VIETNAM JOURNAL - AN EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET/PROVINCE REHABILITATION PROGRAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06484141
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-01452
• Publication Date: May 27, 1963

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VIETNAM JOURNAL
27 MAY 1963
AN EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET/
PROVINCE REHABILITATION PROGRAM
(EXCERPTS)
General Observations by Rufus C. Phillips,
for Rural Affairs
TAB G
Assistant Director
...In general, highly significant progress has been made in
the Strategic Hamlet - Provincial Rehabilitation program in
many provinces. Progress is measured in terms of the estab-
lishment, in steadily increasing numbers, of viable hamlets
with inhabitants who have the will and the means to resist
the Viet Cong. There is a sharp difference between the num-
ber of such hamlets, and the total number of strategic hamlets
officially listed as complete by the Vietnamese Government...
...It has become inescapably clear that, although the con-
cept itself is excellent, execution of the program is sert-
Ously. handicapped by a lack of understanding of the concept
and the lack of sufficient will to put it into effect. This
is especially true of provincial and other local participating
officials, but is by no means confined to them. There ig,
almost across the board, great difficulty in grasping the
idea that "the strategic hamlet is a state of mind." Condi-
tioned by years of experience with the French, and having no
prior experience lathe practice of democratic methods of
leadership, many feel unable to carry out the program without
using methods sure to alienate the population whose support
is its real objective. Significant progress has been made
in improving the basic attitudes of officialdom but this prog-
ress has stemmed more from our on-the-spot insistence that
the welfare of the population be considered than from Central
Government direction....
...More important than what the Central Government says,
however, are its actions in rewarding some province chiefs
and punishing others for their progress in establishing ham-
lets. Here the stress has been almost entirely on quantity,
not quality, which has reinforced the natural inclination of
most provinca.al officials to create strategic hamlets "by
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command." I have accompanied the Minister of Interior, for
instance, on visits to hamlets where he praised the Province
Chief for having moved the population without expense to the
Government; but where I found out later the Province Chief
was obliged, because of popular discontent, to use two compa-
nies of Civil Guard to keep the people in the hamlets. This
continues up to the present to be the main approach of the
Central Government. This must be changed, for insistence by
the Central Government on unrealistic requirements tends to
force province chiefs into actions surely, destructive to
the program....
...These are problems which must be understood and which
must be solved if the Strategic hamlets are to be viable and
effective in achieving their purpose. The evaluations which
are attached highlight some of the problem areas, particularly
in the Delta where they are most acute and where, except in
a few provinces, the apparent progress is largely illusory.
...In conclusion, it should be added that the above com-
ments must not be construed as reflecting undue pessimism or
a negative outlook. To the contrary, the strategic hamlet
program has so well proven itself in those areas where it has
been well executed that there is every reason for optimism and
confidence. At the same time, however, if success is to be-
come widespread, some of the obstacles and problems involved
must be realistically faced and solved. These can be solved
if we have the perseverance. and the intelligence to continue
to seek their solution in a manner which fits the task, for
the heart of this task is a psychological revolution in the
way the Vietnamese Government and its officials operate.
PROGRESS IN THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM - IV CORPS AREA
General Observations
Progress in the Strategic Hamlet-Provincial Rehabilita-
tion program in this Corps area has generally been the slowest
and poorest of all Vietnam. The main problems are a lack
of understanding of the program by many military and pro-
vincial officials, a lack of military support for the program
and a lack of sympathy and understanding of the population
and their problems on the part of many provincial officials.
Particularly harmful is the lack of understanding that the
voluntary participation of the population is essential to the
success of the program. The scattered location .of the
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population in the Delta makes building of hamlets difficult,
but this problem is being compounded by movement of large
numbers of people without proper forethought about whether
it is really necessary to move them and without sufficient
concern for their welfare. In many area the relocation of
the population is aimed primarily at securing roads for the
Government, not at providing security for the population.
This approach, which ignores the fact that the voluntary par-
ticipation and support of the hamlet population are essential
to the success of the Strategic Hamlet Program, can cause its
failure.
Long An
Progress has generally been good in Long An. Provincial
leadership is good and planning has been more thorough than
in most provinces. The province administration is active,
gets out among the population and knows how to work with the
people and win their sympathy. The main problem is the train-
ing and arming of hamlet militia which had not kept pace with
the establishment of the hamlets. Also, too many families are
being moved too fast without adequate prior preparation. It
is estimated that 30% of the hamlets in the province have de-
veloped a spirit of self-defense in the hamlet, adequate to
justify calling the hamlet complete, that a total of 60% pro-
vide a minimum of security and that the remaining 40% are ham-
lets in name only.
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