LATIN AMERICA WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06626238
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2016-02132
• Publication Date: November 25, 1977

Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C06626238
National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
(b)(3)
Latin America
Weekly Review
25 November 1977
Se
RP ALA 77-067
25, November 1977
Copy
1c
Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C06626238
Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C06626238
GUATEMALA
Modern Guatemalan terrorism can be traced back to
1949 and the formation of the Guatemalan Communist Party,
which three years later became the Guatemalan Labor Party
(PGT). In the early 1960s, radical elements of the PGT
joined with survivors of two unsuccessful military up-
risings as well as members of a student opposition group
to form the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR). This organization
spawned the first significant terrorist campaigns in
Guatemala, and the problem has been a major one ever since.
In 1965, the FAR split over the issue of control by
the PGT. One faction became the Revolutionary Armed Forces,
the action arm of the Communist Party (PGT/FAR, as dis-
tinguished from the original FAR), while the other fac-
tion pursued a more independent course. Between 1965 and
1974 terrorist activities reached a peak with the murders
of the US and West German ambassadors, two US military
advisers, and prominent Guatemalan Government and business
leaders; the kidnaping of a Guatemalan Foreign Minister
and a US Labor Attache; and attacks on United Fruit Company
holdings and small army garrisons.
During this period, the organizations underwent a
series of further splits and mergers that left the guer-
rilla movement without a central leadership. In 1974,
Julio Cesar Macias Mayora, alias "Cesar Montes," formed
yet another new faction, the Poor People's 'Army (EGP),
which is now the predominant group in Guatemala. The
various factions of the EGP total roughly 500 guerrillas
and hard-line militants with perhaps 2,000 support per-
sonnel. The urban, plains, and mountain segments are
well organized and under the effective control of a single
unified national leadership.
The EGP has the capability to carry out limited
operations in most areas of Guatemala, but it generally
confines its activities to Quiche and Huehuetenango Depart-
ments in the northwest, Alta Verapaz and Peten Departments'
in the northeast, Escuintla Department in the-south, and
Guatemala City. The government has occasionally under-
taken large countersubversive campaigns in the outlying
areas, particularly in Quiche, but has not been very
successful. The guerrillas take advantage of the diffi-
cult terrain, inexperience of government troops, and local
sympathy.
24
Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C06626238
Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C06626238
The long string of factional rifts in the Guatemalan
terrorist establishment that produced the EGP involved
differences of personality and strategy more than. issues
of revolutionary ideology. Recruitment, publicity and
self-aggrandizement seem almost to be more important to
the EGP and some Other groups than social revolution.
.The EGP is apparently a Cuban-oriented Communist
organization. It claims to be fighting a "people's war"
against wealthy industrialists, large landowners, some
foreign firms, and the military government, which the
EGP seeks to overthrow. Although it has international
ties, the EGP's goals are primarily nationalistic. The
terrorist groups in general believe that campaigns of
violence will provoke the government into imposing a
state of siege, and that the resulting strictures on
civil liberties will generate mass opposition. .
. The strategy of the EGP is to strengthen itself and
win mass support through propaganda campaigns, economic
sabotage, bombings, recruitment of peasants and students,
and kidnapings and assassinations of prominent business
and political leaders. It has been notably successful
in all of these areas. There are also reports that the
EGP plans to exploit the Belize controversy. If tensions
between Guatemala and Belize rise and require the Guate-
malanS to reinforce the border area, the EGP would step
up activities in those parts of the country where military
fortes are reduced. The terrorists reportedly are even
willing to promote tensions on the border by staging
incidents and kidnapings.
In the past year and a half, the EGP has assassinated
a number of people, including regional military commissioners,
police, and lower ranking public officials; bombed homes
of prominent industrialists and a downtown Guatemala
City Sheraton hotel; kidnaped businessmen and the Salvadoran
Ambassador; and raided sugar and coffee plantations, de-
stroying buildings, equipment, planes, and crops'. A
year ago, an EGP band seized a Shenandoah Oil Company
drilling camp in Quiche Department and forced down a
Guatemalan Air Force helicopter.
Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C06626238
Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C06626238
tET
In the past few months, the EGP has been less active
than the PGT/FAR, the action arm of the Communist Party.
Generally, the Soviet-oriented PGT has been less prone to
violence, and instead has utilized its support among
university students and its control of the Autonomous
Labor Federation of Guatemala to promote party interests.
During the last year, however, the PGT has suffered from
internal rifts that have undermined the control of the
Central Committee over regional groups. In August, southern
regional PGT organizations independently assassinated seven
local leaders of the right-wing National Liberation Move-
ment. In September, PGT/FAR members assassinated a former
Guatemalan Defense Minister in downtown Guatemala City.
The PGT has approximately 200 militants and 1,000 sympa-
thizers in Guatemala City, Quetzaltenango, and the south
coast. The PGT/FAR has about 60 members.
The Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) was once Guatemala's
most active guerrilla group, but during the past year it
has been concentrating on reorganization, recruitment,
and propaganda distribution because of internal splits
over ideology and strategy. Some members have advocated
rapprochement with the PGT, while others are defecting
to the EGP. The FAR has 30-40 active members. All armed
actions are carried out b its National Military Commission.
Outlook
The overall level of guerrilla activity has declined
over the past few years under the Laugerud administration,
but as the campaign for the presidential election in March
heats up, insurgency is likelyto increase. Although the
guerrilla movement lacks central leadership, representa-
tives of the leading factions reportedly are meeting to
establish some sort of coalition. Considering differences
over personalities, strategies, and perhaps ideology,
the prospects for a unified guerrilla movement are probably
not strong. In spite of international pressure to respect
human rights, the Guatemalan Government will not retreat
from its hard-line countersubversive measures and will
endeavor to prevent terrorist disruption of the presiden-
tial election.
Approved for Release: 2020/01/21 C06626238