O/NE CONSULTANTS' CONFERENCE, PRINCETON, 14-15 MAY 1959

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06186281
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: June 2, 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIKATES
2 June 1959
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 22-59
SUBJECT: ONE Consu1tante4 Conference, Princeton, 14-15 May 1959
Participants:
Coasultants
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Cyril Black
Calvin Hoover
George Kennan
Klaus Knorr
Col. George A. Lincoln
William LA Langer
Harold Linder
Max Milliken
Philip Mosey
Joseph Strayer
T. CuOer Young
CIA
Allen W, Dulles
Gen. Charles P. Cabell
Sherman Kent
Adm. Soscoe Seibmdrmann
Ludwell Montague
James C. Graham
Keith C. Clark
Sherman KENT took the chair during this conference and introduced
discussion of three principal topics Soviet objectives in Berlin
and Germany, the situation in Iraq and the Soviet role therein,
and the situation in the Caribbean and South America. The Director
was present during the afternoon session an Thursday and General
Cabell attended the Friday meeting.
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A. Thursday Morning, 114 Aprils HEWN
1. Mr. KENT opened this session with a brief recap of ONE
production and activities since the last fleeting. He than turned
to the question of Berlin, Germany and European security, referring
to appropriate Estimates and the Memo to the Consultants and asking
the consultants to comment on Soviet objectives concerning these
matters.
2, Initial responses centered on Soviet fear of and Western
attitudes toward a reunited Germany. DR. LANGER saw in Soviet
efforts to gain recognition for the GDR a major attempt to forestall
any reunification -- a tactic given insufficient emphasis by ONE.
KENNAN observed -.with concurrence from LINDER, MOSEL; and
ARMSTRONG that only the US and West Germany really want German
meunification. abeam wants it, but only an his own terms.
MR. MILLIKAN thought the French particularly opposed to reunification
because, with a divided Germany, Paris feels that it can pull the
"determining Iteights$ in the European community.
3. The discussion revolved next around the Soviet attitude
vis-a-vis Germany. KENNAN led off by disagreeing with LANGER
concerning a Soviet move to forestall reunification through Western
recognition of the GDR. Moscow, said HUNAN, had no immediate need
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to raise the issue an these grounds. Further, it is misleading to
speak, as the 0/NE rarer does, of Soviet efforts to create Western
disunity as a major objective in the Berlin crisis; this, after
all, is a longstanding, continuing Soviet objective.
4. MOSELY saw two additional Soviet dbjectivess (0) a need
to take the psychological offensive in foreign policy, following
the defeats of 1956 (e.g., Hungary), and (b) more important,
Khrushchav's belief that the USSR :now has a real strategic military
advantage which can be demonstrated by taking over all of Berlin.
mosm foresaw a series of Soviet�inspired crises and, perhaps,
a Summit conference in which Kbrushchev might say to the West,
'This is it V
5. MR. KENT asked if the Soviet objectives had pretty much been
revealed in public Statements in other words, is their position
now in the open? KENNAN thought not; the depths have not as yet
been plumbed. The West cannot discover any possibilities for compromise
except through private, secret conversations with the Soviets.
6. Asked wherein there may, in fact, be roam for compromise,
KENNAN noted four possible areas: (a) concerning atomic arament in
general; (b) military dispositions of the two sides; (c) Germany's
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international obligations, such as NATO for the West Germans and the
Warsaw Pact for the East; and (d) the qUestion of Germany's frontiers
in the East. ICEMAN emphasised that he was unable to state that an
East4test deal on such matters can be made, but such matters must
be discussed with the Soviets before any compromise is possible.
If there is any formula at all, it must be on the basis of mutual
concessions. MR. HOOVER concurred, and noted that a big deal is
conceivable eps. perhaps even reunification -- because each side
could agree to a formula on the basis of self-interest and a belief
that it would be ahead of the game.
7. MR. KNORR demurred, asking what concessions could the West
make to gain Soviet compromises. Certainly Moscow was not going to
agree to anything which would mean the demise of the GDR. MIL STRAYER
expressed the belief that the Soviets are not likely to "give up a
fairly good certainty in exchange for a hypothetical ftturent in
other words, Moscow is relatively happy with the status quo.
8. MR. LANGER disagreed, pointing out that nuclear arms upset
the situation (i.e., the status quo). MOSEL! and KNORR discounted
Soviet fear of nuclear arms in West Germany -- Moscow has a certain
residual emotional fear of the Germans but is, nonetheless, capable
of a rational assessnent. MOSELY also felt that -- contrary to STRAYER
the Soviets are not content with the status quo; they want something
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better and believe that they can get it.
9. STRAYER, returning to the 0/HE memo, objected to its implica-
tion that the Soviets seek to shore up their position in the GDR and
Europe so that they could then turn to other matters and concentrate
on peaceful competition. STRAYER and MOSELY rejected such a thesis
because it contradicts the estimate of forthcoming Soviet-Induced
crises. MOSELY argued that the memo spoke only of economic and
political competition, and ignored the use of military power.
said that the memo did not rule out Soviet induced
crises, and spoke of quiescence only in terms of the major Soviet
posture in Europe over the coming years. Direct use of military
forces was intentionally omitted because OAS believes the main Soviet
use of its growing military power will be to support its aggressive
political, initiatives in the world at large.
10. MR. KENT raised the question of European disengagement.
He wondered if the possible primary Soviet aim recognition of the
.- were achieved whether we would hear any more about the Rapacki
Plan from Moscow,
11. KENNAN, answering, observed that the Rapacki Plan was not
a Soviet initiatioe. The Poles had told him that US objections to
the plan were very much like those initially encountered in Moscow.
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12. In connection, generally, with disengagement, XENNAN said
he wished to return to the problem of Soviet objectives in the broad
sense and to outline them as he saw them. To begin with there is
the "finality" in Moscow's view of the decision to equip the West
Germans with nuclear weapons after the long Soviet campaign to prevent
such a measure. Secondly, there has been no diminution of West Berlin's
disturbing force in the GDR; there can be no fully satisfactory
situation, from the Soviet viewpoint, in Eastern Europe so long as
this is the case. Thirdly, there is the Soviet calculation that the
Western position has certain weaknesses and that they have a capability
against the West in Berlin, short of war.
13. Therefore, continued XENNAN, the Soviets say to themselves,
let the division in Europe be a clean one, let it survive, but first,
something must be done about Berlin.
14. Thus, Berlin is a squeeze play to get either recognition
of the GDR, or an ouster of the West from Berlin. Either one would
rehabilitate the GDR regime. This is more of a local consideration
than a global one and is, essentially, a defensive one.
15. MR. BUCK, harking back to some of MR. XENNAN's earlier
remarks (concerning possible items for East-West negotiation), wondered
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whether some of the areas delineated by =NAN were really negotiable
issues e.g., atomic armament of West Germany. No doubt, Soviet
willingness to make concessions in re East Germany should be tested
by the West. But are the Soviets seriously concerned about this and
can this matter be separated from a Western withdrawal from Germany?
What, BLACK asked, are the real specifics in re possible Soviet
concessions? Can't Moscow get what it wants -ft as defined by KENNAN
without making any concessions?
16. WA. KENT asked for some guesses concerning the situation
in Moscow. Is Khrushchev, for example, under pressure at home to
negotiate with the West or to produce a Soviet foreign policy victory?
Is there an 'lout party" in the USSR? MOSEIr felt that Khrushchev
was in firm control and not subject to pressure of this sort. KENNAN
stated that he disagreed, but that he lacked time to explain his
position.
17. MR. LANGER said that in much of the discussion there seemed
to be implicit acceptance of the thesis that the USSR possesses
marked military superiority over the US and that Khrushchev is going
to make the most of it. Was this, in fact, the conclusion of the
estimates? MR. RUM noted that making net estimates was not our
business. He went on to say, however, that we believe the Soviets
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themselves do do not -- and perhaps cannot assume safely that they
do have marked superiority.
18. KENNAN, returning to Berlin, observed that sooner or later
he felt that the Soviets would turnover -- in one way or another --
their control over Western access to Berlin to the GDR. MR. KENT
expressed the opinion that they would not do so during the foreign
minister's or Summit conference. This opinion was challenged by
KENNAN6 MOSEL; and several others; the turnover could occur during
these meetings, maybe even on 27 14147. And -- should the foreign
minister's meeting fail and the holding of a Summit conference seem
In doubt -- the Soviets might make such a move in order to force
a heads-of-state meeting. The feeling was that Moscow would estimate,
perhaps wrongly, that US resistance to Soviet pressure of this sort
would be overcome by panic in Western Europe and that the US would
be fldraggedn to the Summit by its allies (especially the British).
Some present disagreed, arguing that an attempt to force a Summit
through crude pressure would be ineffective or would boomerang.
B. Thursday Afternoons moms Briefing on Soviet Trip
19. Prior to the opening of the substantive session on Thursday
afternoon, MR. KENT asked MR. MOSEL! to give his impression of his
recent trip to the USSR. MR. MOSEIX made the following major points.
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20. Living conditions in MOSCIX have improved significantly
since his last (1956) trip. From 60% to 70% of the people on the
street were wearing new clothes and shoes of improved quality, cut,
and lower cost; in 1956, only 5% were in new clothes. (A Westerner
is not now so readily recognized by his shoes.) A greater variety
of food is now available, though prices are the same. A great deal
of housing construction is underway.
21. The people expect the standard of living to continue to
rise. Father, the tangible evidence of regime concern for popular
welfare, combined with a tendency to forgot the Stalinist tyranny,
has resulted in greater popular belief in the regime's general
propaganda line, including that toward foreign affairs.
22. MR. MOSELY said that he had had an opportunity to speak to
about 30 members of the Soviet Academy of Science, usually in small
groups. He observed that these people were quite willing to talk,
without apparent fear, and seemed numb more knowledgeable about
Western affairs than they had been in 1956. Most were able to read
such Western periodicals as theElimes, Manchester Guardian, and
the Economist.
23. University professors, on the other hand, seemed more
depressed and less willing to talk than the members of the Academy.
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MOSELY learned that six young history instructors at MASCOW U. had
been fired fairly recently for "objectivismM (not further defined)4
Members of the faculties of physical sciences were more optimistic
and seemed to view their colleagues in the social sciences with
same disdain. A Physics professor was certain that the educational
reform would not affect Ws department.
24. Students struck MR. MOSELY as being apathetic about ideological
matters and as keenly interested in the outside world, though they
were generally quite patriotic -- but not Chauvinistic -- and pleased
about such Soviet successes as the sputniks. Foreign students in
Moscow such as those from the UAR and India were depressed
and resentful of the general atmosphere of political repression.
MR. MOSELY suggested that it would be worthwhile for the US to
invite these students to study in the US -- he thought the contrast
would be most beneficial to us. He also recommended most strongly
that the US-Soviet exchange program of students and faculty be
greatly expanded.
O. Thursday Afternoons Iraq and the Scciot Role There
25. MR. KENT called for a discussion of the situation in Iraq.
On the first sections of the Iraqi paper (SN1E 36.2..349), KENNAN
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and others expressed agreement, including the impossibility of
defining Qassimis "point of no return." The consensus, in short,
accorded with our estimate's proposition that there is no one
prospective criterion which will irrefutably indicate that the
Soviets are in control. KENNAN noted possible historical parallels:
(a) Kerenskyle use of the Communists in St. Petersburg to neutralize
the army and turn enlisted men against officers, and (b) Communist
efforts to keep up a facade of independence in Czechoslovakia until
this position was challenged by the Mari:hall Plan initiative in Europe.
26. Concerning the probable policies of a Communist-controlled
Iraq, KENNAN and LINDER stressed continuing Iraqi need for oil
revenues from the West, whatever the complexion of regime. In
general, there was agreement on the proposition that both the Soviets
and the Iraqi Communists would prefer to play this operation quietly
at least as far as rocking the Western oil boat is concerned; and
would probably make a real effort to maintain a facade of Iraqi
independence and dedication to Arab nationalism while they could.
KENNAN and YOUNG emphasized Iran as the next likely target, and
argued that when Iran is ripe for an exploitable upheaval a Communist
Iraq would be likely to pull out the stops.
27. A significant difference of opinion arose over what would
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happen if and when Communist power in Iraq should be challenged
militarily from the CAR, Turkey, Iran, and/or the Vest. Most notably,
HUNAN expressed his disagreement with our estimate that the Soviets
would on balance, probably not react militarily against US-UK,
Turkish or Iranian forces if the latter engaged in full scale Inter-
vention in Iraq. He thought it highly probable that the Soviets
would respond to any such UDV8 quickly and forcefully -- moving into
northern Iran at least and probably into Iraq as well. LANCER
added Afghanistan to the list of possible targets. Most others
agreed that the Soviets would feel compelled, for reaSons of prestige
and because of sensitivity over southern border areas to react more
vigorously than the SNIE indicated -- except in the event that out- f
side intervention was limited in scope or requested by the Baghdad
regime.
28. STRAYER and BLACK pointed out that the Soviet response to
such a military move in Iraq need not necessarily be a countermove
in Iraq or a neighboring state; it could take the farm of a counter-
punch elseihere -- though KENNAN discounted this with the general
argument that the Soviets were already pushing elsewhere about as
much as circumstances allow. LANGER thought that the USSR is
probably more concerned about gaining control of or neutralizing Iran,
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and estimated estimated that in a pinch the Soviets would sacrifice Iraq
to gain Iran. He nevertheless emphasized his feeling that Iraq
presented a very explosive situation. MACK stressed the possibility
that Soviet countermoves might take other than military forms. All
agreed that there was an almost infinite variety of possible Soviet
responses in such a situation.
29. With respect to general Soviet intentions and motives
toward Iraq, there was agreement that Soviet policy in the situation
Was opportunistic. The group generally doubted that Iraqi develop-
ments had been planned that way in advance. All agreed in discounting
the proposition that Berlin was part of a master scheme to cover a
thrust in Iraq. It was felt that Berlin and the German problem are
in themselves far too important to the Soviets to be used in this
manner.
30. On the broader question of future Soviet policy toward
bourgeois nationalist movements in the Afro-Asian area, the consensus
was that the USSR would sooner or later have to stop playing the
neutralists' game, but they would handle each case on an ad hoc
basis, guided by specific opportunities. STRAYER stressed the
difficulties raised for the Soviets by this problem, though both
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be and am were inclined to believe that the Soviets would press
ahead vigorously despite such difficulties. 1CUNG considered that
the risk of alienating Nasser would not serve as any kind of effective
restraint on a forward Soviet policy in the area.
31. With respect to the general quality and approach of the
Iraqi SNIE,s1 (as well as other crash mere), most agreed with MIL-
ZrEAS that it would be desirable to achieve more depth, social
and political analysis, etc., than appeared in these hurr3r:41p jobs.
STRAYER in particular stressed the disadvantages of devoting so
much effort to SNIEfs, everytime a crisis arose, at the expense of
more comprehensive, long-range estimating. Be one, however, came
up with a ready solution for meeting these difficulties while still
turning out obviously necessary crash papers.
D. Friday Morning: The Situation in the Caribbean
32. Mt. KENT opened the discussion with remarks on Latin
America in general and referred to the several study papers at hand
covering the Caribbean as a whole, Nicaragua, and recent strike activity
in Latin America. Mt. MONTAGUE briefly surveyed the situation in the
Caribbean area, focusing on Cuba, and concluded by stating that in Cabe
there existed a danger of an Arbenz-type progression of events.
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33. HENNAS qUestioned whether a man of Castro% temperament
could be a part of the international Communist apparatus and recalled
Stalin's distrust of Communists in the Spanish Civil War. He
warned that we must exercise caution in the use of the word Cormunist,
and differentiate between those vaguely affected by).deology and those
hard core disciplined Communists who are a genuine part of the
apparatus. He pointed out that the emphasis on, personal loyalty in
Latin America makes it difficult to grow hard core Communists there.
(tiring KENNAN's stay in )&scow, he noted that there were no more
miserable people than the Latin Americans in Russia.) What we need is
a new term for the typical Latin American fellow traveler.
34. LIN= indicated that the Castros have manifested a degree
of discipline. MCVTAGUE added that things like agrarian reform are in
the old Latin tradition, but still are also reminiscent of Arbenx.
KEW= suggested that there is a lesson in the Mexican revolution
which was a national phenomena. Although many people seem to think
there is some magic word by which Russians are able to twist almost
any situation, very few people like to submit to eoreisn direction.
BLACK rointed out that whereas the Soviets used military power in
Eastern Europe, in Latin America, where real revolutions take place,
they jump on the bandwagon. gr. LAMER asked if there weren't a lack
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of local leadership to facilitate a Soviet move. MONTAGUE stated
that the Guatemalan revolution in 1944 was a liberal Latin American
affair which became tolerant of Communists and led to Atbene
dependence on them.
35. There was general agreement that the Nicataguan situation
probably would not come to a head soon. MOSLEY felt that if a Castro-
type movement got started in Nicaragua, the middle class influence
would be pretty well excluded. STRAYER indicated that whereas there is
a sizeable middle class in Cdbap in Nicaragua and Panama it was smaller.
Hence a Castro-type revolution in those countries would bring a
different result. General CABELL stated that the Panama filibusters
made a mistake by including motly Cubans, thus permitting the OAS
to do more than it might be able to do in a Nicaraguan revolution
utilizing a predominantly national group. There was agreement that
if one of the Somozas were to be assassinated, the other could not long
survive. In response to LINCOLN's question asking what could be done
to deflate Caribbean revolutionary fervor, CABELL mentioned the affect
of the OAS' action in the Panama affair.
36. LANGER asked if it is inevitable that Cuba will fall into the
hands of ammanian and confusion. CABELL stated that in view of the
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codbination of ipproper leadership, bureaucratic paralysis, and
Comunist pachinations in Cuba, he believed that there was a better
than even probability that drastic action will have to be taken there.
But we shouldn't jupp in at every turn as this is contrary to our
policy. KENNAN epphasised that such action should follow Careful
preparation to assure that our best interests are served.
37. The major upshot of the morning's discussion was the
inability of the group to agree on the likelihood of Mlle's going
Communist.
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