REVIEW OF INTERROGATION PROGRAM ON 29 JULY 2003

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06238939
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2021
• Case Number: F-2015-00693
• Publication Date: August 5, 2003

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5 August 2003
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: (U/AA-I-Ut) Review of Interrogation Program on
29 July 2003
1_ esT On 29 July 2003, the DCI and CIA General Counsel
attended a meeting in the office of National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice to discuss current, past and future CIA
policies and practices concerning the interrogation of certain
detainees held by CIA in the wake of the 11 September 2001
attacks on the United States and in the Nation's war on terror.
The meeting was an outgrowth of the DCI's 3 July 2003 memorandum
to Dr. Rice requesting a reaffirmation of the CIA's policies and
practices. The meeting was attended by the DCI, CIA General
Counsel Scott W. Muller, the Attorney General, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Patrick Philbin, Dr.
Rice, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the
(b)(1) National Security Council (tisc) John Bellinger and the Vice
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2. ("St The DCI started the meeting by stating that
CIA wanted a reaffirmation of its policies and practices (1) in
light of recent White House statements and the resulting media
which had created the impression that certain previously
authorized interrogation techniques are not used by US personnel
and are no longer approved as a matter of US policy and (2) in
(b)(1) liaht of the facL.that the annual review of
(b)(3) NatSecAct was in process.
3. ($-Y After the DCI's introduction, Mr. Muller,
distributed to each participant a set of briefing slides
entitled CIA Interrogation Program, 29 July 2003. A copy is .
attached hereto as Attachment A. Mr. Muller walked through the
slides with the group page by page, explaining orally the
substance of what was shown on each page. Each page was
reviewed with the exception of pages 16-17.
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4. (TS) Near the outset of the discussion of "Legal
Authorities" (page 2), the Attorney General forcefully
reiterated the view of the Department of Justice that the
techniques being employed by CIA were and remain lawful and do
not violate either the anti-torture statute or US obligations
under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment. He said that he had reviewed the
25 June 2003 letter to Senator Leahy from DoD General Counsel
William J. Haynes II and had reviewed with Patrick Philbin the
facts relating to actual CIA interrogations in the past year.
Having done so, he said that CIA practices were entirely lawful
and that he agreed with the statement that had been made with
respect to those policies and practices in the Haynes letter.
(In the week preceding the meeting, CIA had given Philbin,
Bellinger and Gonzales a full briefing on the facts contained in
the slides and, in advance of the meeting, Philbin had reviewed
all the pertinent facts with the Attorney General). In the
course of the discussion, the Attorney General and Pat Philbin
gave a lengthy explanation of the law and the applicable legal
(b)(3)CIPAct.Drincip les. Their explanation squares completely with the
(b)(6) understanding under which CIA has been operating. See previous
Memoranda for the Record by Scott W. Muller, Acting General
(b)(1) and related materials. - Counsel John A. Rizzo, and/or CTC/LGL (b)(3) CIAAct
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5. (TS
There was a discussion of the 27 June 2003
Washington Post article reporting that the Administration had
pledged not to use "stress and duress" techniques in
interrogating detainees. The Vice President asked how the press
could have gotten such an impression and Muller mentioned both
�the President's statement in February 2002 concerning "humane"
treatment of detainees and the various occasions including
26 June 2003 on which the White House press office had stated
that US treatment of detainees was "humane." Judge Gonzales
informed the Vice President that the President's February 2002
policy is applicable only to the Armed Forces. Referring to the
.statements from the Deputy White House press secretary in
response to questions from the Washington Post on the occasion
of the President's 26 June 2003 proclamation on United Nations
International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, Bellinger
explained that the press officer had "gone off script" and had
mistakenly gone back to "old" talking points. The DCI stated
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SUBJECT: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003
that it was important for the White House to cease stating that
US Government practices were "humane" as that term is easily
susceptible to misinterpretation. Bellinger undertook to insure
that the White House press office ceases to make statements on
the subject other than that the US is complying with its
obligations under US law. (In or about March, Bellinger had
made ,a similar commitment and reported to the undersigned and to
Judge Gonzales that he had informed Press Secretary An
Fleischer that the White House press office should not state
either that the US was complying with the Geneva Conventions--
which are inapplicable--or was treating all detainees
"humanely.")
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-.-ctroach, properly implemented, was appropriate.
n
6. (TS) There was a brief discussion of the recent letter
to Dr. Rice from Senator Arlen Specter. The Attorney General
strongly advised that the statements in the 25 June 2003 letter
to Senator Leahy be reaffirmed. Addressing the purported
misinterpretation Of US policy reported in the Washington Post
and CIA's concern that merely reaffirming the Leahy letter (in
light of the other statements made on 26 June and the reporting)
could be read as acknowledgement of the erroneous view of
Administration policy reflected in that reporting, the Attorney
General proposed that the response to Senator Specter emphasize
that the statements In the Haynes response to the Leahy letter
were responses_ to specific legal questions and had been
carefully and narrowly crafted. There was agreement that this
7. (TS, In connection with the "Safeguards"
discussion in the briefing slides (pages 6-7), Mr. Bellinger
explained that CIA's intent and good faith were important
elements of the legal analysis and that the safeguards were
intended to reflect that good faith in spirit and reality.
Mr. Philbin explained at this point that, under the Eighth
Amendment, it was critical to look at the purpose of the acts.
He said that certain. Human Rights groups were citing Eighth
Amendment cases (including Department of Justice briefs) and
/claiming that "stress and duress' techniques violated the Eighth
Amendment per se. He explained that those cases, including one
involving the shackling of a prisoner, were inapplicable
3
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because, among other things,
malicious' punishment whereas
they
the
involved "wanton and
interrogations at issue were.
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undertaken for very different
and
legitimate purposes.
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8. (TS, Dr. Rice asked about the entry (page 7)
"Infractions remedied (two incidents, no harm).' She asked if
there had not been a death in connection with the interrogation
program. Mr. Muller stated that there had been two deaths--both
reported to the Inspector General, the Criminal Division and
Congress--but that neither had involved the Interrogation
Program (i.e., authorized interrogation personnel engaged in or
authorized to engage in interrogations as part of the
Interrogation Program or detainees who were the authorized
subject of enhanced techniques).
9. (S) Mr. Muller explained that the senior leadership of
the Intelligence Committees had been briefed. The Vice
President asked if this included the new leadership and Hr
Muller stated that it did Mr. Muller also stated that CIA
(b)(1) intended to do another briefing after the recess.
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10. (TS In connection with page 8 ("Interrogation
Methods"), Mr. Muller stated that the technique most likely to
raise concerns was the waterboard. Dr. Rice asked for a
description of the procedure which Mr. Muller gave, noting that
the Attorney General opinion authorized administrations of up to
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11. (TS Mr.'Muller summarized the material on pages
9-12 of the briefing slides, stating that they showed that the
detainees subject to the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind
or another had produced significant intelligence information
(b)(1) that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives.
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7 12. (TS Mr. Muller reviewed page 13 of the slides,
noting in particular that three individuals had been the subject
of the viaterboard. The Vice President asked about the
relationship between the column entitled "Sessions" and the
column entitled "WB." Mr. Muller explained. Dr. Rice commented
specifically on the number of times that KSM had been
waterboarded (119). Mr. Muller stated his understanding that a
number of the uses had been for less than the permitted
4
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40 seconds. Patrick Philbin stated that the Attorney General
opinion authorized repetitions of the procedure and the Attorney
General stated that he was fully aware of the facts and that CIA
was "well within" the scope of the opinion and authority given
to CIA by that opinion. The Vice President commented on the
(N O) value of what KSM had provided and noted that KSM had obviously
'--n a "tough customer"..
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13. (TS The DCI stated that it was important for
CIA to know that it was executing Administration policy and not
merely acting lawfully. The Vice President stated, and Dr Rice
(b)(1)" and the Attorney General agreed, that this was the case.
(b)(3)NatSecAct Muller stated that this left the issue of how to deal with
tne annual review process. There was a brief
discussion of that process in which John Bellinger stated, in
response to a question from the Vice President, that there was
no requirement for a full meeting of the NSC-Principals. (Judge
Gonzales stated that he was certain that DoD General Counsel
Haynes [and, by implication, the Secretary of Defense] was
clearly aware of the substance of CIA's program based on, among
other things, the DoD review of similar techniques and numerous.
discussions. Mx. Muller and Mr. Bellinger agreed. At an
earlier meeting on this subject, Judge Gonzales had stated that,
when the techniques. were first authorized; Dr. Rice had
discussed them with the SeoretarY of Defense.) After
discussion, the Vice President, Dr. Rice and the Attorney
General agreed (with the DCI's concurrence) that it was not
(N(1) necessary or advisable to have a full Principals Committee
(b)(3)NatSecActtirdtoreviewan reaffirm the Program. Instead, as part of
the process some combination of Dr. Rice, the
Vice President and/or Judge Gonzales would inform the President
(W(1) that the CIA was conducting interroaations
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using techniques
that could be controversial but that the Attorney General had
reviewed and approved them as lawful under US law.
(b)(6)
Scott W. Muller
5
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ADDENDUM (5 August 2003)
(S) In a telephone conversation on 4 August,
Mr. Bellinger informed Mr. Muller that Dr. Rice was now of the
view that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense
should be briefed prior to A specific plan
will be proposed in the next few days(W)
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1 - DDCI
1 - EXDIR
1 - DDO
1 - D/OCA
1 - SDGC
1 -
1 - CTC/LGL
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EYES ONLY
� CIA
INTERROGATION
PROGRAM
29 July 2003
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OBJECTIVES
� To brief pursuant to the annual
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review.
To provide facts about the interrogation program, in light
of recent erroneous press coverage and other inquiries.
� To affirm that the program is consistent with U.S. policy.
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OVERVIEW
3
Certain "enhanced" techniques are employed in the interrogations of a limited
number of detainees.
� The techniques are drawn from methods used in DOD interrogation resistance
training at the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape ("SERE") schools.
� The techniques have been approved by the Attorney General and fully
disclosed to the SSCI and HPSCI leadership.
� The use of the techniques has produced significant results.
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� LEGAL AUTHORITIES
Properly conducted and authorized interrogations:
� Do not violate the federal anti-torture statute, 18 U.S.0 2340-2340A
� Do not violate the Constitution. They do not "shock the conscience" under
the 5th and 14th Amendments. The 8th Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual "punishment" is inapplicable.
� Do not constitute "cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment"
under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment because, under U.S. law, those terms are limited to
U.S. constitutional requirements.
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PROGRAM BRIEFINGS TO POLICY MAKERS
�� Executive Branch (White House, NSC, DOJ)
� � Spring and Summer 2002
� � Winter, Spring and Summer 2003
� Congress (Chair and Ranking Minority Members HPSCI and
SSCI)
� Summer and Fall 2002 HPSCI chairman Goss and Ranking minority
member Pelosi; SSCI chairman Graham and Ranking minority member
Shelby
� Winter 2003 � HPSCI chairman Goss and Ranking minority member
Harman; SSCI chairman Roberts and a representative of Ranking
minority member Rockefeller
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SAFEGUARDS
� Psychological screening of interrogators.
� Interrogator training and "certification."
� Written guidelines and signed understandings of compliance.
� Headquarters approvals required.
� Limited number of approvals (13 detainees).
� Limited duration of approvals (60 days).
� Approvals are detainee-specific, technique-specific, and interrogator-specific.
� Medical officer is present at all times.
� Psychologist is present at all times.
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SAFEGUARDS (continued)
� Team approach: multiple eyes on" each detainee.
� Remote CCTV monitoring.
� Required daily reporting by cable.
� Chief of Base and Headquarters oversight.
� Ongoing legal review.
� Infractions remedied (two incidents, no harm).
� Inspector General review (January-April 2003).
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INTERROGATION METHODS
Non-Enhanced Measures
� Sleep deprivation up to
72 hours
� Modified diet
� Loud noise/music under
79 decibels
� Constant light, constant
dark
� Water dousing
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Enhanced Measures
'Slap (open-handed)
'Facial hold
'Attention grasp
*Abdominal slap (back-handed)
�Sleep deprivation over 72 hours
"Walling
'Stress positions
-Kneeling
-Forehead on wall
*Cramped confinement (boxes)
�Waterboard (up to 40 seconds)
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RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO
KSM: Al-Qa ida Chief of Operations
� Attack plans against US Capitol, other US landmarks
� Attacks against Chicago, New York, Los Angeles; against towers subways, trains,
reservoirs, Hebrew centers, Nuclear power plants.
� Identification of Iyman Faris, Majid Khan Family, Saifullah Paracha.
� Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plot
� Africa-based plotters and their plans
� SE Asia structure, JI and targets
� Saudi-based attacks vs. Israel
� NASTIERI USS Cole Bomber
� US Navy Ships in Straits of Hormuz, US Embassy, Sana
� Residential Compounds in Saudi Arabia
� Attacks in Gulf Region using SAM and Aircraft
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RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO (continued)
� BIN AL-SHIBII: 9/11 Facilitator
- Attacks against Nuclear Power Plants, Hebrew Centers
- Identified Hawsawi
� BIN ATTASH: KSM Deputy
- Attack against U.S. Consulate in Karachi
- Karachi airport attack plans
ABU ZUBAYDAH: Senior Al-Qa'ida Lt
- Identification of Padilla, Richard Reid
- Attacks on banks, subways, petroleum and aircraft industries
- Info on AQ using toys as concealments for weapons,explosives
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HIGH VALUE DETAINEES (HVD
24 HVDs interrogated at CIA controlled Sites:
� 13 interrogated using enhanced measures
� Detainees produced 1500 disseminated Intel reports:
Circa 50% of all HUMINT CT reporting on Al-Qa'ida
Terrorist plans and intentions
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RESULTS:.
ADDITIONAL. OPERATIONAL 'LEADS
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� Financial Support/
�
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Photo Identifications of Active Terrorists and
Detained Suicide Operatives
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SUMMARY OF INTERROGATIONS
Tarcti
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SUBJECT
SESSIONS
DATES
WB
ABU ZUBAYD,411
42
4-23 AUG 02
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AL-NASHIRI
24 r-I\TOV 02 to
9 JAN 03
2
KIIALID SHAYICH IVIUHAMMAD
18
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4-24 MAR 03 0
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RAMZI BIN AL-SIIIBH
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8 FEB 03 -
Pi, A A' A lfit 11.1
MUSTAFA HAWSAWI
11
20 APR to
17 MAY 03
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SUMMARY OF INTERROGATIONS
(continued)
SUBJECT
SESSIONS
DATES
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AMMAR AL-BALUCHI
+1-
BIN ATTASH
AKA ICRALLAD
5
3
18-20 MAY 03
17-19 MAY 03
0
MORD FARIK BIN AMIN
AKA ZUBAIR
23-25 JUN 03
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REAFFIRMATION OF CIA'S
INTERROGATION PROGRAM
� Pro
15
� Termination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive.
� Major threats were countered and attacks averted.
� 50% of intelligence reports issued this year were derived from the
interrogation of these HVDs.
� Con
� Blowback due to public perception of "humane treatment."
- ICRC continues to attack USG policy on detainees.
� Congressional inquiries continue.
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WITHOUT THIS CAPABILITY,
THEN . 9999
WOO. � � 0 �
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Observations concerning "Enhanced Techniques"
from AQ detainees Abu Zubaydah and Khallad Bin
Attash
Abu Zubaydah said that commitment to Islam could either help or hinder in
obtaining information from HVDs. He said that providing information to
enemies is a sin. hnwevcrtar
Islam allows brothers to provide
intonnation without sin, if they believe that they have reached the limit of their
ability to withhold it. According to Abu Zubaydah, each brother is different.
Some brothers will have to endure harsh treatment, even the water board,
while others will not have to be pushed that far.
� During the interrogation, Khallad said he knew he could not hold out against
the interrogation, so he had no reason to try to hold back.
(Khallad has not been subjected to the waterboard. Since the most recent use
of enhanced techniques against him, his resistance to interrogation has grown
stronger.)
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ISSUES
� Public and NGO misinterpretations of Administration statements that all
detainees are treated "humanely."
Congressional inquiries.
� Leahy letter (June 25)
� Specter letter (June 25)
� ICRC and other NGO inquiries.
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� LEGAL AUTHORITIES
Properly conducted and authorized interrogations:
� Do not violate the federal anti-torture statute, 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A
� Do not violate the Constitution. They do not "shock the conscience" under
the 5th and 14th Amendments. The 8th Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual "punishment" is inapplicable.
� Do not constitute "cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment"
under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment because, under U.S. law, those terms are limited to �
U.S. constitutional requirements.
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