SOUTH AFRICA AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION <SANITIZED>

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
06381536
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
March 9, 2023
Document Release Date: 
April 23, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
F-2018-00226
Publication Date: 
March 15, 1990
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PDF icon SOUTH AFRICA AND NUCLEAR [15799698].pdf440.07 KB
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 15 March 1990 TO: � DI Registry ROOM NO. 7E47 BUILDING OHB REMARKS: FROM: Office of African and Latin American Analysis ROOM NO. 3F45 BUILDING OHB EXTENSION FORM NO. � 1 FEB 56 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 wHir.1-1 MAW I:1F I IqFr1 ppprovedforpelease:202omma6381536 (b)(3)(47) Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06381536 Directorate of Intelligence Office of African and Latin American Analysis 15 March 1990 NOTE FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence Attached is a fresh version of the Nuclear Proliferation memo. After our discussion this morning I met with several of our South Africans and we went step- by-step through the analytical line. I think you will find this version clarifies fhP 2mhi gni ties Deputy Director African and Latin American Analysis Attachment (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(6) Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06381536 Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06381536 orA.,zih (b)(3) Jul 15 March 1990 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence FROM: Acting Director of African and Latin American Analysis, DI SUBJECT: South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation 1. South Africa appears close to a decision to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) after years of negotiation and threatened expulsion from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Most observers now expect Pretoria to sign the treaty later this year or in 1991. 2. Two key factors appear to be pushing South Africa toward NPT accession. President de Klerk is trying to fight South Africa's international isolation and roll back financial and economic sanctions. The issue of nonadherence to the NPT is a source of international condemnation, and each year, South Africa faces potential expulsion from the IAEA. We believe de Klerk wants to remove this source of international criticism. 3. We believe de Klerk will face significant domestic criticism if he fails to win international concessions for signing the NPT, since the weapons program is a source of pride and security for many whites. De Klerk will certainly want to gain assurances from Western governments that South Africa will have access to nuclear technology and commerce if he accedes to the treaty. In addition, he may push for other countries in southern Africa to sign the treaty as a condition of South African accession. (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06381536 Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06381536 SUBJECT: South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation 4. South African accession to the NPT would mark the first time a country with a covert weapons proaram has sianed the treaty we would have three possible options: -- Terminating its nuclear weapons program. require that South Africa place highly-enriched uranium inventories under IAEA safeguards. (b)(1) (b)(3) believe it This would -- Declaring itself a nuclear weapons state. Under this scenario, Pretoria would maintain nuclear weapons stockpiles while subjecting nuclear materials not used for weapons purposes to safeguards. This would require revision of the NPT, which currently identifies only the US, USSR, UK, France, and China as nuclear weapons states. Maintaining a covert nuclear weapons program. Pretoria would have to secret away its nuclear weapons and deny having a weapons program. It is not clear how the IAEA would respond to such a denial. 5. De Klerk's move toward NPT accession coincides with a period of virtually unprecedented regional and domestic change. De Klerk has reversed the relative emphasis former President Botha placed on military and political means to address South Africa's problems at home and in the region, deemphasizing military operations and security measures in favor of diplomatic, economic, and political solutions. 6. Under de Klerk, South Africa has significantly enhanced its regional standing, improving ties with neighboring states, negotiating the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and agreeing to Namibian independence. As a result of South Africa's improving security position, de Klerk has cut some 14 percent from South Africa's defense budget and significantly trimmed research and development or7grams affecting a number of weapons systems. 7. At the same time, de Klerk has taken dramatic steps at home--ordering the release of Nelson Mandela and unbanning the African National Congress--to end the political stalemate that has gripped the country in recent years. We believe de Klerk is committed to negotiating a new constitution with credible black leaders that will be acceptable to the majority of all South Africans and international observers, while protecting white 2 CECIZET Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06381536 Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06381536 J. SUBJECT: South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation interests. most observers believe this process could ebb and flow tor several years. 8. Predictions about the likely outcome of constitutional negotiations at this stage--with both the government and the opposition keeping silent on key questions--remain highly speculative. Any predictions about the position of any future South African crovernment on nuclear issues would be at best speculative. it is conceivable that de Klerk is inclined to sign the treaty before taking South Africa into uncharted waters. In any event, we would expect de Klerk to try to resolve the nuclear question before implementation of a new constitution that substantially affects white control. over the security forces. 3 Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06381536 Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06381536 (b)(3) (b)(6) Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06381536 ER 90-0400/2 3637 (O-81) CApproved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06381536 f: � � t- 4a