DISCUSSION WITH GOVERNOR AVERELL HARRIMAN AT LUNCH, OCTOBER 30TH

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06246228
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2017
• Case Number: F-2012-01096
• Publication Date: October 31, 1963

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06246228
31 October 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Discussion with Governor Averell Harriman at Lunch,
October 30th
1. We reviewed the South Vietnam situation. I stated that we
had reached a point of decision. I felt that we either had to make up
our minds to go along with Diem or to put our shoulder behind the
coup -- that we were studying the alternatives to, and the pros and
cons of both, and that I had not made a final personal judgment.
However, in the last analysis it was a policy decision. On the one
hand the Diem regime's strength had eroded away. On the other
hand there was great uncertainty concerning the type of government
which would succeed in the event of a coup.
2. I brought up the question of the August 24th cable, stating
it was difficult for me to understand the reason why it was sent out
so precipitously, particularly in view of the fact that on August 22nd
at the meeting attended by the President and a substantial number
of advisers, the group were briefed on the Pagoda raids in July,
etc., and that no policy judgment was reached which would indicate
action taken in the August 24th cable. Harriman accepted no
responsibility for the cable and asked why we did not express ourselves
when it was "coordinated". I said it was not coordinated and that at
8:00 p.m. Saturday night Mr. Helms had been called and had been
"informed".about the general substance of the cable which was
"supported by the President, State Department and Defense Department".
Our views were not requested. Harriman said he was surprised as
he had been told that the cable had been coordinated with us and that
we supported it. I corrected this impression.
3. We then turned to the discussion of Laos. I said that
Alexis Johnson had been given a paper outlining in detail all CIA
activities in Laos, which was then reviewed and approved by the
Special Group 5412. In view of th0 criticism of CIA/Saigon activities
which had come from the Embassy and the Department, I said that he,
Harriman, was the architect of the situation in Laos and therefore
I wished for Alexis Johnson in approving CIA/Laos activities at the
5412 Committee to do so after discussion with Harriman. Harriman
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Harriman said he knew all about our activities in Laos and approved,
but there was not criticism and thought we were and had done a good
job in Laos. This had been reported by both Ambassador Brown and
Unger. I said that inspite of all this I wished his current review and
current approval.
4. Harriman then asked what should we do in Laos. He said
that Khrushchev's attitude changed between April and July and that
he was worried over reports that the Soviets were assisting the North
Vietnamese and hence probably Meos in Laos. He questioned whether
CIA had a plan. He also raised the question of whether the U. S. should
not put in a small military force. I said that it did not appear to us
that the situation had reached a point where the U. S. should take
precipitous action. I felt diplomatic action was indicated and I was
not sure just how accurate or how extensive the Soviet military aid
to North Vietnamese really was. However, it appeared to me that the
Soviets might, as part of their row with the ChiComs, openly support
the North Vietnamese.
5. Governor Harriman then turned to a discussion of Latin
America. He said that he was going down to a meeting in Brazil and
that he was seeking ideas. What did I think about Latin America? I
said that the situation was very disturbing. Each country had its own
separate problem and therefore no general formula could be applied.
I did say, however, that we felt the intensified guerrilla and insurgency
activities directed by Castro out of Cuba applied to practically all
Central and South American countries. He also asked that J. C. King
discuss Latin America with him.
NOTE: I transmitted this request to J. C. King. I think
we should consider whether King should accompany Harriman
on his -mission. Also I believe it might be useful for DDP
and DDI to put together some current appraisals of the current
situation in each country and out of this might come some
suggestions. We should avoid being drawn too deeply into
policy matters.
SAM:mcm
(taped)
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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06246228