SOVIET FORCES AND CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT THROUGH THE LATE 1990S (U)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06550419
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00586
• Publication Date: July 10, 1987

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Soviet Forces and Capabilities for
Strategic Nuclear Conflict
Through the Late 1990s (u)
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume I�Key Judgments and Summary
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10 July 1987
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Energy.
Also Participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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NIE 11-3/8-87JX/I
SOVIET FORCES AND CAPABILITIES FOR
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT
THROUGH THE LATE 1990s (u)
VOLUME I KEY JUDGMENTS AND SUMMARY
Information available as of 10 July 1987 was used
in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on that date.
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NOTE
This Estimate is issued in several volumes:
� Key Judgments.
� Volume I contains the Key Judgments and a summary of Soviet
programs and capabilities believed to be of greatest interest to
policymakers and defense planners.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Strategic Offensive Forces. Evidence and analysis over the past
year have reaffirmed our judgment that all elements of Soviet strategic
offensive forces will be extensively modernized between now and the
late 1990s, and will be more capable, diverse, and generally more
survivable. An increasing proportion of Soviet intercontinental attack
warheads will be deployed on submarines and mobile intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and a smaller but still substantial proportion
in fixed silos. The major changes in the force will include:
ICBMs. Preparations are underway to deploy in 1988 or 1989 a
new, silo-based heavy ICBM with an improved capability to
destroy hardened targets. ICBMs of the SS-X-24-class (a 10-
warhead system)� will be deployed in SS-19 silos by 1988. The
new silo-based deployments will be more vulnerable as US
countersilo capabilities improve, but will enhance the Soviets'
already formidable capabilities for prompt attack on hard and
soft targets. SS-X-24-class ICBMs will also be deployed in a rail-
mobile mode this year. These rail-mobile deployments, contin-
ued deployments of the road-mobile SS-25 (a single-warhead
ICBM), and expected improvements and follow-ons to both
missiles, will significantly improve Soviet force survivability.
� SLBMs. The proportion of survivable Soviet weapons also will
grow through the deployment of much better nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and new submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The new submarines are
quieter and are capable of operating from deep under the ice-
pack, and carry long-range missiles. We expect the Soviets to
build a total of eight Typhoons and up to 12 to 14 Delta-IVs,
and judge they will introduce a new SSBN, carrying a new
SLBM, in the middle-to-late 1990s. Soviet SLBMs are likely to
have sufficient yield and accuracy by the late 1990s to attack
current US ICBM silos with greater confidence, but SLBMs
during the next 10 years will not be nearly as effective for this
role as Soviet silo-based ICBMs.
Bombers and Cruise Missiles. Ongoing modernization will give
the heavy bomber force a somewhat greater role in interconti-
nental attack, with more weapons and greater force diversity.
(b)(3)
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While production of the Bear H, which carries the AS-15 long-
range air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), seems to be winding
down, the new swingwing Blackjack, which will carry ALCMs
and short-range attack missiles, will be operational in 1988. The
Soviets appear to have a program for development of a Stealth
fighter and a Stealth bomber;
The earliest we would expect the fighter would be the
mid-1990s; the Stealth bomber could be operational by the late
1990s, but more likely not until about 2000. The SS-NX-21 long-
range, land-attack, sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) is in the
process of being deployed, including on a dedicated submarine
carrying 'up to 40 SLCMs. The SSC-X-4 long-range, ground-
launched cruise missile could begin deployment in late 1987 or
1988, and SLCM and ALCM versions of a large, long-range
supersonic cruise missile are likely to become operational in 1988
and 1989.
Strategic Defensive Forces. The Soviets continue to invest about
as heavily in active and passive strategic defenses as they do in offensive
forces, and their capabilities will improve in all areas:
� Air Defense. Soviet capabilities against low-flying bombers and
cruise missiles are increasing because of continuing deployments
of the SA-10 all-altitude surface-to-air missile and three differ-
ent types of new lookdown/shootdown aircraft. These will be
supported by the Mainstay airborne warning and control system
(AWACS) aircraft, which should be deployed in 1987 or 1988.
� Ballistic Missile Defense. The new Moscow antiballistic missile
(ABM) defenses, with 100 interceptors, should be fully opera-
tional in 1988 or 1989 and will provide an improved intercept
capability against small-scale attacks on key targets around
Moscow. The Soviets have developed all the required compo-
nents for an ABM system that could be used for widespread
deployments that would exceed Treaty limits. There are
differing views about the likelihood that the Soviets would
make such deployments, and we have major uncertainties
about the degree of protection such deployments would afford
the USSR. some new ABM compo-
nents may be under development and might begin testing in
the next year or two; if so, a new ABM system could be ready
for deployment as soon as the mid-1990s. Also, improving
technology is blurring the distinction between air defense and
ABM systems.
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� Hardened Protection for the Leadership. We have identified
hardened Soviet command posts for military and
political leaders, deep-underground com-
plexes�bunkers, tunnels, secret subway lines, and other facili-
ties. Costing the equivalent of tens of billions of dollars, the
Soviets' 40-year program to provide deep-underground shelters
for the leaders is designed to enable them to survive a nuclear
war, and to direct the war effort, reconstitution, and 'postwar
recovery.
� Antisubmarine Warfare. The Soviets still lack effective means
to locate US SSBNs at sea. While we expect the Soviets to
continue to pursue vigorously all ASW technologies, we judge
they will not be able to deploy in the 1990s, and probably not
until well beyond, a nonacoustic ASW detection system that
could reliably monitor US SSBNs patrolling in the open ocean.
However, the Soviets may be able to deploy
ASW remote detection systems by about 2005 that, under
certain conditions, would have some effectiveness against US
attack submarines approaching Soviet SSBN bastions.
� Laser Weapons. There is strong evidence of Soviet efforts to
develop high-energy lasers for air defense, antisatellite (ASAT),
and ballistic missile defense (BMD) applications.
about how far the Soviets have ad-
vanced, and the status and goals of any weapon development
programs. We expect the Soviets to deploy mobile tactical air
defense lasers by the early 1990s, followed by more powerful
strategic and naval systems. The Soviets are developing ground-
based, airborne, and space-based high energy laser weapons for
ASAT. While there are differing views on dates of operation,
limited capability prototypes in some cases could be available
by the mid-1990s. If ground-based BMD lasers prove feasible
and practical, we expect a prototype would be tested in the
middle-to-late 1990s, although an operational system probably
would not be deployed until after the year 2000. The Soviets
also appear to be considering space-based lasers for BMD. We
think they may be able to test a feasibility demonstrator as early
as the mid-1990s, but we do not expect them to � deploy an
operational system until after the year 2000.
� Other Advanced Technologies. The Soviets are also engaged in
extensive research on other technologies that can be applied to
ASAT and BMD weapons
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there is
potential for a surprise development in one or more of these
areas. However, the Soviets probably are at least 10 to 15 years
away from testing any prototype particle-beam weapon for
ASAT or BMD. The Soviets might test a ground-based radio-
frequency ASAT weapon by the early 1990s. We believe it is
possible that a space-based, long-range, kinetic-energy BMD
weapon could be deployed, but probably no earlier than the late
1990s.
Space Program. The Soviets have a vigorous military space
program, and we expect their large investments to allow expanded
access to space for a variety of missions in the early 1990s. For example,
the new SL-X-17 heavy-lift launch vehicle, now being flight-tested, is
comparable in lift capacity to the former US Saturn V lunar launch ve-
hicle. It will provide key support for the establishment of larger space
stations and options for orbiting large components for possible future
space weapons.\
Projected Forces. This year, we have projected four alternative
Soviet strategic forces to illustrate possible force postures under various
assumptions of the strategic environment the Soviets will perceive over
the next 10 years. The number of deployed intercontinental nuclear
warheads, currently about 10,000, will increase by about 1,000 by 1990,
as new systems are deployed that carry more warheads than the systems
they replace. Two of the projected forces are premised on a Soviet
belief that relations with the United States are generally satisfactory and
arms control prospects look good. If the Soviets decide not to exceed the
quantitative sublimits of SALT II, by 1995 deployed warheads would
probably number between 13,000 and 14,000, perhaps as low as 11,500
if modernization and growth were more limited. In the absence of an
arms control process the Soviets would not necessarily expand their
intercontinental attack forces beyond these figures, but they clearly
have the capability for significant further expansion. In an environment
where the Soviets see relations with the United States as generally poor
and arms control prospects bleak, the number of deployed warheads on
Soviet intercontinental attack forces could grow to some 16,500 by 1995
and 18,500 by 1997. In all of these cases, the introduction of modern-
ized systems will result in a decline in the number of launchers.
We also include a projection for an SDI -response" force that
features a larger offensive force expansion (up to 21,000 warheads by
1997). The projection is based on a near-term Soviet judgment that the
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United States will deploy land-based ABM interceptors and space-based
SDI assets beginning in the middle-to-late 1990s. The projection depicts
Soviet measures aimed primarily at overwhelming US defenses through
sheer numbers of warheads, and does not reflect such possible responses
as increased ASAT efforts, Soviet BMD deployments, or advanced
penetration aids. While increasing the sheer size of their offensive forces
would be the most viable near-term Soviet response, advanced technical
countermeasures would be critical to dealing with SDI in the long term.
The size of the force could be several thousand warheads lower than the
projected 21,000, depending on the timing of the introduction of
technological countermeasures. Given the uncertain nature of the US
program and the potential disruption of their efforts, we judge that the
Soviets have not yet committed to deploy offensive force modifications
specifically to respond to SDI. Thus, in the absence of a crash effort,
such modifications would be unlikely to be deployed in significant
numbers until about 2000 or beyond.
Implications of Gorbachev's Declaratory Policy. We have
considered the potential impact of Gorbachev's declaratory policy that
takes an apparently more benign approach to issues of nuclear war than
we have typically characterized in previous years in this Estimate.
Analysts differ about the impact this policy may have, if any, on Soviet
weapons procurement and operational planning. On the basis of all the
available evidence which we present in this Estimate, we do not expect
any significant reduction in the priority the Soviets have given to
nuclear forces or any serious revision of their operational priorities and
practices.
At the same time, the Gorbachev leadership has placed a special
emphasis on revitalizing the Soviet economy and has made arms control
proposals calling for deep cuts in strategic forces. Economic factors
might affect somewhat the rate and levels at which some strategic
systems are deployed. However, the large sunk costs in production for
new strategic weapons and the fact that such production facilities
cannot readily be converted to civilian uses mean that Gorbachev's
industrial modernization goals almost certainly will not have major
effects on strategic weapons deployments through the mid-1990s. We
judge that strategic forces will continue to command the highest
resource priorities, and therefore would be affected less by economic
problems than other elements of the military.
Arms Control. We believe the Soviets are willing to reach arms
control agreements calling for deep cuts in intercontinental offensive
forces, contingent upon the curtailment of the US SDI. Greater
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flexibility with respect to arms control, however, would not prevent
continued vigorous modernization of all aspects of Soviet strategic
forces. Moreover, we judge that in negotiating agreements, the Soviets
would aim, at a minimum, to preserve the net strategic capabilities of
these forces to serve the gamut of Soviet security objectives.
Soviet Force Goals and Capabilities. Although Agencies have
long differed on the interpretation of Soviet military doctrinal issues,
there is reasonably close agreement on the trends in Soviet strategic
forces and on their employment in war. Soviet strategic capabilities
serve many vital functions for the political leadership. Powerful
strategic forces provide the most effective means to deal with the
contingency that global nuclear war could actually occur, and give the
USSR the superpower status that is critical to the maintenance and
expansion of its foreign policy influence. Moreover, the Soviets have
maintained the more traditional military view that forces prepared to
fight a war are also better able to deter war; they have never subscribed
to Western concepts, such as Mutual Assured Destruction, that draw
sharp distinctions between the strategic force requirements for deter-
ring a nuclear war and those for fighting one.
The Soviets apparently believe that, in the present US-Soviet
strategic relationship, each side possesses strategic nuclear capabilities
that could devastate the other after absorbing an attack. Thus, the
Soviets have strong incentives to avoid risking global nuclear war.
While the Soviets apparently do not foresee that this strategic
reality will soon change, they continue to procure weapons and plan
force operations intended to secure important combat advantages and
goals in the event of nuclear war, including, to the extent possible,
limiting damage to Soviet forces and society. Ideally, a favorable
outcome for them in such a war would comprise neutralizing the
capability of US intercontinental and theater forces to interfere with
Soviet capabilities to defeat enemy forces in Eurasia, dominating
Eurasia, and preserving the ability of the Soviet state to survive and re-
cover.
Because of the Soviets' demanding requirements for force effec-
tiveness, they are likely to rate their capabilities as lower in some areas
than we would assess them to be. They are probably apprehensive about
the implications of US strategic force modernization programs�includ-
ing significant improvements in US command, control, and communi-
cations�and are especially concerned about the US SDI program and
its potential to undercut Soviet military strategy. Although we do not
have specific evidence on how the Soviets assess their prospects in a
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global nuclear war, we judge that they would not have high confidence
in the capability of their strategic offensive and defensive forces to
accomplish all of their wartime missions�particularly limiting the
extent of damage to the Soviet homeland.
Nuclear War Initiation and Escalation. The Soviets' strategic
outlook would affect their decision as to whether or not to risk initiating
global nuclear war in various circumstances. In peacetime, their lack of
high confidence in accomplishing all of their wartime missions, and
their appreciation of the destructiveness of nuclear war, would strongly
dissuade them from launching a "bolt-from-the-blue- strategic attack.
The Soviets also would probably be inhibited from provoking a direct
clash with the United States and its allies that could potentially escalate
to global nuclear war.
The Soviets believe that a major nuclear war would be likely to
arise out of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional conflict that itself was
preceded by a political crisis. The Soviets see little likelihood that the
United States would initiate a surprise nuclear attack from a normal
peacetime posture.
In a conventional war in which the Soviets were prevailing, they
would have obvious and strong incentives to keep the war from
escalating. Yet, they continue to believe it likely that NATO, to avoid
conventional defeat, would at some point resort to nuclear weapons�
potentially including US strategic strikes. The Soviets themselves are
prepared to use nuclear weapons, potentially including strategic strikes
on the US homeland, if they suffer serious setbacks in a conventional
war with NATO.
If NATO used only a small number of battlefield nuclear weapons
to try to halt a Warsaw Pact conventional offensive, there is a
substantial possibility that the Soviets would respond in kind or, if their
offensive was not stymied, even refrain briefly from resorting to nuclear
weapons at all. However, they would see the chances of global nuclear
war increasing significantly once any nuclear weapons were used in a
theater war with NATO.
If they had convincing evidence of US intentions to launch its
strategic forces (in, for example, an ongoing theater war in Europe) the
Soviets would attempt to preempt. It is more difficult to judge whether
they would decide to preempt in situations where they see inherently
high risks of global nuclear war but have only ambiguous evidence of
US intentions to launch its strategic forces. Because preempting on the
basis of such evidence could initiate global nuclear war unnecessarily,
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the Soviets would have to consider the probable nuclear devastation of
their homeland that would result, the reliability of their other nuclear
employment options (launching their forces quickly upon warning that
a US ICBM attack is under way and retaliating after absorbing enemy
strikes), and their prospects for success on the conventional battlefield.
We cannot ultimately judge how the Soviets would actually weigh
these difficult tradeoffs. Their nuclear warfighting strategy, however,
does not predispose them to exercise restraint if they saw inherently
high risks that global nuclear war could occur and believed restraint on
their part could jeopardize their chances for effectively waging such a
war. The Soviets have strong incentives to preempt in order to
maximize the damage to US forces and limit damage to Soviet forces
and society. Moreover, their strategic programs indicate that for the
period of this Estimate the Soviets' nuclear warfighting strategy will
endure.
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MAJOR CHANGES IN THIS YEAR'S ESTIMATE
There have been a number of new developments and some changes
in our assessments since the last Estimate. We wish to highlight that:
� Preparations are under way at deployment complexes to replace
silo-based SS-18s with a new heavy ICBM and, contrary to our
expectations last year, some SS-19s with silo-based SS-X-24-class
ICBMs. Both new missiles are now in flight testing. (See
paragraph 2)
� SS-X-24-class ICBMs will be deployed this year in specially
configured trains.
(See paragraph 2)
� Some SS-17 silos are being deactivated. (See paragraph 2)
On the basis of new analysis, we now judge that Delta-IV SSBN
production will continue beyond the five or six projected last
year, possibly reaching 12 to 14 units by the late 1990s and that
a new-class SSBN will not be introduced until the middle-to-late
1990s, rather than the late 1980s or early 1990s. (See paragraph
4)
� New evidence indicates the Soviets are apparently working on
prototypes of both a Stealth fighter and a Stealth bomber. (See
paragraph 5)
� The SS-NX-21 land-attack sea-launched cruise missile is in the
process of being deployed on several submarine classes, includ-
ing the Yankee 402AA, a dedicated carrier with up to 40
missiles. (See paragraph 6)
� We have detected large phased-array radars under
construction that are for the purpose of ballistic missile detec-
tion and tracking. (See paragraph 13)
� We have new judgments, and alternative views, on Soviet
widespread ABM deployments over the next 10 years in the
absence of, or in the face of, US SDI deployments. (See
paragraph 15)
� On the basis of further analysis, we have additional insights into
the Soviets' 40-year program to provide deep-underground
facilities to protect key
leaders in a large-scale nuclear war. (See paragraph 20)
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� We have reevaluated our estimates of, and in some cases
lengthened the time for, the potential availability of Soviet
directed-energy and kinetic-energy weapons and their proto-
types, primarily because of new analysis. There are alternative
views. (See paragraph 26)
� The launch of the new SL-X-17 heavy-lift launch vehicle is a
milestone in the Soviet use of space for military purposes. (See
paragraph 31)
� We have modified somewhat our projections of future Soviet
offensive forces (see paragraph 32) and this year we have
included a projection of Soviet offensive force expansion that
could be part of a response to possible US SDI deployments in
the middle-to-late 1990s. (See paragraph 37)
� We have additional insights regarding the potential for the
Strategic Rocket Forces' highly centralized command, control,
and communications capability to improve the effectiveness of
Soviet ICBM attacks and regarding the integration of Soviet
strategic force operations. (See paragraphs 48 and 55)
� We have improved our understanding of how the Soviets are
likely to view escalation in a future war. (See paragraph 52)
� New analysis provides insights into the Soviets' potential use of
high-yield nuclear weapons to generate electromagnetic pulse as
part of an initial strike against North American targets. There is
an alternative view. (See paragraph 65)
� We have examined the issue of the effect, if any, that Gorba-
chev's declaratory policy on nuclear war issues might have on
current and future Soviet strategic force procurement and
operational planning. (See paragraph 79)
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SUMMARY
Strategic Offensive Forces
1. All elements of Soviet strategic offensive forces
will be extensively modernized between now and the
late 1990s and will become more capable, diverse, and
generally more survivable. While the Soviets will
continue to rely on fixed, silo-based ICBMs, mobile
ICBMs will be deployed in large numbers (see figure
1), and major improvements will be made to the sea-
based and bomber forces. The major changes in the
forces will include:
� An improved capability against hardened targets
through further improvements to the heavy
ICBM force.
Significantly better survivability from improve-
ments in the SLBM force through quieter subma-
rines and longer range missiles and from continu-
ing deployment of mobile ICBMs. Mobile ICBMs
will also improve Soviet capability to use reserve
missiles for reload and refire. An alternative view
holds that reload and refire operations are as
problematic for mobile launchers as for silos.
� An increase in the diversity of the bomber force
and in the number of its deliverable warheads, as
a result of the deployment of new bombers with
long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.
� Deployment of a variety of new long-range,
land-attack cruise missiles on ground-based
launchers, aircraft, and submarines.
Land-Based Ballistic Missile Forces
2. The Soviets are continuing programs to modern-
ize these forces by deploying more survivable, mobile
systems while upgrading their highly reliable silo-
based systems. The ICBM force, as shown in figure 2,
will have been almost entirely replaced with new
systems by the late 1990s:
� Preparations are under way to deploy two new
silo-based ICBMs. A new heavy ICBM, carrying
at least 10 reentry vehicles (RVs), is being flight
tested and will replace the SS-18 beginning in
1988 or 1989. Modification of SS-18 silos has
begun. A 10-RV SS-X-24-class ICBM is in flight
testing and will be deployed in SS-19 silos by
1988. Conversion of some SS-19 silos began last
year.
� The Soviets are preparing to deploy SS-X-24-class
missiles in a rail-mobile mode in 1987.
We expect, within
the next several years, testing of improved ver-
sions of SS-X-24-class ICBMs, as the Soviets
continue to develop this major missile type.
The Soviets have now deployed
the road-mobile single-warhead SS-
25.
An SS-25 follow-on, which we
judge will have single- and three-RV payload
options, will probably begin flight-testing in late
1987 or early 1988. By the mid-1990s, we expect
some 300 to 400 SS-25-class launchers to be
deployed.
The Soviets have continued to phase out older
silo-based single-RV SS-11s as they have de-
ployed the single-RV road-mobile SS-25.
We continue to project that the SS-17 force will
be phased out beginning this year as newer
ballistic missiles with multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) are de-
ployed.
3. In the absence of negotiated reductions, we
expect the number of deployed SS-20-class missiles to
change only slightly, if at all, from the current level.
SS-4 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) launchers
are being deactivated, and it is probable that this force
will be phased out over the next year or two.
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Figure 1
Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces,
Warhead Mix
1987 Late 1990s
ICBMs
SLBMs
Bombers
ICBMs
SLBMs
Bombers
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Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Forces
4. An extensive modernization program will result
in deployment of much better SSBNs and new
MIRVed SLBMs. The major changes, as shown in
figure 3, include:
� Deployment of additional SSBNs.
new SSBNs of the Ty-
phoon and Delta types are under construction.
The Soviets continue to deploy one new SSBN of
each type each year. While we continue to
expect a total of eight Typhoon units to be
constructed, we now judge that Delta-IV produc-
tion will continue, possibly reaching 12 to 14
units by the late 1990s. We judge that the Soviets
will introduce a new SSBN, carrying a new
SLBM, in the middle-to-late 1990s�later than
we had projected last year.
� Continuing deployment of the new SS-N-23
SLBM on Delta-IVs and future deployments on
some Delta-Ills. In the past, we had judged that
the SS-N-23 would be backfitted into all Delta-
Ills. We are now less confident in that judgment.
We believe there is an even chance that some,
but probably not all, Delta-Ills will be backfitted
with SS-N-23 missiles. The increased range of the
14
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Figure 2
Modernization of Soviet ICBMs
Launchers
1987
SS-I8
SS-17.
SS-19
Late 1990s
SS X 24
class
New heavy
ICBM
Warheads
1987
SS-I I. SS-I3
SS-25
SS-I8
SS-17,
SS-I9
Late 1990s
New heavy
ICBM
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Figure 3
Modernization of Soviet SLBMs
Launchers
1987 Late 1990s
Yankee
Delta I,
Delta-II
Typhoon
Delta-IV
Delta-Ill
Delta-I,
Delta-11
Delta III
(SS-N-18) b
Delta III
(SS-N-23) b
Typhoon
New
SSBN
Delta-IV
Warheads
1987 Late 1990s
Yankee
Delta-I,
Delta-II
Delta-III
Typhoon
Delta-IV
Delta-I, Delta II
Delta-III
(SS-N-18)
Delta-III
(SS-N-23) b
Delta-IV
Typhoon
New
SSBN
a Color change for Typhoon in the late 1990s indicates new missile
deployed in existing submarine class.
b Dashed line indicates one-half Delta-Ill SSBNs backfitted with the
SS-N-23 SLBM. We estimate there is an even chance some, but
probably not all, will be backfitted.
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SS-N-23, relative to that of the SS-N-18 missile
currently on Delta-Ills, will make SS-N-23-
equipped SSBNs more survivable. An alternative
view holds that the Soviets are unlikely to retrofit
the SS-N-23 into the Delta III. 3
� A replacement for the SS-N-20 on Typhoon
SSBNs. We expect the replacement to begin
initial testing in 1987 and probably begin deploy-
ment in 1990 or 1991
Strategic Aviation
5. Soviet long-range strategic aviation is undergoing
its first major modernization since the 1960s; by the
late 1990s, as shown in figure 4, almost all older heavy
bombers will have been replaced. The heavy bomber
force will have a somewhat greater role in interconti-
nental attack and will be more diverse:
� Deployment continues for Bear H aircraft and
AS-15 ALCMs, although production of Bear H
aircraft seems to be winding down.
� We project the Blackjack will be operational in
1988, and will carry ALCMs and short-range
attack missiles (SRAMs). This aircraft may have
entered serial production in early 1987.
� The new Midas tanker is operational, enhancing
the capabilities of the Soviet air forces. The
initial deployment pattern indicates that the first
Midas tankers will be used primarily to support
intercontinental strike aircraft.
� The Soviets are developing a new peripheral
attack aircraft that will probably replace, begin-
ning in the mid-1990s, Fencer aircraft for deep
interdiction missions.
� We now have evidence that the Soviets are
working on prototypes of both a Stealth fighter
and a Stealth bomber
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Cruise Missiles
6. Soviet long-range land-attack cruise missile pro-
grams include continued development and, in some
cases, deployment of subsonic and supersonic systems:
� The AS-15 ALCM continues to be deployed with
the Bear H aircraft and will soon be deployed on
the Blackjack.
� The SS-NX-21 SLCM is in the process of being
deployed. Four classes of submarines are proba-
ble deployment platforms: the Yankee 402AA
dedicated SS-NX-21 carrier, and Victor, Akula,
and Sierra nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs).
We project the Soviets will deploy eight to 10
402AA submarines, each carrying up_ to 40 SS-
NX-21s.
the SSC-
X-4 ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)
could begin deployment in late 1987 or 1988.
� The Soviets are continuing to develop a large
supersonic cruise missile. We expect that the
SLCM version, the SS-NX-24, will be operational
in 1988 on a converted Yankee-class submarine.
Also, we project a new dedicated submarine class
for this system could be operational in 1989. The
AS-X-19 ALCM, which we estimate will be
deployed externally on Bear H aircraft, could be
operational in about 1989. There possibly is a
GLCM version.
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Figure 4
Modernization of Soviet Heavy Bombers
Heavy Bombers
1987 Late 1990s
Bison
Bear H Bear H
Older
Bears
Blackjack
Weapons
1987
Bison
Older
Bears
Bear H
Late 1990s
Bear H
Blackjack
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Strategic Defensive Forces
10. The Soviets continue to invest about as heavily
in active and passive strategic defenses as they do in
offensive forces.
Air Defense
11. Deployment rates of low-altitude-capable, stra-
tegic air-defense systems are increasing. By the late
1990s, the SA-10 all-altitude surface-to-air missile
(SAM) will constitute nearly half of the deployed
strategic SAM battalions and will contribute a large
increase in firepower. The Soviets are deploying new
lookdown/shootdown aircraft�Foxhounds, Flankers,
and Fulcrums�with much better capabilities against
low-flying targets; these new aircraft will make up a
majority of the air defense-capable aircraft in the
homeland by the mid-1990s. The fighter force will be
about the same or smaller in size, but, compared to our
previous Estimate, there are significant increases this
year in our estimate of the rate of modernization of
newer fighters with a lookdown/shootdown capability.
The Mainstay airborne warning and control system
(AWACS) aircraft will begin to be deployed during
1987 or 1988 (later than we had forecast), and a family
of balloon-borne sensors is also being developed.
Ballistic Missile Defense
12. The new Moscow ABM defenses, which will be
fully operational in 1988 or 1989, will have 100 silo-
based interceptors, providing an improved intercept
capability against small-scale attacks on key targets
around Moscow.
13. As new large phased-array radars become fully
operational in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they will
provide a much improved capability, for ballistic
missile early warning, attack assessment, and accurate
target tracking. These radars will be technically capa-
ble of providing battle management support to a
widespread ABM system, but there are uncertainties
and differences of view about their suitability for
battle management and whether the Soviets would
rely on these radars to support a widespread ABM
deployment. Since last year, we have detected
new large radars under construction,
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14. The Soviets have developed all the required
components for an ABM system that could be used not
only to augment the Moscow defenses but also for
widespread deployments beyond Moscow in excess of
ABM Treaty limits. The components include the Flat
Twin radar, an aboveground launcher, and the Gazelle
missile, which will soon be deployed as part of the
Moscow ABM system. Assuming they have already
begun making the necessary preparations, we judge
the Soviets would be capable of undertaking rapidly
paced ABM deployments (sites could be prepared in
months). Such deployments would be designed to
strengthen the defenses at Moscow, to cover key
targets in the western USSR, and to extend protection
to key targets east of the Urals. We have major
uncertainties about the degree of protection such
deployments would afford the USSR. (See paragraph
75.)
15. We judge it unlikely that the Soviets would
conduct such a widespread ABM deployment begin-
ning in the late 1980s or early 1990s roughly a 10-
percent chance).
The Soviets probably
perceive the potential near-term military benefits of
such a deployment as outweighed by the implications
of US and Allied responses, particularly the prospects
of a unified commitment to SDI and the end of the
USSR's ability to advance its interests through the
arms control process. An alternative view holds that it
is unlikely that the Soviets will begin widespread
deployments of ABMs in the 1980s but the likelihood
increases during the early 1990s when major portions
of the large phased-array radar network become oper-
ational. Major components of a rapidly deployable
ABM system remain intact and continue operating at
Saryshagan.
16. some new ABM com-
ponents may be under development and might begin
testing in the next year or two. We judge that the
Soviets will probably test a new or modified endoat-
mospheric interceptor�and possibly a new exoatmos-
pheric interceptor.
If testing of
these components, and possibly new radars, began in
the next year or two, a new ABM system could be
ready for deployment as soon as the mid-1990s.
17. As long as the Soviets do not perceive clear US
intentions to deploy an ABM system in the 1990s, we
will find it difficult to judge the likelihood of a Soviet
deployment in mid-decade. Lacking such a percep-
tion, the Soviets would be unlikely to deploy a system
based on the components currently available;
if the Soviets believed US SDI deployments
would occur in the 1990s, they would almost certainly
take steps to deploy their own ABM system in the
1990s. Depending on when the Soviets decide that
such a US deployment was certain, they would either
use currently available components�Gazelle and Flat
Twin�or new or modified components if they were
available.
ABM Capabilities of SAMs
18. The mobile SA-12 system can engage conven-
tional aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic
missiles. \
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19. Analysis indicates that the SA-10, with feasible
upgrades, could achieve some capability for point
defense of hardened targets against most types of RVs.
According to an alternative view, the SA-10 system has
some advantages as an ABM over the SA-12 system,
and, if certain ABM features exist in the SA-10, or are
added, this system could intercept all current types of
US RVs. 8 According to another view, the SA-10 has
essentially no capability against ballistic missile RVs.
This view further holds that an upgrade sufficient to
give the SA-10 any significant ABM capability is
tantamount to building a new system. 9
Hardened Protection for the Leadership
20. A primary objective of the Soviets' strategic
defense effort is to protect and support the leadership
from the outset of crisis through the postattack period.
We have identified hardened Soviet
command posts (CPs for military and political leaders,
urbaff deep-underground complexes. We
estimate there are more deep-underground
facilities
Antisubmarine Warfare
21.
New, quieter SSNs such as Akula will
enhance the Soviets' ability to protect their own
SSBNs;
We expect the Soviets to continue to pursue
vigorously all ASW technologies as potential solutions
to the problems of countering US SSBNs and defend-
ing their own SSBNs against US attack submarines.
They are energetically trying to develop a capability
to sense, from platforms in air and space, submarine-
generated effects./
22. We judge the Soviets will not be able to deploy
in the 1990s, and probably not until well beyond, a
nonacoustic ASW detection system that could reliably
monitor US SSBNs patrolling in the open ocean. This
judgment is based on operational considerations, diffi-
culties we expect the Soviets to encounter ip...exploiting
the basic phenomena of wake detection, and the major
advances required in high-speed computing and in
sensor and signal-processing technologies. There is a
low to moderate (10 to 60 percent) probability that the
Soviets could deploy, before the year 2000, an air-
borne ASW remote detection system, and, by about
2005, a spaceborne submarine wake detector. Such
systems would have some effectiveness against enemy
SSNs operating at very shallow depths and at high
speeds and approaching ASW barriers near Soviet
bastions.
Directed-Energy and Kinetic-Energy Weapons
23. Soviet efforts to
develop directed-energy weapons�especially high-en-
ergy laser weapons�for air defense, ASAT, and BMD
applications. We estimate that just the high-energy
laser efforts we have been able to observe would cost
roughly $1 billion per year if carried out in the United
States.
\ Our estimate
has changed because of reevaluations of the level of
Soviet technology development, a better understand-
ing of how the Soviets bring new technology into the
weapons development process, and, in some cases, new
evidence. We are also better able to define the timing
and potential capabilities of less complex weapon
systems or prototypes of such systems that the Soviets
may be able to deploy in the near term. An alternative
view holds that the new analysis and evidence are
insufficient to give much confidence in judgments of
lengthened times for the potential availability of Sovi-
et directed-energy weapons.
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Deep-Underground Facilities
For 40 years, the Soviet Union has had a vast
program under way to ensure the survival of the
leadership in the event of nuclear war. This multifacet-
ed program has involved the construction of deep-
underground bunkers, tunnels, secret subway lines, and
other facilities
Cost-
ing the equivalent of tens of billions of dollars, this
program is designed solely to protect the senior Soviet
leadership from the effects of nuclear war.
Neither changes in the Soviet leadership nor the
restructuring of the strategic balance and the refine-
ments in military doctrine that accompanied these
changes appear to have diminished the Soviets' commit-
ment to the program. Over the program's history, its
purpose has remained unchanged�leadership survival
so that the leaders can maintain internal control and so
that Soviet military power can be centrally directed
throughout all phases of a world war. The secrecy of the
program, and the uncertainty thereby created in US
planning about the extent and nature of these facilities,
contributes to this purpose.
The Soviets' experience with civil defense, leadership
protection, and massive relocation efforts during World
War II has taught them the benefits of a leadership
protection program.
The enor-
mous and continuing Soviet investments in the leader-
ship protection program indicate that they believe its
benefits are well worth the large cost
24. We expect laser weapons that are deployed in
an air defense role to be integrated with SAMs in a
point defense role. The Soviets will probably field a
mobile tactical air defense laser capable of electro-
optical sensor damage by the early 1990s. We expect
more powerful (hundreds of kilowatts) and capable
strategic and naval systems to be deployed later in the
1990s. If the Soviets do not complete technological
development of a megawatt-class air defense laser
until the late 1980s, deployment of such a weapon
would not begin until about 2005. It is possible,
however, the Soviets have advanced more quickly, in
which case deployment could begin in the middle-to-
late 1990s.
25. We have evidence that the Soviets are devel-
oping one or more ground-based, high-energy laser
devices with potential ASAT capabilities. Some mili-
tarily useful capability can be achieved for ASAT
missions without deployments in large numbers or
complex tracking and command and control systems.
A Soviet laser ASAT device, whether a one-of-a-kind
weapon or an experimental device, can potentially
cause serious damage to US space systems.
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26.
we judge that the Soviets probably
will begin deployment of operational ground-based
2-MW-class laser ASAT weapons by the late 1990s.
Further, we judge that by the early-to-middle 1990s,
the Soviets are likely to have prototypes of 2-MW-class
ground-based laser ASAT weapons that will potentially
have some military capability.
27. The Soviets are probably continuing to experi-
ment with airborne laser devices that could be used for
air defense or ASAT missions. We believe an opera-
tional airborne laser ASAT system to be unlikely
before about 2005, but a prototype, with some limited
damage capability, is possible as early as the mid-
1990s. An alternative view holds the Soviets will have
a prototype in the early 1990s and achieve an opera-
tional capability by the late 1990s. "
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29. There is evidence of a large Soviet program to
develop ground-based laser weapons for terminal de-
fense against ballistic missile RVs. There are, however,
many unknowns concerning the feasibility, practical-
ity, and timing of ground-based laser weapons for
BMD. There are also large uncertainties in any esti-
mate of when the Soviets might have such a system
operational. If such a system proves feasible and
practical, we expect that a prototype ground-based
weapon would be tested in the middle-to-late 1990s.
An operational system probably would not be de-
ployed until after the year 2000. However, if tests
prove successful, the Soviets could choose to take the
risk of not constructing a prototype weapon, and
proceed directly to final system deployment. Although
we assess this course to be unlikely, a few such systems
could be operational by the middle-to-late 1990s. The
Soviets also appear to be considering space-based lasers
for BMD missions. We estimate they Will 'riot test a
feasibility demonstrator of a space-based laser BMD
system before about the mid-1990s; an operational
system based on such concepts would not be deploy-
able until after the year 2000, possibly about 2010.
30. The Soviets are also engaged in extensive re-
search efforts of other technologies (particle beam,
radiofrequency, and kinetic energy) that can be ap-
plied to ASAT and BMD weapons,
there is potential for a surprise development in one or
more of these areas:
the Soviets are
conducting research under military sponsorship
on particle beam weapons (PBWs). Because of
questions of feasibility and severe requirements
on technology, we judge that the Soviets are at
least 10 to 15 years away from testing any
prototype long-range, ground-based PBW for
terminal BMD or a space-based neutral PBW.
We estimate that, by the early 1990s, there is a
moderate likelihood that the Soviets will test a
ground-based RF ASAT weapon potentially ca-
pable of damaging unprotected satellites, but it is
unlikely that a space-based RF-damage ASAT
feasibility demonstration device could be tested
before the mid-to-late 1990s.
plans to develop kinetic-energy weapons for stra-
tegic applications. To date, identified Soviet re-
search efforts have been in short-range technol-
ogies,
In the mid-
1980s, the Soviets began to consolidate the re-
search, possibly to give it the same type of central
direction and organization as in the laser pro-
gram. It is possible that the Soviets could place in
orbit a feasibility demonstration device of a long-
range kinetic-energy weapon as soon as the early
1990s. If so, they could begin testing prototypes
with some military capability in the middle-to-
late 1990s and could begin deploying an opera-
tional system about 2005.
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the earliest we judge the Soviets could
have an operational system in space is the late
1990s.
Space Program
31. The Soviets have a vigorous military space
program, and we expect their large investments in
space systems R&D to pay off in the early 1990s in
terms of expanded access to space for a variety of
missions. The Soviets recently conducted the first test-
flight of their new heavy-lift launch vehicle, the SL-X-
17, that is comparable in lift capacity to the former US
Saturn V lunar launch vehicle. Once operational, this
launch vehicle will be key in establishing larger space
stations, and will give the Soviets the option of orbiting
large power sources and other components for future
space weapons.\
Projected Forces
32. This year we have again projected alternative
Soviet strategic forces that illustrate possible force
postures under different assumptions about the strate-
gic environment the Soviets will perceive over the next
10 years:
� Force 1, featuring limited growth in strategic
force warheads, is premised on Soviet belief that
Soviet-US relations are generally satisfactory,
with the pace of Soviet modernization being
somewhat restrained and with more of their
older forces being retained. We emphasize that,
in this force projection, the Soviets build fewer
new strategic systems and modernize at a slower
rate than we actually expect. An alternative view
holds that while the deployment levels and rates
projected in Force 1 for some individual systems
may prove to be too low, the aggregate level of
weapons and the modernization rates implied by
this force would be more consistent than those in
the other forces with the high priority the Soviets
are placing on modernizing their economy
and would enable the Soviets to achieve key
military objectives. 19
� Force 2 assumes an environment of continuing
arms control negotiations. The Soviets deploy
new and modernized weapons at a higher rate
than Force 1 and remain at the upper bounds of
the MIRVed sublimits of SALT II. At the same
time they avoid deploying weapons, other than
the SS-25, that would demonstrably contravene
SALT modernization limits. Older launchers are
replaced on a less than one-for-one basis.
Force 3 posits new and modernized Soviet forces
growing beyond SALT limits, although the total
number of launchers decreases somewhat. The
Soviets assess Soviet-US relations will be general-
ly poor and arms control prospects bleak. US SDI
deployments do not begin in the 1990s but the
Soviets believe they are still in the offing.
� Force 4 portrays an SDI "response" force that
features a larger (than Force 3) expansion of
Soviet strategic offensive forces, both launchers
and warheads. The expansion is based on a near-
term Soviet judgment that the United States will
deploy land-based ABM interceptors and space-
based SDI assets beginning in the middle-to-late
1990s.
33. The projected growth in the number of de-
ployed warheads on Soviet intercontinental attack
forces is shown in figure 6:
� The force currently consists of about 10,000
warheads on some 2,500 deployed ballistic mis-
sile launchers and heavy bombers. Most war-
heads are in the ICBM force.
Force diversity is increasing. A growing propor-
tion of Soviet intercontinental attack warheads
will be deployed on SSBNs and mobile ICBMs,
with a smaller but still substantial proportion in
fixed silos.
� Warheads are increasing. Systems now being
deployed (new Typhoon and Delta-IV subma-
rines, Bear H bombers, and SS-X-24-class ICBMs)
carry many more warheads than the systems
they are replacing.
With deployment of these new ballistic missiles,
and, if the Soviets decide to remain within the
quantitative sublimits of SALT II, by 1990 the
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Figure 6
Projected Total Number of Deployed Soviet Warheads-
ICBMs, SLBMs, and Heavy Bombersa
Midyear
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
Force 44
Force 3'
Force 2
Force 1
1 1 1 1 1
0
1986 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
a The range in the number of weapons in Forces 1 and 2 and up
to the early 1990s in Forces 3 and 4 reflects uncertainty in the
number of warheads on the SS-18 Mod 4 and new heavy ICBM.
b The striped uncertainty band indicates Force 4 may be somewhat
higher or as many as 3,000 weapons lower than we project.
The darker uncertainty band indicates that Force 3 could be
some 1,500 weapons higher or lower in 1997 than we project.
deployed warheads will grow to between 10,500
and 11,500; by 1995 probably between 13,000
and 14,000.
� In the absence of an arms control process, the
Soviets would not necessarily expand their inter-
continental attack forces beyond the SALT II
figures; however, they clearly have the capability
for significant further expansion. Force 3 projects
about 16,500 deployed warheads by 1995 and
18,500 by 1997, and Force 4 projects as many as
21,000 by 1997 in response to an early SDI
313285 7-87
deployment. There is an alternative view to
Force 4. (See paragraphs 38 and 39.)
the maximum possible
number of intercontinental attack warheads by 1997 is
about 22,000. Some increase in the number of weapons
beyond that is possible,
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35. Despite the widely diverse assumptions under-
lying our four projections, substantial strategic force
modernization is probable in all cases; the Soviets most
likely will replace most of the weapons in their arsenal
with new or modernized systems by the late 1990s. It
is notable that, in our projections, deploying these
modernized systems will result in a decline in the
number of launchers, except for an SDI response force.
Overall, force composition does not dramatically
change. The Soviets will continue to increase the
number of mobile ICBMs and cruise missiles, but silo-
based ICBMs will continue to carry a substantial
portion of the total warheads. While Soviet heavy
bomber weapons will increase, ICBMs and SLBMs will
continue to be the primary elements of intercontinen-
tal attack forces.
36. Both the US and Soviet proposals at the strategic
arms reduction talks (START) would significantly re-
duce the current force size and would have a major
effect on the current and planned programs. These
proposals, however, differ in major ways. We judge
that the Soviets would be slow to drastically reduce the
number of their heavy ICBMs, given the importance
they attach to them and the unique counterforce
capabilities of these weapons. Any willingness to make
such reductions would depend on major US conces-
sions, including substantial constraints on SDI, and a
corresponding reduction in US silo-based ICBMs.
37. The "SDI response" force projection is intended
to illustrate key measures the Soviets might attempt in
their offensive forces to counter early US SDI deploy-
ments. Primarily the projection posits overwhelming
or saturating US ballistic missile defenses through
sheer numbers of warheads. This projection does not
include other possible Soviet responses, such as an
increased effort in antisatellite programs, deployed
ballistic missile defenses of their own, or technological
improvements such as maneuvering RVs (to evade
defenses) and other advanced penetration aids. While
we expect the Soviets to continue their own advanced
technology BMD efforts in any case, in the face of
prospective near-term US SDI deployments they
would probably take steps to deploy their own conven-
tional ABM defenses in a nationwide defense as noted
in paragraph 17. The degree of effort they would
devote to ABM deployments under these circum-
stances�relative to offensive responses�is unclear.
Competition for resources (special nuclear materials,
for example) could require some trade-offs between
offensive and defensive responses, but the extent of
such competition is unclear.
38. While increasing the sheer size of their offen-
sive forces would be the most viable Soviet response in
the near term, the incorporation of advanced technical
countermeasures would be critical to dealing with SDI
in the long term. One key uncertainty in evaluating
Soviet offensive responses to SDI is the point at which
the Soviets decide to incorporate such countermea-
sures into their offensive forces. The Soviets have been
engaged in efforts relevant to SDI countermeasures for
many years, and presumably undertook additional
work when the United States began pursuing SDI. On
balance, however (given the uncertain nature of the
US program and the potential disruption of their own
efforts), we judge that the Soviets have not yet com-
mitted to the deployment of specific SDI-responsive
modifications to their strategic offensive programs. In
the absence of a crash effort, therefore, advanced
technological countermeasures to SDI would be un-
likely to be deployed in any significant numbers until
about 2000 or beyond. We also are uncertain about the
effect that the introduction of advanced countermea-
sures could have on the subsequent growth of Soviet
strategic forces. We would expect, however, that in the
late 1990s, as the Soviets prepared for an increased
emphasis on qualitative responses, the rate of expan-
sion of offensive forces would slow considerably and
the force size would roughly flatten out. The size of
the force could be a few thousand warheads lower
than our "SDI response" projection, depending on the
timing of the introduction of technological counter-
measures. We note, however, that these observations
are tentative, and that we are very uncertain about
how the Soviets would actually undertake SDI respons-
es and how effective the Soviets would perceive such
responses to be.
39. An alternative view agrees with the foregoing
discussion, but holds that the possibility of a force
lower than 21,000 warheads by 1997 is considerably
more likely than the main text implies. According to
this view, the Soviets could begin to introduce qualita-
tive improvements in their strategic offensive forces in
the middle-to-late 1990s. The introduction of these
qualitative improvements would probably limit the
growth of offensive weapons to about 19,000 by 1997.
For example, the introduction of penetration aids such
as decoys, chaff, and faster burning missiles in the
middle-to-late 1990s, would require the offloading of
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some reentry vehicles from their ballistic missiles,
thereby constraining warhead growth. Thus, in this
view, Force 4 should reflect the earlier introduction of
qualitative measures that the Soviet would require to
counter an evolving US strategic defense system. Force
4 projects a total force level which this view judges to
be quantitatively excessive. 2�
Resources
40.
wer the next
decade the Soviets will make substantial resource
commitments for modernizing strategic forces. This
strategic force upgrade comes at a time when General
Secretary Gorbachev has firmly established industrial
modernization as a top priority. The ambitious goals
outlined in the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan (FYP) are
intended not only to accelerate the slow economic
growth of the past decade, but also to narrow the
technological gap between the Soviet Union and the
United States and to establish the infrastructure need-
ed for production of the next generation of high-
technology weaponry. Toward this end, Gorbachev
has called for a large-scale replacement of outdated
plants and equipment and has emphasized high-tech-
nology industries
41. As a result of heavy investment in the defense
industries since the late 1970s, existing weapon facili-
ties and those already under construction will be able
to produce the strategic forces projected in this Esti-
mate at least through the early-to-middle 1990s. For
some basic materials and intermediate goods used in
the production process, however, competition within
the defense sector and between the military and
civilian economies might be stiff during this period. It
is possible these factors could somewhat affect the rate
at which some strategic systems are introduced and
the levels deployed. Nevertheless, the large sunk costs
in production for new strategic weapons and the fact
that such production facilities cannot readily be con-
verted to civilian uses mean that Gorbachev's industri-
al modernization goals almost certainly will not have
major effects on strategic weapons deployments
through the mid-1990s.
42. New construction of defense plants and retool-
ing of existing facilities will be required in the late
1980s and early 1990s to produce the next generation
of weapons. Success in the current economic modern-
ization effort over the next few years, through in-
creases in the quantity and quality of Soviet machin-
ery and other products important for defense, would
put the USSR in a good position to produce the more
advanced weapons of the late 1990s and beyond and
still provide for growth in civilian investment and
consumption. On the other hand, it appears more
likely that�despite some important successes�the
modernization provided for in the FYP will fall far
short of the goal. This will present the Soviet leader-
ship with a dilemma: to delay or scale back some-
where in their planned allocation of resources�con-
sumption, modernization of the economy, and the
military. We judge, however, that, even if military
programs are affected, strategic forces will continue to
command the highest resource priorities and therefore
would be affected less by economic problems than any
other element of the Soviet military.
43. Although we do not believe that the Soviets'
economic difficulties are the primary reason for their
interest in arms control, failure of the modernization
program to spur economic growth might increase the
attractiveness of an arms control agreement. Restrain-
ing or eliminating SDI, for example, could free enor-
mous amounts of technical and industrial resources
vital to other Soviet military and civilian programs
which would otherwise be spent on countermeasures.
On balance, in the near term the civilian economy
would accrue only small benefits from reducing or
even eliminating particular strategic systems that are
well under development and for which production
facilities have been constructed. Over the long run,
cost avoidance associated with systems in the early
stages of R&D, particularly responses to SDI, could be
substantial and the Soviets could pursue advanced
technology efforts at their own pace. An additional
view holds that the Soviet leadership is well aware that
the potential economic savings from arms control are
marginal, as strategic weapons make up only a small
portion of the defense budget. The holder of this view
believes that Soviet force decisions, including potential
arms control agreements, will continue to be driven
primarily by the requirement to meet military objec-
tives, rather than economic concerns.
Arms Control Issues
44. At least for the near term, continued Soviet
SALT "interim restraint" and the prospect of new
arms control agreements will influence the quantita-
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tive and qualitative development of Soviet strategic
offensive forces. Soviet "interim restraint" is likely to
revolve around SALT II's key quantitative provisions,
especially the MIRV sublimits. The Soviets probably
regard the near-term US deployments beyond SALT II
as having marginal military significance. Even if they
abandon all pretense of SALT adherence, the Soviets
are likely to take actions, such as delaying dismantle-
ment of older strategic systems, that they can portray
as "proportionate" to US measures. Because of arms
control considerations, the Soviets also will probably
hedge in the development and testing of new systems.
45. Goals the Soviets apparently hope to gain
through the arms control process or any resulting
agreements are to:
� Protect and enhance the capabilities of Soviet
military forces in relation to their opponents.
� Constrain US and NATO force modernization,
especially in such fields as ballistic missile de-
fense and space warfare.
� Make the prospective military environment more
predictable, so as to facilitate military planning
and avoid unnecessary military expenditures.
� Use the arms control process itself to help stimu-
late public pressures in the West that might
unilaterally constrain US and NATO programs
and undermine the cohesion of the Western
alliance.
46. If they believe the potential payoff from formal
agreements to be sufficiently high, we judge that the
Soviets would accept some constraints on their military
programs:
� Their apparent willingness to ban INF missiles
reflects an attempt to magnify the political and
military advantages of their conventional pre-
ponderance in Europe, while at the same time
covering theater nuclear targets with systems
unlimited by the agreement. The Soviets proba-
bly believe that the elimination of NATO's INF
missiles would erode the credibility of the US
strategic deterrent in the eyes of European gov-
ernments. That is, in the Soviet view, the Euro-
peans would believe that, if the United States
had to depend almost entirely on its central
strategic systems to threaten strikes against the
Soviet homeland in the event of a Warsaw Pact
offensive against NATO, the United States would
be confronted with the prospect of provoking a
massive Soviet strike against North America.
� Soviet proposals for deep cuts in intercontinental
offensive forces in return for US curtailment of
SDI could allow the USSR to preserve its net
strategic advantages, covering critical fixed tar-
gets and improving Soviet prospects for damage
limitation. The more stable planning and budget-
ary environment that would ensue could enhance
Gorbachev's efforts to rehabilitate the Soviet
economy in the near term so as to make the
Soviets more competitive in the longer term.
Soviet Scenarios for Nuclear War
47. Soviet military planning is guided by funda-
mental wartime objectives: to decisively defeat enemy
conventional and nuclear forces, to occupy enemy
territory in the theater, and to defend the homeland
against enemy attack. To meet these objectives, the
Soviets train their forces for a global nuclear conflict.
This training has diversified in scope and become
increasingly complex.
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49. The Soviets believe that, if a major nuclear war
occurred, it would be likely to arise out of a
NATO�Warsaw Pact conventional conflict preceded
by a political crisis that could last several weeks or
longer. They perceive a conventional phase as lasting
from a few days to several weeks or longer. In recent
years they have devoted increasing attention to pre-
paring for conventional war. (See paragraphs 79
through 89 for further discussion of potential changes
in Soviet military doctrine relating to the future
prospects for conventional and nuclear war.) The
Soviets see little likelihood that the United States
would initiate a surprise nuclear attack from a normal
peacetime posture; we judge it to be unlikely that they
would mount such an attack themselves. The Soviets'
key objectives in the conventional phase would be to
weaken the enemy's theater-based and sea-based nu-
clear forces with attacks by conventional weapons,
while protecting their own nuclear forces. We esti-
mate that during the conventional war there would be
a high likelihood that the Soviets would attempt to
interfere with selected US space systems that provide
important wartime support, using both destructive and
nondestructive means. (However, the Soviets' own
growing reliance on space assets for the conduct of
military operations is likely to pose a dilemma if the
United States deploys antisatellite capabilities.)
51. If the Soviets were advancing on NATO terri-
tory, they would be unlikely to initiate use of nuclear
weapons unless they believed that NATO was about to
use them. They would be likely to initiate nuclear
weapons use if they suffered serious setbacks in the
conventional war. If there were localized use of a few
battlefield nuclear weapons, the Soviets would proba-
bly still think there was an opportunity to avoid large-
scale nuclear war. If NATO launched small numbers
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conventional offensive, there is a substantial possibility
the Soviets themselves would even refrain, at least
briefly, from resorting to nuclear use. However, once
large-scale use of nuclear weapons occurred in the
theater, imminent Soviet escalation to intercontinental
nuclear war would be probable.
53. As the likelihood of large-scale nuclear conflict
increased, Soviet leaders would face the difficult
decision of whether to seize the initiative and strike, as
would be consistent with their general military doc-
trine, or to be more cautious in the hope of averting
large-scale nuclear strikes on the Soviet homeland. We
cannot state with high confidence what the Soviets
would actually do under a particular set of circum-
stances, despite the weight of evidence indicating the
doctrinal imperative to mount large-scale preemptive
nuclear attacks.
54. The Soviets have three principal strategic em-
ployment options: preemption, launch-on-tactical
warning (LOTW), and retaliation. In the event the
Soviets decide to use strategic nuclear weapons, we
believe preemption remains their preferred option
because it maximizes the chances for destroying ene-
my forces and thus limiting damage to Soviet forces.
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Soviet Capabilities and Incentives To Control Escalation
Although we do not fully understand how the Soviets
would rate their chances to keep a war with NATO
from escalating to global nuclear war, we have gained
some additional insights this year into the wide range of
factors that would bear on this crucial issue.
Factors contributing to control. The Soviets have
been emphasizing measures and practices that, among
other benefits, provide flexibility for keeping a future
war with NATO from escalating to global nuclear war:
� European theater exercises in the 1980s have
improved Soviet capability to fight a longer con-
ventional war, perhaps without escalating. These
exercises have featured prolonged conventional
warfare with emerging advanced conventional
weapons, and frequently have demonstrated only
limited Warsaw Pact advances into NATO
territory.
� Growing diversity of Soviet offensive forces, in-
cluding deployments of mobile ICBMs, improves
their overall secure retaliatory capability. In the
Soviet view, this might help intimidate NATO
from threatening nuclear escalation.
� The Soviets apparently expect that high attrition
rates for their SSBN force and some attrition to
other strategic forces will be a reality of major
conventional war. These would not necessarily
provoke the USSR to rapid escalation.
� There is continued Soviet interest, indicated in
exercises, in a modest limited nuclear option
involving the brief use of small numbers of battle-
field nuclear systems. Combined with recent
growth and improvements in battlefield nuclear
systems, this option provides the Soviets with an
additional opportunity to try to limit escalation in
a European war so as to avoid nuclear strikes on
the Soviet homeland or escalation to global nuclear
war.
� The Soviets apparently consider that the United
States might attempt a limited intercontinental
strike, and there could conceivably be circum-
stances under which the leaders would consider
responding to a limited intercontinental strike
with a limited strike of their own.
Factors contributing to escalation. The Soviets
have continued to emphasize certain measures and
practices that could actually diminish their flexibility
for controlling escalation, but would help them to
prosecute a global nuclear war. The evidence includes:
� Their continued heavy emphasis in their conven-
tional operations on destroying NATO's nuclear
assets. That destruction would improve Soviet
chances for combat success if nuclear operations
began, but could increase the chances of provok-
ing NATO's nuclear escalation.
� Soviet retention of a large, and increasingly vul-
nerable, silo-based ICBM force through the 1990s
that is likely to contribute to Soviet incentives to
preempt, even though preemption carries a great-
er risk (than other employment options) of escalat-
ing a theater war unnecessarily.
Assessment. We cannot ultimately judge how the
Soviets would actually weigh the trade-offs when faced
with a decision to risk escalation in a future war with
NATO. However, we believe that Soviet military and
political leaders continue to expect that a future war
with NATO would likely escalate to global nuclear
war�especially if any nuclear weapons are used. More-
over, it is far from clear that Soviet political leaders
would be predisposed to try to control escalation in a
crisis or conventional war, rather than seize the initia-
tive to maximize the USSR's combat advantages in an
ensuing global nuclear war. Indeed, where choices have
to be made, the Soviets have apparently sought to
prepare for global nuclear war at the expense of
facilitating escalation control.
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55. In their initial intercontinental strikes the Sovi-
ets would seek to neutralize US and Allied military
operations and capabilities by destroying US-based
nuclear forces, disrupting and destroying the support-
ing infrastructure and control systems for these forces
as well as the National Command Authority, and
attempting to isolate the United States from the
theater campaign by attacking its power projection
capabilities. They probably would also attempt to
reduce US military power in the long term by attack-
ing nonnuclear forces, US military-industrial capacity,
and governmental control facilities, although the ex-
tent of the attack on these targets in the initial strikes
could vary, depending on the circumstances. It is
highly unlikely that the Soviets would limit initial
intercontinental strikes to only a -decapitation- attack
against command, control, and communications tar-
gets, or to only a portion of US strategic forces, such as
ICBM silos.
56. The Soviets have considerable flexibility in their
employment of ICBMs. In our judgment, they would
not launch their ICBMs in a single massive strike.
58. As force modernization proceeds, the Soviets
will continue to rely primarily on silo-based ICBMs for
initial strikes while withholding many of their SLBMs
and presumably most of their dispersed mobile ICBMs
subsequent strikes during late
flict.
for
phases of nuclear con-
59. There is an alternative view that the main text
overstates the difficulties the Soviets would have in
reconstituting their current silo-based ICBM force in
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nuclear conflict,
122 According to another alterna-
tive view, Soviet reload attempts would be on a
contingency basis; that is, any reserve missiles not
required to maintain the online force would be used
for reloading. Furthermore, in this view, it is by no
means clear that reload and refire operations during
nuclear war would be less problematic for mobile
launchers than for silos. 23
60. Besides a growing role for mobile ICBMs, other
key operational developments we expect include:
� An increasing role for SLCMs, especially for
follow-on strikes.
� A greater role and greater survivability for the
heavy bomber force as a consequence of the
improved capabilities of the Blackjack.
� Extension of Soviet air defense coverage farther
from Soviet borders with the deployment of
Midas tankers to support Mainstay AWACS and
fighter aircraft, and with increased use of Arctic
support bases for interceptors.
61. In addition, we expect the Soviets to take
greater advantage of ice cover for their SSBNs. Longer
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range SLBMs, such as the SS-N-23, permit the Soviets
to cover targets while operating deep within Soviet
bastion areas.!
Capabilities of Strategic Forces
62. The Soviets have enough hard-target-capable
ICBM RVs today to attack all US missile silos and
launch control centers with at least two warheads
each.
63. Our analysis suggests that the Soviets have
generally emphasized the destructive effects of ground
burst attacks against ICBM silos. \
64. Beginning with the SS-N-23, Soviet SLBMs are
expected to achieve better accuracy. They are likely to
have sufficient yield and accuracy by the late 1990s to
attack current US silos with greater confidence, but
SLBMs are inherently less suited than ICBMs for use
in an initial countersilo strike and during the next 10
years will not be nearly as effective for this role as
Soviet silo-based ICBMs.
65. Soviet plans for nuclear attack against North
America probably include high altitude electromag-
netic pulse (EMP) attacks by heavy ICBMs designed to
degrade US command, control, and communications.
We judge that the Soviets would employ EMP precur-
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sor strikes only if they did not jeopardize the effective-
ness of their main attack.\
66. We judge that, for a comprehensive Soviet
attack against North America, the Soviets currently
have enough warheads to meet most and possibly all of
their targeting objectives in a preemptive strike. This
would also be the case if the Soviets could accomplish
a reasonably successful LOTW. However, we judge
the Soviets may have insufficient warheads to meet
high damage goals against US ICBM silos if they were
to retaliate after absorbing an initial US attack (pre-
sumably an important scenario in Soviet force plan-
ning) because of expected Soviet losses in their silo-
based ICBMs. 2
67. Over the next 10 years, we expect that Soviet
offensive forces will not be able to effectively target
and destroy patrolling US SSBNs, alert aircraft, air-
" We judge that the Soviets would wish to destroy US ICBM silos
even in a retaliatory strike when most US silos would be empty. The
Soviets would be unable to determine which US silos had launched,
and thus would want to attack all US silos in order to destroy any
ICBMs that were withheld or failed to launch. Moreover, the Soviets
may be concerned that the United States would try to reload some
surviving silos
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craft in flight, or the dispersed land-mobile ICBM
force. Moreover, we judge that the Soviets would
regard ballistic missile barrage attacks to be militarily
impractical against both US bomber flyout corridors
and US mobile missiles, unless they could localize
mobile missiles with near-real-time surveillance capa-
bilities�a capability we do not foresee in at least the
next 10 years. We believe that the Soviets would credit
undegraded US warning and control systems in a crisis
or conflict with the ability to launch ICBMs on tactical
warning.
68. The Soviets probably perceive their ICBM silos
to be somewhat more vulnerable to a US attack than
we would assess, given their differing views of nuclear
effects and attack modes
Soviet concern over the vulnerability of their silo-
based ICBMs will increase over the period of this
Estimate as the United States deploys more accurate
missiles. However, the Soviets will continue to rely on
silo-based ICBMs for the bulk of their preemptive
attack capabilities, and most of their ICBM force will
continue to be silo based.
the Soviets continue to see certain
advantages in silo basing, such as quick reaction and
reliability, which are desirable for performing prompt
soft- as well as hard-target missions.
69. Dispersed Soviet mobile missiles, many SSBNs
patrolling in waters near the USSR, and a large part of
the silo-based ICBM force would survive an attack by
current US forces. To assure adequate retaliatory and
protracted warfare capabilities, the Soviets will in-
creasingly depend on SLBMs and mobile ICBMs.
70. These characteristics of Soviet strategic offen-
sive force modernization have strengthened the judg-
ments we made in previous Estimates about the
nuclear employment options the Soviets are likely to
find necessary, feasible, or desirable in the 1990s.
While the Soviets are improving their retaliatory
capabilities, the inherent advantages to striking first
and their continuing dependence on relatively vulner-
able silo-based systems, especially for prompt attacks
on hard targets, indicate a continuing commitment to
the preemption option./
Soviets will continue to view preemption as the most
desirable option, even though the ambiguities of stra-
tegic warning could potentially leave them in the
dilemma of either failing to preempt and thereby
suffering much greater damage, or launching their
forces unnecessarily.
71. Thus, the Soviets will probably continue to view
their LOTW option as a highly important fallback.
Indeed, compared to absorbing an enemy strike and
retaliating, the Soviets may become even more depen-
dent on LOTW in the 1990s. This is because, should
they absorb a strike, their silo-based forces would
suffer greater attrition in the future as a result of
improved US countersilo capabilities. At the same
time, the Soviets probably appreciate that, should they
fail to preempt or execute LOTW successfully, their
ongoing modernization program will still increase their
overall ability to deliver devastating counterstrikes
after absorbing an enemy nuclear strike.
72. Current Soviet ASAT capabilities could not
deny the United States the use of space in time of war,
but Soviet ASAT systems could attack a number of key
US satellites. I
the nu-
clear Galosh ABM interceptor and one, peiTiaps two,
ground-based, high-energy lasers�have the potential
to destroy or interfere with some satellites in near-
Earth orbit. None of these Soviet capabilities, howev-
er, would survive a nuclear attack. Electronic warfare
currently represents the only potential Soviet threat to
unprotected satellites in higher orbits.
73. The United States would require multiple high-
yield accurate weapons to achieve a high probability
of severely damaging almost all types of Soviet hard-
ened exurban leadership facilities that we have locat-
ed. \
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74.* Sufficient warning to implement relocation
plans would allow survival of a large percentage of the
Soviet leaders, mostly those at territorial levels. How-
ever, the Soviet wartime management system would
be seriously disrupted as the result of a US attack;
there would be major degradation or denial of many
national-level leadership functions associated with the
Moscow area. Damage would also be pronounced at
the intermediate level of the command chain, affect-
ing military districts (and regional military high com-
mands) as well as the leadership of the Soviet repub-
lics.
75. The current Moscow ABM system of
Galosh launchers provides a limited, single-layer
defense capable of intercepting ballistic missile RVs
only before they reenter the atmosphere./
widespread deployment of a Soviet ABM system,
even if US evaluations indicated it could be overcome
by an attacking force, would complicate US attack
planning and create uncertainties for US planners
about the effectiveness of a US strike.
76. Any, judgment about the overall effectiveness of
the future Soviet air defenses against an attack by
bombers and cruise missiles is subject to considerable
uncertainty. Penetration of improved Soviet air de-
fenses by currently deployed bombers would be more
difficult. These defenses, however, would be consider-
ably less effective against US cruise missiles and future
bombers. Our judgment is that, against a combined
attack of penetrating bombers, SRAMs, and cruise
missiles, Soviet air defenses during the next 10 years
probably would not be capable of inflicting sufficient
losses to prevent considerable penetration of Soviet air
defenses. These judgments, however, are highly de-
pendent on the effectiveness of US electronic counter-
measures and the penetration altitudes of US bombers
and cruise missiles.
77. There is an alternative view that this Estimate
substantially understates the capability of the Soviet
air defense system to defend key target areas against
low-altitude penetrators. The holder of this view be-
lieves that the effectiveness of Soviet air defenses in
such areas would be significantly higher against a
combined attack of penetrating bombers, SRAMs, and
cruise missiles than the Estimate suggests. 26
78. While significant improvements in the capabili-
ties of both Soviet and US strategic offensive forces
will occur throughout the next 10 years, sizable forces
on both sides would continue to survive large-scale
nuclear strikes. It seems highly likely that the Soviets
could maintain continuity of command and control
throughout all phases of a war, although. it would
probably be degraded. The Soviets could have difficul-
ty maintaining endurance and effectiveness over
weeks of continuous operations, particularly if subject-
ed to US strikes. Soviet long-range reconnaissance
capabilities could be particularly affected. We believe
the Soviets would launch continuing attacks on US and
Allied strategic command, control, and communica-
tions to prevent or degrade the coordination of retalia-
tory strikes, thereby easing the burden on Soviet
strategic defenses, and degrading US and Allied abili-
ties to marshal military and civilian resources to
reconstitute forces.
The New Gorbachev Declaratory Policy on
Nuclear War
79. The Gorbachev regime has enunciated a declar-
atory policy that takes an apparently more benign
approach to issues of nuclear war than we have
typically characterized in previous years in this Esti-
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4(b)(3)
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mate. In some analysts' views, this policy may at least
reflect a greater Soviet willingness to be flexible on
arms control and may possibly portend significant
changes in Soviet goals and priorities for conventional
and nuclear war with NATO. In other analysts' views,
this declaratory policy will have little or no effect on
Soviet strategic goals and priorities. The potential
significance of this declaratory policy and the contro-
versy it has sparked among analysts warrant a deeper
examination.
80. Since the late 1970s, an evolving Soviet declara-
tory policy has eschewed superiority in nuclear forces
and dismissed victory as an attainable objective in
nuclear war. More recently, Gorbachev has forcefully
adopted it as a key element in his publicly espoused
,`new political thinking." This new declaratory policy
was written into the Party program, approved by the
27th CPSU Congress in early 1986, and has been
echoed by key military spokesmen such as Chief of the
General Staff Akhromeyev. We acknowledge that,
because Gorbachev has shown himself willing and able
to question long-cherished precepts in the domestic
field, we must be alert to the possibility that something
new and fundamentally different is happening in
Soviet military doctrine and policy, while at the same
time carefully weighing the evidence with an appro-
priate degree of caution and skepticism.
81. Although the Gorbachev regime has codified a
public policy that rejects superiority and victory as
Soviet objectives in the development of strategic nucle-
ar forces, these statements, by themselves, cannot be
taken as clear evidence of the Soviet leadership's real
views on nuclear war or of a change in emphasis on
nuclear forces. Some of these statements, for example,
are clearly self-serving�intended, at least in part, to
influence Western perceptions. Moreover, there is
evidence that there is not a unanimity of views within
the Soviet military hierarchy on nuclear force issues.
Consequently, analysts both inside and outside the
Intelligence Community differ on the impact, if any,
that Gorbachev's declaratory policy may have on
current and future Soviet weapons procurement and
operational planning.
82. Nevertheless, we continue to judge that the
USSR's national security decisionmakers underwrite
the research, development, testing, and deployment of
its strategic nuclear arsenal for three principal reasons:
� As Marxist-Leninists they see a deep and abiding
antagonism with the West that could result in
nuclear war�even though such a war is no
longer deemed inevitable. Consequently, they
continually improve the warfighting capabilities
of their strategic forces.
In their view these forces deter adversaries from
taking the risk of starting a war with the USSR in
the first place and perhaps even from escalating
once a war has begun.
Such forces give the USSR superpower status and
underpin an assertive Soviet foreign policy. Stra-
tegic nuclear weapons are the most visible confir-
mation of Soviet superpower status.
83. We emphasize that, although the Soviets have
shared the West's goal of avoiding nuclear war, they
have not accepted such Western deterrence concepts
as mutual assured destruction (MAD) as a sound basis
for strategic nuclear force planning. At the same time,
the Soviets apparently believe that in the present US-
Soviet strategic relationship each side possesses strate-
gic nuclear capabilities that could devastate the other
after absorbing an attack. Soviet leaders have stated
that nuclear war with the United States would be a
catastrophe that must be avoided if possible and that
they do not foresee such a war as inevitable. Neverthe-
less, they regard nuclear war as a continuing possibility
for which they must be prepared; they have continued
to improve their nuclear warfighting capabilities
through force modernization and operational improve-
ments. They have continued to emphasize passive
defenses, such as deep-underground leadership facili-
ties that are designed to protect the leaders and enable
them to conduct the war, reconstitute forces, and
direct the postwar recovery. Indeed, a tenet of their
strategic thinking holds that the better prepared the
USSR is to fight in various contingencies, the more
likely it is that potential enemies will be dissuaded
from initiating attacks on the Soviet Union and its
allies and will hesitate in countering Soviet political
and military actions. In short, while certain Western
strategic theories, such as MAD, have drawn sharp
distinctions between deterrence and warfighting re-
quirements for strategic forces in the nuclear age, the
Soviets have maintained the more traditional military
outlook that forces that are prepared to fight a war are
also better able to deter war.
84. Soviet doctrinal writings long have posited the
objective of victory in war. The Soviet view of victory
in nuclear war and the extent to which it drives their
nuclear force acquisitions and employment policy
have been the most controversial issues over the years
for Western analysts of Soviet doctrine. The Soviet
political and military leadership certainly recognizes
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the difficulty of applying such doctrinal tenets to
nuclear war. In particular, the objective of victory in
general nuclear war would have been extremely diffi-
cult for the Soviets to attain in any meaningful sense
even as the Soviets were moving toward strategic
parity with the United States in the 1960s and into the
1970s. More recently, the Soviets have made impres-
sive gains in all aspects of their strategic forces, but we
judge that they would not have high confidence in the
capability of their strategic offensive and defensive
forces to accomplish all of their wartime missions,
particularly the key mission of limiting the damage to
the Soviet homeland. (For details see volume II,
chapter VII.) There is no indication that the Soviets
were ever sanguine about the consequences they could
expect to suffer in a nuclear war no matter which side
struck first, and they clearly recognize that the devas-
tation would be so enormous as to call into question
the ability of their society to function. Nevertheless,
the Soviets apparently have seen, and probably contin-
ue to see, significant value in trying to prevail in
general nuclear war, particularly in terms of succeed-
ing in their military and political objectives in Eurasia
while limiting damage to a sufficient extent to provide
some chance for reconstituting Soviet leadership and
society. For all practical purposes, this is what might
constitute for them "winning" a nuclear war.
85. The holder of an alternative view agrees that
the Soviets are well aware that the USSR would suffer
enormous damage in a general nuclear war, and notes
the judgment in volume II, chapter VII that Soviet
offensive and defensive forces will continue to be
unable to prevent such damage. In this view, the
Soviets also recognize that the damage each side would
inflict on the other in a general nuclear war prevents
either side from being a "winner" in any practical
sense, and renders meaningless the concept of "pre-
vailing." 27 Another alternative view holds that the
main text understates the potential for the most
critical elements of Soviet society to function following
a nuclear war. Given the extensive preparations the
Soviets are continuing to make in passive and active
defenses, command, control, and communications re-
dundancy, leadership protection, and preparations for
protracted nuclear operations, the Soviets expect to be
able to reconstitute the most critical elements of their
society following large-scale nuclear strikes. Such
elements include strategic and theater forces, central-
ized control over regional military forces and territori-
al government, national communications networks,
and selected industrial production. 28
86. With respect to the issue of superiority, which
Gorbachev's apparently more benign declaratory poli-
cy also rejects as a goal, the following realities of the
nuclear balance may still keep relevant and attainable
various key advantages in building forces and in
waging nuclear war. Nevertheless, these realities make
any overall, decisive superiority extremely difficult to
achieve and thus help inhibit a major clash between
the superpowers:
� The continuous and energetic modernization of
the Soviets' strategic nuclear forces has, since the
1960s, dramatically increased their capability to
wage nuclear war.
� The number of US strategic weapons that would
survive a Soviet first strike has continued to be in
the thousands, and has increased�despite major
improvements to Soviet counterforce capabilities.
� The Soviets continue to invest heavily in strategic
defenses, particularly air defense, leadership pro-
tection, and advanced weapons technologies.
However, even with the improvements taking
place in these forces, they are well aware of their
inability to prevent massive damage to the USSR.
� While the Soviets have achieved advantages in
certain areas and will continue to strive for forces
superior to those of the United States, they expect
that the United States will not allow them to
achieve a clear superiority in strategic interconti-
nental forces. Similarly, they have overcome
early US strategic superiority and are determined
to prevent any such US superiority in the future.
According to an alternative view, the Soviets recognize
that any meaningful "nuclear superiority" is unattain-
able because: (1) both sides' forces will continue to be
unable to prevent massive damage and (2) even if
"nuclear superiority" were theoretically possible, each
side would take whatever steps were necessary to
prevent the other from attaining it. 29
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87. There are divergent interpretations among
Western analysts of whether and to what extent these
realities and Gorbachev's declaratory policy will guide
the development of future Soviet nuclear forces, oper-
ational concepts, and nuclear employment strategy.
These interpretations range from an expectation of a
Soviet deemphasis on nuclear forces as compared to
the past, to an expectation that these factors will have
little or no operational significance in terms of either
Soviet force acquisition or employment strategies.
88. We believe it is highly significant that, consider-
ing the longstanding differences of view on Soviet
military doctrinal issues and the question of victory,
there is reasonably close agreement among agencies on
the trends in Soviet forces and their employment in
war. On the basis of all the available evidence which
we lay out in this Estimate, we do not expect to see
any significant reduction in the priority the Soviets
have given to nuclear forces, or a serious revision of
Soviet operational priorities and practices. The Soviets
are continuing to procure the forces and the capabili-
ties to be able to wage nuclear war. We expect the
Soviets to maintain a vigorous offensive and defensive
force modernization effort. We judge that strategic
forces will continue to command the highest resource
priority and therefore would be affected less by
economic problems than other elements of the mili-
tary.
89. We also see the Soviets as being willing to reach
arms control agreements calling for deep cuts in
intercontinental offensive forces, contingent upon the
curtailment of the US Strategic Defense Initiative.
Greater flexibility with respect to arms control, how-
ever, would not prevent continued vigorous Soviet
efforts to modernize all aspects of their strategic
forces. Moreover, we judge that the Soviets would aim,
at a minimum, to preserve the net strategic capability
of their forces to serve the gamut of Soviet security
objectives, from fighting a nuclear war to maintaining
geopolitical leverage as a superpower.
Concluding Observations
90. The evidence shows clearly that Soviet leaders
are improving the counterforce capability, survivabil-
ity, and damage-limiting capabilities of their military
forces, both to dissuade enemies from starting a war
and to prepare for the possibility that the USSR will
actually have to fight a global nuclear war.
9L The Soviets have seriously addressed many of
the problems of conducting military operations in a
global nuclear war, and are training for increasingly
complex war situations, thereby improving their abili-
ty to deal with the many contingencies of such a war.
Their persistence in enhancing their strategic offensive
and defensive capabilities is pursued, not with the
expectation that they would avert widespread disaster
in all circumstances, but rather in a belief that, if
nuclear strikes took place, sizable forces would be
likely to survive on both sides, the war might well
continue, and they should be prepared to pursue an
outcome as favorable as possible. Ideally, that outcome
would comprise neutralizing the ability of US inter-
continental and theater nuclear forces to interfere
with Soviet capabilities to defeat enemy forces in
Eurasia, dominating Eurasia, and preserving the abili-
ty of the Soviet state to survive and recover.
92. In the Soviets' view, strategic offensive and
defensive capabilities that can even begin to measure
up to such demanding wartime goals also serve well to
dissuade adversaries from taking the risk of starting a
nuclear war with the USSR in the first place and
perhaps even from escalating once a war has begun.
These capabilities also give the USSR the superpower
status that is critical to the maintenance and expansion
of its international influence. At the same time, the
recent declaratory policy of the Gorbachev regime,
questioning the attainability of some of the traditional
Soviet nuclear warfighting goals, reminds us that the
USSR's strategic nuclear forces, no less than its other
military forces, are not ends in themselves. Rather,
they are the most powerful instruments of the political
leaders who authorize these forces to be built and who
have the ultimate authority to decide whether, when,
and how to use them. Accordingly, we acknowledge
that the Gorbachev regime may at least be more
prepared to seriously bargain with these strategic
forces in arms control. Nevertheless, even while allow-
ing for some uncertainty, we judge that the Gorbachev
regime, like its predecessors, highly values powerful
strategic forces both because they offer the only
effective means to cope with the persistent contingen-
cy that nuclear war could occur and because of their
other vital contributions to Soviet security interests.
Thus, we expect the regime will continue to emphasize
strategic nuclear forces for the period of this Estimate.
93. Soviet military planners operate in a planning
environment that typically places high priority on
preparing for the possibility of actually having to wage
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a global nuclear war. Consequently, planners
emphasize:
� Passive defenses, active defenses, and massive
initial strikes on enemy forces to limit the dam-
age they can inflict.
� Highly redundant and extensive command, con-
trol, and communications capabilities, and lead-
ership protection to ensure continuity of control
of the war effort and the integration and coordi-
nation of force operations both at the interconti-
nental level and in Eurasian theaters.
� In general, preparations for more extended oper-
ations beyond the initial nuclear strikes.
94. As a result of such demanding requirements,
the Soviets are likely to rate their capabilities as lower
in some areas than we would assess them to be. They
clearly are concerned about:
� The vulnerability of their submarines to US
ASW, particularly in view of the reserve mission
they assign to a part of their SSBN force.
� The impact of continuing and potential US stra-
tegic nuclear modernization programs, SDI,
NATO INF deployments (as well as NATO's
emerging advanced technology conventional
weapons capabilities), and improvements in Brit-
ish, French, and Chinese nuclear forces.
� The increased probability that US improvements
in command, control, communications, and intel-
ligence will enable the United States to retaliate
more effectively and to manage forces more
efficiently in at least the initial stage of a nuclear
war.
� Their own ability to maintain effective com-
mand, control, communications, and intelligence
connectivity throughout key phases of a war.
� Their inability to prevent, or confidently inhibit,
the United States from launching a large-scale
counterstrike. We judge that the Soviets would
anticipate that a large force of US and Allied
weapons�alert bombers, patrolling SSBNs, and
at least a small number of ICBMs�would sur-
vive a major massed strike. Moreover, the Soviets
could not be confident that the United States
would be unable or unwilling to launch its ICBM
force on tactical warning or under attack. The
Soviets are well aware of their inability to pre-
vent massive damage to the USSR with their
strategic defenses even with the improvements
41
taking place in these forces. They also recognize
that US strategic defenses cannot prevent mas-
sive damage.
95. We conclude that the Soviets' calculations of
their chances for success in any nuclear war would
occur against a backdrop of fundamental uncertainty.
They recognize the many uncertainties that would
affect their chances for success in nuclear war. We
judge, therefore, that the Soviets would not have high
confidence in the capability of their strategic offensive
and defensive forces to accomplish all of their wartime
missions, particularly the limitation of damage to the
Soviet homeland.
96. The Soviets' probable lack of high confidence,
their appreciation of the destructiveness inherent in
global nuclear war, and the seriousness with which the
Soviets have approached the contingency of actually
having to wage such a war would probably inhibit
them from provoking a direct clash in peacetime with
the United States or its NATO Allies.
97. Should the Soviets get involved in a major
conventional war with the United States and its NATO
allies, however, the Soviets would see inherently high
risks that global nuclear war would ensue. In this
situation, they would consider: the likely nuclear
devastation of their homeland; the reliability of their
employment options to launch their forces quickly
upon warning that a US ICBM attack is under way
and, failing that, to retaliate effectively after absorb-
ing a US attack; and their prospects for success on the
conventional battlefield. They would also consider that
they could maximize damage to US forces and help
limit damage to Soviet forces and society in the
ensuing nuclear war by launching a preemptive nucle-
ar strike. In weighing a decision to preempt, the
Soviets would further consider that they may have
only ambiguous evidence of US intentions to launch its
strategic forces.
98. We cannot ultimately judge how the Soviets
would actually weigh such difficult trade-offs. We do
emphasize, however, that, because of their nuclear
warfighting strategy, exercising restraint to avoid esca-
lation to global nuclear war would not necessarily be
the Soviets' overriding concern. Indeed, because of the
stakes involved the Soviets may well accept some risk
that, by preempting, they might unleash global nucle-
ar war unnecessarily. Their strategic programs indi-
cate, moreover, that, for the period of this Estimate,
the Soviets' nuclear warfighting strategy will endure.
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