THE COPACABANA INCIDENT: THE INTERDICTION OF ARMS DESTINED FOR COLOMBIAN INSURGENTS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06271659
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2019
• Case Number: F-2017-01654
• Publication Date: March 13, 1989

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1 3 MAR 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
SUBJECT: The Copacabana Incident: The Interdiction
of Arms Destined for Colombian Insurgents
1. The attached memorandum analyzes the recent seizure
Jamaica of over 10 tons of military ordnance en route to the
Revolutionary Arms Forces of Colombia (FARC)--Colombia's
largest insurgent group. We expect that, despite this
successful interdiction, FARC will in the future acquire
more powerful arsenal it has sought for some time.
2. This paper was prepared by
Transfers Branch, Office of Global Issues.
OGI,
the
Arms
3. Your comments are welcome and may be directed to
Chief, International Security Issues Division,
Attachment:
GI M 89-20020
Interna ecuri y ssues 'ivision
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Central Intelligence Agency
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
13 March 1989
The Copacabana Incident: The Interdiction of Arms
Destined for Colombian Insurgents
Summary
On 5 January 1989, Jamaican authorities seized ten tons
of modern infantry weapons and ammunition that had been
delivered to Jamaica on the freighter "Copacabana".
the shipment was destined for
Colombia s largest insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), which had purchased the weapons
via private arms dealers. This incident illustrates the
ease with which insurgent, terrorist, and criminal groups
can purchase large quantities of lethal military ordnance on
the international gray arms market and underscores the
potential importance of regional efforts to interdict
illicit weapons shipments.
The Copacabana incident has strengthened the hand of
those Colombian officials who believe that FARC is
exploiting the current cease-fire, and Bogota will almost
certainly use this incident to renew its call for greater
international cooperation in controlling the sale of
infantry weapons. Nevertheless, we expect that FARC--which
earns millions of dollars annually by taxing or controlling
illicit drug production in parts of Colombia--will
eventually succeed in acquiring large quantities of powerful
military ordnance.
This memorandum was prepared by Arms
Transfers Branch. Comments and queries are welcome and may
be addressed to the Chief, International Security Issues
Division, Office of Global Issues
GI M 89-20020
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The Copacabana Incident: The Interdiction of Arms
Destined for Colombian Insurgents
The seizure by Jamaican authorities of ten tons of
ordnance on 5 January 1989 foiled an attempt by the largest
insurgent organization in Colombia to acquire thousands of
modern infantry weapons ideal for combating military and
counternarcotics forces. The methods used by individuals
and firms involved with procuring these weapons on behalf of
the Colombian insurgents illustrate the ease with which
private arms dealers can purchase large quantities of lethal
military weapons for resale to insurgent, terrorist, and
criminal groups.
The Seizure
On 22 December 1988, the Panamanian-registered
freighter "Copacabana" delivered a shipping container with
ten tons of modern infantry weapons to Kingston, Jamaica.
The arms--ostensibly destined for the Colombian armed forces
--had been loaded onto the Copacabana earlier that month in
Setubal, Portugal. In accordance with Jamaican regulations,
the weapons were temporarily stored in a Jamaican Defense
Force warehouse pending the arrival of a privatelv-owned,
aircraft
to fly the
shipment to Colombia. Eveleigh, a dual UK/Panamanian
citizen and director of the Panamanian firms "Bluewater
Shipmanagement Company" and "Copacabana Shipping, SA," had
arrived in Kingston before the Copacabana in order to
facilitate the onward transhipment of the arms.
Jamaican authorities requested Bogota to authenticate
the end-user certificate (EUC) presented by Eveleigh and
seized the shipment after being informed by Colombian
officials that the certificate had been forged.
GI M 89-20020
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seized
o
o
by Jamaican authorities consisted
1,000 G3A2 automatic rifles.
250 HK21 light machineguns.
o 10 60mm "Commando" mortars.
o 600 60mm high explosive mortar rounds.
of:
the shipment
Only the First Installment
Jamaican
authorities learned that the captured weapons represented
only about one third of nearly $2.7 million worth of arms
which Eveleigh had purchased on behalf of the FARC.
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explained the discrepancy between the amount
of weapons ordered and the quantities actually recovered in
Jamaica by claiming that the Copacabana shipment was only a
"test run" which, if successful, would have led to a "gold
mine." This claim is supported by the fact that the types
and quantities of arms ordered by Eveleigh match
those listed in the forged Colombian EUC. State Department
reporting also indicates that INDEP recently informed the
Colombian government that it had been paid in full for all
of the weapons listed on the EUC and that it was holding the
remainder of the arms pending Colombian government shipping
instructions.
Implications
For the FARC. The discovery of the Copacabana arms shipment
underscores earlier reporting from a variety of sources that
FARC is seeking modern infantry weapons on the international
gray arms market. FARC procurement officers apparently
realize that they can acquire larger quantities of well-made
military ordnance from private arms dealers than they can
from local sources within Colombia.
Had the Copacabana and subsequent shipments planned by
Eveleigh actually reached the FARC, they would
nave not only substantially enhanced the group's firepower
but also provided it with a homogeneous and easily
serviceable arsenal. The rifles and machineguns, for
example, are nearly identical to those used by the Colombian
armed forces. This would have ensured FARC a ready source
of spare parts and ammunition as well as providing them with
weapons at least as effective as those used by the best
armed government forces opposing them.
o The G3A2 rifles can deliver accurate fire against
man-sized targets out to at least 400 meters when
fired in the semi-automatic mode and are capable of
fully automatic fire for use against multiple
adversaries at closer ranges.
o The belt or magazine-fed HK21 light machineguns can
deliver sustained, suppressive automatic fire out to
1000 meters and, in addition to firing the same
ammunition as the G3 rifles, also share many
interchangeable components.
The successful delivery of the mortars and other
explosive ordnance would have provided the FARC with its
first indirect fire capability. The mortars would have
allowed FARC units to attack Colombian military patrols
without exposing themselves to direct rifle fire or to shell
airports and landing zones used in the transport of
counternarcotics forces.
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o The INDEP "Commando" mortar can be carried and
operated by a single man and fires a 60mm
antipersonnel round to a maximum range of 1000
meters.
o The crew-served INDEP 81mm HP mortars listed on the
forged EUC have even greater ranges and fire
explosive rounds with a lethal radius of over 13
meters.
Similarly, although FARC has manufactured its own improvised
shape charges in the past, the acquisition of the antitank
mines listed on the EUC would have allowed the group to mine
roads in order to attack tanks and armored personnel
carriers or interrupt the flow of military and civilian
traffic.
We cannot corroborate statements made by Jamaican and
Colombian officials that the FARC paid for the Copacabana
arms with cocaine shipments to Europe. It seems likely,
however, that the FARC--which earns millions of dollars
annually by taxing or controlling illicit drug production in
parts of Colombia--earned a large part of the $2.7 million
it paid for the arms from its direct or indirect involvement
with narcotics trafficking. Given the large sums of money
at its disposal, we expect FARC, at some future time, will
again seek large quantities of highly sophisticated weapons
from other gray market dealers. Barring the fortuitous
circumstances surrounding the Copacabana seizure, it is
highly probable that such efforts will eventually succeed.
For Bogota. The Copacabana arms seizure strengthened the
hand of the Colombian military in several ways. The
transfer by Jamaica of all of the captured ordnance to
Colombia not only denied ten tons of weapons to the FARC but
provided the Colombian military with sorely needed arms for
use against the group. More importantly, the incident
provided Colombian military officers and other opponents of
Bogota's current, oft-violated, cease-fire agreement with
FARC an opportunity to expose FARC duplicity in talking
peace but preparing for war. At a press conference on 10
January, the Colombian defense minister displayed the entire
arms cache and noted that FARC had attempted to use the
period of its so-called unilateral Christmas cease-fire to
smuggle new arms into Colombia. Although the question of
FARC culpability continues to be debated in the Colombian
press, it appears that FARC credibility has suffered a major
setback.
Bogota will almost certainly use the Copacabana
incident to renew its call for greater international
cooperation in controlling the sale of conventional military
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weapons. Similar efforts by Colombia last year in both the
United Nations and the Organization of American States met
with little success. In a recent conversation with the US
ambassador, the Colombian foreign minister indicated that,
in addition to recalling its ambassador to Portugal and
issuing a formal protest to Lisbon, Bogota may also convene
a meeting of the EC ambassadors in Colombia in an effort to
get their countries to review their policies on arms sales.
For the Gray Arms Market. The Copacabana seizure
illustrates the dangers inherent in an international arms
market in which violent subnational groups can obtain large
quantities of modern infantry weapons by exploiting lax arms
export laws and the willingness of arms manufacturers and
dealers to turn a blind eye towards lucrative transactions.
Although the Portuguese government and INDEP are portraying
the issue as a purely Colombian internal problem by claiming
that the sale was approved on the basis of a Colombian EUC,
this incident has clearly embarrassed Lisbon by focusing
renewed attention on Portuguese arms export procedures. This
is not the first time that the Portuguese armaments industry
--an ailing, low-tech operation in need of export markets--
has been embroiled in controversy. During the Iran-Iraq
war, INDEP and other Portuguese arms companies sold to both
sides, claiming economic necessity and arguing that the sale
of "defensive" weapons would have little impact on the
outcome of the war. We believe that the end of the Iran-
Iraq war, the resulting soft market for infantry weapons and
ammunition, and the growing number of developing nations
acquiring their own small arms manufacturing capabilities
will further contribute to the ready availability of
automatic rifles, machineguns, and other light infantry
weapons ideal for terrorist, criminal, and insurgent use.
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