DRAFT NOTES ON PRINCETON CONSULTANTS' MEETING ON FRIDAY, 6 DECEMBER 1957

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06186248
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: December 11, 1957

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11 December 1957
Draft Notes on Princeton Consultants' Meeting of Friday, 6 December 1957
A. Dulles
A. Smith
R T Rmith
remeans
Matthias
Stoertp
Armstrong
Black
Bowie
Hoover
Knorr
Linder
Strayer
DDCUMENTNO.
NO CHANGE IN CUSS. CI (b)(3)
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE. ft /0
DATE:1 e
MTN: 70V
1. Soviet Foreign Policy (questions growing out of
briefing of the group on the November 0/NE London discussions with
the J.I.C.). HeWIE asked whether the USSR was in fact pursuing a total
military efforts or was it attempting to give the ikpression of a
greater military capability than it actually possesses. In short,
was it attempting to deter the US and still not have to allocate all
the resources which a full defense effort might require. A. SMITH
stated that BOWIE's view is roughly what the majority view of NIE 11-4-57
says, that is, that the Soviets are making less than a total effort.
KNORR asked if Soviet leaders might conceivably estimate that they
could reduce expected Soviet general war casualities, through prior
technological developmentsAnd a defense effort relatively much
greater than the US, to)say, about 8 million causalities. Would this
tempt them to overlook the deterrents? BMWs feeling on this score
was that no leadership could be that certain; no one could estimate
the consequences of all out war. Such a premise would be too shaky-
and too high a gamble for Soviet leadership.
(b)(3)
2. Will Khhushchav turn outward? BOWIE asked, what does "turn
outward" really mean? What kind of internal problems would give rise
to such a foreign course? What kind of external.adventures might in
fact be undertaken? He felt that NIE 11-4-57 was somewhat unresolved
on this point and that the estimate doesn't really discuss the full
significance of such questions. ARMSTRONG stated that certain people
(b)(3)
-CONFIDENTIAlt-
Try rrrrT
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held the thesis that Soviet actions in Syria were in part caused by
internal Soviet problems. KNORR strongly doubted this thesis, holding
that such an economic indidenee would be extremely small with respect
to WW1 Soviet GNP. A. SMITH explained the treatment of this question
in NIE 11-4-57: that on the one hand, Soviet problems will probably
not pile up to such a point as to cause collapse; yet competing demands
on Soviet resources will pose reater problems to Soviet leadership
than they have in the past. Thus, what is this in-between-level
of troubles and how will it be manifested? HOOVER felt that the Soviet
people were used to disappointment, and that, therefore, even if
Soviet economic goals do fall somewhat short, there will have still
some economic gain and this will redound to Khrushchev's advantage.
A. SMITH stated that Soviet announced economic goals were not the
kind which result in a great, immediate jump in GNP, as VAS the case
in the immediate post-mar years, and that, therefore, Soviet econeMic
difficulties were not likely to become dramatic. BLACK agreed, feeling
that such economic troubles will remain within the regime's capabilities
to manage. STRAYER doubted that economic difficulties will give rise
to a need for an adventurous foreign policyolhere was general consensus
..w=this view.
3. Problems relating to the impact of intelligence assessments on
our policy makers. The R1 stated that he wished to raise two inter-
related questions which had arisen out of his recent discussions with
the Johnson Committee of Congress. The first of these questions related
to how best to call the active attention of our policy makers to
disturbing trends abroad. DCI felt that the intelligence community
had somewhat failed over the past few years in bringing the close attention
of our policy makers to the build-up of Soviet missile capabilities.
We had had good, hard intelligence since 1955 on !Wrist missile development.
Our documents had discussed these questions. He himself had discussed
Soviet missile build-up at the NSC, and before the Atomic Energy and
Armed Forces Joint Committees of Congress. Despite these efforts, it
took a sputnik and a dog to surface awareness of the problem in America.
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This was in fact a kind of Pearl Harbor. The question thus is how to
bring out our intelligence findings with sufficient force and vigor to
spur necessary policy action without sputni4s or dogs.
4. The second, related, question relates to the fact that, except
for NESC, the Intelligence community does not prepare net evaluations
as to where we stand relative to the USSR. DCI stated that this point
was very forcefully demonstrated in his appearances before the Johnson
Committee, in that the senators were amazed to find that he knew much
more about Moscow's air defense installations than he did about those
of Washington, D. C. DCI thereupon asked the consultants if there
would be benefit in preparing net evaluations in such fields as
missiles, nuclear developments, bombers, general economy, chemical
warfare, bacteriological warfare, and etc. Should not there be some
organism or mechanism that could make such net sudies and then inform
the NSC that we stand thus and so ahead or behind the USSR? ARMSTRONG
asked if this were not the province of the NSC itself. Why didn't
the NSC ask the JCS or their own staff for such studies? LINDER asked
if a comparative study of missile development had been in our net
evaluation paper. A. SMITH explained that this question was ground in
but is always placed in the future tense at some date which the paper
sets, and the difficulty is that the last such papees future date VW
not set far enough ahead to grind in interim Soviet development in
missiles. (Abbo not sure I got that last point correctly).
(You may want to delete the follow;
5, BOWIE stated that the NSC had taken a basic decision two years
ago that our missile program was to have a number one, over-riding
priority. DCI questioned whether this decision had in fact been that
clear-cut. BOWIE maintained that it had, adding that this decision had
been taken over the protest of the military. In retrospect, there had
been a bad miscalculation of our satellite program in that it VAS
looked on merely as a scientific program. The Planning Board had seen
it also as a psychological question and had tried to drive home this
point of view in nits paper", but that somehow this view did not register.
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BMIE stated that there was a proclivity among (unnamed) highiaevel
US officials to discount intelligence warnings again and again.
These people feel that the intelligence community overrates Soviet
capabilities, even though its warnings have proved correct in the past.
Our question, therefore, is how to combat such-highlyiplaced, influential
optimists. DCI, without commenting directly on BOWlEts statements,
recalled that there had been great doubts in the minds of many people
when the missile programs were in their infancy because it seemed
in fact
inconceivable that a missile could some day/go five thousand miles
and then come down with any degree of accuracy.
6. There was general consensus in the group that net evaluations
should be done, but no agreement as to who should do them. BOWIE tended
to defend past NSC efforts on this score, recalling that the NSC had
asked the Killian Committee to prepare an estimate of Soviet missile
potential, and then had in aci4lition the estimates of our own missile
planners as to the US potential. BOWIE thought that there were certain'
advantages in such a procedure, in that perhaps harder estimates could
be made in each of the two independent papers, whereas a net estimate
might tend to fuzz up certain questions. DCI and ARMSTRONG disagreed
with BOWIEls view, feeling that it was just such a system which had
failed and had not had the necessary dramatic impact. greed,
stating that whatever prioritiea had been set by the NSC on our missile
program, the crucial point was that there had been no push behind such
decisions. KNORR asked how can we "red flag" or manipulate the receptivity
of the consumer. Who sticks on these "red flags"? How many "red flags"?
LINDER recalled the earlier statement of ARMSTRONG that the problem
lies not in the intelligence community but in the executive. Who
follows up on NSC decisions to make sure that things get done'
7. BCP4lE pointed out certain difficulties in giving programs the
desired push. For instance, how can one set up a crash, Manhattan-type
project in a context where Congress wants to cut expenses? Secondly,
we had a crash program on bombers in the past that was voted by Congress
over the Administration objections. (DCI interjected that he had
been accused on this score of having been responsible for a $900 million
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Alieberbooh). BMWs third example was Air Farce infatuation with
a crash ICBM program, to the detriment of an IRBM program. NSC
stressed the political implication in Europe of having IRBMs, whereas
Air Force wished to make only about 60 1RBMs, wish them off on the
British, and then be done with the matter.
8. HOOVER wondered if, rather than ad hoc or Killian-type net
evaluations, there might be merit in preparing a net study every six
months. He recognized the dangers herein of such routine netting, and
also the fact that "this pillieon't cure the dpstase" of not having a
commander's estimate. STRAYER felt that the impact problem was a greater
one than that of netting, and that two procedures might improve impact:
a) cut-down on the volume of intelligence production that goes up to,
and bog down, the policy makeriand b) make the conclusions and
format of NIEs less stodgy. Why not tabloid presentation, instead of
-abitesdoctoral dissertation? HOOVER felt that the product's impact
could be improved by indicating the hardness of the intelligence
judgment: i.e., tell when certain judgments were based on photographs,
delectronic data, etc. BCWIE felt, however, that even if we had
Shakespeare writing our NIE's, the written word would not and could
not have the dramatic impact of an actual event. Furthermore, impact
and speeding up of programs is no cure-all in itself, since our
capabilities depend also on ideas re thrust, re-entry, etc. A. SMITH
added that it also depends on who makes the net evaluation. For
example, the impact of Soviet bomber production was other than would
eviA14.4"
have been done had more significance been pointed out, tft4m ,impaadmothe
Soviet and US bomber production, than merely a comparison of numbers.
9. Significafte of missile development for our relations with our
allies. DCI raised a number of questions in this regard. Could the
USSR nullify Strope-based IRBM's by not hitting Europe and, instead,
hitting the US? How can we guard against possible future Soviet political
approaches to our NATO allies in which the Soviets may say, "Look, get
rid of US bases and welean't attack you"? How does the intestinal
fortitude of the British compare with our other allies? What kind of
operational arrangements should we have with our non -British allies?
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To what extent are our bases in Europe and Afrioa now being neutralized
by the existence of operational Soviet 750 n.m. UMW DCI felt that
such problems as these were just around the corner for NATO.
10. .KNORR asked if the existence of missiles fundamentally altered
the basic question, that of a greater awareness of the implications
of nuclear war. DCI answered that this problem was now directly pointed
up for Europeans by the existence of sputnik. BOWIE agreed, stating
that the problem is that Europe recognizes that the US is now coming
under direct threat of Soviet missile attack. The question in Europe:11'191
minds is one of whether our strength will be sufficient and will be
committed in a future crisis situation in which we are not directly
threatened. STRA1ER felt that the missiles had made a psychological
impression that bombers could not do: that is, that as long as thd
question is simply one of bombers, there is a human tendency not to
worry and to feel that somehow we can retaliate; the new factor,
however, is an impression that a missile attack is unanswerable.
11. KNORR felt that a decline in confidence in US retaliatory
determination may, within such countries as France and Belgdm!olead
to a desire to have their own possession and control of missile
retaliatory means; whereas, formerly, as long as they had confidence
in the US ability to counter, their rational course was one of not
wanting to have anything to do with missiles. BOWIE felt in this
regard that there were dangers involved if all the NATO countries did
get deterrent powers. If there were a fortress Britain, France, Germany,
etc., each might want to get out of NATO and of collective security if
it thought it had enough deterrent power of its awn. This, he felt,
was a danger underlying the British White Paper.
12. STRAYER felt that Soviet uncertainties and suspicions re
the West would continue to deter Moscow, since there would be no
assurance that "taking out Germany" would not bring in England and
other powers. BOWIE agreed, stating that whatever arrangements are
make with our allies, it may be better to keep the Soviets uncertain
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as to who among the allies might pull the triggers. This kind of
, question is not a chess game, and the Soviets could not compute such
risks with any degree of accuracy. HOOVER felt that another deterrent
to the USSR would be the fact that even if certain of our allies
did opt out, there might still be some NATO members who might
exercise their missile capability against the USSR. DCI added that
Soviet troubles in this regard might be aggravated by the existence
of a number of floating missile bases: i.e., destro/f yers itted for
launching DUMB.
13. A. SMITH asked what difference, if any, there might be in
neutralist feeling among our allies now that the US as well as
themselves'are under the gun. How will such sentiments express
themselves in situations short of war? STRAYER felt that as time
passes our allies would probably feel that the US would become more
reticent to see a general war situation develop. This would probably
increase sentiment toward neutzelimm and teemed getting rid of our
bases. However, our allies would probably hang on to these bases so
that they would at least have something to sell at such time as they
might sell out. Our problem, therefore, might be what our allies will
ask 113- is a price for maintaining these bases. In short, our relations
with our allies and the existence of our bases in their territory
would go on about as bef . (Not sure I got this correctly) There
was general agreement with iJjudgment.
Evet-oz
14. DCI raised the possibility that "hard bases" might be
established in such out-of-the-way places as eastern Greenland and Libya.
Being thus removed from crowded cities, political problems with our
Allies might not be too great. KNORR somewhat disagreed, feeling that
the Soviets might nullity such bases by threats to destroy that
country's capital city. The point was raised that there might be
increasing dangers to our non-European bases as a result of Soviet
tactics of attempting to turn popular opinions against their awn
governments, either before the outbreak of war, or upon its outbreak.
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BOWIE felt that the question of bases turned on the psychological question
as to whether our allies felt that the bases were to joint advantage.
There would be danger if an image ever developed that the US intended
to use such bases only to protect the US, or if the Soviets were ever
able to create the impression, in such planes as North Africa, that
there was no joint advantage derived from such non-NATO real estate.
(I have a few notes on the last stuff, about economic recession in the
Wrest, if you want them -- though nothing much was said.)
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