DISCUSSION - SECRETARY RUSK'S CONFERENCE ROOM - TUESDAY EVENING - 6:00 P.M. - 16 SEPTEMBER 1963

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06315672
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2017
• Case Number: F-2012-01096
• Publication Date: September 18, 1963

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18 September '963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Discussion - Secretary Rusk's conference room -
Tuesday evening - 6:00 p.m. - 16 September 1963
ATTENDING: Secty. Rusk, Secty. McNamara, Mr. Bundy,
Gov. Harriman and McCone
1. Secretary Rusk presented a personal communication from
Lodge, the intimacy of which was indicated by the fact that Lodge
actually typed the letter himself. The letter extolled the capabilities
of John Richardson and then went on to say that a new face was
necessary to handle the change in the South Viet Nam government
and therefore Lodge recommended that General Lansdale be sent out
immediately. He went on to say that since General Lansdale would
need a staff he would propose that Lansdale be made Chief of Station
and the CAS staff report to Lansdale. This matter was left for
discussion with the President on the following day.
2. There then followed a long discussion of a series of
papers prepared by Hilsman which involved two courses of action,
which became identified as Track I, i.e. persuasion and influencing
Diem to improve his posture and the posture of his government in
South Viet Nam and in world opinion; and second, the Track II,
progressive actions to force Diem either to agree to modify his
policies or to remove him. Track II involved four phases, each
progressively stronger in the implementation of sanctions.
3. It was agreed that a choice had to be made as to whether
we would go Track I or Track II. The consensus of opinion was that�
the paper should be reconsidered on the basis of expanding Phase One
of Track II to include many of the suggestions made in Track I, and
by so doing be in a position to move from Phase One to Phase Two,
and so forth. No decisions were reached in the meeting. Throughout
the meeting basic differences appeared between Harriman, for State,
who obviously wishes to dispose of Diem and McNamara who seems to
feel we'd better get along with him as the best of all alternatives from
the standpoint of winning the war. DCI took no position other than to
point out that the prospect of separating Nhu from Diem was indeed
dim, there was no alternative on the horizon for Nhu as an advisor
to Diem and director of the strategic hamlet program which he had
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handled with considerable skill, and most importantly if we were to
force Diem and Nhu too far there is a pretty good prospect they
might attempt to engage in a detente with Ho Chi Minh, the price of
which would be the removal of U.S. influence from South Viet Nam.
A memorandum dealing with this subject was circulated throughout
members of the Executive Committee and their staff assistants who
had been attending the larger meetings. On Tuesday (17 Sept.) at
5:30 the same group met with President Kennedy. Prior to the
meeting State had produced a paper which consolidated Track I and
Track II as outlined above. This paper had been rejected by Bundy
who had produced a similar paper, much of which was included in
the State paper from an action point of view. This paper took the
form of a cable to Lodge. (Attorney General attended this meeting
but did not attend Monday's meeting.)
4. There was an extended discussion of the content of the
proposed cable and a number of revisions were made, the essence
of which was to set forth a plan for Lodge to consider and comment
upon, but not a directive for action. Also the cable was to be
worded in such a way to try to suggest to Lodge that he try to
approach negotiations with Diem in a spirit of attempting to reach
an understanding rather than laying down the law. The impression
was that Lodge is quite rigid and he was inclined to put forth an
idea to Diem on a take-it-or-leave-it basis rather than to try to
reason with him and influence him or negotiate with him. Decision
I
was made to ive Lodge maximum latitude in the administration of
aid and other phgrams in South Viet Nam to enhance his prestige
and to give him added leverage. DCI raised the question of continuing
�the relationship with Nhu, pointing out that over the years ,CAS had
had regular meetings with Nhu at about two week intrervals and one
was now due. Bundy stated that Lodge did not desire such contacts
so it was decided no contacts would be made with Nhu except at the
direction of the Ambassador.
5. It was obvious throughout the meeting and it was very
clearly indicated by the President that there were differences of
opinion within the government with Harriman favoring the disposal
of Nhu at all costs, McNamara, Defense Department, favoring
retention of Nhu in the interests of prosecuting the war. The
President pointed out this placed Lodge in an extremely difficult
situation; also it was obvious there was some concern over possible
impatience on the part of Lodge.
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6. It was therefore decided to send McNamara with such
assistants as he needed to survey the situation and to discuss the
problems of South Viet Nam with Lodge. Rusk decided to ask
Alexis Johnson to remain in Bangkok and to meet with McNamara
and Lodge. It was agreed that a briefing officer or perhaps
Michael Forrestal should meet with Johnson in advance in Bangkok
to bring him up to date as Johnson has not been a party to South
Viet Nam negotiations and developments.
7. With respect to Richardson the consensus seemed to be
that if Lodge had decided on a change of Chief of Station, he was
entitled to make such a request and it should be honored. DCI
stated he was perfectly willing to change Station Chief at any time,
however he urged this not be done precipitously and that time be
provided so there could be a continuity of operation in the Station.
This matter was left up to further discussion between Lodge and DCI.
With respect to Lansdale's introduction into the picture, Bundy
expressed CIA's unalterable opposition and the meeting recognized
Lodge's suggestion/impractical. Furthermore DCI made the point
that Lansdale was unacceptable to CIA because of past experience
with him; that his introduction would only be useful if an understanding
between Lodge and Diem was being sought and Lansdale could be used
as a friend in court to Diem; that if the policy was to unseat the Diem
government, then Lansdale's presence in South Viet Nam would be
detrimental rather than a help and finally that any actions taken with
respect to the station should not be precipitous. This was left for
discussion between McNamara and Lodge and Johnson. There was
no suggestion a CIA representative accompany McNamara, however
it is my intention to discuss this privately with McNamara and
possibly have Colby go out to South Viet Nam with McNamara.
Substance of my comments on the Lansdale assignment were consistent
with the attached memorandum of 17 September on this subject.
8. The President asked that I call on General Eisenhower at
the earliest moment and bring him up to date on the developments in
South Viet Nam. This is arranged for Thursday morning, 19 September.
JAM/mfb
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