FOREIGN KNOWLEDGE OF US INTELLIGENCE AND ITS D&D IMPLICATIONS STATEMENT OF <SANITIZED> DEPUTY NIO FOR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL FOR THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06088962
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-01770
• Publication Date: July 23, 1998

Approved for Release: 2015/07/28 006088962
TOPS RET
(lax 46
_444
FOREIGN KNOWLEDGE OF US INTELLIGENCE
AND ITS D&D IMPLICATIONS
Statement of
Deputy NIO for Science & Technology
National Intelligence Council
for the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
23 July 1998
Good Morning Mr. Chairman.
I am
V 01/N t. -
a
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Deputy National Intelligence Officer (b)(3)
for Science and Technology, and Executive Secretary of the
Foreign Denial and Deception Committee. I am pleased to be
here to address the important question you've asked about
the extent of foreign knowledge of US intelligence and its
implications for denial and deception:
We have just completed a National Intelligence Estimate
on foreign denial and deception (D&D) under the auspices of
Dr. Lawrence Gershwin, NIO/S&T, who very much wanted to be
here, but is abroad today with his family on a well deserved
vacation scheduled some months ago. I served as Project
T ECRET
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2015/07/28 006088962
Approved for Release: 2015/07/28 006088962
T'ss ''"Scs
� The declassification of Cold War intelligence products,
and more recently, documents related to the Gulf War.
These many sources of information combine to present a
fairly detailed mosaic about how we undertake intelligence,
and the overall impact of successive disclosures is
cumulative. For those who make it their business to
understand US intelligence�and foreign counterintelligence
services give this some priority�their potential data base
is substantial, and growing.
I would like to elaborate just a bit on four of these
sources because our ability to modulate this outflow of
information varies greatly, as does their resulting damage
to US intelligence collection efforts.
Foreign espionage. Spies have hurt us greatly, and
test the best of our counterintelligence capabilities. The
--VUGRAPH ON SPIES�(2)
Ames case, for example, was particularly damaging because of
the volume of finished intelligence he passed exposing many
6
Approved for Release: 2015/07/28 006088962
Approved for Release: 2015/07/28 006088962
TOP ET
aspects of imagery,
and even MASINT, as well as some
� analytical techniques. Earlier spies for the Soviet Union
such as Walker, Pelton, Howard, Souther, and Hall had
provided significant information that the Ames material
certainly amplified. Other spies like Chin have passed
intelligence to China that has likewise aided Chinese D&D
efforts.
Unauthorized disclosures. We've lost much sensitive
information about our sources and methods, through
unauthorized disclosures of classified information. This
happens in books and articles, for example, by persons who
have had clearances, then use classified materials in their
publications As you know, some journalists exploit
excellent contacts among readers of classified publications
and make disclosures about US intelligence on almost a daily
basis.
In 1997 alone, CIA opened
unauthorized disclosures, of which
cases investigating
ere referred to the
Justice department for criminal investigation. The
Department of Defense referred
/ 19972 of which
disclosures.
cases to Justice during
Preliminary data for 1998 indicate that we are
well ahead of last year's pace�in word, the problem of
unauthorized disclosures seems to be getting worse, not
7
Approved for Release: 2015/07/28 006088962