E -T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
�
Opproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550
influence in the area. Future attacks may be anticipated in situa-
tions in which Castro feels that public resentment of US policy
exists or can be stirred up.
b. Physical targets vulnerable to a limited sabotage
effort. Prime targets for sabotage will be mining, industrial, and
business installations in which there is a large proportion of US
capital, which are otherwise associated with the US, or which are
so important to the local economy that damage to them would create
difficulties for governments which are anti-Castro and cooperating
with the US. Oil facilities in Venezuela, including the oil and
water pipelines to the refineries on the Paraguana Peninsula, and
similar facilities are likely to be chosen as targets for Cuban
sabotage. InstallationB for the handling of Venezuelan iron ore
are also likely objectives. US installations in Panama might be
attacked.
c. Port and communications facilities are generally vul-
nerable to sabotage and are appealing targets to Cubans and other
Latin American Communists particularly in countries which are coop-
erating with the US and whose communications media are taking an
anti-Castro line. Telephone, telegraph, radio and television facili-
ties, and most public utilities, particularly electric power and
-17-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550
S-E-C-R-E=T
transformer stations, are potential targets. Selection of targets
for sabotage will depend on the importance of particular facilities
but even more on the varying access of Castroites and Communists to
them.
d. Political targets susceptible to exploitation. Po-
litical instability throughout Latin America in almost every case
characterized by pressures from below upon relatively conservative
and generally anti-Communist government, provide Castro with op-
portunities for subversive political activity. Particularly un-
stable situations include the following:
(1) Venezuela where Communist-inspired disorders
have been kept in check by the government, but
where continued Communist and leftist violence
may lead the military to take control. In a
country such as Venezuela, where the stability
of an anti-Castro and anti-Communist government
depends heavily upon one man, assassination is
another danger.
(2) Nicaragua, where Communist-led groups, in antici-
pation of coming elections, may seek to incite or
exploit violence against the Somoza regime.
S-E-C-R-E=T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
6 pproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550
__
S-E-C-R-E-T
(3) Guatemala where President Ydigoras' position
is weak and uncertain.
(4) The Dominican Republic, where the problems of
political reconstruction after a generation of
dictatorship have proved almost more than the
caretaker government can handle, and where some
political groupings amenable to Castro's influ-
ence are seeking to gain a footing.
( 5)
Bolivia, where the struggle for dominance within
the ruling MNR Party between the moderates and
those on the far left is ready made for exploi-
tation by Castro.
� (6) Brazil) where Communists have penetrated the
government and military to some limited extent,
the tide of nationalist and anti-US feeling is
strong, and depressed socio-economic conditions
and inefficient government administration pro-
vide Castro many opportunities, especially in the
northeast.
_19-
S -E -C -R -E -T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
S-E-C-R-E-T
AEIMC A
HIGHLIGHTS OF CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN
OTHER LATIN ANERICA COUNTRIES TO DATE
1. Cuban subversive activities of one sort or another have
been directed toward virtually every other Latin American State.
Cuban Embassies have been without exception centers for propaganda
and efforts to cultivate receptive local groups, whether they be
Castroite, regular Communist, leftist, or sipply disgruntled with
the existing regime.* The Cuban Embassy is commonly a disburser
of funds for subversive purposes. Radio propaganda from Havana
has been and is beamed at each of the Latin American States, some.!,
times tailored to have particular local impact. Sympathetic nationals
from the other Latin American States have been encouraged and given
financial support to come to Cuba for varying lengths of time for
training, goodwill visits, or for purposes of instruction and co-
ordination of subversive programs*
2. The above represents a general pattern. There are, of
course, significant variations and different degrees of effort,
* Only five countries still have Cuban Embassies: Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, 1\4xico, and Uruguay.
GROUP 1
S-E-C-R-E-T Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
dpproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550
S-E-C-R-E-T
ANNEX A
depending on how Castro's regime views the importance and vulner-
abilities of the target country. The following represents a summary,
country by country, of the most typical reports of Caen subversive
activity available to us, (See paragraphs 7-8 of subject memorandum
for evaluation of Castro's subversive activities to date.)
A. Argentina
(1) A "Cuban-Argentine Friendship institute" exists for
recruiting and sending Argentine citizens to Cuba.
Some 150 have been sent by way of Uruguay and Mexico
for training in guerrilla warfare.
(2) There is continued Cuban contact with Argentine
Peronist-Communist groups.
(3) In July 1962, police in Buenos Aires discovered a
quantity of explosives and propaganda which were
subsequently linked to Cuban Communists and Peronist
activists.
B. Bolivia
(1) Between 130 and 150 Bolivians will receive "scholar-
ships" in Cuba during 1962.
- A2 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
dpproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550
S-E-C.R-E=T
ANNEX A
(2) The Cuban Embassy has attempted to incite extreme
leftist members of the governing JCR Party to leave
the party, and presumably assists the Bolivian
Communist Party in its program to penetrate the
peasant and labor rdlitia units.
(3) The Cuban Embassy has cultivated relations with the
Bolivian campesino� and given finnncial assistance
to the peasant union in the Cliza Valley of Bolivia.
C. Brazil
(1) Castro has close ties with Francisco Juliao, self-
proclaimed Marxist and leader of the Peasant Leagues
in northeast Brazil. %Tadao has traveled to Cuba
several times; his wife and children live in Cuba;
a number of his associates and rank and file League
members have gone to CUba for flargicultural" training;
and Brazilian CorromIst leaders have stated that
Juliao's Leagues have received arms and money from
Cuba.
-A3-
S-E-C4q-E4r
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
0 Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155 o
S-E-C4R.Z.JT
(2)
AMEX A
Castro supports and has personally encouraged the
insurrectionary policy of the dissident Communist
Party of Brazil (CPB), which split from the regular
Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), in 1961 with a
netbership of about 1,000.
D. British Guiana
(1)
The Castro regime has been hospitable to the leader-
ship of the dominant People's Progressive Party (PPP)
in Guiana, and Premier Cheddi Jagan, his wife, and
other members of the PPP have traveled to Cuba and
made enthusiastic comments about the Castro regime.
(2) Cuba has provided the PPP with a printing press, the
people to install it, and possibly some small arms.
(3) As many as 60 Guianans nay be in Cuba on scholarship
and receiving mtlitary training there.
(4) Cuba last Awe wanted to set up a permanent trade
commission office in British Guiana; the UK was
wiliIng to let a Cuban trade group visit but not
establish a permanent office and finally refused
the Cubans visas.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
oApproved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
(1%)
S-E-C-R-E-T
AMEX A
E. Chile
(1) Senator Salvador Allende, leader of Chile's
Communist-dnminated Popular Front and a leading
presidential aspirant, has made at least two trips
to Cuba. He has been an outspoken defender of Castro.
(2) In March of 1962, Cuban Minister of Education Armando
Hart went to Chile for an international conference
and took With him several sacks of propaganda. In
early October 1962 the Cubans were caught smuggling
propaganda material into Chile.
(3) A nunber of students fram Chile have undergone
Communist indoctrination in Cuba.
(4) The Chilean pro-Corr-wrist labor confederation,
CUTCH, has tried, along with Cubans, to promote
a Communist-daminated Latin American Labor Federation.
F.
(1) Castro's principal instrument is the United. Front for
Revolutionary Action (FUAR)� organized by pro-Castro
-A5-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
approved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550
S-E-C-R-E4
ANNEX A
extremists in early 1962 to create a guerrilla move-
ment aimed at overthrowing the present government.
(2) Castro reportedly gave the FUR $15,000 last aline
and promised more financial aid on a semiannual basis.
(3)
The FUAR has recruited members from the Revolutionary
Liberal Movement: the Worker-Student Peasant Movement,
and the Colombian Ca=mist Party's extremist wing
Which is dissatisfied with the party's reluctance
to engage in armed. revolutions.
(4) The FUAR is also flaking efforts to penetrate the
many armed bandit groups that have operated in rural
areas of central and. western Colombia since l948 and
to coordinate these groups into a unified insurgency
movement.
G. Costa Rica
The small Communist "Popular Vanguard Party" (VP)
haA sent several members to Cuba for training, and
there are plans to organize guerrilla training pro-
grams in Costa Rica nnder the dtractiou of these
members.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
Opproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550
S-E-C-R-E-T
H. The Dominican Republic
AMEX A
(1) Under its provisional Council of State the Dominican
Republic has been a major target for Caen subversion,
aria regular radio broadcasts to the Dominican Republic
from Cuba have helped incite the frequent riots in
Santo Domingo.
(2) A cadre of Dominican Communists is headquartered
in Cuba.
(3) The Communist-dominated 114th of Jane Party (PCJ)
has plans for executing guerrilla warfare in the
event of government persecution, has reportedly
stored away arms for such use, and expects Cuban
material and financial support it any such effort.
(4) A government roundup during the Cuban crisis of
pro-Castro political leaders turned up a cache of
arms, propaganda, materials, and radio equipment.
I. Ecuador
(1) Castro has assets both in the Commnnist Party of
Ecuador (kCE) nna in the Revolutionary Union of
Ecuadorean Youth (URJE).
- A7 -
S-E-C-R-E4
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
approved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550
ANNEX A
(2) The nucleus of a guerrilla organization was begun
last sumer by dissident 7eCE elementsdraminz on
members of the URJE. Representatives of both groups
have received guerrilla training in Cuba, and are
stockpiling arms in rural areas. The URJE has prdb-
ably gotten some Cuban finenr*ial support and may have
received arms from Cuba.
(3)
Manuel Araujo Hidalgo, a pro-Communist former
Ecuadorean Minister of Interior, who has recently
visited Cuba, China, and the USSR reportedly has
received a considerable amount of money from the
Cuban�GoveLuwent for his work with the URJE.
(4) Ecuador has received substantial ayantities of
Communist propaganda.
J. El Salvador
On 1 March 1961, the Salvadoran Government broke
relations with the Castro regime after receiving
evidence that the Cuban charg�as urging increased
revolutionary activity on the part of Salvadoran
Communists.
A8 -
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
kia)c____s4Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
ANNEX A
K. Guatemala
(1) Castro given financial support, training, and
propagandaassistance to the Communist-influenced
"13 November" Croup, which lannched sporadic guer-
rilla fighting early this year (some 1*-60 active
fighting men And several hundred collaborators).
(2) Castro was also in touch early this year with leaders
of the orthodox Guatemalan Communist Party urging them
to take a more militant revolutionary role similar to
the "13 November" Group.
(3) (Leaders of both groups are normally in exile in
Mexico.)
L. Haiti
A cadre of Haitian Communists is resident in Cuba,
and many thousands of Haitian citizens living in
eastern Cuba are being subjected. to Communist regi-
mentation and indoctrination.
- A9
S-E-C-R.E4
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
cA)pproved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550
S -T
AMEN A
M. Honduras
(1) Prior to the break in Cuban-Honduran diplomatic re-
lations in April 1961, Cubaxi personnel under the
cover of consular and diplomatic offices were active
in the north coast region of Honduras.
(2) Many Hondurans are in Cuba under the "scholarship"
13rOgrallao
(3) Honduras now is the target of a particularly vicious
regular rallio program beamed especially to Honduras
by Radio Havana.
N. Jrunei ca
(1) The limited Cuban subversive efforts of which we
have knowledge are directed through the "Peoples
Freedom Movement" (the de facto Communist Party),
the Caen Consulate, and a "Friends of Cuba
Convittee."
(2) Same 25,000-40,000 jarnicans are currently living
In Cuba, and considerable travel between Cuba and
the rest of Latin America goes through JOnnica.
- A10 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
approved for Release: 2017/01/24 CO60851550
ANNEX A
0. Mexico
(1) Mexico is the most important outside base for Cuban
propaganda and subversive operations into the rest
of Latin America.
(2) The Cuban Etbassy in conjunction with the large
Soviet Ebbassy, the Cuban Consulate in Merida:
and the "Cuban-Mexican Cultural Center" in Merida
have been particularly active in support of the
Connunist-influencedNatiOnal Liberation Movement
(D11.).
(3) Cuban Embassy officials helped to incite the anti-US
demonstrations by Mexican students in July and
August 1960.
P. Nicaragua
(l) A cadre of Nicaraguan Communists is based in Cuba,
and it has sporadic contact with pro-Castro elements
in Nicaragua and in exile in other Caribbean countries.
(2) Annmber of Nicaraguans have received guerrilla
training in Cuba, and have later been among the
- AU -
S-E-C41-E.JT
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
6, \pproved for Release 2017/01/24 0060851550
S-E-C-R-E-T
A NIM A
small guerrilla bands that have infiltrated Nicaragua
from Honduras.
Q, Panama
Cuban financial assistance is believed to be chan-
neled to the pro-Communist National Action Vanguard
NANO in Panama, a revolutionary group of Marxists
active among the peasants; one of the VAN leaders
frequently travels to Cuba and claims to be a per-
sonal friend of Fidel Castro.
R. Paraguay
(1) Cuban efforts with regard to Paraguay take the form
of financial support and direction to exiled opposi-
tion groups, notably in Uruguay and Argentina.
(2) The principal recipient of such aid is the United
Front for National Liberation (MIRA), some of whose
leaders are in Uruguay or Argentina, and whose rank
and file (2,500-5,000) is mostly in Argentina.
(FU1NA members in Argentina also receive arms and
supplies from Brazilian Communists.)
- Al2 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
pproved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
ANNEX A
(3) FUINA has persistently sought to penetrate and direct
other exile activities, and has been implicated in or
responsible for several invasion attempts since 1959.
S, Peru
(1) In June 1962, at least eight Peruvians traveled to
Cuba via Mexico to receive training and indoctri-
nation, and other Peruvian Communists or pro-Communists
have long resided in Cuba.
(2) Although still in the organizational stage, pro-
Communist guerrillas and other leftist extremist
groups have been operating intermittently in Peru
for many months, and the Peruvian Communist Party
is intensifying efforts to organize scattered ex-
tremist groups and Indians into a subversive move-
ment, including incitement to invade private property
in central and southern Peru.
T. Trinidad
The local Communist-front party has been more active
since the May visit of a Cuban representative from
Jamaica.
- A33 -
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
SZ -C.41 -E4
AENEX A
U. Uruguay
(1) Uruguay is the next most important center of opera-
tions after Mexico for both Castro and the Soviets.
(2) The activities of the Cuban Embassy in Montevideo
in promoting pro-Castro propaganda led the Uruguayan
Government in January 1961 to declare the Cuban
Atbassador persona non grata for interference in
internal Uruguayan affairs.
V. Venezuela
(1) The Castro regime has been particularly vitriolic in
its propaganda attacks on the Betancourt government.
(2)
There is in Venezuela the most active and best sup-
ported Communist guerrilla :movement in Latin Anerina,
apparently directed by the Venezuela:nen/In--mist Party
with the aid of the Movement of the Revolutionary '
Left (MIR).
(3) Pro-Castro elements were probably involved in recent
violence, during the Cuban crisis, which resulted in
the blowing up of US-owned oil facilities in Venezuela.
- A3.4 -
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
o

S-E-C-R-E-T
ANNEx B
ESTIMATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN CUBA AFIER
WITHDRAWAL OF STRATEGIC MISSILESY
ARMOR
Bloc
AS OF
1 AUG.=
DELIVERED STE
mb
1 AUGUST../
AS OF
9 NOVEMBER
130
30
o
175
10
some
305 (about 1/3
are T-54/100mm)
40
some
Medium tanks (T-54/100mm and
T-34/85mm)
Heavy tanks (JS-2/122mm)
Amphibious tanks (PT-76)
Assault guns (SU-100) 50
Armored personnel carrier
(BTR-152) 25
Armored personnel carrier
(BTR-50P) o
Armored personnel carrier
(8 wheel) 0
25
15
4o
28
75
4o
4o
28
Amphibious Armored Scout Car
Non-Bloc
BRDM 0
13
13
Light tank, M-3A1 (US)
Medium tank, M-4A1,
with 76mm gun (US)
Medium tank, Comet with
77mm gun (UK)
12
12
15
0
o
0
12
12
15
Scout car, 140-3A1, white (US)
19
0
19
Light armored car, M-8 (US)
20
0
20
9./ The inventory of non-Bloc equipment does not reflect any attrition
which may have occurred as a result of normal usage or a lack of
spare parts.
I/ Cost of Military Equipment in Cuba received from the Sino-Soviet
Bloc since 1 August 1962: We estimate that the total value of these
military shipments since 1 August, including the other equipment,
spare parts, and ammunition usually associated with these weapons,
would exceed$550 million, of which about 50 to 60 million would be
related to the IL28's. These estimates do not include the cost of
the services of Soviet "technicians."
GROUP 1
S-E-C-R-E-T Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
approved for Release: 2017/01/24 0060851550
S-E-C-R-E-T
ANNEX B
AS OF
1 AUGUST
ARTIWRY
DELIVERED SINCE AS OF
1 AUGUST 9 NOVEMBER
Bloc
Quad 14.5mm ZPU 50
50
100
76mm field gun M-1942 150
50
200
85mm field gun D-44 110
190
300
122mm How. M1938 75
45
120
122mm gun m-1931/1937 60
60
120
57mm AT gun M-1943 270
30
300
Quad 12.7mm AA MG 350
0
350
Twin 30mm AAA gun NI-53 60 -
60
120
37mm AAA gun, M-1939 90
30
120
57mm AAA gun 60
60
120
152mm gun-How. M-1937 55
125
180
FROG (ArtyKton PT-76 0
4
4
Non-Bloc chassis)
75mm Pack How, (US) 8
0
8
105mm How. (IT) 4
0
4
371com gun, ti-6 (us) 9
0
9
25mm Hotchkiss AA gun
(Fr) 16
0
16
MORTARS
Bloc
0
600
-EGM 600
122mm 180
0
180
160mm 0
some
some
Non-Bloc
0
39
--60mm (Us) 39
81mm (us, IT) 106
0
106
4.2-in (us) 7
0
7
INFANTRY ROCKET LAUNCHERS
Bloc
RP67-2 AT 1,000
0
1,000
RMf130 24
26
50
RM-132 12
13
25
B2
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C060851550
S-E-C-R-E-T
ANNEX B
AS OF DELIVERED SINCE AS OF
1 AUGUST 1 AUGUST 2 NOVEMBER
INFANTRY ROCKET LAUNCHER (contid)
Non-Bloc
0
0
14.5
27
3.5-in rocket launcher
(US, 1T) 145
57mm recoilless rifle, 1/1-1.8
(US) 27
SMALL ARMS
300,000
(Most were manufactured in
Belgiumpsome in the US?
and a few in the Bloc.)
MOTORIZED TRANSPORT
Bloc
�174 to 10 ton trucks 3,800
4,000-6,000
70500-10,000
Tracked amphibian K.-61 0
30
30
Non-Bloc
0
1,300
1/4 ton truck (US)aJ 1,300
Trucks, misc. (US) 160
0
160
Sedans (US) 175
0
175
MISSILES
Bloc
SA-2 Guideline
Sites 0
24
24
Launchers 0
144
144
Est. missiles possibly a few
500
500
Coastal defense cruise
(35 n.m.)
Sites
0
4-5
4-5
Launchers
0
8-10
8-10
Est. missiles
0
40
40
el/ An unknown number of this total are Bloc trucks.
- B3 -
S-E-CrR-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085150
S-E4M1-E-T
AS OF
1 AUGUST
MISSILES (cont'd)
Non-Bloc
None
RADARS
DELIVERED SINCE
1 AUGUST
ANNEX B
AS OF
9 .NOVEMBER
Bloc
0
15
15
TOKEN
KNIFE REST
0
15-20
15-20
SPOON REST
0
30-40
- 30-40
FRUIT SET
0
24
24
FIRE CAN
0
20
20
BAR LOOK
0
15
15
FLAT Floing
o
15
15
0
unknown
unknown
WHIFF
ROCK CAKE
0
unknown
unknown
Non-Bloc
None
HELICOPTERS
Bloc
-R1=4 (Hound) MI-1 (Hare)
24
about 45
about 70
Non-Bloc
1
9
2
35
0
o
0
15
1
9
2
50
H-19(US)
H-13 (us)
VH-12 (us)
JET FIGHTERS
Bloc
MIG-15/17
MIG-19
O
12
12
MIG-21
Non-Bloc
O
39
39
4,
T-330 trainer (us)1
Have been used as fighters.
- B -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155Q
S-E-C-L-E-T
AS OF
1 AUGUST
DELIVERED SINCE
1 AUGUST
ANNEX B
AS OF
9 NOVEMBER
JET LIGHT BOMBERS
Bloc
0
142
42
IL-284ri
Non-Bloc
None
CTEER PROPELLER AIRCRAFT
Bloc
IL-14, transport, (USSR)
14-16
0
14-16
LI-2, transport, (USSR)
0
4
4
Non-Bloc:12/
F-51, fighter (US)
1
0
1
F-47, fighter-bomber (US)
3
o
Sea Fury MK-1, fighter-
bomber (UK)
10
o
lo
B-26, lt/tac/attack/bmr(US)
17
o
17
TBM-35, Carrier type torpedof
Plume, WIT (US)
5
o
5
C-82, transport US)
1
0
1
C-470 transport US)
7
o
7
C-46, transport US)
4
o
4
C-54, transport (US)
2
0
2
Lockheed Lodesters, transport
(US)
T-6, trainer .(1S)
MS, trainer (us)
1
6
6
o
o
o
1
6
6
NAVAL SHIPS
Bloc
Subchasers (Khronshtadt)
6
o
6
Motor torpedo boats
12
4
16
MAR cruise-missile boats
0
12
12
(2 missiles per boat)
Patrol and service craft
0
several
several
a/ At San Aaiun Airfield: IL-28s, 24 in crates,_ 5 completely assembled,
2 partially apsedbied (fuselages and tails assembled), 2 UIL-26s (the
trainer model) completely assembled.
b/ This inventory does not include over 50 light aircraft reportedly
confiscated from private owners.
- B5 -
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 006085155
QApproved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155
S-E-C-R-E-T
ANNa B
AS OF DELIVERED SINCE AS OF
1 AUGUST 1 AUGUST 9 NOVEMBER
NAVAL SHIPS (cont'd)
Bon-Bloc
5
0
5
PF (Patrol Escort) (us)
PGM (Motor Gunboat) (US)
Misc. Patrol and Service-
craft/
1
42
0
0
1
42
******
NOTE: The sudden increase in military equipment deliveries began in
late July. We are mable to determine, however, whether our
estimate of the amount of Bloc equipment in Cuba as of 1 August
is significantly lower than it should be. If so, this may be
low in the category of land armaments. We feel fairly sure
that the great bulk of the most sophisticated weapons did arrive
after 1 August. A possible exception is that some SA-2 missiles
and associated equipment arrived in the last week of July. Some
150 Bloc ships have arrived in Cuban ports since 1 August. Of
these over 120 are believed to have carried arms and military-
related equipment. The full breakdown of these cargoes by type
of arms is not known, and the types and quantity of arms which
the other ships may have carried is not known. The estimate of
Bloc arms currently in Cuba is based partly on solid evidence of
the presence of known quantities of some types of arms and partly
on estimated requirements for T/O&E in other categories.
Total may be Greater as a nmber of fishing boats and pleasure
craft hove boon ared for patrol use.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2017/01/24 C06085155