CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06224745
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-01825
• Publication Date: August 10, 1961

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COPY NO. 7
OCI� NO., 0292/4
10 August 19t
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
A
THE USSR'S ROLE IN THN CONGO
A year ago, Moscow thought
it saw an excellent opportunity
to influence the Congo's polite
/eel and econenIc development--
and to advance Soviet goals for
Afriea as a whole�by establish-
ing a firm advisory position
within the central government
at Leopoldville, For a time,
the OSSR's objective of unify-
ing the country under Patrice
Lumumba coincided with the aim
of independent African statee.
Soviet leaders however, undere
estimating the extent of Afro-
Asian support for the United
Netleee, overplayed their hand,
and .:bloc alma in Africa
Buffered A severe setback.
Although its opportunities
to influence the situation have
diminished, the USSR does net
consider the Congo a lest cause
An eightenan Soviet diploma tie
mieseion arrived unannounced in
the Gisengit stronghold of Stan-
Leyville early last month, pre-
sumable anticipating the recon-
vening of the Congolese perlia-
meet. Two members of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry told an Amer-
ican official on 27 July that
the leRSS expected the forma-
tiou of a Congolese government
representing ell factions in
parliament. Moscow has begun
to ley the groundwork for cul-
tivating Congoleme extremists
And those elements sympathetic
to the Communist bloc,
Baily Soviet Attitude
Soviet actions in the
months before the cense re-
ceived independence gave no
evidence that the Kremlin lead-
ers anticipated the later de-
velopments there. Peter to
1060 the bloc maintained lim-
ited coetaets with Congolese
political figures tbrough the
Czech Consulate ig Ieepoldville.
The Communiete began system-
atic cultivation of leading
10 Aug 61.
Congolese during the pre-indee
pendeoce Bound Table Conference
in Bruseele early that year.
Principal responsibility
apparently was assigned to the
Belgian Communist party (PCB)
and, within the party, to cen-
tral committee member Albert
Wee/Edna. Trips to East Ger-
any. Prague, and Moscow were
offered to the delegates, and
some�including Gizenga�vial ed
the bloc during and imm ia
after the contcronce.
The Econemie Round Table
le late April and early May of
1960 gave the PCB and bloc rep-
reeentat;ves in Bressols further
occasion for contacts with the
Congolese.
After the Belgian Govern-
ment ended its administration
of the Congo, on 30 jEMA 1960,
Khrushcbee Sent a personal nee-
sage recognizing the regime
meld requesting diplomatic rela-
tions. The Soviet delegates
attending the independence
ceremonies remateed more than
A week in Leopoldville, and at
their departure an agreement
to exchange ambassadors was
AROOOMOOd.
The mutiny which broke
out a week after independence
among Congolese troops near
Leopoldville who demanded in-
creased pay and the removal of
Belgian officers�initially eat;
not politically luspired or
Primarily anti-European in
character, It received in-
pates, however, from inflam-
natory anti-Belgian speeches
by Lumumhae who had cone out
ahead of his rivals in elec.,
tiOns a few weeks earlier and
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CUP INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUBBABY
headed a "national coalition''
geSerement representig 2$
different factional and parties.
Rimaecassion to the soldieea'
demenddr.ied to the arey'indisel-
pline and rioting throughout
most of the provincee eed
PremPted m 'request from him
and 'Veal-dent gasavueo for ee
aBSISCance In controlling the
outbreak.
Imfluencing Fietorc
The rapidly deteriorating
political end economic ettno_
tion 'Welch followed gave soviet
leaders An opportunity to estab-
lish a stroag bloc presence
deep in flack Africa and at the
Mem time to further the Metes
page as -chnmelen Pt szticolooial-
lam, benerector of mealy inee.
pendent African etates, and de-
fender of African and &S inn na-
tiomaiela, ln odditi000 it
offered Ulf) Poonibility of open-
ing to Communist penetration wkay
memshejacent to the still de-
Pnodent territories of 'British
/Dust Africa, the Perteguemo
colanies, and, within the
French Commenity, the now Cen-
tral African Repeblic and Congo
Republic (Brazzaville),
The collapse of the Parie
"mumelt" meeting two menthe
earlier had ended Meseowrs ppc-
sVIRMit attitV40 of conciliation
toward the Went, and Soviet
leaders had adePted an locreae-
inglY belligerent emsture. Nore-
ever, the Congo eituatioo fol-
lowed in the wake of the Cob-
ferenee Of Coamunist leaders
at Bucharest in late Jane. at
!Witch the Chimoee openly no-
eneed Kbrusbither of softnees
toward the West, A specific
poen* at Isaac wee the degree
and character of 'support the
blot should give nationalist
movenonts in the underdeveloped
areas.
Soviet leaders apparently
felt that developments in the
Congo could be fully exploited
without undue rise, and Moscow
=mated an extensive campaign
of official atatementeo diplo-
matic activity, and prepaganda
an Fart of ita strong anti-US
lino.
Bloc Tectice
Belgium'm airlift Of re-
inforcements to the Congo to
assist its troops who. re-
mained there by treaty was is,
mediately denoueced by Ehruanchev
Its a special press conference at
the Kremlin as an attempt to sup-
preen tho COMO'S attalaVent Of
independence. This was followed
by a Soviet Government statement
accueing the western powere of
"OhloB to "liquidate " the new
state through direct military
action,
The USSR initially anpport-
ed UV action to deal with the
SitmatiOn in en effort to pre-
vent Unilateral seetere inter-
vention, force the withdeaeal of
Belgian troops and oiviliae md-
viumrs, and etrengtben the cen-
tral governnent. Premier Le-
munibars extreme enticolonial
nationalism supported the bloc's
obieetive of reMoviag European
influences from Africa.
The indepondeot Afrieem
states favored UN intervention
se a means of easing tenaton,
restoring the Authority of the
Leopoldville regime, and avoid-
ing extension of the cold war
into Africa. Ghana Ind Guinea.
already aiding Lunumbe /thane
'artily as part of their effort
to promote cialme to African
leedershipo wars particularly
eager to cooperate with the W.
In addition, they saw an oppor-
tueity to enhance their role
within the international or-
gonization, to insulate the
Congo from unwelcome foreign
intervention, and--he acting
as mediator between the Congo-
lese premier and the UN--to net
a precedent for flallire
tions elsewhere in Africa.
At the Security toenail
Emission convened to dinemes the
siteatloo, the Soviet delegate
demanded a resolution condom/l-
ing Belgium's "armed aggres-
sion'," accusing the US of col-
laborotion, and millet for the
withdrawal of Belgian forces.
In the early days of the
crisis, Soviet leaders 'sought
to create the impression that
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the USSR might intervene. In
reply to Lumembale and Kanavu-
bu's request on 14 July tO
"watch developments closely"
since the Congo might "find it
necessary" to ask for Soviet
help, Wireshchev promised
"resolute measures" and the
"required help" if further "im-
perialist aggression" made such
action necessary. Responding
to Lumumba's reiterated threat
A few days later to request
Soviet treops, FirSt DepUty
Foreign Miniuter Kumnetsov told
the Security Council that the
USSR would "answer all requests"
of peoples struggling for lib-
eration. These carefully non-
committal pledgee, by appearing
responsive to the Congo Govern-
mantle concern, were also in-
tended to bolster Lumumba's
tenuous bold over the govern-
mental machinery,
Meanwhile the USSR began
rallying neutralist support
for its campaign to brand the
Western countries aggressors.
First Deputy Premier Mikoyan
and, Foreign Minister Gremyko
expounded Soviet views on the
Congo situation to diplomats
at 4 reception on 13 July and
called on the Afro-Asian coun-
tries to join the USSR in de-
nouncing the West's interven-
tion.
However, Soviet leaders
were careful to avoid becoming
isolated from the Afro-Asian
position. In the Security Coun-
cil, Kuznetsov withdrew his
resolution calling for evacua-
tion of Belgian forces within
three days and accepted a mod-
10 Aug
crate One for "speedy" with-
draw.1 sponsored by Tunisia
d Ceyleo
of diplomats
were tak.tg tiLO lead in urging
UN assistance to the COngolese
Government, Moscow was obtain-
ing maximum propaganda advan-
tage by circumventing the UN
facilities and delivering aid
directly to the Congolese. The
first Soviet planeload of food
supplies arrived in Leopoldville
on 20 July; from then until mid-
September, whoa bloc personnel
were expelled from the Congo,
the Soviet bloc provided Lu-
umba'e extremist faction with
17 aircraft (including a per-
sonal plane for Lumumba), IOC)
trucks, and unknown quantities
email arms, money, food, and
medicines, The bloc sent 350
to 400 technicians and several
igh-level political and eco-
nomic advisers, and Soviet IL-18s
ferried Ghanaian and Guinean
troops to the Congo in support
of Lumumba.
The aid port of bloc
and radical African states enc
aged Lumumba to take a bard line
with his opponents and to defy the
UN in order,to achieve his goal of
unifying the Congo under his per-
nal rule. Re boasted of bloc
support and of the Soviet troope
which would be sent if he re-
quested them.
Soviet leaders apparently
me concerned over the ex-
ed Congolese expectations
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of bloc support. A party of
Soviet representatives headed
by FOreign Ministry official
Pomin--/ater appointed Soviet
charg�'affaires--arrived in
Leopoldville in late July
aboard a Soviet food plane to
coordinate future moves with
the Lumumba government and
channel first-hand information
to Nescow.
During Lumumba'S visit to
New York at the end of July,
the USSR sought to moderate
Congoleee demands. Two Soviet
Government statements issued
between 31 July and 5 August
reaffirmed the USSR's remit-
sees to "take resolute measures
to rebuff the aggresoors," but
they carefully avoided coo-."
mitting Moscow to unilateral
action.
An offical statement on
20 August, contained the first
reference to "volunteers," a
flood of which could come from
among "loyal friends" in Africa
and Other continents if addi-
tional NATO units were sent to
the Congo. Th0 Congo three
days later rejected Soviet mil-
itary help, however, stating
that it did not need foreign
volunteers. Soviet propaganda
began to claim that Moscow's
action had prevented the US
from intervening in the situa-
tion.
Attitude Toward the UN
Soviet leaders from the
outset regarded the UN opera-
tion in the Congo as no more
than a temporary expedient for
eliminating Belgian influence
and creating conditions favor-
able to advancing bloe aims in
Africa. The African states
ex-
pected that the UN would act in
support of Lumumba and Use
10 Aug 61
LT i%11Y
force against opposition elements
--particularly secessionist
Katanga Province--to unify the
country under Leopoldville. They
feared that political fragmentation
into autonomous provincial govern-
ments would encourage continued
economic dependence on Brussels
and that national allegiance
would be Subordinated to tribal
and sectional loyalties.
Secretary General Hammer-
skjoid, however, ruled that
the UN resolutions did not author-
ize UN troops to use force on
behalf of the central govern-
ment. His failure to move
against Tebembets Belgian-backed
regime in Katanga drew Strong
Afro-Asian and bloc criticism,
Moscow accused Hammarskjold and
Under Secretary Blanche of con-
nivance with the Western powers
to perpetuate colonial control
under cover of the UN.
When Mobutu overthrew Lu-
mumba oo 14 September and sub-
sequently expelled all bloc
representatives, Soviet tactics
entered a now phase. The USSR
launched an all-out campaign
to wreck the UN's Congo opera-
tion. Moscow, for the first
time, broke with the Afro-Asians
by vetoing in the Security Coun-
cil a moderate resolution spon-
sored by TUniala and Ceylon de-
signed to confirm Hammarskjold's
stand against unilateral military
support to the Congo. General
Assembly approval of the reso-
lution on 15 September provoked
the first Soviet propaganda
criticism of the Afro-Asian
position, In his shoe-pound-
ing address before the General
Assembly a week later, Ithru-
shchev reaffirmed the USSR's
support for Lumumba and made,
his 'vtreika"� proposal for
replacing the UN secretary
general,
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CURTIRMT INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY SUMMARY
Soviet Influence Wanes
The bloc's direct involve-
ment In the Congo virtually
ceased with the olosure of the
Soviet and Czech embassies at
LeePoldvillo 00 17 Septenbcr,
and the USSR sought to channel
assintance to pro-Lumumba
torten through Gni/Ilea, Ghana,
and the UAL UN control of
the major airfieldn prevented
any substantial amount of a
free reachia the rebels
ID the UN, Moscow
refuse to pay its ehare of the
Congo operation expenses and
demanded that Hammarskjold sub-
mit ptopess18 for withdrawing
UN military forage,
Tbe USER renponded to
Lumumba's arrest in early De-
cenber wtth a government state-
ment ocatningly attacking Han-
marakjold and the UN command
and laying the blame entirely
on what it alleged was US in-
terterenne, The statement
again voiced displeasure with
those African and Asian statee
which "have not preserved the
requisite unity" on the Congo
lenue,
Soviet leaders took A cau-
tious attitude toward the runp
government proolained in Stan-
leyville by Lumumba's pro-
Communlst deputy Antoine Glaenga
in mid -December, presumably to
maintain flexibility with re-
gard to events in Leopoldville.
Growyko &tared publicly that
the USSR rocognized Gizenga as
acting premier, but Moncow did
not extend formal recognition
to tile regime. After a delay
of ten days. Khruehthev rep/led
to an appeal for material ea-
sistmace from Gizenga by reit-
erating general promises of
soviet support and sympathy.
The VAR, hovever, threw
its entire support to Gimenga.
A Ddiplonatic^ missioawas -es-
tablinhed for him in Cairo, and
UAR officera in Stanleynillo
provided military advice and
technleal assistance. Nasir
10 Aug 61
withdrew the UAR unit from the
UN command and urged Ghana and
Moroceo to do the sane,
Moecon apparently regarded
UAR nupport'for Gina as
strengthening the position of
the extremists and thee facil-
itating Lumunba'e eventual
restoration, It sought to co-
ordinate bloc aid efforts with
the (MR and made available to
Gizengn's miesion in Cairo a
substantial oum of money and a
snall quantity of arms. Bloc
states joined the VAR, Mukha,
and Guinea in urging Sudanese
offinials to perait UAR over-
flinhte en route to Stanleyville.
With Khartnem'a refusal to grant
this permission, bine and tad-
cal African support for the
pro-Inimumba group was rentricted
to denanda for Lmmunba's release
&nd reinatatement and for the
disarming on Mobutu and Tehembd
forces.
The Soviet leaders saw in
Lumunba's death�announced in
mid-February�an excellent op-
pertunitY to carry forward their
canpaign against colonialism and
again identify the USSR with
anti-Western elements In Africa
and Asia. They hoped it would
load to the withdranal of the
remaining Afro-Aelan contingents
in the Congo and block any effee-
tivo Western-backed UN action to
deal with the eituation.
VOscow also aeixed on the
issue ae a pretext for renewing
Soviet attache on Hamnarskjeld
and for pressing Khrushchev's
plan to reorganize the UN in the
hope of garnering Aft -Lam
support. In letters in late
February to Nehru and other heads
of government in Asia Africa,
Europe, and Latin America, Kbru-
shchev nought to establisb the
point that Lunumba's death Jus-
tified the Soviet proposal and
Mosnow's attack lent fall on
Heemarehiold- Ee proposed that
all "foreign troops" be with-
drawn from the Caego and re-
placed with a conmission on
African atates,
As a gesture of restraint
toward the now adminlstration
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in Mashingtom, Khruabehav did
not directly implicate the US
to liumumba's death, but he
obliquely warned against any
unilateral intervention in the
Coco.
Shortly thereafter, Com-
munist China and the hioe sat-
ellites formally recognized
Olzeuga's regise and agreed to
exchnego %ambassadors,
Present Soviet Attitthdn-,
Bececee's bitter dominate-
tion of Eammarskjeld reflected
the frustration the Soviet
loaders had felt since Lumnaha
was overthroun and bloc mis-
sions expelled from the Congo.
In attacking the UN organiza-
tion, however, the USSR Lost
support among the African and
Asian countries. While the
Asian-African states disagreed
with some of Hammarskjoldia
P011ates, they were unanimous
in upholding the institutional
authority of the secretary gen-
eral, and they considered the
United Matioas the only alter-
native to involvement in !met-
Rest power struggles.
Soviet hopes in tho Congo
were further frustrated by an
aPPAront conflict of totarent
between Moscow and Cairo. An
early as January there were
signs that the Soviet Union.
vas becoming concerned over
the OA R's influence with Gi-
seam and the possibilit of
unilateral GAR aid
The Sovle o
e also said to feel that
Nasir was paying 'Lip oorvicAr
to African nationalism while
restiog on the, -laurels" of
1.0 Aug 01
his sueeess in influeanieg
AfrO-Aalan opinion,
in late bruary, fellow-
idg the. adoption by the US Gen-
eral Assembly of a moderate
resolution sponsored by the VAR,
Liberiai and Ceyldn upholding.
aammarskjold's authority in the
Congo, a to Soviet official
reportedly characterized the
VAIVs African policy as yeesiv-
peal' Mid. said Nasir's real aim
was to isolate the 'socialist
namr fros Africa.
� The failure of ronoved,So-
riot efforts to provide aid to
Gisenga and to install him eS
LUMUMlui'S legitimate successor
closed out this phase of Moscow'm
attempts to influence events in
the Congo./
Nevertheless, with politica/
forces and structures still in
flux, the Congo remains a poten-
tially fertile mad for bloc
setiviti
Bo-
vlet Foreign Ministry official
Semenov warned Amibausader Moms-
*on in mid-May that the Sovieta
had been restrained with respect
to the Congo, but that if the
situation should deteriorate,
they would act *ivory foreefolly,"
Should the current anetable rela-
tionships among Congolese fac-
tious break down, Moscow could
be expected to novo evicXly in
an attempt to influence subse-
quent alignments and recoup its
former position.
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