Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 28, 2022
Document Release Date: 
November 28, 2017
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 12, 1970
Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) to. DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Report Political Terrorism: A Survey of the Literature and Twelve Case Studies (b)(3) 12 June 1970 No. 0513/70 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 WARNING This document e ains information affecting the national defense of the Unite ates, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, the US Code, as amended. its transmission or revelation its contents to or re- ceipt by an unauthorized person is rohibited by law. GROUP 1 ExcLumn 1110M AUTOMATIC DO.NOliADING AND DECLAt,SIPICATION Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 S'ES12ET (b)(3) POLITICAL TERRORISM: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE AND TWELVE CASE STUDIES (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) POLITICAL TERRORISM: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE AND TWELVE CASE STUDIES Contents FOREWORD SOME WRITING ON POLITICAL TERRORISM 1 SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 7 A. The Nature and Objectives of Terrorism 7 B. The Effectiveness of Terrorism 10 1. Against Colonial Regimes 10 2. Against Authoritarian Regimes 11 3. Against Constitutionally-Elected Governments 12 C. Counter-Measures: Kinds and Effectiveness 13 1. Kinds of Forces 13 2. Conventional Measures 15 3. Extraordinary Measures 15 4. Reform 21 5. Summary 23 TWELVE CASE STUDIES A. Historical 1. Tsarist Russia (1825-1917) 27 2. The United States (1831-1920) 58 3. Ireland--Sinn Fein (1916-1921) 91 4. Palestine--Stern Gang-Lehi (1931-1948) 98 B. Recent and Current 1. In Colonial Situations b. Algeria i. The FLN (1954-1962) 109 ii. The OAS (1961-1962) 113 (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 OM, (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3). b. Guatemala (1960-1970) 145 (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) FOREWORD There is a substantial literature of terrorism. Part of this is fictional, and part has been written by the terrorists themselves. Most of the rest is in the form of studies of particular situations, mainly of terrorism against authoritarian or colonial governments; there is very little literature on terrorism in free societies. There are a few articles on the theory and practice of terrorism which formulate general propositions about terrorism apart from the study of particular cases. There is no general work, however, which derives a systematic and coherent set of propositions from a close study of particular cases. The students of particular cases either generalize little or are confined to cases of one type (usually colonial), while the most ambitious theorists do not seem to have drawn their propositions from, or to have tested them on, the range of particular cases. A general work of the type most desirable would, we think, consider terrorism in operation against at least three types of governments--colonial, authoritarian, and constitutionally-elected--and the counter-measures taken by these governments. It would then construct a set of general propositions about terrorism as elaborate as the material permits. The following study makes a beginning along those lines. It is by no means a definitive work on the subject. Its case studies are representative, not comprehensive, and its conclusions are tentative. Part I is a review of the few books and articles found to be of value as a source of general propositions. The conclusions of the study--the general propositions which stood up in, or derived from, our examination of 12 cases-- appear as Part II. The case studies, the main body of the report, appear as Part III. (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Some of the 12 case studies are substantial; some, where information is scanty, are brief. There is no common format. In each of them, however, the analyst has tried to assess the conditions producing the terrorism, the prime objective and essential strategy of the terrorists, the terrorist organization and its practices, and the effectiveness of terrorism. Each case study also includes a discussion of measures taken against the terrorists, the effectiveness of the measures, and the lessons derived by those concerned or by other observers. (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 ozumxii (b)(3) I. SOME WRITING ON POLITICAL TERRORISM In fiction, the two classics are probably Fyodor Dostoyevsky's The Possessed (1872) and Joseph Conrad's The Secret Agent (1907). Dostoyevsky was writing of the 'Russian Nihilist movement, and in particular of Nechayev and his followers. He saw them as a pack of fools led by one evil intelligence, unconsciously preparing the way for state terrorism, i.e., for the anti-religious, pseudo- scientific totalitarian state. Conrad was writing of the anarchist movement in England, which he saw as a form of lunacy, and, as such, truly terrifying. Only insanity, he said, could not be reasoned with, bought off, or coerced. Both Dostoyevsky and Conrad saw society's short- range "answer" as a reaffirmation of the traditional values under attack. Dostoyevsky was willing to defend an authoritarian society employing harsh repressive methods, while Conrad was devoted to democratic principles. Conrad was not sure, however, that adherence to conventional procedures could effectively deal with terrorists. His apparent spokesman, Chief Inspector Heat, argued that he must work within the principles of his society if he was to preserve it, but he feared that it "may yet be necessary to make people believe that some of you [bomb-planting anarchists] ought to be shot at sight like mad dogs..." Outside of fiction, a part of the literature has been written by the terrorists themselves--from Bakunin and Nechayev in the mid-19th century to General Grivas and the late Frantz Fanon and Carlos Marighella in recent years. Much of this--for example, Nechayev and Fanon on the psychology of the terrorist, Grivas and Marighella on tactics--is well worth reading. However, the practitioners of terrorism do not discuss it from the point of view of the society or government against which it is practiced. Most of the literature is in the form of studies of particular situations--terrorism in Tsarist Russia (where in its modern form it began), in Western Europe, and in a number of colonial situations. (These are used and refer- enced in Part III of this report, the 12 case studies.) Comparatively little has been written about terrorism in -1 - --greRET Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SEeRET (b)(3) recent years, especially in the critical category of terrorism practiced against constitutionally-elected governments. The nearest thing to a general work of the type that seems most desirable is Roland Gaucher's The Terrorists: from Tsarist Russia to the 0.A.S., published in France in 1965 and in England by Secker and Warburg, London, in 1968. Gaucher's book is aimed at a popular audience, in that its stated objectives are to capture the "essential moments" of terrorism, to "describe its more lively episodes," and to "depict its protagonists." It includes generally good accounts of the two waves of terrorism in Tsarist Russia, the terrorists' unsuccessful effort to overthrow the Bolsheviks, terrorism in Europe, and terrorism in Ireland and Palestine and Algeria. But Gaucher does not do as much as he might with his material. In a brief concluding chapter on the strategy of terror, he sets forth only a few findings. He concludes that the aim of terrorism is to "break the spirit of the opposition" and that it is undertaken because other methods seem doomed to defeat and "because a certain emotional threshold has been crossed." He holds that terrorism must first impose its law on the population it "wishes to lead into battle"--must make people either prefer the terrorists to the government or fear the terrorists more than the government. He sees terrorism as �best suited to the task of fighting foreign rule. And he concludes that terrorist movements, always an expression of weakness, tend eventually to be wiped out unless circumstances "enable them to play on a world stage and pass on to other forms of combat"--e.g. guerrilla war. In sum, Gaucher's careful studies and modest observa- tions are of value to anyone who might attempt to develop an ambitious set of general propositions about terrorism, but he himself is not primarily a theorist and does not do so. A much more ambitious and rigorous theoretical effort, aimed at a more specialized audience, is Thomas P. Thornton's chapter, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation" in INTERNAL WAR: Problems and Approaches, edited by Harry Eckstein, Macmillan, 1964. Thornton offers a definition of terrorism and explains it, discusses tactical considerations (targets, responses sought, discrimination) and proximate objectives (morale-building, =2- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) I Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SEtaRZT (b)(3) advertising, disorientation, elimination of opposing forces, provocation of counter-measures). He concludes with a section on the place of terrorism in internal war, in which he finds that terrorism cannot be the final determinant of the outcome of an internal war. He does not, however, discuss means of countering terrorism. And the article is entirely at the level of assertion: no case studies or even examples are presented, and there is no way to judge the degree to which his general propositions have been derived from close study of particular cases. Thornton, who is now with the Department of State, is most useful as a source of general propositions with which to approach and bring into order the raw materials of case studies. These cases do seem to support most of his propositions --though not all--and many of the formulations on the nature and objectives of terrorism in the first part of the next section of this paper are similar to Thornton's. Terrorism as a part of guerrilla war is discussed at various points throughout Robert Taber's The War of the Flea, Lyle Stuart, New York, 1965. Taber is concerned almost entirely with guerrilla wars and terrorism against colonial and other occupying powers; he is a partisan of almost all such wars, without distinguishing between those which are dominated by the Communists and those which are not. Concerned with guerrilla wars, which have popular support, he tends to think of all terrorism as having popular support, as being a "manifestation of popular will." At one point he argues that modern governments could crush guerrilla movements and terrorists if they were willing to be as ruthless as the situation demands: he adduces Franco as his example. But through most of the book, and in his conclusions, his view of the terrorist cause as usually a popular one leads him to argue that almost any action against the terrorists, instead of against the basic social injustices that breed them, is vain and even counter-productive. This is clearly a restricted view, and one which seems to be refuted by studies of several non-colonial situations. Brian Crozier in The Rebels: A Study of Bost-War Insurrections (Chatto and Windus, London, 1960) devotes a substantial part of his book to terrorism, also in, colonial or similar situations. He is not so ready as is Taber to assume that terrorism has a great deal of inherent -3- S TT Approved for Release 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) popular support, even in colonial situations. In his case studies, only Egypt and Palestine are held up as examples of terrorist movements that had popular support. He finds that, lacking popular support, terrorist movements have to dissipate their efforts in order to keep their nominal supporters in line. Agreeing with Taber that the objective of terrorism in a colonial situation is to make the colony too costly to be worth keeping, he thinks (with Thornton) that terrorism is generally a useful auxiliary weapon, but rarely decisive and sometimes, if carried too far, counter- productive. He like Taber argues at one point that "pure repression" of a rebellion (including terrorism) is some- times possible, at least for the short term. However, also like Taber, he is concerned with causes he takes to be just and popular, even where he concludes that the terrorism itself is not, and in his discussion of counter- measures he too emphasizes the need for "enlightened policies" to correct the basic conditions which produce the rebels. Raymond M. Momboisse's Riots, Revolts and Insurrections, published by Charles C. Thomas of Springfield, Illinois, in 1967, includes a section on terrorism which appears to be derived largely from Thornton and other writers. However, Momboisse as Deputy Attorney General of the State of California has been professionally concerned with insur- rectionists. His discussion of counter-insurgent methods is professional, and he emphasizes the importance of good intelligence, especially from insiders. He argues that with solid intelligence, the insurgents can be contained, or harassed, or destroyed, as the government wishes. Ted Gurr of Princeton has published recently two interesting articles: "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence" (in World Politics XX, January 1968), and "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices" (in American Political Science Review No. 62, December 1968). Gurr contends that "relative deprivation" (the difference between what men have or expect to have and what they feel entitled to) is the basic precondition for civil "violence" or "strife." He argues that a high level of discontent, especially if an elite group is disaffected along with the masses, normally leads to intense and persistent violence, and he discusses the effects of "retribution" against it. He offers a number of interesting -4- ---k"Pipcp (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SERET (b)(3) propositions: 1) the belief of the aggressive group as to the attitude of the armed forces (e.g. will they be loyal?) is particularly important; 2) any weakening of law enforcement agencies leads to much trouble; 3) tacit approval of violence is sure to make trouble; 4) "moderate coerciveness" is likely to make the situation worse, and only the "highest levels" of coerciveness are likely to inhibit civil violence; and 5) inhibition of civil violence by external retribution tends in the short run to increase anger but in the long run to reduce it. It is uncertain, however, whether Gurr's work is very helpful with respect specifically to terrorism. It is frequently impossible, for example, to judge what kind of violence or strife he is talking about; and he sometimes seems to mean by "coercive force" the size of military and internal security forces, sometimes the amount of force applied, and sometimes the kind. Another problem is that he offers very few examples. An especially good article on the psychology of the political extremist, and of extremist organizations, is Egon Bittner's "Radicalism and the Organization of Radical Movements," American Sociological Review, December 1963. Bittner, of the Langley Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute in San Francisco, offers a definition of the extremist view as that which differs diametrically (not just in degree) from common sense--meaning that it seeks a perfectly unified, internally consistent interpretation of the world which is not possible outside a hard science. This pure, simplistic schema would be continually discredited by practical experience if the believer could not find some way of discrediting his practical experience. This is the organizational task of the movement. In terms of the believer's psychic economy, the solution must reward him for his participation in the movement ("payoffs" or "kicks"), must maintain his internal harmony by leaving as little as possible to negotiation between claims, and must prevent energy leaks by monopolizing his interest. The organizational solution, Bittner argues, includes: 1) a sense of charisma attached to the movement and creed, often symbolized in the Leader, and expressed in arrogant self-righteousness; -5- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SEM-EX_ (b)(3) 2) doctrine drawn in part from outside everyday experience, perhaps from the unique experiences of the Leader, permitting rigidity of 'conviction and scorn of argument; 3) an intense concern for purity (not clarity) of belief, so that an insistence on clarity is itself evid- ence of bad faith and disloyalty; 4) the containment of the member's life entirely in the movement, with no important area of personal choice; 5) suffering as an integral part of the movement, both to minimize the effects of anticipated suffering on morale and to accumulate aggression toward the external enemy, toward whom the extremist acts as an "instrument of fate" (there is nothing personal in, say, the enemy's assassination); 6) the suspension of all. traditional ties outside the group, and the discouragement of strong personal ties even among members, except for devotion to the Leader; and 7) the exploitation of external antagonism to the movement for its organizational advantage, e.g. so compromising the member that he cannot return to the outside world. The person suited to such a movement, Bittner (like others) finds, is one high in the personality traits of dependence, rigidity, and sadomasochism. Such movements would never get started, he surmises, if there were not a fair number of such persons in the larger society. Not all members are entirely suited psychologically, but the right attitudes are enforced on them in the name of discipline. Bittner concludes that the features of political extremism, considered as a group's "organized response to its peculiar disadvantage" (i.e. its opposition to common sense), appear as "calculated and efficient mechanisms," which are "compatible with or even feed on the emotional life of the persons who implement them..." Bittner's conclusions seem to apply particularly to terrorists in free societies. -6- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 NWP4.14WF (b)(3) II. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS A. The Nature and Objectives of Terrorism Political terrorism is symbolic action, by those out of power, designed to achieve political ends through the systematic use of violence.- It is distinguished from intimidation (which emphasizes threats), mob violence (normally unplanned and uncontrolled), mass insurrection (larger in scale, later in time), and governmental ter- rorism (presented as law-enforcement). It may be practiced by anarchists, by nihilists, by their successors the modern totalitarians, by nationalists, and by a variety of social groups with genuine or fancied grievances. Terrorism is always directed ultimately against the ruling government. Although a terrorist movement may associate itself with opposition to a given policy (e.g. prosecution of a foreign war, imprisonment of 'political' offenders), its true aim is always that of expelling, overthrowing or.replacing the government it is acting against. Most terrorist movements today 'regard themselves as part of a larger "anti-imperialist" movement working for the downfall of all anti-Communist governments. Terrorism is a weapon of the weak who are fanatically devoted to their cause. Denied effective expression in a colonial situation or any extremely oppressive 'society, the terrorist--often highly-motivated--can often argue credibly that this course is forced upon him. In a free society in which other means of action are open to him, the terrorist most often seems to choose this course--a "romantic messianism"--out of psychological need. The terrorist's cause is normally more important to him than his life. Terrorism is always rationalized the same way, whether the rationale is true or false in the given society. The argument is that the government practices terrorism on a far greater scale and for base ends, whereas the terrorist has noble objectives and employs terrorism more selectively and humanely. -7- -Slrft4E11 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Terrorism aims primarily at producing psychological effects. To the terrorist, the human and material damage done is less important than the psychological--and thus political--effects. If the aim is primarily to deprive the government of a material asset, the activity is sabotage, not terrorism. In order to achieve optimum effects, widespread publicity is essential to the terrorist. Terrorism seeks to demonstrate the weakness of the government, and, ultimately, of the individual. It seeks to demonstrate in the first instance that the government can be effectively opposed, that it cannot govern effectively. It seeks to show that government leaders and the government's security forces cannot protect themselves, their resources, their principal supporters, and the general populace. It aims to progress to the point of disorienting and isolating everyone by making it appear that the structure which previously sustained his strength and morale is now weak and disintegrating, so that the terrorists will appear to him to be an alternative source of order or at least too strong for the individual to oppose. Terrorism employs simple forms of action that are easy bra small group to carry out. Assassination is an important part of the program of most terrorist movements, and has been the primary instrument for some (Tsarist Russia, Palestine, Guatemala). Bombing has been (b)(3) important to almost all terrorist groups for selective attack or for terrorizing the general public, or both. Indiscriminate sniping is popular. Arson is very common. Rioting is organized, occasionally as a diversionary tactic. Kidnapping to raise money or gain publicity has been . practiced for years, and may now be spreading as a means of securing the release of political prisoners. Airplanes and ships are hijacked. Some terrorists torture and murder captured officials and their own defectors. If the group is competing with other terrorist organizations for leadership of the movement, it may use those same means against them. Terrorist organizations are also simple. The ter- rorists are usually young and often depend heavily on a single charismatic leader. The overall organization may include political, military and specialized departments (e.g. bombing or kidnapping), and regional, district, municipal and even smaller commands. Some of its units -8- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 I..., 140,1 (b)(3) may be autonomous. The most sophisticated kind of or- ganization has three layers, a top or leadership layer (possibly a central or executive committee), an intermediate or planning layer, and an action layer made up of those who actually carry out the acts of terrorism. The intermediate layer screens the leaders from the troops, whose only contact with the leaders may be through that middle layer. The basic action unit is the small cell, which is difficult to penetrate. Action groups may be composed of one cell or several cells, and are often ad hoc groups brought together for a particular mission. Terrorists normally discriminate, concentrating their efforts on the symbols and resources of the govern- ment or on a key group such as the police. But terrorism may also be indiscriminate; bombing public places and sniping at random targets may be calculated to disorient and demoralize the general populace. There is commonly some element of apparent indiscrimination, in the interest of producing widespread anxiety and in order to prevent the government from concentrating its resources to protect particular targets. Terrorism seeks to rise to 'higher' forms of action. The terrorists see their actions as leading to other forms of action which will eventually expel, overthrow, or replace the government. Some envisage that their efforts will expand to guerrilla warfare and then to full-scale anti- colonial or internal war. Others envisage stimulating massive popular revolt. They may hold such beliefs even when neutral observers would regard them as fantastic. Terrorism may be employed at all stages of a war or popular uprising. However, when employed after more ambitious methods have failed (e.g. when a guerrilla movement has been broken up), it is usually _ineffectual. Terrorist movements often seek to provoke the government into over-reaction on the calculation that this will assist the movement to rise to 'higher' forms of action or will gain it international sympathy and support. Such was the case with the terrorists in Ugeria (both the FLN and the OAS), The terrorists anticipate that the government's use of extraordinary and illegal measures will generate the popular -9- (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) "S'ECALET Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 or_A-rec41 (b)(3) support for the terrorists required for guerrilla warfare or will produce widespread revulsion against the government which can be turned into a popular revolt, or will lead to pressure on the government by other governments. Governmental over-reaction has in fact often led to an accession of popular support and international sympathy for terrorist causes which has been highly or even critically important in the outcome. Governments which withhold extraordinary measures until they no longer appear to be over-reacting avoid this trap. B. The Effectiveness of Terrorism Against Colonial Regimes Terrorism appears to be best suited to a colonial situation. In all four of the cases examined--Ireland, Palestine, and Algeria--terrorism played an im- portant role in expelling the colonial regime. It may have played the primary role in some of these. In Ireland, terrorist acts by the Irish resist- ance were effective against the British-administered Irish police and against the British intelligence network, and helped to provoke the use of extreme measures by the British. Although that apparently was not part of the Irish plan, the extreme British measures united the Irish and divided the British, and, in the end, the British were forced to conclude a truce even though the Irish resistance was greatly weakened. In Palestine, the assassination of the British High Commissioner may have affected British determination. In any case, it was a spectacular act, and it provoked extreme measures of retaliation which attracted inter- national attention and helped the Jewish cause. -10- (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) ,t11..ELT Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) - Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 CtRa' (b)(3) In Algeria, despite the suppression of their opera- tions in the cities, the terrorists succeeded in intimidat- ing the Moslem population and gained much popular support by provoking severe French reprisals; again, part of the plan. They were also successful in attracting international attention and support. However, the later terrorism of the rightwing OAS failed to gain any non-European or interna- tional support, and its cause was lost. Against Authoritarian Regimes (b)(3) Terrorism seems to be less effective against authoritarian regimes, at least in the short run. Authoritarian regimes normally conduct a high level of surveillance and can resort at will to a variety of extraordinary and even illegal measures against the terrorists. Of the two cases examined--Tsarist Russia --the terrorists were effectively suppressed (b)(3) in Russia Nevertheless, (b)(3) in Russia the terrorists were in a way successful, in that they helped prepare the way for the government's eventual overthrow by others, and terrorism may lead (as in Batista's Cuba) to the nup,rthrnw nf annthrm anthor itarian Latin American government (b)(3) In Russia, in the 1880's, the wave of reaction and repression which followed the assassination of Alexander II, strengthened by popular revulsion against the terrorists, soon destroyed them. In the early years of the 20th century, other successful assassinations of government leaders again failed to overthrow the Tsarist regime and again led to the suppression of the terrorists, but this terrorism also helped to disrupt a trend toward reform which, if it had continued, might have saved Russia from the Bolsheviks. Some of the original Nihilists had envisaged a revolutionary dictatorship such as the Bolsheviks imposed; thus, in a sense, they were victorious. -11- ET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 ohums4..._ (b)(3) Against Constitutionally-Elected Governments Terrorism can pose a serious challenge to free societies in which great social injustices or severe economic problems exist (e.g., Guatemala), but terrorism does not do well in free societies in which serious grievances are not widespread The latter societies are the first to develop popular revulsion. Of the six case studies of constitutionally-elected governments, the terrorists have posed no substantial threat to three (19th and early 20th century America In 19th and early 20th century America, the terrorists could only shock: some of them had some popular support when they were regarded as labor leaders instead of ter- rorists, but they lost popular support when their roles in terrorism became known. Some accused terrorists were supported by labor demonstrations or threats, but not often effectively. Most had no popular support at any time and provoked popular revulsion with every outrage. All brought retaliation and repression on themselves and others, damaged their own causes, and left a lasting negative impression on their societies. -12- (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) In Guatemala, the terrorists seem to have a fair chance of causing the democratically-elected government to be reolaced with a more authoritarian one however, such a government might not oblige them by behaving so badly that it would (as they believe) provoke a popular revolt. Note: In all societies, one kind of terrorist act, the assassination of the head of the government, has invariably been counter-productive. In every case examined, the terrorist cause has suffered badly in consequence. C. Counter-Measures: Kinds and Effectiveness Kinds of Forces Military forces, the conventional police, federal law enforcement and investigative agencies, and vigilante groups have all had successes and failures. The vigilante groups, however, have achieved their successes at such political cost that they are now rarely encouraged. Some combination of military forces, police forces, and federal agencies is now the preferred approach almost everywhere. -13- (b)(3) (b)(3) --sErREz_ Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Military forces have been used effectively as guard- ing, patrolling and striking forces in a variety of routine and special ways. They are perhaps best employed for the saturation of a troublesome area in which ter- rorists are concentrated; that is, moving in in large numbers, overwhelming the terrorists, paralyzing their organization,- and hunting them down house by house--in effect, a wartime military operation. The French paratroop operation in Algiers in 1957 is a prime example. However, in none of our colonial situations were military forces able to save the situation for the colonial power; they might have done so, if the government had persisted, but in each case the military forces in the long run contributed to arousing such popular and international sympathy for the terrorist cause that in the end the colonial power chose to withdraw. In the cases of authoritarian govern- ments and free societies too, prolonged use of military forces and lack of discrimination in their operations has provoked popular resentment. Local police have also been used effectively against terrorists. They are very vulnerable, however, in colonial situations, and in all such cases have had to be replaced or backed up by troops or special forces. They have usually required backing in non-colonial situations too, and have sometimes been put under military control. They have tended to be the prime targets of the terrorists among functional groups, partly because the populace usually has mixed feelings about them. The police seem to be best used in relatively stable situations, working in areas they know and against groups or individuals they know. Like the military, the police sometimes provoke popular antagonism by the use of coarse methods and by extralegal activity, such as cooperation with vigilantes. Where police work is incompetent, as in Guatemala, the terrorists thrive. Federal agencies seem to be best used for nationwide problems which require a comprehensive attack, coordination of the work, and careful discrimination. They too have had failures, as in some periods in Tsarist Russia. And federal forces too have been guilty of counterproductive excesses, as in Guatemala where the government itself has organized assassination teams. They have had successes, however, both under authoritarian governments and in free societies. The Tsarist police did roll up the terrorist -14- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 � � �;�!;. �til . � Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SECRET (b)(3) movement after the assassination of Alexander II and again in the early 20th century, (b)(3) (b)(3) The most effective counter-terrorist force seems to be one specifically designed for that purpose, controlled and directed by a federal law enforcement agency, and draw- ing on various intelligence and security agencies including elements of the military and police. Among the historical case studies, such forces under federal control worked effectively in Tsarist Russia in some periods, and in most of Palmer's term in the United States The organization of such forces has varied widely, although there seems to be a common disposition to separate the components concerned with intelligence and interrogation, surveillance, penetration, and raids and arrests. Conventional Measures Conventional security measures, such as thorough investigations, intensive surveillance (including wiretaps), the use of heavy guards and patrols, curfews, house searches, stop-and-search, raids, arrests for criminal acts, appeals or rewards to informants, offers of amnesty, have all had some success without provoking great resentment. In general, however, terrorist operations tend to force (as the terrorists often aim to force) the government into adopting extra- ordinary measures. Extraordinary Measures ExtraOrdinary and sometimes illegal methods employed against terrorist movements have included: .declaring -15- (h1C31 (b)(3) (0)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SIM< (b)(3) emergencies, imposing martial law, instituting censorship, restricting assemblies, closing schools, dissolving labor unions, banning political parties, suppressing public media, withdrawing university sanctuaries, cordoning off terrorist enclaves, imposing extreme penalties for agitation or for violation of emergency regulations, disregarding legislative immunity, suspending political rights, confiscating property, initiating group accountability systems, raiding and wrecking homes and areas in the course of search sweeps, conducting raids and arrests without observing legal pro- cedures, making mass arrests and holding suspects without charges or trial, beating and torturing suspects, disposing of terrorist cases by administrative action or by military courts, exiling citizens and deporting aliens, retaliating against groups or communities, and organizing vigilante action. Some of these extraordinary measures have been effective at one time or another or in one situation or another, but all have provoked popular resentment in some degree. In some instances the amount of resentment generated has gravely weakened the government's cause. Several of these forms of action are widely regarded as reprehensible whatever the result. In all three types of society considered--in Tsarist Russia for example--harsh action against student demonstrations has been counter-productive. Re- pression of this non-terrorist activity (as distinct from legal action against terrorist activity which may accompany demonstrations) has encouraged a small minority of the student demonstrators to become full-time agitators and ultimately terrorists. There is some evidence that established terrorist organizations look on expelled students as a particularly good source of recruits. Mass arrests (following terrorist acts) of groups which have produced terrorists, and their detention without trial while an attempt is made to sort out the terrorists, have been employed by all three types of governments considered, with mixed results. Among the colonial cases, mass arrests in Ireland and Palestine unquestionably hurt the terrorists' organiza- tions. However, the Irish terrorists continued to assas- sinate British officials and agents; and in Palestine the -16- (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SEMES (b)(3) mass arrests did not prevent the assassination of the highest official in the area. In both countries,,mass arrests contributed to a shift in popular support from the government to the terrorists. Mass arrests apparently 'contributed to initial Trench successes in Algeria; the terrorists in Algiers were wiped out. Among the cases of authoritarian regimes, in Tsarist Russia mass arrests at various times from the 1820s through the 1870s may have helped to prevent the formation of an effective terrorist movement through the 1860s. They did not prevent, and may have hastened, the formation of efficient terrorist organizations in the 1870s which killed many officials and (in 1881) assassinated the Tsar. After terrorist leaders had been captured, mass arrests were important in breaking up the movement and keeping it sub- merged for the rest of the century. It formed up again in the first years of the next century to kill many more officials--some just below the Tsar's level--despite the mass arrests that were taking place concurrently. In 1906 and 1907, terrorist assassinations reached their highest point during a period in which mass arrests were being made. This particular group of mass arrests, however, apparently helped to put the terrorists out of action for the next decade. At least one constitutionally-elected government has made mass arrests. Mass arrests in the United States in 1919-1920 probably picked up a few genuine terrorists, although illegally and inefficiently. Those mass arrests (and subsequent deportations) did not arouse widespread popular resentment, indeed they had general approval. But there was some reaction against them even at the time, and the affair has been regarded by most observers since as a rather shameful episode in U.S. history. Other constitutionally-elected governments among our examples have sometimes arrested large numbers of people, but these were arrests on evidence, not mass arrests in the sense of the arrest of all known members of a party, group, family, or neighborhood. -17- (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SEC/4,Q' (b)(3) In sum, mass arrests seem to have been counter- productive, or on balance unproductive, more often than they have proven useful. The torture of suspects has been practiced both by colonial governments (Ireland and Algeria), and by authoritarian regimes (Tsarist Russia It has been defended by all of its practitioners as a dis- agreeable necessity. There is reason to believe that in all of these cases the authorities sometimes obtained information on terrorist organizations by this means that they could not have obtained in any other way, and that this information was important in their subsequent successes against the terrorists. In no case, however, did torture lead to the destruction of the terrorist movement, in some cases it reinforced terrorist deter- mination, and in almost all cases it provoked popular revulsion (including the home populaces of colonial governments) and brought heavy international pressure on the governments employing it. It seems self-evident that no free society 'can afford to use this form of action. Vigilante action against actual and suspected terrorists has sometimes been taken with official en- couragement under both authoritarian and constitutionally- elected governments. In Tsarist Russia, the police sometimes cooperated with right-wing terrorist organiza- tions exploiting anti-semitic feeling. In the United States in 1919-20, mobs attacked the meetings and parades of political radicals, and private patriotic organizations 'assisted in the arrests of suspected Communists. More recently, Guatemala has included private citizens in special counter-terrorist corps organized to hunt down and kill terrorists. Vigilante action was not effective in apprehending the genuine terrorists in Tsarist Russia. A reaction against illegal and unproductive vigilante activity took place in the U.S. While vigilante activity in Guatemala was effective against the Communist movement for a time, many innocent people were assaulted and the populace became alienated; government-sponsored assassination and vigilante activity was sharply curtailed, although one vigilante group has reportedly reorganized. It seems apparent that this form of action is counter-productive. -18- (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SE6UT (b)(3) In all three types of societies examined, the key to effective action against terrorist groups has most often seemed to be good intelligence, which depends on a combination of thorough investigation, intensive surveil- lance, effective penetration, and the cooperation of informants. Such intelligence gives advance warning of terrorist plans and permits small, well-trained forces to move suddenly against correctly-identified key figures. Even where this form of action has been less important than extraordinary measures such as action against entire organizations and areas (e.g. a Communist party and its sanctuaries), it has been one important part of the government's effort. In Ireland, both sides made good use of informants, the British to locate (and then kill) resistance leaders and the Irish to learn British plans and to identify (and then kill) British agents. (As it turned out, Irish ter- rorism against the British intelligence network considerably reduced its effectiveness ) In Tsarist Russia the secret police had its greatest successes in preventing terrorist acts when it was able to plant agents in terrorist organizations; according to the last head of the Okhrana, the work of one young lady resulted in the prevention of several planned assassina- tions and the capture of the would-be assassins. Penetra- tion can of course work both ways, as in the case of the notorious Azev, the double agent who planned the successful murder of high officials at the same time he was working for the Okhrana. -19- (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SMUT (b)(3) In the United States, the Molly Maguires were broken by penetration by a private detective, and in later years investigation and penetration prevented many planned labor union bombings and resulted in the conviction of the planners. (b)(1). (b)(3) Advantages of penetration as a counter-terrorist tactic, for a free society, are apparent. The agent can testify as to conspiracy and (less hard to prove) the commission of criminal acts, and this testimony--unlike information obtained by illegal measures--will stand up in court. It must be recognized, however, that penetration of very small groups is very difficult, and that, if the terrorist movement is composed of many small groups which are not in contact with one another and are not responsive to a central organization, there is little possibility of penetrating all of these groups. Moreover, the security agencies must take care not to be penetrated themselves, as this can undo all their work. However, it seems likely that, in a free society, as terrorist acts increase the numbers of defectors and informants will increase, out of revulsion for such acts. Also, some terrorists will inform on others in exchange for a reduction in the charges against themselves. The value of special courts to deal with terrorists seems debatable. In Tsarist Russia, terrorists, when not handled by administrative action, were often turned over to military tribunals and other special courts for speedy and harsh action, but this sometimes provoked an increase in both the sea1p and intrangity of ttarrovicf no+iwifx7 -20- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 uncr (b)(3) (b)(3) The value of capital punishment is also debatable. It is obvious that the prospect of death does not deter the hard-core terrorist, who has already signed his life away. The only capital crime in Tsarist Russia for many years was the murder or attempted murder of a member of the Imperial Family; yet many attempts were made. The actual execution of terrorists May serve to deter the less fanatically committed,:but it may reinforce the remaining hard-core terrorists or help the terrorist cause in other ways. In Tsarist Russia, high officials were frequently assassinated expressly in retaliation for the execution of terrorist leaders. The British in colonial situations (Ireland, Palestine, repeatedly found the execution of terrorists to be, on balance, counter- productive, in that it increased popular sympathy for the terrorists' cause. Severe penalties for minor offenses such as violation of curfews or even the possession of a weapon are generally counter-productive. They dissuade some, but again the terrorists gain popular sympathy. Reform None of the governments studied�whether colonial, authoritarian, or constitutionally-elected�cOuld have prevented.the formation of a terrorist movement Or could' have extinguished the movement, simply by social reform, unless it were a reform so radical as to Tut itself out of business. All of these terrorist movements have been built around true revolutionaries, who are not interested in reform. In most cases, -however, the government need -217- '-C4LRFLT (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 "am uricri-a� (b)(3) not have been faced with as large a problem as it was, and, among current case studies, it seems still within the power of the governments concerned to. reduce the problem by reform.� This has been true even in colonial situations; where the fundamental issue is independence. .In all four cases studied, the British and French could have reduced popular sympathy for the terrorists by making reforms short of independence. In the two case �studies of authoritarian governments, Tsarist Russia demands for reform were or are a large factor. Zhelyabov, who organized the assassination of the Tsar in 1881, argued at his trial that the terrorist movement developed simply as a result of despair over the government's lack of responsiveness. This was clearly not a complete explanation, as some of Zhelyabov's colleagues were totalitarian fanatics, and the two terrorist waves --in Zhelyabov's time and.in the early 20th century--in fact disrupted long-term trends of social reform. But observers have been struck by the reluctance of many of the Russian terrorists to take up this means of action. It may be, as some Russian officials believed at the time, that the bulk of the �terrorists could have been diverted into constructive activity. Certainly their popular support could have been reduced. Agrarian reform played a part in drying up the second wave of terrorism after 1907. Among the constitutionally-elected governments studied, reforms clearly reduced the terrorist prohlPm in the U.S. in the 19th and early 20th rentnripq In the U.S., some terrorists remained despite the steady progress of the society, but the abolitionist issue was of course removed after 1863 and the growth of effective unions virtually wiped out the anarchist and syndicalist -22- T (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) terrorists based in the labor movement-in.the early 20th century. In Guatemala, however, �the government seems to have done very little in the way of reforml In sum, reform can divert some potential. terrorists and many more of their potential supporters and sympathizers, and can help to mobilize the public behind the government in critical periods. Summary No single form of action--legal or illegal--against - terrorists is sovereign. Thus a combination of means is always used, and the combination depends both on the nature of the attack And on the nature of the society attacked. � Obviously a totalitarian state has inherent advantages in combatting terrorism, because surveillance of the .entire society is so complete that, there are few places. in which an active enemy of the state can hide or work, and because the state Can take any promising form of action without regard for.public opinion. When a modest challenge arises, the government can simply arrest all known members of suspect groups and all their relatives and associates, hold them indefinitely and torture those who might know something, make further raids and arrests on the, basis of those leads, and mop up with vigilante action. Such tactics may work fairly well even for authoritarian states, in which surveillance is less pervasive,, public opinion cannot be altogether.disregarded, and there are some limits on the means which may be adopted.. However, the history of Tsarist Russia suggests, that while terrorists -23- (b)(3) (b)(3) "SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) may be successfully contained for some-Years by authoritarian measures, they will eventually re-emerge if the popular grievances which produce, and support terrorists have 'not been Allayed. A colonial government is in a comparatively weak position. The terrorists begin with a good cause--independ- ence--and may have considerable popular support from the start. The government is free to use almost any means to combat the terrorists--including means which would never be employed against criminals in the home countries--but extraordinary measures tend to unify the populace against the colonial government and to develop heavy international pressure on the government. The colonial government frequ- ently decides that the colony is just not worth the cost. A constitutionally-elected government may also be in a weak position, once the terrorist movement has got established. A free society is to some degree--and neces- sarily--a victim of its own institutions. In the first place, the government may be unable to make an effective national response because it lacks jurisdiction over many forms of terrorist activity--that is, most crimes fall under the jurisdiction of local authorities. Beyond this, if a free society takes extraordinary measures against terrorists, it risks permanently changing the character of the society. (This is only a risk, not a necessary consequence.) Thus any free society confronted with a terrorist challenge does well to begin with, and to adhere as Long as possible to, a conservative course of action which emphasizes investiga- tion, surveillance and penetration, concentrating on the apprehension and conviction of terrorist leaders for actual criminal offenses. With good luck, the terrorist movement can be reasonably well contained and can eventually be exposed as the weapon �I a lost cause and thus dried up. It sometimes happens, however, that conventional measures do not avail, or even that there is a considerable increase in torrnrim fter the first governmental inter- vention . Thus the free society, in (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) order to preserve itself, is forced to adopt extra- ordinary measures which would ordinarily provoke popular resentment and which would indeed, if persisted in, change the character of the society. In this connection, there seems to be a general principle in the development of terrorism which, when understood, is helpful to any government to which public understanding and public support are important. This principle is, that terrorism tends to be counter-productive at intermediate levels. A low, level of terrorism is well tolerated by most societies. If, however, terrorism escalates beyond that level, it normally alienates the populace and causes a shift in popular sympathy to the government. (This has been true in all three types of societies considered --e a Tsarist Russia Ireland and Algeria/OAS, (b)(3) If the terrorists are to gain (b)(3) their ends, after that point is reached, they must make a great leap forward in terrorism, effectively terrorizing the entire populace (as in Ireland and Algeria/FLN). (b)(3) If the terrorists are unable or unwilling to attain that extreme degree of ruthless violence (as in Tsarist Russia and Latin American countries), the terrorist (b)(3) movement tends then to decline. This principle seems to have important implications for the government's management of a terrorist challenge. That is, if the government can avoid over-reacting and thereby alienating public opinion when terrorism is at a low-level--if it can avoid the kind of mistakes made by several colonial governments and by some of the Latin American governments--it will be the beneficiary if terrorism rises to the next level. The government will -25- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) then have the popular support it needs to move 'firmly and decisively against the terrorists employing certain extraordinary measure have been tolerated at an earlier stage. cularly true if the government has initiated desirable reforms. With the or well contained, the government then dispense with its extraordinary measures which This would not is path- terrorists beaten on as a free society. can and carry The cases examined suggest a tentative general ,conclusion that there is a "best course" for a constitu- tionally-elected government faced with a terrorist chal- lenge. This is, first, to attempt to deal with terrorism by conventional, conservative measures; and, second, if terrorism rises to a higher level despite such measures, to take advantage of the concurrent rise in.public hostility to the terrorists and employ certain other legal, less conservative measures (varying with the case) which popular support will make effective The struggle need not,'of course, go through these three stages of low, intermediate, and high (or attempted high) levels of violence. The terrorists may opt for the highest possible level of violence from the beginning. In this case, the government would seem to have no choice but to undertake extraordinary counter- measures at once. -26- (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) -1-ECES.T. Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) TSARIST RUSSIA (1825-1917) The Background The revolutionary extremists of Russia in the - latter half of the last century, according to many observers, are paradigms of the psychology, aims and methods which have underlain the rise of modern revolutionary terrorism. They have been the object not only of historical inquiry but of imitation by latter-day revolutionaries. The most recent example is provided by two violent factions of.a contempo- rary "student" organization which have reportedly chosen the Russian extremists as their exemplars even to the extent of adopting the names by which they came to be-known--the Narodniki (Populists) and the Nihilists (Nothing-ists). In Russia both terms were used in general and also specific senses. Both terms were used to characterize a whole generation of revolutionary youth that emerged with unexpected suddenness in Russian universities in the 1860's and 1870's. The term "Nihilist" points specifically to their zeal for destruction, but rather than implying an absence of beliefs it was applied to radicals blindly and fanatically attached to their ideas. The term "Narodnik" is especially connected with the crusade of young radicals into the countryside in the 1870's which was called the "to-the-people" movement. Through propagandizing and educating'the peasant masses, they sought to spark a rising of the peasantry, who, the Narodniki believed, were "communists by instinct and tradition." The upheaval, they expected, would spontaneously replace the Tsarist regime with a system of agrarian socialism. The peasants proved indifferent or hostile and turned over to the police a number of the Narodniki who had gone into the countryside. As a result some of the Narodniki lost their "faith in the People" and moved to terrorism as the path to a revolutionary apocalypse. Turgenyev popularized the term "Nihilist" in "Fathers and Sons", his classic novel of the generational conflict in Russia in mid-century. The work depicts the gap, or gulf, between the radicals among Russia's youth of the time and their "enlightened" intellectual forebears among Russia's gentry. The latter had imbibed a mixture of Western liberal, -27- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 bJCTtL (b)(3) progressive and romantic ideas which had spread among the Russian aristocracy in the wake of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era. Under the impact of Western ideas, they became painfully aware of Russian backward- ness and of the gap between the Tsarist autocracy and the masses, between the thin stratum of an educated and privileged class and the "dark people" of the peasantry.* Typically, the "fathers" were "cultured" noblemen who. suffered from a sense of social "guilt" and deprecated themselves as "superfluous men." The "sons"--the nihilists-- broke violently with the "fathers," rejecting their "cul- ture" and genteel idealism. Instead, they became passionate proponents of an ethic of self-denial and activism. Despairing of gradual reform under Russia's autocracy and enthralled by visions of an apocalyptic revolution, they dedicated themselves to the destruction of the existing order root and branch. The Nihilist suppressed any stray conciliatory impulse he might feel toward the society around him: as one of them expressed it, "I feed on my own bile." The novel "What is to be Done?" by Chernyshevski became a universally accepted statement of the Nihilist creed among the radical youth. The novel portrays a group of students living according to the new ideas and in conscious defiance of existing social conventions, and also pictures a new Russian village organized on communis- tic principles. Wallace, an English journalist and historian, who was a perspicacious observer of the Russian scene in the last half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, offers a characterization of the ethos of the Russian Nihilists which has striking parallels today. Wallace says: According to popular opinion the Nihilists were a band of fanatical young men and women, mostly medical students, who had determined to turn the world upside down and to introduce a new kind of social order, founded on the most *The peasant serfs, in fact, were also called by way of metaphor "blacks" (i.e., slaves). -28- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) � � , Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 ozilauzi (b)(3) advanced principles of social equality and Communism. As a first step towards the great transformation they hacIreversed the traditional order of things in the matter of Coiffure: the males allowed their hair to. grow long, and the female adepts cut their hair short, adding' occasionally the additional badge of the blue spectacles. Their unkempt appearance naturally shocked the aesthetic feelings of ordinary people, but to this they were indifferent. They had raised themselves above the level of Popular opinion, glorified in Bohemianism, despised Phili- stine respectability, and rather liked to scandalize old-fashioned people imbued with antiquated prejudices. Wallace adds that this was the absurd aspect of the movement but that underneath the appearances these youths were "terribly in earnest, were systematically hostile, not only to accepted conventionalities in the matter of dress, but to all manner of sham, hypocrisy, andcant...." (cf. Wallace, Russia: On the Eve of War and Revolution, New York: Random House, 1961, Vintage Russian Library V 724.) Despite its design as a tract for the times, Dostoyevsky's novel, The Possessed, is the great psycholo- gical study of Nihilism. Dostoyevsky, who almost fell on to the path of Nihilism as a youth, insisted that a dia- lectical relation tied the Nihilist "sons" to the enlightened fathers despite the antagonism that separated them. The great Russian Liberal of the. first half of the 19th century, Alexander Herzen; and the fantastic, though real-life Nihilist, Nechayev, became his models for the novel's main characters. Dostoyevsky's main contention was that, although Nechayev's ethic--that any and every means was permitted to accomplish revolution--was appalling to a Herzen, Nethayev's doctrine was an extreme and unsentimental extension of widely- held ideas among Herzen's generation. Dostoyevsky's thesis is not without basis. Herzen had called for the reform of Russia through democratic and constitutional means, specifically through a Constituent Assembly. However, he saw these means as a vehicle for an act of unfettered popular will which would produce a sweeping -29- ...�keitZT (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 anun4L1 (b)(3) social revolution in mid-19th century Russia.- This romantic, quasi-Rousseauean notion, of a transformational act of the. general will, passed into the minds of the revolutionary youth and in fact animated. the hopes of a wide spectrum of 'revolutionary factions in Russia. Out of growing impatience and despair of a peaceful transformation of the old regime, some revolutionary factions resorted to terror aimed at high officials and the Tsar himself. The Two Waves of Terrorism Rising out of the miliau of the mid-century generation of radical "sons", the first wave of terrorism emerged in the rule of Alexander II, the emancipator of the serfs (1855-1881). Ironically, Alexander's reign was an era of unprecedented reforms, rapid social change and liberaliza- tion in the political and intellectual spheres in contrast to the Draconian despotism of his precedessor Nicholas I (1825-1855). Although Nicholas' regime produced no ter- rorists (the Third Section, or secret police, had not found . a single serious conspiracy as of 1855), radical and activist appetites grew in secret student circles and debating societies under Nicholas and became voracious in the atmosphere of change and heightened expectations that Alexander's reforms produced. The terrorists, seeking total and immediate change through political assassination, finally killed the Tsar himself. (There is a very good account of these first two periods--of Nicholas I and Alexander II--in Franco Venturi's Roots of Revolution, Alfred A. Knopf, 1960.) His successor, Alexander III, riding on a tide of public revulsion against terrorism, succeeded in suppressing the terrorist organizations. At the same time he put an end to the era of reform and instituted an ultra-conservative regime under the head of "Autocracy, Orthodoxy and Nationality" (1881-1894). The second wave of terrorism developed after Alexander III's death, striking during the reign of the last Tsar, Nicholas II (1894-1917). 1:t developed in the first decade of this century, especially in the period of the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) and the abortive 1905 Revolution. The terrorist assassinations of Tsarist of- ficials this time were engineered by members of the Social Revolutionary party, agrarian socialists who were political heirs of the Narodniki. -30- Th'ECRET Approved for Release 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 zhuretr4: (b)(3) The First Wave: 1860 to 1881 The historian kleading liberal constitutionalist under the last Tsar--provides a useful periodization of the evolution of the revolutionaries toward terrorism under Alexander II.* He distinguishes four phases: (1) 1855-1863, in which the-young'break with the old intellectual leadership and develop an ethos of "deeds not words", seeing themselves as "thinking realists" and forthright materialists in,contradistinction'to.the. philosophical idealism of their elders; (2) 1864-1873,' in which secretive student circles and debating societies evolve into tightly-knit revolutionary organizations;' (3) 1874-1877, in which several thousand'revolutionary youth--the Narodniki--undertake a crusade ."to the people" in the countryside to win the peasantry over to the Revolu- tion through propaganda and agitation:- and (4) 1877-1881,. in which disillusion sets in with the collapse of the crusade and leads one ,wing of the Narodniki to form con- spiratorial terrorist groups and initiate a systematic campaign of political assassinations, while a second wing (of the Narodniki) branches off and founds the Russian Marxist movement. Later, the most extreme elements of . the Russian Marxists, led by Lenin, organize the Bolshevik party. Two Two kinds of revolutionary personality are distinguish- able in the movement that produced the political-terrorists of Alexander II's reign. They seem not to be simply . character-types unique to the Russian experience but recur in the history of modern revolutionary terrorism. . Two . striking figures of the period, Nechayev.and Zhelyabov,-em- bodied the two kinds of.character. Nechayev manifested a wholly unscrupulous and steel-like fanaticism which excluded no means, however viciOus, to accomplish revolution--including, if necessary, the imposition of a revolutionary tyranny over, a recalcitrant society. The revolutionary apparatus which Nechayev claimed he headed in Russia turned out to *Paul Miliukov et. al., History of Russia (Vol. III), Funk and Wagnalls, 1969. -31- Approved for Release 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 ox,u14.g,A. (b)(3) be, in large part, fictional, but his notion of revolu- tionary organization was elaborated by one of Nechayev's associates, Tkachev. Tkachev laid out in detail the theory of an elitist, conspiratorial and dictatorial re- volutionary organization which was realized'in the practice of Lenin's Bolshevik party. Nechayev and Zhelyabov are ably depicted in Robert Payne's book, The Terrorists (Funk and Wagnalls, 1957); Albert Week's The First Bolshevik (N.Y.U. Press, 1969) is the most revealing study of Tkachev. Nechayev was among the first of his generation to regard the pursuit of the Revolution as a full-time, all- absorbing profession. His practical efforts were unavail- ing, but his example and his ideas of revolutionary method and organization profoundly influenced the subsequent development of revolutionary movements in Russia. Zhelyabov stands in contrast to Nechayev in some important respects. Zhelyabov was a skilled amateur who was the chief of The People's Will group that finally succeeded in killing Alexander II. Unlike Nechayev, Tkachev or later Lenin, Zhelyabov saw his revolutionary activity as a transient, though compelling, mission, not as a permanent career. Zhelyabov yearned to shatter, rather than seize, state power, thinking that this was all that was necessary to open the way to an agrarian coopera- tive Utopia and a constitutional republic. While resorting to extreme methods and subordinating personal ethics to revolution, he was driven by a fierce, puritanical passion which contrasted with the cold, calculating practicality of a Lenin, who single-mindedly concentrated on shaping his actions to the end of taking and holding power. Berdyayev in his Origins of Russian Communism (1937) seems close to the mark in seeing in such figures, especially Zhelyabov, a messianic and apocalyptic mentality which finds analogues only in the history of religion. The first attempt on the life of Alexander II was made in 1866, by the student Karakozov. Karakozov belonged to a loose group of young revolutionaries, but was acting on his own and in fact against the advice of his friends. The efficiency of the Tsarist police in that period can be judged from the fact that, although Karakozov's plan to kill the Tsar was known to the police three weeks -32 - Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 IJJJ (b)(3) beforehand, they did not get around to apprehending him. The attempt was followed by arrests, executions,: exiles, and a general repressiveness which prevented overt terrorist acts for the rest of the decade. Nechayev,.inspired by Karakozov, was-the most for- midable of the terrorists being formed beneath the surface in the late 1860's. He was able to put together only a small group, and was apprehended himself after murdering a member of the group who disobeyed his orders.- However, his "Revolutionary Catechism"--a systematic account of the nature and duties of the true revolutionary--was the first Terrorist Manifesto and the inspiration for hundreds of - subsequent terrorists. Sentenced to twenty years, he remained absolutely intransigent and died in prison the year after the event he had steadily prophesied�the' assassination of the Tsar. The Narodniki in the early 1870's were active in agitating among peasants and workers. Many were arrested for it, and some were given long sentences. Some of these populist revolutionaries founded the Land and Liberty organization in 1876. In 1877, after some of those arrested had been held in preventive detention for years, the regime staged a massive trial of 193 of the more than 1,500 arrested. The outcome was the handwriting on the wall for the Tsarist regime: despite the fact that the case was tried by a committee of Senators rather than a jury, very few severe sentences were handed down. Public sentiment--i.e., of the limited educated class which made up the public opinion--was rapidly becoming favorable toward the revolutionaries and hostile to the police. Tsarist officials had perpetrated enough arbitrarily repressive acts to outrage the sensitized conscience of the new educated class. This was particularly marked early in 1878, at the trial of Vera Zasulich, a young revolutionary who had once served a two-year term in prison and in January 1878 shot and wounded a notoriously brutal and corrupt police official, General Trepov. Prior to the Zasulich case, political cases had always been tried by Senatorial committees; but this one was handed over in March to an ordinary tribunal for a jury -334 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 or, -71w.....A (b)(3) trial. Zasulich converted her trial into an indictment of the regime and--despite her admission of the shooting--won a 'pot guilty' verdict from the jury amidst public rejoicing and official consternation. The authorities; frustrated by the autonomy the courts had won under Alexander, also had to endure a bad press in the newspapers and periodicals that flourished in Alexander's less restrictive climate. The Zasulich affair, and the arrests of other young revolutionaries--some of whom were sentenced to death-- in the months following, served to confirm the populist revolutionary movement in its course of terrorism. Political murder was justified as a combination of vengeance, self-defense and propaganda, all of which were expected to precipitate the disintegration of the Tsarist "system." An excellent brief account of the Zasulich affair and its repercussions can be found in M.T. Florinsky's Russia: A History and an Interpretation (MacMillan, 1953). The next blow was struck in August 1878, when a terrorist assassinated General Mezentsev, the head of the Tsarist police (the Third Section) in the streets of St. Petersburg. This came only two days after the execution of a terrorist, and was done in his name. The regime responded by adopting within a week a decree which would turn over to military tribunals every suspected terrorist or revolutionary. Violent student demonstrations resumed in the fall of 1878, when the police were making further arrests. Some arrested were central leaders of the principal terrorist organization, the Land and Liberty group. However, Land and Liberty managed to penetrate the police through an unknown student, who provided such excellent information on the plans of the police that the terrorists were able to rebuild their organization despite the loss of their leaders. The pattern of assassinations and large-scale arrests continued into 1879. In February terrorists killed Prince Kropotkin, the governor general of Kharkhov, in reprisal for death sentences given other revolutionaries by military tribunals. The Land and Liberty journal soon thereafter boasted that terrorism was a weapon that forced the govern- ment to recognize its "total impotence...in the face of a -34� Approved for Release 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) danger whose source is invisible and unknown." Terrorists made another Attempt on the Tsar's life in April. The regime's response to this latest attempt has been described as the imposition of a "state of siege." Extraordinary powers were given to the regional governors, enabling them to hand over to the military tribunals--which could impose sentences up to death--anyone who might displease them. The regional governors were also 'authorized to arrest and banish at will and to suppress publications. Many revolu- tionaries were executed during the summer of 1879. At the same time, in summer 1879, the terrorist group Narodnaya Volya (The People's Will) was taking shape. This came about through a split. in the Land and Liberty group on the question of whether or not to kill the Tsar. Those who favored it became The People's Will. The expelled student Zhelyabov, who. had served two brief terms in prison but had been acquitted in the mass trial of 1877 and had only recently joined the Land and Liberty organization, was foremost among those who advocated killing the Tsar. As it turned out, Zhelyabov was to become the leader of the group and the organizer of the assassination. In early August 1879, the student Lisogub,-.a member and favorite of the Land and Liberty organization, was publicly hanged. Two weeks later, the Executive Committee of The People's Will under Zhelyabov formally sentenced the Tsar to death. From that day on, their pursuit of the Tsar was bold and relentless. Although the group was very small, its zeal and resourcesfulness in this pursuit produced an illusion of a widespread and powerful network. The common--but erroneous--belief of many terrorists of the �time was that the Tsarist autocracy "hung in the air" without supporting roots in �any social class, and that a well-placed blow would collapse the autocratic structure. The People's Will group believed, of course, that the best-placed blow would be at the Tsar himself. They made at least seven attempts on his life from November 1879 until their final success on I March 1881. Each attempt required careful planning and painstaking preparations. They decided that explosives would best ensure success and manufactured their own bombs with the aid of a skilled chemist who was a 'member of the organization. -35- (b)(3) Approved Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 ow.:11,4A (b)(3) One abortive attempt involved the purchase of a building beside a railway on which theImperial train passed and the placing of a. mine in a tunnel theybuilt.under the tracks. After this failure, The People's Will group publicly announced the failure and stated its determination to kill the Tsar sooner or later. Some members of the group were captured, and one was tricked into betraying the others in the early summer of 1880. This led to further arrests, but the police did not catch up with the key figures, especially Zhelyabov and his mistress, Sofia Perovskaya. After a very near miss in February 1881 in which the Tsar was accidentally delayed from entering a room they destroyed by dynamite, the terrorists set another mine under the main route by which the Tsar normally left the palace. On the fatal day (I March) the Tsar took an alternate route from the palace, but the terrorists had prepared for this contingency by stationing bombers on this route. The first terrorist blew up the Tsar's car- riage but missed the Tsar himself. A second terrorist threw another bomb which killed the Tsar as he went to assist the victims of the first explosion. (The chief of the Tsar's Security detail failed to prevent, as he should have, the Tsar's exposure to the second bomb.) Sofia Perovskaya directed the group in this action; she could have escaped abroad, but chose to share Zhelyabov's fate and was arrested ten days after the assassination.* With the murder of the Tsar, the energies of The People's Will seemed to be spent. Four men and two women --all young, ranging from 19 to 30--were tried and hanged publicly for the murder. The police, under the ultra- *A few months later, spokesmen for the Narodniki con- demned the assassination of President Garfield (in July 1881) on the ground that such an action in a free society like the United States was an expression of the "same spirit of despotism" that they were trying to eliminate in Russia. The Narodniki were in fact seeking a constitutional government. -36- Approved for for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Ohl.714..ta (b)(3) conservative regime of Alexander. III, the successor to the dead Tsar, succeeded over a six-year period in rooting out the remnants of the group. By 1883, all members of the Central Committee remaining in Russia had been caught. Popular revulsion against the regicide undoubtedly assisted these efforts. Even liberals who had originally sympathized with the aims of the terrorists (and who, the terrorists expected, would set up a constitutional regime after the fall of the TSardom) withdrew their support. Seven students did engage in an abortive attempt to kill Alexander III in 1887 in an inept imitation of The People's Will's methods. The police discovered the plot and waited until the would- be assassins were posted in the streets, bombs in hand, and then arrested them all. Lenin's elder brother was among them. Despite their resourcefulness, an astonishing political naivete lay behind the readiness of the members of The People's Will to commit suicide on the altar of revolution. They rejected the most elementary lessons of political experience--they were, in fact, without such experience and could not have obtained it in any case, under the autocratic regime. Instead, their principles of action, were born out of the secretive and superheated ideological debates of student societies. Contrary to the expectations of The People's Will, the regicide. did not ignite a popular revolt. Though discontented, the masses werenot:in revo- lutionary ferment and knew little about the terrorists', activities or aims. In fact, many peasants viewed the regicide as an act of venegeance by the nobility against the Tsar that had set them free. The Second Wave Although the terrorist organization of The People's Will was crushed under the harsh rule of Alexander III, there were occasional assassinations in the last two decades of the century, and systematic terrorism arose again in the first decade of the 20th century. It was a time of renewed political agitation within the Russian educated class and of opposition activity by a wide spectrum of revolutionary elements, including a growing Marxist movement. Russia's humiliating defeat by the Japanese -37- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SECW.T (b)(3) in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) severely undermined the prestige and authority of the Tsardom and paved the way for the abortive but Almost successful revolutionary upheaval in 1905. � The revival of systematic efforts at political assassinations of high Tsarist officials developed under the auspices of the Socialist Revolutionaries, the political heirs of the Narodniki in advocacy of "peasant socialism" and of The People's Will in the employment of political terror. �They believed again that the fall of the autocracy by itself would lead to a decentralized agrarian socialism. They were anti-statist and anti-bureaucratic, warning that Marxism would lead to "state socialism," and they also, unlike the Marxists, sought alliance with liberal elements in overthrowing the monarchy. Though now conceding that terrorism as a tactic was inadequate without propagandizing the peasantry, it was the belief in the efficacy of political terror that held loosely-knit Socialist Revolu- tionary (SR) groups together. A separate conspiratorial terrorist group, "The Fighting Organization"--was formed under orders from the SR Central Committee. Counterparts to the main organization were also set up by local SR groups. The "Fighting Organization" was mainly responsible for the successive waves of political murders of high Tsarist officials from 1901 to 1907, the year when the revolutionary ferment simmered down. Some of the SR terrorist groups also committed armed robberies under the name of "revolutionary expropriation"--adventures which the main SR party frowned upon, but which Stalin in his early career with other Bolsheviks emulated in his home ground of Georgia. The SR Fighting Organization consisted of small numbers of men and women ready to sacrifice their lives to the cause. They were drawn from all walks of life from the peasantry to the aristocratic families. For example, the daughter of the vice governor of Yakutsk volunteered for the task of killing the Tsar at a ball (although this plan was not carried out because of a last-minute cancel- lation of the ball). The terrorism of the SRs generally followed the pattern set by The People's Will of the 1870's and 1880's, but with greater refinement of method. Moreover, the SRs' constant battle with the police seems to have led to increasing skill -38 - gt'ISRET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SEtHET (b)(3) on both sides in fabricating plots and counter-plots. The antagonists became so entangled that the "double agent" became a major menace to both sides. The staging of ruses and the infiltrating of agents into the Tsar's police apparatus, as well as liquidating police infiltrators in their own ranks, grew into a major activity of the Fighting Organization. The SRs claimed many victims among high officialdom. These included two Ministers of Interior and the Governor- General of Moscow. Following student demonstrations in the winter of 1900-1901 in which hundreds of students were beaten by Cossacks and many were expelled, jailed, and banished, many other students were forced into the army as a disciplinary measure. A student angered by this regulation shot and killed the Minister of Education early in 1901. After the regime tried unsuccessfully to placate the students with modest educational reforms, another student assassinated the Minister of Interior in April 1902. The new Minister of Interior (Von Plehve) instituted an ultra-reactionary policy against all elements of the population. One of the students expelled and jailed earlier, Sazonov, came to the capital with an SR terrorist squad in 1904 to attempt to kill this Minister, and in July he did so, throwing a bomb into his carriage. Sazonov's deed was widely ap- plauded, and the Minister's successor announced a program of liberal reforms and a relaxation of the censorship. Sazonov himself was sentenced to life imprisonment, and committed suicide five years later as a protest against the prison administration. An atrocious act by the regime in January 1905--the killing of workers attempting peacefully to present a petition to the Tsar--apparently reactivated the SR terrorist organization. Another student who had been jailed for agitation, a Pole named Kalyayev, who had played a supporting role in the assassination of Von Plehve in 1904, was now given a starring role. He was chosen by the SRs to attempt the assassination of Grand Duke Sergei, the governor-general of Moscow. In February, after withholding one bomb because the Duke's wife and children were also in the carriage, Kalyayev--working -39- -SE-GREZ (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 81`GRET (b)(3) alone, without aback-up--threw a bomb into the Duke's carriage which killed him. Exulting in his act, Kalyayev was hanged. (There is a good account of Kalyayev, a poet and a complex person, in Payne's book, The Terrorists. The same book has an interesting account of Boris Savinkov, a very bold and colorful figure who organized this assassination and many other operations, and escaped unscathed to write his memoirs.) The hanging of Kalyayev was followed by several more attempted assassinations of high officials, and successful assassinations of less important figures. In October 1905, the Tsar, frightened by the revolu- tionary uprisings of that year, took good counsel and agreed to a draft manifesto promising reforms. This was greeted with general enthusiasm, and in November the central committee of the Socialist Revolutionaries decreed a temporary suspension of terrorist activity. At the same time, however, the extreme right-wing opponents of any reform closed ranks and took action to undercut the manifesto. In the SR Congress of December 1905 and January 1906, the SRs decreed an end to their suspension of terrorist activity. Intensified terrorism began at once, and in August 1906 the newly-formed "maximalist" faction of the SR terrorists--a faction devoted wholeheartedly to terror-- made an attempt On Prime Minister Stolypin. They entered Stolypin's summer home disguised as guests and threw down dynamite sticks, killing 32 people in addition to them- selves and wounding 22 others, including Stolypin's two children. Although this attack was disavowed by the SR central committee, from this time Stolypin became the terrorists' most formidable enemy. Within a week of the attack on Stolypin, new legis- lation provided for the transfer of criminal cases, at the discretion of high officials, to military courts. At the same time, a circular directed provincial governors to maintain public order "at any cost" and to enroll the services of private persons sympathetic to the struggle against revolution--in other words, to organize vigilante activity. Moreover, the police were given complete freedom to make searches, arrests and deportations without observ- ing legal procedures. And government officials holding "undesirable" views were summarily expelled. -40- -4E.CLIET Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 .t;CItiL. (b)(3) ,This very harsh, across-the-board. program took some time to work. By the end of 1906, some 1,600 officials --ranging from generals to village policemen--had been killed by SR terrorists in that year alone. Apparently as a gesture of conciliation) the regime in spring 1907 withdrew its August 1906 decree establishing the special military courts. This did not seem to help. During 1907, some 2,500 officials were killed by the terrorists. (Some of this was done by Bolshevist terrorist squads, but they were less important than the SRs.) During 1907, good police work--with the help of some of the extraordinary and illegal measures noted above--led, to the arrest of the leaders of the "maximaiist" faction . (the one that had made the attempt on Stolypin). This group had used the proceeds from a spectacular robbery-to.,. set up an organization separate from the SRs. The arrest � of its leaders forced the liquidation of its central organization, and the local organizations had dried up or beencrOShed by the end of 1907. Late in 1907, the police captured .the leaders of the most important remain- ing terrorist squad of the SR organization. The steam seemed to go out of the terrorist movement in 1908. . The movement suffered heavily with the exposure in that year of Evno Azev as a double-agent who had served and betrayed both of his masters impartially. He had organized assassinations (including that of Von Plehve in 1904) on behalf of the revolutionaries, and he:had compromised his revolutionary comrades to the police. According to Florinsky, this exposure dealt terrorism, already declining, "a blow from which it never recovered." It was no longer possible to assert, as had the "Granny of the Russian Revolution" Catherine Breshko-Breshkovskaya, that terrorism was a pure manifestation of "revolutionary and civic valor." The terrorists mustered just one more big punch, and it is uncertain who called the shot. In 1911, five years after their first attempt, they assassinated Prime Minister Stolypin, who had been mainly responsible for rolling them up after 1907. Again the terrorist was a double agent, Bogrov, who by a stroke of luck managed to get within pistol range of Stolypin at a theatre. �There is some evidence that Bogrov was impelled to his action by -41- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 grt`Fighl (b)(3) fear that his SR associates suspected him of being a double agent. Some observers, however, believe that Bogrov was acting on behalf of the police on orders from the Tsar. In any case, whoever was responsible was acting on the dictum of the mid-19th century terrorist Nechayev--to kill the most intelligent and able officials while allow- ing the mediocre and inept to persist in discrediting the regime. The general result that political assassinations produced from Alexander II's reign to the Russian Revolu- tion--from 1855 to 1917--was a vicious circle of violent action and repressive counter-action. Efforts by the Tsars or their ministers to institute political reforms to meet the needs of the time were repeatedly blunted or erased by terrorist outrages. The repressive counter- measures of the regime in turn intensified the impulse among revolutionaries to force change by violence. The assassination of Alexander II, most historians agree, was a severe setback for those among the Russian educated class who were striving for the peaceful transformation of the monarchy into a constitutional regime. The ter- rorists did not succeed in producing an apocalyptic "liberation" of Russia and the establishment of peasant socialism and constitutional rule. Rather, they opened the door to an extended period of reaction and repression under Alexander III. A similar destructive dialectic undercut moves toward a constitutional structure and general reform under the last Tsar. Despite the noble ends professed by the Narodniki and their SR heirs, their violent means ag- gravated the conditions that eventually produced the Russian Revolution of 1917 and brought to power not a democratic but a despotic revolutionary regime. COUNTER-MEASURES UNDER VARIOUS TSARS The "Third Section" Under Nicholas I The Tsar's political police, engaged in a continuing struggle with revolutionary, and terrorist groups in the 19th and early 20th century, assumed its basic form under Nicholas I (1825-1855). Before Nicholas, "higher" or -42- MMGRET Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SEef (b)(3) bodyguard-type police had reached back at least to Ivan the Terrible's dreaded Oprichniki, a personal political security force that left its own mark in the history of terrorism. Nicholas I, however, created a modernized secret police in the wake of the abortive Decembrist uprising of 1825. This revolt, more romantic than realistic in conception, was plotted by a conspiratorial society consisting mainly of young Imperial Guardsmen and aristocrats imbued with the libertarian and republican ideas which had spread through Europe in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. Mass arrests, some executions and many exiles followed �the exposure of this plot. Nicholas endowed his new police apparatus with wide-ranging missions and sweeping powers. He placed the police apparatus under his quasi-personal direction as the "Third Section" of "His Majesty's Own Chancery." The Third Section became one of Nicholas's main instruments of state policy. While patterned after the Napoleonic Ministry of Police, in the exercise of a combination of intelligence, police and security functions, the breadth of the Third Section's functions was unique--so much so that Russians of the time regarded the ubiquitous Third Section as a break with national traditions. It was not onlydesigned to cope with subversive' activities in the usual sense, but to uncover the hidden thoughts of the population, manipulate public opinion and, in sum, to insure that all political initiative remained firmly in the hands of the .sovereign. The prying, suspiciousness and omnipresence of Nicholas' police is vividly described in the diary of de Custine, 4 French nobleman who travelled through Nicholas' Russia.* Custine's memoirs lend weight to the view that the Third Section was a rough ancestor of Stalin's secret police. The Third Section was divided into a formidable.. corps of gendarmes, consisting of military officers and enjoying some prestige, and a network of secret operatives drawn from all levels of society. The extraordinary powers of the Director of the Third Section under Nicholas rested *Astolphe de Custine, Journey for Our Time, Vintage, 1952. ""'47 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) on. his close ties with the Tsar, which elevated him to the status of 7a kind of prime minister." The Third. Section's- widespread'extra-legal operations and employment of administrative trials and punishments was largely respon-- sible for the reputation Nicholas I's reign acquired as a Draconian dictatorship. (Sidney Monas's The Third- Section, Cambridge, 1967, provides the most comprehensive inter- pretive study of Nicholas' police-.) Nicholas I's repressive police policy can perhaps be credited with scotching any incipient conspiracies against the Tsardom. However, Nicholas' policy produced a general feeling of alienation from the Russian state within the educated class and forced thought in Russia inward, divorcing it from action. The intellectual elite was reared on European idealism and romanticism, and when it turned to politics it was first caught up with Utopian socialism and later by an apocalyptic and revolutionary nihilism. It was under Nicholas that radical ideas began to incubate in secretive discussion circles. Some of these sprouts eventually bore fruit in the form of,poli- tical terrorism in Alexander II's reign. Perhaps the greatest weakness of Nicholas' Third Section was its resort to administrative devices to cope with social discontent and its tendency to equate intel- lectual ferment with full-blown activities aimed at destroy- ing the regime. A celebrated example of the latter mistake was the arrest shortly after the European revolutions of 1848 of the members of an informal circle of devotees of the pacific Fourier, the French Utopian socialist. At a dinner organized by a minor Foreign Affairs official, Fourier's ideas for self-contained Utopian communities and the anticipated doom of the modern city were enthusias- tically discussed. The police regarded the meeting as a plot to destroy St. Petersburg and arrested 39 members of the group. Charged with a "conspiracy of ideas", an offense not contained in the legal code of the time, some 16 were sentenced to death and six to forced labor or Siberian exile. The death sentences were commuted minutes before the scheduled executions. Tsar Nicholas evidently saw the proceedings as an object lesson for would-be revolution- aries. Dostoevsky (then 28) was among those initially condemned to death, but his sentence was reduced to four years of hard labor and six years of army service in Siberia. -44 - (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) In any: case, it was under Nicholas I that the deadly cycle of conflict between police and revolutionaries began. The conflict helped mightily in maintaining the extreme polarization'ofHpolitics under the last Tsars. Counter-Terrorist Measures Under Alexander II As noted earlier, Alexander II's reign, the era of "the great reforms," opened with.great expectations of far-reaching social changes and constitutional reforms. Major changes, including Alexander's emancipation ,of the serfs, did occur.. Moreover, the state under Alexander II was far less restrictive than in the repressive rule of Nicholas I. In some respects his rule was remarkably libertarian. The*universities, for example, won a freedom from outside interference that had few parallels anywhere, and the courts of justice also enjoyed a great measure of independence. However, as the reforms failed to produce a.total transformation of Russian society, disillusion and unrest grew in the liberal and radical wing of the intellectual class. The brief period of good feeling begun with the freeing of the serfs was succeeded by a resumption of the political struggle between the regime and the radicalized intelligentsia. *Phases of renewed attempts at reform and conciliation by the regime alternated with periods of reaction and repressive measures. In the process, as has been noted, one wing of the Narodniki resorted to the systematic _political assassinations that culminated in Alexander's death and the return to a harsh ultra-conserva- tive regime under Alexander II/. Despite the network of police informers keeping tabs on the activities and changing moods of the radical intel- ligentsia, the eruption of terrorist-activities in Russia's political life in the 1860's and 1870's came as a shock to the regime. Alexander's reform administration underrated the potent mixture that reform and rising expectations were producing among the "public," principally the educated and privileged 'class.' The government also initially found it difficult to understand and cope with the relationship between the peculiar intellectual climate of Russian -.4 5- Th'EugiaS (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SErRgT (b)(3) society and the phenomenon of terror, on the one hand, and the dynamic between police actions and a hypersensitized public opinion on the other hand. Though some of the Tsar's advisors were clear-sighted, the possibility of carrying out a consistent and integrated counter-strategy --whether reformist or conservative--against the revolution- aries was reduced by the see-saw battles between court factions for the ear and mandate of the Tsar. There were curious combinations of harsh repression and lenient treatment of oppositionists. The response of the regilhe in the Karakozov case--previously noted--is a good example of repressive over-reaction. KarakOzov, put to torture, turned out to be alone in his plot to kill the . Tsar, but the Tsar's advisors blamed the younger generation as a whole. The general crackdown that followed drove many radical � students into European exile to evade the police. Student disorders in the universities during the 1860's also resulted in the Tsar's decision to implement a traditionalist educational program throughout the country's Schools to combat the spread of revolutionary ideas. The disorders also provoked the political authorities into efforts to curb.university autonomy. These counter-measures indeed seemed to reduce revolutionary activity toward the latter half of the sixties. However, in a curious decree in 1873 the govern7- ment undermined its own policy by ordering home all young Russians studying in Switzerland. The students threw themselves into renewed activism which produced the "to the 4seop1e" movement of the Narodniki. The show trials of the participants staged by the government to discredit the revolutionaries were successfully turned into platforms of propagandizing their cause. The instances of leniency and laxity on the part of the authorities were as striking as the instances of severity. There were many escapes by revolutionaries from Siberian exile and from prisons. Exile, despite its rigors, often put revolutionaries only temporarily out of business. Many, in fact, used exile as a kind of revolutionary's "sabbatical" wherein they mediated on revolution and strategy. The notorious Nechayev, although in solitary confinement, found no difficulty in maintaining a steady stream of correspond- ence with-his associates from his cell in the Peter and Paul -46- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) 7, Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 6E Cirt-XX (b)(3) fortress; and Zhelyabov and his mistress Perovskaya, both of them police suspects moved freely through Russia with trunks full of dynamite-. A complicating factor, for the police, Was popular support of terrorists,. Large amounts of money were often given to revolutionary organizations by wealthy well-- wishers and converts. Further, while actual membership in the secret groups was small, their revolutionary ideas and even terrorist activities found support not only among students but in the professions and even in the army and - bureaucracy itself. This situation often led to compromises of police operations against the terrorists. An impressive but abortive attempt to defuse the terrorist.movement was initiated in 1880 by Loris-Melikov, the ex-governor of Kharkov, to whom the Tsar gave dictatorial powers to deal with the crisis produced by the increasingly intense attempt on the Tsar's life that The/People's Will group, was mounting after 1879. While he actually strength- ened repressive measures against revolutionaries, :he worked to win overthe liberal wing of the Russian public and isolate the terrorists (by depriving them of an issue). In a program, popularly known as the "dictatorship of the. heart," he began instituting major reforms directed toward a constitutionalist-parliamentary-type regime, the broad demand of:both_the liberal and terrorist elements Soon after Loris-Melikov's appointment, terrorists of The People's Will made an unsuccessful attempt: on his life. The People's Will Central Committee- disavowed this, and for the.rest of 1880 the terrorists were quiet. Some observers believe that they were waiting to see what Loris-Melikov would do, but the main reason for their inactivity seems to have been the loss of central leaders through a series of arrests in 1879 and 1880.' Loris-Melikov gained the support of the liberals, but his efforts were eventually crippled by counter-moves from .the revolutionaries, and court conservatives. The killing of the Tsar in 1881 put an end to this hopeful epXsode. Reform of the.police was a part of Loris-Melikov's coordinated attack on the sources of political and social -47- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SENT (b)(3) discontent., He removed the political police from their immediate access to the Tsar in the Third Section of his chancery and placed them in a Department of Police, where they remained (under the Ministry of the Interior) until 1917. At about the same time the police began to be called the "Okhrana" the Defense) in journalistic and revolu- tionary parlance--the name that stuck until the fall of the monarchy. The Hard Line of Alexander III Alexander III suffered none of the vacillation of his murdered father over issues of reform but devoted himself to restoring the integrity of the principles of autocratic rule. Loris-Melikov was quickly replaced by . a new chief minister who drafted a statute empowering the government to proclaim states of "emergency." The statute gave administrative officials throughout the empire broad extra-judicial and executive powers. Originally a "provisional" three-year measure, the law was frequently renewed until the fall of the monarchy. The law gave officials special powers to arrest, confiscate�property � without trial, transfer criminal cases from regular courts to military tribunals, close schools, suspend periodicals and fire subordinate officials. Moreover, police penetra- tion of The People-'s Will after 1881 was pervasive. In a narrow sense the police apparatus, with strong support from Alexander III, was eminently successful in breaking the back of The People's Will in the early 1880's, leaving its remnants scattered and crippled. And through its network of informers and secret operatives, the police uncovered and arrested the group of conspirators who sought to revive The People's Will and assassinate the Tsar in - 1887, Open attacks on the regime thus were contained. However, much as under Nicholas I, A new generation of revolutionaries--this time a large portion of them Marxists, including the young Lenin and Stalin--bided their time and developed their theories and strategies beneath the crust of the Ultra-conservative order. Moreover, Alexander III's systematic program of conservative counter-reform pro- foundly-undermined the political modernization which had made halting progress 'under his predecessor. -The net -48- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) result was to stir a new brew of political and social discontent that broke out under his successor, Nicholas II. The Mixed Record Under Nicholas II Alexander III's ministers, with a considerable measure of success, had exploited pro-monarchist and conservative opinion and even widespread anti-semitic feeling in deal- ing with liberal and revolutionary elements. Following his death in 1894 and in the period leading up to the abortive 1905 Revolution, the Okhrana carried forward this strategy in some of its operations. The strategy involved both an attempt to generate public support for the govern- ment and a resort to counter-terror against the revolu- tionaries. In general, the regime's policy toward liberal trends in this period of 1894 tu 1905 was unintelligent; and toward renewed terrorist activity was ineffectual. In the years 1895 to 1900, some 6,000 members of the Social Democratic party were arrested for organizing strikes and other proscribed action. The Socialist Revolutionary Party was reorganized in 1900 and decided.to.organize terrorist teams as one form of revolutionary action', complementing "mass struggle." It was a time of much ferment among university students. The government acted savagely against student demonstra- tions�beating, jailing, exiling and impressing into the army large numbers of students.. It was students treated in this way Who killed the Minister of Education in .1901 and the Minister of Interior in 1902. As previously noted,. the new 'Minister of Interior pursued an ultra-reactionary policy toward all elements of the population, in effect recruiting for the revolution. He also contrived a war with Japan (an unpopular war), persecuted national minorities, and in particular promised to "drown the revolution in Jewish blood." (Many of the. SRs were in fact- Jewish, in- cluding the founder of the Fighting Organization, -Gershuni, - and his successor, Azev.) Following the assassination of this. Minister by an SR terrorist in'July 1904, the Tsar's policy was less repressive than it -might understandably have been, but there were still' no genuine reforms. -49- ET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) With the incident of January 1905 in which troops killed workers attempting to present a petition (and also killed innocent bystanders), the regime decided, upon a hard line across the board. The governor-gene-ral of St. Petersburg, the son of the police official Trepov who had been shot by the terrorist heroine Vera Zasulich in 1878, ordered mass arrests of intellectuals and the - dissolution of labor unions, and thus managed to unify all opponents of the .regime, liberals and terrorists alike. With the assassination of the governor-general of Moscow in February, the Tsar denounced disorder and proclaimed his intention to extirpate the "roots of sedition.." He also proclaimed his intention to consider "legislative proposals" if they did not break with tradition. It � was to be a bad year for the Tsar: strikes, peasant uprisings, student demonstrations calling for revolu- tion, mutinies in the armed forces, and attempted as- sassinations--opposition too widespread to be dealt with by pure repression or empty promises. Later in 1905, the Tsar's principal advisor told him that he had a choice: to institute, a rigid dictator- ship to try to stamp out sedition, which he did not think possible in any case, or to make some genuine move toward constitutional government. As previously noted, the Tsar at that time agreed to a draft manifesto promising real reforms (civil liberties, a strong Duma), an act hailed by almost everyone, including the Social Revolu- tionaries, but this was undercut at once by rightwing opponents of reform. These forces, among other-things,- exploited nationalist and antisemitic feeling to organize pogroms in which thousands were killed. Following the Social Revolutionaries' official call in January 1906 for a resumption and intensification of terrorist activity, Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin began to carry out the first broadly conceived and integrated counter-attack on revolutionary terrorism and its poli- tical bases which had been seen for many years. Stolypin is regarded by most historians as one of the ablest of Tsarist ministers. His strategy against the Social Revo- lutionaries was based on a clear insight into the political crisis facing the monarchy. Like Loris-Melikov a quarter- century earlier, he did not see terrorist activity as -50- tl`t,�}1E11' (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 --"Prvvrt (b)(3) simply a police problem; he too realized that part of the problem was to divert and enlist the potential supporters and sympathizers of the terrorists. Stolypin's attitude toward the terrorists themselves was tough and aggressive, and the more so after the attack on himself--and the maiming of his children--in August 1906. As previously noted, the police were then given wide powers to search, arrest, and deport; provincial governors were told to maintain order "at any cost" and to organize vigilante activity to this end; many news- papers (one source says/260) were closed down; and offi- cials were permitted to dispense with investigation when they were satisfied as to the guilt of the accused and to transfer the cases to military courts. (This last was similar to decrees issued before and after the assassina- tion of Tsar Alexander II 35 years earlier.) These courts met within 24 hours, reached a decision within 48 hours, and usually imposed sentences of death, which were carried out immediately. While the special courts were apparently regarded as counter-productive by spring 1907 and were withdrawn, the other extraordinary measures--together with the frequent torture of suspected terrorists, who had learned how to resist normal interrogation--continued through 1907 and perhaps beyond. After the loss of some 4,100 officials to terrorists in the years 1906 and 1907, by 1908 Stolypin and the police had dispersed and virtually eliminated the SR terrorist organization. Unfortunately, available materials do not permit a judgment as to how: ,much of this success was owed to good police work and how much to extraordinary and illegal measures. This is not clear even in the most spectacular single success of the period, the arrest'of the leaders of the super-terrorist "maximalist" group in spring 1907. These arrests were due at least in part to good police work, probably including penetration of the group, but the police probably employed torture to locate some of these leaders and to get further leads with which to roll up the local organizations throughout Russia. At the same time, Stolypin was steadily urging the less violent oppositionists into peaceful forms of poli- tical activity. By a mixture of persuasion and pressure, he won the cooperation or at least acquiescence of iduch -51- (b)(3) Approved Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) of of the center and even some of the left. He was an effective leader in the quasi-parliament, the Duma, established as a concession to the pressures of 1905. He won respect even among his foes. Stolypin implemented a sweeping, and in Russian conditions radical, land reform program. This undermined the efforts of the Social Revolutionaries to build a revolutionary mass movement on a peasant base. The SR program called for a system of agrarian socialism grow- ing out of the traditional communal structure and tilling arrangements of the Russian village. Stolypin moved in the opposite direction, making it possible for great numbers of peasants to become small landowners. That move, as Stolypin correctly judged, gave the peasant a stake in law and order. The spreading success of this reform caused Lenin to become deeply pessimistic about the prospects for revolution in Russia; only Russia's entry into World War I revived his expectations and spirits. Stolypin's death at the hands of a double-agent in 1911 seemed to be a fluke, resulting from a gross failure of vigilance on the part of a police official guarding him. As previously suggested, however, it is possible that this was planned negligence, on the Tsar's order. Stolypin had fallen from favor, and the right wing again was in the ascendant. (Interesting accounts as well as varied views of Stolypin appear in Miliukov's and Florinsky's histories, as well as in works on the pre-revolutionary era by two English historians: Sir Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy (A.A. Knopf, 1939) and Sir Donald Wallace, Russia: On the Eve of War and Revolution (Random House, 1961)). Evaluations of the Okhrana Immediately available sources on the inner workings of the Okhrana from 1881 to 1917 are meager, although there is a substantial amount of possibly valuable Russian- language material at Stanford. The most thorough biblio- grapher of the sources (E.E� Smith's The Okhrana: The Russian Department of Police, A Bibliography, Stanford, 1967) complains that no general work exists covering the -52- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SECRET (b)(3) Okhrana's operations from the time of Alexander II. He rates an untranslated book by a vice director of the police (Kurlov, The Catastrophe of Imperial Russia), covering only the years 1907-1910, as excellent, and another by the last police head, Vassilyev, as episodic and more sensa- tionalist then profound, but interesting.* Based on his review of the sources, Smith does stress that Okhrana was a far more complex institution than most observers and even historians have realized. He points out that its apparatus extended from its headquarters in St. Petersburg to virtually every locality of the empire. Further, its operations followed the activities of Russian revolution- aries in exile in Europe; a Special Section in Headquarters directed a foreign Okhrana with its principal base in Paris. It maintained close surveillance of and engaged in counter- measures against revolutionary groups in Europe and even the United States. On the whole, Smith assesses the professional skill of the Okhrana favorably. Surveillance, including inter- ception of mail and deciphering codes and invisible writing without detection was, according to Smith, quite effective. Smith says that the Okhrana's penetrations into revolution- ary groups were generally effective and that each local Okhrana "worth its salt" had an agent planted in every local revolutionary or terrorist group. He cited the famous case of Roman Malinovskiy, who maintained close ties with Lenin himself and whose speeches as a Bolshevik deputy in the Duma (parliament) were edited first by Lenin and then by the Okhrana. Lenin refused to the end to believe that Malinovskiy was a double agent. The Okhrana's coverage of Lenin himself was good, but they apparently failed to take him as seriously as he deserved. Another observer, Roland Gaucher (The Terrorists) concludes that the Okhrana was very effective in inter- rogations, having worked out an elaborate system of exploiting the suspect's psychological vulnerabilities. *A.T. Vassilyev, The Ochrana, Harrap & Co'y, Ltd., London, 1930. -53- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SECRET (b)(3) He notes that the Okhrana got many of its agents by compro- mising the suspect in interrogations and then giving him his freedom in exchange for his work. There were many volunteers for such work, but in general a person already a member of a terrorist organization would be preferred. The record obviously supports Smith's comment that the personnel of the Okhrana ranged from intelligent and principled men to numbskulls and scoundrels. He notes that many failed to understand revolutionary motivations or doctrine. Some were obtuse, misinformed and prone to shallow views of their functions. But others showed remark- able insight. For example, the Tsar's Minister of Interior, Durnovo, in 1914 warned the Tsar, on the basis of his long familiarity with Okhrana reports on the revolutionary move- ment, that Russia's entry into world war would end in a Russian revolution. Smith believes that the operational failures of the police (e.g. the Azev and Bogrov cases) did not materially contribute to the fall of the dynasty. The reasons for the collapse of the dynasty, he concludes, must be found in broader political causes and mistakes in high policy. Among these reasons, he cites: (a) successive defeats in war--in the Crimean War under Alexander II, in the Russo-Japanese War, and finally and disastrously in World War I; (b) the failures of the Tsar and his principal advisors to understand and cope with revolutionary forces; (c) the failure of policy-makers to use police information effectively and to give the police firm policy direction; and (d) the abandonment of the police apparatus by the Provisional Government that replaced the monarchy for a brief period in 1917, which then found itself helpless before the Bolshevik uprising under Lenin's lead. To clinch his argument, Smith notes that Lenin's secret police, the Cheka, emulated the methods of the Okhrana in a number of ways, including its comprehensive system of dossiers. According to Smith, Lenin showed that the apparatus itself was not unserviceable but was, indeed, an effective instrument of the Bolshevik dictatorship. More- over, the ruthless Bolsheviks, Smith adds, did not suffer from the vacillations, ineptitude and political short- sightedness that often afflicted the monarchy's policy making. -54 - ThtnRRT (b)(3) Approved for Release 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 grtfig.T__ (b)(3) The previously-cited book by the last police chief, Vassilyev, which Smith devalues, arouses some doubt about the operational efficiency of the Okhrana. The Vassilyev book is more revealing than the author himself suspects. Vassilyev, a loyal but unsophisticated servant of the Tsar, gives an account of the Okhrana's operations covering roughly the twenty years before the Bolshevik revolution which at times would resemble a Buster Keaton sequence if the affairs were not so deadly serious. It is a story of imprudent police actions and plain fiascos by over- zealous or gallible police operatives. There was also plot-faking by the Okhrana, a tactic developed monstrously under the Bolsheviks. The Okhrana's organization, according to Vassilyev, was divided into two parts--an External agency engaging in intelligence and surveillance, and an Internal agency which engaged in clandestine operations against the ter- rorist organizations. The External agency often used separate and unlinked groups of agents in the same surveil- lance operation as a means of double-checking information. The surveillance operation appears to have had a fair degree of success, although the SR terrorists worked out a system for discovering the surveillance agents assigned to them, often luring these agents to their death. The Okhrana's real complications and entanglements were centered in the clandestine operations. The use of agents--that is, the infiltration of agents into terrorist �organizations--was a dangerous practice, as the agent might be and sometimes was doubled. The Okhrana tried to reduce the dangers of this by getting two agents into every revolutionary group whenever possible, reporting independently and being checked not only by each other but by External surveillance. Penetration was ef- fective in many cases, but the use of agents proved disastrous in some--e.g. Stolypin's death came at the hands of a double agent. The Okhrana had perhaps the best record of success in provocation--inducing terrorist groups to undertake operations which would result in their arrest, and creating false anti-Tsarist groups to lure the unwary. One of the key operational problems facing the Okhrana, Vassilyev points out, was judging the size of terrorist forces. More often than not the police, it appears, over- estimated those forces. -55 - ,rRCLRET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 BECREX_ (b)(3) Vassilyev argues that terrorist organizations and modes of operation were "so elaborate that they were not to be countered by ill-considered measures of violence." In one instance, Vassilyev recalls, the Okhrana itself, unsure of the extent of one terrorist plot, warned off rather than arrested the leader on the hope that he and all his confederates would flee. However, Vassilyev does admit that at times the police did not move soon enough, "because of pressure from public opinion." And he com- plains in general terms of bureaucratic inertia and fussiness, and of bureaucratic rivalry. Despite its successes, the overall record of the operations of the Tsar's political police, according to most accounts, was uneven. Even from a purely technical standpoint, its successes were often counter-balanced by failures; and from a broad political perspective, many commentators believe that its workings in the long run were counter-productive in terms of the Tsar's own poli- tical interests. Bibliographer E.E. Smith's discovery that no one has fully exploited the original and secondary sources for an overall study of the Okhrana suggests that sweep- ing judgments on its success or failure must be made and viewed with caution. However, the sources of some of the difficulties the Tsar's secret police experienced over a longer period--from the time of Nicholas I to the end of the monarchy--seem clear enough. From its inception in its modern form under Nicholas, the secret police were given an excessively broad mission and ill-defined func- tions. Moreover, the Tsar's ministers often failed to maintain close enough supervision of the police to prevent their operations from working at cross-purposes with official policy. Also, counter-terrorist and counter- revolutionary activities went off on their own tangents with bizarre results. The security of the police was infirm--it was too often penetrated. And it made some monumental mistakes in judgment. Verging on a truism, but one borne out by the Rus- sian experience, those Russian officials who more or less successfully coped with terrorists fitted police operations into a broader political strategy. Such officials displayed a more or less clear view of the political environment in -56- rt,RET.T_ Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SECHZT (b)(3) which terrorism developed. Further, they kept a sharp eye on the struggle for the loyalties, sympathies or acquiesc- ence of important social groups most prone to support or accept rapid or revolutionary change. However, these able officials were not numerous. More usually, Tsarist offi- cials as well as the Tsars themselves let the immediate disruptions or horrors of terrorist activity obscure their long-range vision. -57- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 -"MITRE-T. (b)(3) THE UNITED STATES: 1831-1920 I. Abolitionist "Uprisings" The two pocket-size uprisings against the system of slave-holding in the South -- e.g., Nat Turner's (1831) and John Brown's (1859) -- were characterized by their leaders' failure to anticipate the probable public revulsion against crude terrorism. Neither seems to have gone further in his thinking than to assume that the nobility of the cause (eman- cipation) would carry all good men, black and white, along with him. Abraham Lincoln grasped the psychology of Brown and equated it with that of European regicides: "An enthu- siast broods over the oppression of a people till he fancies himself commissioned by Heaven to liberate them. He ventures the attempt, which ends in little else than his own execu- tion." (Speech of 27 February 1860) Turner and Brown had a similar rationale for their killings. They believed that they had been chosen by God to free slaves, and that they were accountable for their action only to God. Both men had serious psychological defects, a fact which may account for their failure to perceive the probable damage their action would do to their political cause and for their inability to preserve their quasi-military forces. Their uprisings were crushed by the first act of armed counteraction. Turner's group, having murdered 51 whites including women and children, provoked a strong negative reaction among poten- tial allies in the South. Emancipation societies which had flourished there were immediately dealt a death blow. On the legal level, almost every state in the South enacted new laws which greatly increased the severity of the slave codes. Psychologically, his actions created a deep sense of fear of massive slave insurrections, which pervaded Southern thinking for 30 crucial years. Brown, a fanatic already considered an outlaw because of his murder of a Missouri slaveholding planter, chose a poor -58 - Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 target. There were very few slaves in the Harper's Ferry area, and the first man his group killed was a free Negro, the station baggage-master. The sympathy and admiration generated by Brown's dignified bearing during his trial was greatly overshadowed by the antagonism and alarm his raid created even among moderates. Few could sanction seizure of a Federal arsenal or a firefight with Federal marines (ironically, led by Colonel Robert E. Lee). II. Assassinations of Symbolic Figures A. Presidents Some assassins of American presidents believed in a vague way that murder of the chief executive would eliminate, at the root, opposition to their political cause. However, their motivation actually was deeper, in the unconscious. They give an overwhelming impression of mental disturbance, suggesting that regardless of a president's policies or personal character, killers will always appear. 1. Lincoln There was an element of insanity in John Wilkes Booth, who was described by one in a position to know as "insane on that one point"--the struggle between what he saw as Northern tyranny and Southern freedom. The brief diary he kept during his effort to escape suggests that he envisaged his act as that of Brutus or William Tell. In addition, he was in- flamed by a craving for revenge. After he shouted from the Ford's Theater stage "Sic semper tyrannis!" he shouted "The South is avenged!" His planning had been rational. He had visited the presidential box earlier in the day and secured its door to block quick pursuit. And, but for chance, he probably would have escaped the theater unharmed. Booth had planned an even more spectacular impact. The accomplice was to murder Vice President Johnson, but he failed to act. Another accomplice was to -59- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) murder Secretary of State Seward; he succeeded in seriously wounding the Secretary. Booth was incredulous at the public reaction to the murder. He jotted down the following in his brief diary, a day or two after killing Lincoln. "After being hunted like a dog through swamps and woods, and last night being chased by gunboats till I was forced to return, wet, cold, and starving, with every man's hand against me, I am here in despair. And why? For doing what Brutus was honored for--what made William Tell a hero; and yet I, for striking down an even greater tyrant than they even knew, am looked upon as a common cutthroat." He failed to perceive that by striking down the highest political figure in the North he would produce only revulsion and shock, rather than elation, among the populace. The public reaction deepened the North-South split. Lincoln had been a moderating influence; his views at the end of the Civil War were far more con- ciliatory to the defeated South than was true of the radical Republicans. The shocking manner of his death intensified the polarization, brought wider political support to the advocates of a radical reconstruction policy, and perpetuated the political cleavage centered on the relative status of whites and blacks. The Northern populace became more susceptible to the argument that unless the political activities of Southern whites were forcefully suppressed, a conspiratorial plot against the Union would persist. Thus the radical minority within the party was better able to undermine Lincoln's policy of moderation. The South became increasingly homogeneous and bitter as a result of being treated as a conquered province; and bitter- ness was grist for the conservative's mill. Had Booth not murdered the President, the Southern planter class which dominated political life in the South might not have been able to regain the control it exercised before the war. Men were judged to be either loyal to the "old South" or traitors, and any opportunity for the rise of a new class of Southern leaders was curtailed. If Booth -60- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) ever believed that his act would produce greater political freedom for the South--he was wrong. It led to greatly increased Northern suppression. 2. Garfield Charles J. Guiteau, who shot President Garfield at a Washington railroad station on 2 July 1881, was a disappointed office-seeker and a mentally un- balanced lawyer. When apprehended, he insisted that he had acted under divine inspiration, and that Garfield's death would unite the Republican party and save the Republic. Because he earlier had worked for Garfield's election, he believed he deserved a consulship in Paris, and his failure to be appointed was the immediate motive for the assassination. His act catalyzed public concern about the spoils system and eventually led to the passage of the Pendleton Act, in December 1882, which estab- lished a federal Civil Service Commission. Although civil service reform probably would have been achieved before the end of the 19th century, the murder of Garfield stimulated immediate legislative action. 3. McKinley McKinley was shot in Buffalo on September 61 1901 by Leon F. Czolgosz, an American of Polish descent. He was nearly insane, although in his signed confession he said that he was aware of what he was doing when he fired the shot. He said that he knew he would be "catched" and was willing to accept the consequences of his act. He felt the assassination to be a "duty", because he believed there should be no "rulers". Czolgosz was a relatively new convert to anarchist ideas. He had been particularly impressed by a speech in Cleveland earlier in the year by the Russian-born anarchist Emma Goldman. Miss Goldman had discussed anarchist bomb-throwing and other terrorist acts, and although she claimed not to believe in such methods, "she did not think that they should 761- 1E-CMS4E. (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 be too severely condemned in view of the high and noble motives which prompted their perpe- tration". (Cleveland Plain Dealer, 6 May 1901) During the intermission, Czolgosz asked her to suggest materials to read, and she recommended several titles. To his disturbed mind, the speech and the literature were a call to action. Thus, an important factor in the assassination of McKinley was the open exhortation of hatred and violence against public officials in the speeches and writings of Bakunin, Miss Goldman, and Johann Most. Later, Miss Goldman defensively rejected the idea that circulation of anarchist ruler- killing concepts had anything to do with Czolgosz's act. Stressing psychology, she wrote that killers are "high strung, like a violin string." "They weep and moan for life, so relentless, so cruel, so terribly inhuman. In a desperate moment, the string breaks." (Anarchism and Other Essays, 1911) Yet, shortly after the assassination and Czolgosz's execution, she implied approval of the act and, in her own words, could "bow in reverent silence before the powers" of the killer's soul. Many American writers of the time viewed as a flattering comment on the unlimited liberty of the press in the U.S. the fact that Goldman's ruler- hatred and Most's bomb-making instructions could be freely printed and circulated. An anarchist news- paper in San Francisco wrote that this unusual press freedom in effect deterred killers from attempts on president's lives: "The Anarchists are treated with sufficiently gross injustice, even in this country. But they are at least allowed the right of conducting a peaceful propaganda, and the conse- quence is that McKinley, hated and despised though he is, needs no body-guard to protect him from the attacks of revolutionists." This passage was quoted in the journal, Outlook, on 10 August 1901, just one month before McKiiii-677�iiias shot. The story widely circulated at the time held that McKinley's murder was organized by anarchists -62- (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 with international connections, and that Czolgosz was merely the pawn of a highly sophisticated terrorist organization which had assassinated the heads of states of several European countries. Following the assassination and the stories of international conspiracy, popular anxiety about the stability of the government and the danger of internal subversion developed. Organized reactions included acts of violence by local citizens in various states against persons with known anarchist views. In some cases, individual anarchists were attacked by angry mobs; in others, vigilante committees were organized to attack entire anarchist communities. The most important anarchists arrested in the aftermath of the assassination were Emma Goldman and Johann Most, the German-born preacher of bomb-throwing. Anarchist leaders were also arrested in many major cities. In Rochester, Justice Day of the New York Supreme Court ordered a grand jury investigation of the city's 100 anarchists. He ordered that "every person found to be a member of the local society was to be indicted for conspiracy to overthrow the government In Cleveland, the police suppressed meetings of local anarchist groups and the newspaper published an editorial demanding that Czolgosz's father be fired from his job as a ditch digger for the city. 11 Vigilantes, like government officials, tended to make no distinction between philosophical- individualist anarchists (peaceful) and Communist anarchists (some peaceful, some violent, in method). In Spring Valley, Illinois, the site of an anarchist community of about 500, a citizens' committee visited the general manager of the Spring Valley Coal Company and insisted that he discharge every known anarchist in his employ. The committee also informed him that there were 2,000 towns-people who were ready to assist in exterminating the "reds." Near -63- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) McKeesport, Pennsylvania, at the anarchist colony of Guffey's Hollow, a community composed primarily of Italian coal miners, 25 anarchist families fled the community after 300 men wearing robes resembling those of the Ku Klux Klan and armed with rifles and shotguns marched on the community. Throughout the country, the outraged citi- zenry indicated their suspicion and a desire for vengeance and protection. Any group which felt that it might be suspected of association with anarchism or with the assassin felt impelled to make a public statement denouncing the act and dissociating itself from the killer. Thus, all five of the Polish newspapers in Buffalo clearly condemned Czolgosz and denounced anarchism in strong language. A significant and lasting effect of the assassination was the revision of immigration laws by Congress two and a half years later. An early sign that strong sentiment favored a hardening of immigration policy appeared in an editorial in the Washington Post on 14 September (eight days after the assassination). The editorial stated: We parade as a matter of patriotic pride those dangerous political dissi- pations which should be a cause of patriotic sorrow and alarm. We open our arms to the human sewage of Europe; we offer asylum to the outcasts and male factors of every nation. In his first message to Congress, Theodore Roosevelt initiated a federal campaign to control anarchists in order to prevent future assassinations. Not only anarchists, he declared, but also "all active and passive sympathisers with anarchists" should be sub- jected to a national war waged with "relentless efficiency." Legislation took the form of anarchist- exclusion ammendments to the immigration laws, -64 � (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Th-E e R (b)(3) blocking entry into the country of anarchists who believe in or advocate overthrow of governments or assassination of public officials (Section 2) or who disbelieve in all governments (Section 38). (Passed in Congress, 3 March 1903). The new legislation was used for the first time against English anarchist John Turner, arrested on 23 October 1903 for a New York speech. The Supreme Court took the case on 6 April 1904; it rejected Clarence Darrow's defense. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Fuller presumed that "Congress was of the opinion that the tendency of the general exploitation of such views is so dan- gerous to the public weal that aliens who hold and advocate them would be undesirable additions to our population." The activities of native born or naturalized anarchists were also limited by government action. Two years after the assassination, the state legislatures of New York, New Jersey, and Wisconsin passed laws outlawing the teaching of anarchist doctrines and limiting the movements and activities of anarchist organizations within their states. These laws were more relevant to the Czolgosz case than the federal ammendments, which could not have been used to deter men like him because he was born in the U.S. The Immigration Act of 16 October 1918 went a small step further, providing for the exclusion and deportation, "any time after entry," of those aliens who were anarchists. In 1919 Attorney General A. M. Palmer asked for, but did not get, tough legislation in the form of a peace- time sedition act which would make "preaching anarchy and sedition" a crime under general criminal statutes for native Amer-3757F. Nevertheless, Palmer with the assistance among others of J. Edgar Hoover (Head of the General Intelligence Division of the Department of Justice) was able to use the 1918 Act to deport anarchists, the most important of whom were Goldman and Alexander Berkman. They and 49 others sailed to Russia on the ship Buford ("Red Ark") in December 1919. -65- &REN Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 --SEGRET (b)(3) The criminal syndicalist laws enacted partly against the Industrial Workers of the World ("wobblies") during World War I and immediately thereafter were part of a pro- tracted, combined attack of the federal and state governments. The attack between 1917 and 1920 almost completely disrupted the anarchist movement in the U.S. Although anarchism was to be a factor in the Sacco-Vanzetti case, it no longer attracted public attention after 1920. The Communists became the new menace. B. Industrialists 1. Mine Supervisors Murders committed by Irish immigrant miners in the coal fields of eastern Pennsylvania in the 1860's and 1870's were directed against English or Welsh mine supervisors for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to economic grievances. Motives were usually personal. The leaders of Molly Maguire groups were neither miners nor union employees. On the contrary, their acts of terrorism were cited by mine owners to condemn the unions as perpetrators of violence. For the most part the leaders were town idlers and toughs; some were saloon keepers; only the rank and file were actual miners. The Molly Maguire groups could unleash their assassins against any supervisor and could terrorize local people into providing alibis for the assassins. The groups operated almost without restraint for several years. Finally, the President of the Reading Railroad, F. B. Gowen, secretly hired Alan Pinkerton, who sent a detective (James McParlan) in October 1873 to penetrate the Molly Maguire clandestine organization. McParlan was highly success- ful. He was initiated into the secret MM order, and over the course of 30 months in the coal fields, sent out secret reports which identified group leaders and the assassins. He later surfaced and was the key witness for the prosecution. His evidence helped Pennsylvania wipe out the Molly Maguire groups. -66 - Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 SECRRI__ (b)(3) The Molly Maguire terrorism badly hurt union activity in the coal fields, permitting the owners to tar the unions with the Molly Maguire brush. 2. Carnegie Steel Company Manager H. C. Frick In the 6 July 1892 battle between Carnegie Steel Company guards (300 armed Pinkerton men) and striking workers at the Homestead, Pa. plant site, three Pinkerton men and 10 workers were killed. Communist-anarchists Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman decided upon revenge against company manager Frick. Berkman first planned to assassinate Frick-with a bomb, and he tried to make one, following directions printed in the widely circulated pamphlet of Johann Most (titled, Science of Revolutionary Warfare: A Manual of Instructions in the Use and Preparation of Nitroglycerine, Dynamite, Gun-Cotton, Fulminating Mercury, Bombs, Fuses, Poisons, etc., etc.) published c. 1886. Berkman, working at night in a New York apartment, was not able to fabricate a bomb that would detonate. His efforts greatly worried Emma Goldman, who feared he might not control the explosion and might kill friends sleeping in the apartment. She later recounted: "What if anything should go wrong - but, then, did not the end justify the means? Our end was the sacred cause of the oppressed and exploited people...What if a few should perish? - the many would be made free and could live in beauty and comfort." Berkman's difficulty was that the dynamite "was wet", and he decided to use a revolver and knife. He entered Frick's Pittsburgh office on 23 July 1892 and fired two shots and stabbed him twice, but Frick recovered. Berkman served 22 years (1892-1914) in jail for his effort. He failed to eliminate Frick or to achieve his political propaganda purposes. Frick became stronger and even more immovable in labor :matters. Berkman's act hurt the cause of the strikers. And it created a sharp split among Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SECRET (b)(3) Communist-anarchists. Goldman and Most engaged in public mutual recriminations, a major scandal in anarchist history, which contributed significantly to the disintegra- tion of the anarchist movement in America. In articles published after the assassination attempt, Most modified his views on terrorist acts, and stated that he had greatly over-esti- mated the importance of terrorism. He concluded that terrorism was not practicable where the revolutionary movement was yet in its infancy and where, as a result, governmental reprisals could put an end to all radical activities. Berkman's act had aroused a lynching fury among the American public, and Most, having completed his ninth prison year, was apparently henceforth to live less dangerously. Berkman and Goldman in planning the murder made a mistake common to many anarchists. They believed conditions in the U.S. to be as oppressive as in Russia and failed to distinguish between democracy and despotism. In addition, they lacked understanding of how Americans would react to the assassination attempt. :Finally, they failed to recognize that modern police forces and efficient concentration of state power made their tactic far out of date. Goldman had second thoughts. In 1928, after her deportation, she wrote: "I feel violence in whatever form never had brought and probably never will bring constructive results." III. Bomb-Throwing, Bomb-Planting, Bomb-Mailing A. The Chicago Haymarket Affair A bomb was thrown at Chicago's Haymarket Square (during the McCormick works strike) on 4 May 1886 at a unit of 180 police acting to disperse a peaceful crowd listening to Communist-anarchist lecturers. Eight policemen were killed, and 67 wounded. The national public was outraged, and a cry for vengeance -68- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) � Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) against anarchists quickly rose, especially in Chicago. Eight anarchists were condemned for "conspiracy", although there was no persuasive evidence that any of them had thrown the bomb. But one thing, their naive worship of the liberating virtues of dynamite, weighed very heavily against them, both with the jury and a large section of national public opinion. Johann Most had already published his pamphlet giving detailed instructions for bomb-manufacture. Also, one year before the Haymarket incident, on 25 February 1885, Alarm, the English-language organ of the Chicago anarchists, had published an article beginning with the words "Dynamite! Of all the good stuff, that is the stuff!" The article gave minute directions as to "stuffing several pounds of that sublime stuff into an inch pipe" and placing it "in the immediate vicinity of a lot of rich loafers...." The Chicago eight were all members of the Inter- national Working People's Association, which had issued a manifesto in October 1883 for "Destruction of the existing class rule, by all means, i.e., by energetic, relentless, revolutionary, and international action." At least one fanatic in the group, Louis Lingg, was similar in his zeal for the bomb to the Russian Nechayev and to the German-American Johann Most. As he was taken from the court Lingg said, I declare again, frankly and openly, that I am in favor of using force. I have told Captain Schaack, and I stand by it. "If you cannonade us, we shall dynamite you." By the afternoon of May 4, Lingg and his colleagues, working in his Chicago apartment had completed about 50 round and pipe-shaped dynamite contrivances with caps attached. Lingg and a friend transported the bombs to an agreed meeting place, and distributed them. On the way home, pausing at a police station, Lingg told a comrade that "it might be a beautiful thing" to throw one or two bombs into the station; but he was dis- suaded. Soon thereafter, he had to be dissuaded from -69- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) throwing one at a police wagon. During the trial, however, it was never proved that he threw the bomb at the Haymarket Square meeting. The Haymarket incident, more than any other, conditioned Americans to equate anarchism, and socialism, with violence and murder. Union men thereafter drew away from the anarchist agitators and rejected association with all revolutionary ideas and many liberal ideas. Despite the effort of many American and British liberals to have the Chicago eight set free, five were hanged; among them was the editor of Alarm, Parsons, who was not at the Square when the bomb was thrown. Three were sentenced to long terms; in 1893 they were pardoned by Governor Altgeld, who was subjected to a storm of criticism. Another result of the incident was the hovering threat of legislation which would have meant deporta- tion to all alien anarchists. The threat of such a law, not passed until 1918, deterred a large number of those remaining in the anarchist movement. The journal Alarm survived editor Parsons by only two years; ITEWiter-Zeitung became moderate, eventually moving to the socialist camp. B. Bomb-Killing of Idaho's Ex-Governor In Idaho during the 1890's, a small scale war was conducted between the radical Western Federation of Miners (later to become a subordinate unit to William Haywood's Industrial Workers of the World--the "wobblies") and the mine owners, who were assisted by local sheriffs and state militia. By May 1897 the situation had become so tense that President Boyce of the Western Federation of Miners urged every local union in Idaho and Colorado to organize a rifle corps, "so that in two years we can hear the inspiring music of the martial tread of 25,000 armed men in the ranks of labor." The war reached a climax in the spring of 1899, when the $250,000 lumber mill of the Bunker Hill Company was destroyed by the miners with dynamite. Frank Steunenberg, Governor of Idaho, besieged by the mine owners seeking redress, asked President McKinley -70 - Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) for Federal troops and declared Shoshone County in a state of "insurrection and rebellion." McKinley ordered several companies of negro soldiers from Brownsville, Texas to the scene to put down the "insurrection." They rounded up striking miners by the thousands and put them into specially built "bull-pens." White troops closer than Texas had been available, but, in the view of Haywood, black soldiers were used to "incite the miners" and to press an indignity upon them. The miners blamed Governor Steunenberg for all their troubles in the mining country in the late 1890's. After leaving office, he returned to sheep-ranching. Six years later, on 30 December 1905, he opened the gate of his home at Caldwell. To the gate was tied a piece of fish-line, one end of which was attached to a bomb, which instantly killed him. Harry Orchard, a member of the Western Federation of Miners, was hunted down and arrested by James McParlan, the Pinkerton detective who had smashed the Molly Maguires earlier. Orchard confessed to 26 murders, mostly of mining bosses in Colorado and Idaho, including the bomb-assassination of Steunenberg, at the direct instiga- tion of Haywood. "Wobblies" leader Haywood was arrested in Colorado, and illegally extradited to Idaho in February 1906. (A later application on his behalf to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus was denied eight to one. In his dissent, JUFTTEJ McKenna declared that the crime of kidnapping had been committed, pure and simple.) Haywood seemed destined to be found guilty, but huge and threatening labor demonstrations were held in May 1907 in major American cities, intimi- dating American political figures. The judge recommended acquittal. Haywood was acquitted in July 1907, although the entire jury believed, privately, that he was guilty of ordering Orchard to commit the murder. Radical-labor organizations, particularly the "wobblies," were encouraged to continue with labor violence, and they were convinced that their threats in demonstrations had preserved their leader for further agitation. McParlan and other men who examined Orchard were convinced that he -71- -57SIZET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 �Lckliza, (b)(3) was not lying about Haywood's complicity, but, unlike the Molly Maguires trials in the 1870's, overwhelming public and labor sympathy was on the side of the accused. Haywood's "wobblies" advocated violence and "direct action", such as arming Western miners and calling industrial strikes in order to displace capitalism with syndicalism. They also openly opposed American participation in World War I. Haywood was arrested for sedition in September 1917, convicted in August 1918, and in September given a 20-year sentence. But when released on bail, he sailed incognito to Russia, where he died in the Kremlin hospital in March 1928. His militant "direct action" and syndicalist appeals, particularly during the war, created strong public opposition. That opposition, and the severe penalities imposed by the federal government, were factors in the decline of the "wobblies". Just prior to Haywood's arrest, with other "wobblies" officers, agents of the Department of Justice raided offices of the IWW from coast to coast, "without a search warrant". (William D. Haywood, Bill Haywood's Book, New York: International Publishers, 1929, p. 326) Immediately after he was sentenced in September 1918, a huge bomb exploded at the entrance of the Federal Building in Chicago. No suspect was seized, but public condem- nation of Haywood intensified. C. New York Union Square Explosion The explosion of a bomb in Union Square during an attempt to hold a socialist public meeting at the end of March, 1908, was the work of Selig Silverman, a member of Berkman's Anarchist Federation of America; Silverman was a Russian-born radical who had been reading anarchist literature. The immediate cause was petty: having been manhandled one day by the New York police, he went home and made a bomb from the top of his brass bed- stead. 'He half-filled it with nails broken in two, put nitroglycerin on the nails and gun powder on the nitro- glycerin, then put in a short fuse, and waited. When a -72- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 S-EIRELT (b)(3) group of socialists tried to hold a mass meeting and police intervened, he seized the ppportunity. But in his anxiety to kill policemen, he tried to light the fuse with his cigarette, inserting the light in the wrong hole. The immediate explosion killed the man by his side and "frightfully"maimed Silverstein. All accounts say he was a mentally disturbed individual, only a dabbler in serious anarchism. The bomb incident, and earlier activities of anarchists, had by then stirred up a hysterical and futile discussion in the press. The main point was that a near-repetition of the Haymarket incident had occurred and it seemed impossible to create conditions which would prevent future recurrences. Two key New York papers took different lines. The Times took a hard line, linking the socialists with Silverstein as "one; if not in heart and purpose, at least one in the effects they produce..." and "there is no place for these teachers and these teachings in this republic." (Quoted in Current Literature, May 1908) The Tribune warned against sweeping denunciations and broad inferences, stating that the city officials should have granted permission for the meeting, as once promised. It claimed that London and Paris were more tolerant, and the results were not worse than in New York, even though anarchists "are more numerous and powerful abroad than here." The Tribune continued, in a coolheaded way, to insist that history teaches nothing on preventive action: Like all the crimes of the anarchists, this one was without rhyme or reason. The bomb was to be thrown, no matter what the police did. And it is this utter lack of reason which makes anarchy so hard to deal with. It is never possible to anticipate its outbreaks, because- it never has anything to. gain by its crimes. It is possible to guard against crime that is logical or that is moved by. reasonable self-interest,, but there is no. logic in bomb-throwing. Every once in so often -73- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) among the many men who brood too much over social disorders or talk too much over the coming revolution, a man or group of men suddenly determine to � commit some striking crime as a "protest" against society. They kill a ruler who is no different from other rulers and who is absolutely sure to be succeeded by another like himself. They murder a priest at the altar not because he has ever done anything to offend them. They attack a chief of police for nothing that any one can find out. They explode a bomb amidst a number of innocent and � unoffending men. They assert their opposition to organized society, but none of these deeds affects or is even remotely likely to affect the organization of society. They seem to be moved by a sort of vanity for reminding society with sen- sational publicity of its dangers and for showing now and then that their threats of revolution are not all empty air. On the problem of anticipating and guarding against the moments when the incessant talk of "revolution" indulged in not by the anarchists alone will lead hotheads or vain fools to the use of dynamite, unfortunately this Union Square incident sheds no light. (Quoted in Current Literature, May 1908.) An influential journal of the time, Current Literature, pointed to the "striking futility" that prevailed in the general discussion about remedies. Sargent, the commissioner general of immigration, wanted a new law requiring immigrants to present certificates of good charac- ter as a condition of entry to the U.S., but the secretary of another federal department believed it would only produce a lively trade in forged passports. The Phila- delphia Ledger suggested bringing about "so stable and just a se-TIM-Rent of industrial and economic conditions" as to "sweeten the lives of the submerged" and stop the breeding of anarchists. The New Orleans Picayune "seems to say something, but doesn't, when it observes that 'the anarchist evil can be met in only one way, � -74- -SECRET- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 T (b)(3) namely by firm and stern repression." The New York Times suggested that people in high places (the rich) could help by awakening to a sense of duty and leading better lives. The New York Sun suggested a federal law making it a penal offence to have dynamite or other deadly explosives in possession, and giving the police the right to make domiciliary visits. It admitted, however, that the constitutionality of such a law was doubtful, and then suggested uniform legislation of that sort by all the states. (Current Literature, May 1908) The journal cites other suggested remedies for anarchist terrorism. A man wrote to the New York Evening Post, saying: "To prevent any one �from speaking on behalf of anarchy is to give to the cause of anarchy the most formidable weapon it has ever possessed, a weapon even more dangerous than the bullet of Czolgosz, for if our people were once to say to the anarchist; 'You have no other means for the propagation of your 'doctrines except assassination,' they would give him the first real excuse for his detestable crimes." The Evening Post endorsed this view, proposing that an anarchist not be punished for his special beliefs but only for his crime. The Post went on to say: There is one way, and only one way, to combat it effectively, and that is 1py reason. If we cannot marshal arguments to destroy the fallacies and the half- truths upon which the structure 'Of socialistic and anarchistic theory rests, our case is hopeless. Argument with ignorant, hungry, and excited men is, obviously, a formidable undertaking, but still it is the only method in a free country like this.. Certainly; the clubs of the police will never put sound ideas into People's heads. The commissioner of police of New York City, Mr. Bingham, also had a remedy. He thought there should be a fund of $100,000 to establish a "squad of secret police" to cope with the anarchists. But -75- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) the novelist, David Graham Phillips, thought otherwise: Secret police have not stopped anarchist' outrages in the Continent. Why should they here? Do not the English and the Swiss manage that sort of insanity best? Believing that to close mouths is to stop the safety valve, they permit talk without limit. Then they treat the criminal as a common criminal. It seems to me we would do well to cease inflating that sort of criminal cranks as semi-political persons, and to deal with them as dangerous lunatics... (Quoted in Current Literature, May 1908) But the examples of England and Switzerland were not analogous ones and appear not to be entirely relevant. Their populations were far more homogeneous and stable than America's because the identification of the citizen with his own govern- ment was far more immediate than in immigrant-heavy America. And the bombings were in fact political acts. D. Los Angeles Times Building Explosion In 1903, Samuel Gompers, unable to control the dynamiting terror of the Iron Workers union--part of his AFL--had warned the police that he would protect bomb-planters if union men. The public, he said, must not expect the unions to turn over the rioter or terrorist, for that "would be prejudicing his case before it went to the jury." (Interview published in the New York World, 7 June 1903) On 1 October 1910, James B. McNamarT-5T-the militant Iron Workers--a man professionally competent, or "handy with the sticks"-- dynamited and completely destroyed the Los Angeles Times building of General H. G. Otis, a conservative, anti-union publisher. Twenty persons were killed. McNamara was not immediately apprehended; he was shielded by his union and by Gompers' AFL. He was -76- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 1.4:(77NCI' (b)(3) later arrested with an accomplice in April 1911, but only because W. J. Burns, a detective hired by a builders' association earlier to investigate a whole string of McNamara's dynamitings, knew of his guilt. In order to remove the two men from Detroit to Los Angeles, Burns illegally and secretly took them across state lines. The accomplice impli- cated McNamara and his brother John in the Times dynamiting, and in others. Gompers, however, declared the jailed McNamaras innocent. Together with socialist leader Eugene Debs, he started a campaign calling for massive proletarian demonstrations to "protest against" (intimidate) the perpetrators of the "frame up" (court trial). Large sections of the public believed the union version that the explosion was caused by a leaky gas system. Demonstrations took place in most major cities just before the trial began on 11 October 1911, and Gompers used vague but threatening language about the future: when the capitalists "hang a few of us, we will show them a new way to meet an issue." The AFL collected a huge fund--a defense fund--from American workers. Clarence Darrow was retained at a high cost: $50,000 as a retainer and $200,000 over a six-month period after he went to Los Angeles. Armed with popular sentiment and competent legal counsel, the AFL chal- lenged detective Burns9 evidence. Darrow's strategy was to select jurors with meticulous care. But during the weeks of protracted jury selection, the District Attorney, aware that some of the prospective jurors had been taking bribes from the defense lawyers' aides, planted dictographs in Darrow's rooms, and state agents in Darrow's employ. On 29 November, the District Attorney's detectives arrested two of Darrow's agents and charged them with bribing prospective jurors. Darrow was permitted to save his good name only by retreating. His retreat took the form of impelling the McNamara brothers to plead guilty, inasmuch as he had been assured the District Attorney would recommend leniency should confessions be entered in the record. After (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 6 Et14402' (b)(3) going over the matter with them for thebetter part of a day in their cell, Darrow attained pleas of guilty from both. (Darrow later denied that fear of being prosecuted for bribery had anything Aorrdo- with the dramatic reversal. But the District .Attorney, the Judge, and Burns all held the view that Darrow had been caught in a serious crime and acted to escape clean.) On 1 December, the defense withdrew the pleas of "not guilty," McNamara pleading guilty to the Times building bombing and John to another dynamiting. On 5 December, James was Sentenced to life imprisonment and John to 15 years. � The effect of the confessions on the general public was one of shock followed by bitterness against the AFL, the socialists and the Iron Workers union. Samuel Gompers predicted, at a tearful interview, that the confessions "won't do the labor movement any good." The result of the bombing and the trial was a sharp reduction in the militancy of the AFL. President Taft, five days after the opening of the trial, was informed in Los Angeles of further finds of detective Burns about dynamitings to be perpetrated. On his return to Washington, Taft ordered the Department of Justice to make a full investigation, and incriminating evidence against high union leaders was discovered. On 1 October 1912, the federal government placed on trial 54 AFL officials, charging them with transporting dynamite on passenger trains for unlawful purposes or conspiring to cause such violations of Federal laws--38 defendants were convicted and sentenced, including the president of the Iron Workers. The trade unions and the Socialist Party, which had been on the brink of an effective alliance, split, weakening both. Public support fell away from Gompers and Debs, and the press in all major cities persuasively compared the AFL trade unions to the Molly Maguires and the Mafia. The press was aided in this campaign by access to the federal and private investigations which revealed that between 1905 and 1910 the Iron Workers union had attained higher wages and shorter hours by terrorizing employers, and by dynamiting approximately 150 buildings and bridges in the U.S. and Canada. --78- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) E. New York Tenement House Explosion On 4 July 1914, a bomb exploded in the apartment of three anarchists living in a Lexington Avenue, New York City tenement house, killing all three.' in general, their own of amateurism, but the men were defended as heroes in Emma Goldman's anarchist journal, Mother Earth. The issue of July 1914 was dedicated "Tirail7 FRYTTred dead." One writer made an open appeal for "offensive violence." Local newspapers, and the American press declared that the men had been victims of incompetence. It was a clearcut example They have guns, they have cannon, they have soldiers, they have disci- pline, they have armies--and we have dynamite. To oppression, to tyranny, to jails, clubs, guns, and navies, there is but one reply: dynamite! This lack of practical wisdom was one of several characteristics which distinguished the American anarchist from the politically more mature American Communist. F. San Francisco Preparedness Day Explosion In the course ofaPreparedness Day parade in San Francisco on 22 March 1916, a dynamite bomb exploded near parade ranks, which included the Mayor and the Governor of California. Ten. persons were killed and 36 were wounded. Newspapers throughout the country called for action against "the radicals who did it." The-men arrested included Thomas J. Mooney, . a leader of streetcar workers,py:the,Bay Area; and :Warren Billings, a local labOr-Union organizer and 'advocate of direct action.' The prosecution's case :.was not strong, and at some points internally contra- dictory, but in February 1917,, Mooney was convicted and sentenced to. hang. *Labor and. liberal opinion in America held.thatthe'men had been "framed" and sent to prison in an atmosphere of patriotic and anti-labor -79-. (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) hysteria. President Wilson, seeking liberal and labor support after America's entry into the war, was under pressure to save Mooney. In Petrograd, American Ambassador Francis was the target of a demonstration, at which the workers and sailors shouted for the release of "Muni." In January 1918, President Wilson asked California's governor to postpone execution; in March, sailors and workers staged another demonstration at the American- embassy in Petrograd, and through their interpreter, Louise Berger, a close friend of Berkman (still in jail) and Emma Goldman, the sailors announced their decision to hold Ambassador Francis as a hostage until "Muni" and Berkman (among others) were re- leased. In the presence of the demonstrators, Francis cabled Washington, and he reportedly promised them to work for the release of the men. In the same month, Wilson addressed an open letter to Governor Stephens, urging that Mooney be given a new trial immediately or his death sentence commuted. The Russian sailor-worker threat to hold the ambassador hostage played a major role in Wilson's action. As a result, execution was postponed, and after the war, the Governor commuted the sentence. However, Mooney remained in jail for 21 years, even though it was never convincingly established that either he or Billings had planted the bomb. G. Italian-Born Anarchist Bombings and Palmer's "Red Raids" On 28 April 1919, the mayor of Seattle, who had been denouncing the Red Menace, received a bomb package-in the mail. On 29 April, a maid at the Atlanta home of Senator Thomas Hardwick, former chairman of the Committee on Immigration, opened a package that blew Off her hands. On 30 April, in New York, Charles Caplan, on his way home by. subway, read in a newspaper about the 'description of the bomb-package in the Atlanta incident, rushed. back. downtown to the parcel, room in the main post office where-he worked, and surveyed the 16 packages he -80- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 .3 El71144....L_ (b)(3) had set aside :for insufficient postage. All of � them were labeled "Novelties.," all stamped With a label from Gimbel's just like the one in the newspaper account. They were addressed to the � Postmaster, Attorney General Palmer (who had been appointed one Imonth earlier), Justice WendellAIOlmes,. the Secretary of Labor, the .Commissioner .of Immigration, Judge K. M. .Landis (who tad recently presided at an anarchist.trial), Senator Lee Overman (chairman of a committee investigating. bolshevism), J. P. Morgan, John D.:Rockefeller, and others.. Caplan notified his superiors, who directed a bomb expert to open one parcel, which was discovered to conceal a highly .explosive �bomb- The post office department began .a search for J3'ther bombs 36 in _all were found, .some on the way -to. .the west coast, and all had been mailed in New Nbrkwith the false ,Gibel's label. The sender or senderswere, not found, but the general public was frightened. Various theories :were advanced; the most widespread was'lhat "A nationwide bomb 'conspiracy, which the police authorities say has every earmark .of BOlshevik origin....has been discovered. "f (NOW York Times, 1 May .1919) A. Mitchell Palmer, who took office. in:March.I9I9. ,as Attorney General, had assumed a moderate eDUTSe,' ilesisting.powerful:pressure from CongreS, the :press, and the public for :decisive action against the "Reds". He to defend the civil and legal rights .of .all men provided they did not advocate use.of*violence- . On the -eve of Palmer'.s appointment as Attorney H,General,the American press anticipated: that at least 7,000 radicals would be rounded up and deported .by the � Department of Justice. But after Palmer took office .there,were,no further reports of impending large-scale roundups.. The new Attorney General. also refused toause .outside help, In a sharp Shift of policy early_in. .1919, former Attorney. General, Gregory had ordered the dissolution of the Department's ties to the American Protective League, a private organization :of about 250,000 members that assisted the Department'si3ureau Approved for for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 S2t-NgT (b)(3) of Investigation during the war and for several months thereafter. Palmer re-affirmed the Department's desire to have the League disband. Several weeks after he became Attorney General, he declared: Espionage conducted by private individuals or organizations is entirely at variance with our theories of government, and its operation in any community constitutes a grave menace to that feeling of public confidence which is the chief force making for the maintenance of good order. .Three weeks later, in an interview in Cleveland, -Palmer asked the League to stop sending him infor- mation about radical activities: Their continued work of watching meetings of Socialists, Bolsheviki, and other anti- government bodies is unnecessary and is fully covered by the United States Secret Service...There is no way to prevent them sending the reports, but they are not wanted. ,The New York Times complained "The Attorney General has perhaps been a little hasty in telling �the patriotic and defensive societies that their help in guarding the Republic is neither needed nor welcome." (Issues of land 2 April 1919) Soon after Palmer took office in March 1919, Governor 4, M,_COx of Ohio requested Permission to examine material; collected by the American Protective League And turned over to the Department, dealing with German wartime propaganda in Ohio schools. Palmer refused the request, explaining that the files contained mainly "gossip, hearsay information, conclusions, and inferences," and that it was "our opinion that information of this charac- 'ter could not be used without danger of doing serious "wrong to individuals who Were'Probably innocent:" -82- "Z"tv.iirrr, (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 201/11/20 C06646360 sI t 1 tE.T (b)(3) Even after the serious May Day riots, instigated in major American cities by mobs attacking radicals at their meetings or parades, Palmer insisted on the basic legal rights of citizens not advocating violence. The New York Times on 4 May derided the "policy of tolerance which had marked the attitude of the Department of Justice...it must be dropped for one of vigorous prosecution if the Bolshevist movement is to be held in check." In mid-May, Luigi Galleani, the leading figure among Italian anarchists in America, was deported from the East Boston Immigration Station. Shortly afterward, on 2 June, a bomb exploded at the Washington home of Palmer. Windows of nearby houses were shattered, in- cluding those of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt who lived directly across the street. Apparently the bomb had exploded prematurely and killed its carrier. Parts of the body were found on the street, and one part was found on the Roosevelt doorstep. Pamphlets entitled Plain Words (printed by Italian-born anarchists in May 1919), were scattered on the street warning that "there will have to be bloodshed." Do not say we are acting cowardly because we keep in hiding, do not say it is abomi- nable; it is war, class war, and you were the first to wage it under cover of the powerful institutions you call order, in the darkness of your laws, behind the funds of your boneheaded slaves. Within an hour of the explosion at Palmer's house, bombs exploded in eight cities in public buildings and the homes of government officials and businessmen. The simultaneous bomb explosions in other cities included the New York home of Judge Charles Nott (a watchman was killed), a church in Philadelphia, the Boston home of Judge Hayden who had dealt severely with arrested May Day radicals, the Newtonville home of Representative Leland Powers who had sponsored an anti-anarchy bill in the Massachusetts state legislature, and the Pittsburgh homes of U.S. District Judge W. H. Thompson who had once presided over a prose- cution of Italian-born anarchist Carlo Tresca and of -83- c-14E,T Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 T (b)(3) Chief Inspector W. W. Sibray of the Bureau of Immigration. Palmer later told a Senate investi- gating committee: I remember...the morning after my house was blown up, I stood in the middle of the wreckage of my library with Congressmen and Senators, and without a dissenting voice they called upon me in strong terms to exercise all the power that was possible...to run to earth the criminals who were behind that kind of outrage. In this way, Palmer shifted his moderate stance and set out on a vigorous course of investigating, arresting, and prosecuting various sects of radicals. Palmer's first move,on 1 August 1919, was to create a General Intelligence .Division in the Department of Justice: its function was to collect information about radicals (mostly aliens) and coordinate the results with information from other government agencies. But still he took no action against the radicals, despite the contagion of hysteria and emotion spreading among the public and Congressional figures who genuinely feared a "Red" plot to disrupt the country and seize power. Congress and the press insisted that the nation-wide� steel strike which began in September was inspired and led by radicals; in the fail a storm of criticism broke around him for refusing to act against the oncoming "Red revolution." Still, on 15 October, he opposed proposals for immigration restriction then being urged upon Congress; the New 'York Times editors lost patience, deploring his "sentimentality." (Issue of 17 October 1919) Senator McKellar, after visiting the Department of Justice to hear Palmer's side of the matter, reported that "The trouble is that we have got a very liberal provision in our Constitution about the freedom of the press and freedom of speech." Palmer only reluctantly accepted the need--as that need was dinned into his ears from "every editorial sanctum in America," as he put it--to do "something and do it now, and do it quick, and do it in a way that would bring results to stop this sort of thing in the United States." -84- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 . � Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 gt*RET (b)(3) His critics had insisted that deportation was the chief remedy, and Palmer was to discover it was the only legal action he could take successfully against most radicals, 90 percent of whom were foreign born. According to the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended in October 1918, any alien anarchist, no matter how pacific his beliefs, was deportable. So was any alien advocating use of violence against property, public officials, or the government, or who belonged to an organization which advocated the use of violence. The deportation statutes, however, gave no deportation authority to the Department of Justice. Alien violators could be arrested only on warrants issued by the Secretary of Labor; their cases were heard by an immigration inspector and they could be deported only on order signed by the Secretary of Labor. With the concurrence of Labor Secretary Wilson, Palmer and his aides decided to arrest members of the Union of Russian Workers. The Union was a social club of lonely Russian immigrants and its members had never been guilty of disorder or crime. But the Union's literature was radical. Department of Justice agents raided meeting places of the Union in 12 cities on the second anniversary of the Russian Revolution, 7 November 1919; in New York city alone, 650 members were arrested although only 27 arrest warrants had been issued, and in many instances, brutality was used against the arrested persons. Of the 650, 43 members of the Union were deported, while the other people arrested were released after questioning. Many swore they had been beaten and threatened while being questioned. For the first time Palmer had acted in accordance with the view that in a national "emergency," security of the country took precedence over concern for basic constitutional rights. Also for the first time the public approved of his action; the public approved especially the deportation of 51 anarchists to Russia on 21 December on the Buford (the "Red Ark"). His next targets were the Communist and the Communist Labor parties. Palmer's aides learned from the November roundups that many arrested aliens exercised their right to -85- ThzeRgx (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) counsel. A section of Rule 22 of the immigration regulations declared that the arrested alien "at the beginning" of his hearing "shall be apprised that he may be represented by counsel." The Justice Depart- ment prevailed upon the Immigration Commissioner to change the regulations to read that the arrested alien shall be advised of his right of counsel at the beginning of his hearing "or at any rate as soon as such hearing has proceeded sufficiently in the development of the facts to protect the Government's interests..." The next legal hurdle was to secure proper search and arrest warrants. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution stipulates that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Temphasis supplied) The mass arrests contemplated made it difficult to acquire properly sworn affidavits with the necessary detailed descriptions of the place to be searched and persons to be arrested. Only by sending forward grossly incomplete affidavits to the Bureau of Immigration in the Department of Labor were search warrants acquired. As for arrests, Palmer's lieutenants acted on the premise--not supported by the law--that membership alone was sufficient basis for arresting Communist Party and Communist Labor Party persons. When, on 2 January 1920, arrests were made in meeting places and homes of members in 33 cities, thousands of arrests were made without warrants. Immigration officers, holding warrants issued by the Department of Labor, waited in detention centers while Department of Justice agents rounded up all persons attending Communist meetings. Captives, approximately 6,000 in all, were then brought in and matched against the warrants. Mopping-up operations continued for several days, and smaller raids were carried out in many parts of the country over the following six weeks. In Massachusetts, for example, there were 14 raids; in Boston, 500 aliens were marched through the streets in chains and jailed in poor conditions. Over 3,000 persons were arrested; about 3,000 other suspects were taken into custody, held for periods ranging from a few hours to several months, -86- ---S"rft-RET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) and then released without ever having been officially arrested. Persons found in the homes of those arrested were also taken to police headquarters, in many cases despite the absence of search and arrest warrants. Because of the mass nature of the procedure, many mistakes were made. Even among aliens at party meetings, a large number were not members. Some whose names appeared on membership lists were found to be illiterate and totally uninterested in Communism. In Lynn, Massachusetts, 39 men, arrested and held overnight, had come together in a meeting hall often used by radicals solely for the purpose of forming a coopera- tive bakery. During the Red Raids of early January 1920, Department of Justice agents avoided violence. However, in many areas police assisted in rounding up and bringing in prisoners, and frequently members of private patriotic organizations--of the kind Palmer nine months earlier had spurned--helped conduct the raids. These police and private assistants, along with agents temporarily recruited and added to the Bureau of Investigation, probably inflicted a large share of the beatings reported. On 5 January, the New York Times editors apologized to Palmer for questioning his Department's "vigor" in "hunting down the enemies of the United States." The Nation, the New Republic, and 12 prominent lawyers (including Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter) condemned the mass arrests as being clearly illegal. Palmer had developed presidential aspirations which began to weigh heavily in his actions, and he was anxious to proceed with deportation, the next step. In late February 1920, he promised an audience of clubwomen that they would soon witness a "second, third and fourth Soviet Ark" sailing from New York. However, a new man, L. F. Post, had become Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor. He discovered that some of the detained persons had been imprisoned for two months, and that attendance at a meeting was the only evidence against them. He demanded all the records from the Immigration Commissioner's -87 - (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 s , - � (b)(3) office and reviewed them carefully; cancelling warrants where evidence seemed clearly insufficient, dismissing cases of "automatic" membership (men transferred without their knowledge from other oi-ganizations), and releasing aliens held on illegally seized evidence. By 10 April, Post had decided 1,600 cases, cancelling arrest warrants in 1,141, or 71 percent of them. He also ordered the release of many others for whom warrants had not been obtained. In many cases, he reduced the amount of bail. However, he did order the deportation of aliens clearly members of the Communist Party even when they appeared to have little understanding of Communist doctrine. Finally, of about 3,000 persons originally held for deportation, only 446 were sent out of the country. This deportation probably reduced the incidence of killings and bombings. As to the assumed danger of revolution, the Communists and anarchists did not have such a capability. Prior to May Day 1919 and May Day 1920 Palmer and his aides predicted some drastic act of subversion on the part of Communists, but no such act occurred. Most of the evidence which convinced his aides in the Department of Justice that the government was in danger was derived from printed matter collected by the General Intelligence Division--matter which contained optimistic calls to revolt, following the victory of the Russian Revolution when Communists everywhere exaggerated their revolutionary strength. These calls, as one author pat it, "belonged to the realm of literary make-believe." (T. Draper, The Roots of American Communism, New York, Viking, 1957, p. 224.) No action occurred, as a result of the literary appeals. By the spring of 1920, the general public reconsidered the theory of the Red Menace in the light of clearer develop- ments. Bolshevism seemed isolated within Soviet borders. Bombings had ended abruptly after the explosion in Palmer's house, and industry was relatively free from labor strikes. As for the man who bombed Palmer's house and who was himself blown to pieces, the Department of Justice established that he was an Italian-born anarchist of a dynamite-minded group living in Paterson, New Jersey. -88- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 S (b)(3) The threatening leaflet, Plain Words, was also the work of this group. Sacco and Vanzetti were members of an East Boston group of Italian- born anarchists sympathetic to the Paterson comrades. Their belief in anarchist doctrines later weighed heavily against them in their murder trial. -89- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Principal Sources "A Review of the World"; Current Literature, May 1908 Louis Adamic, Dynamite, New York, Viking Press, 1934 Alexander Berkman, Prison Memoirs of an Anarchist, New York, Mother Earth Publishing Company, 1912 Wayne G. Broehl, Jr., The Molly Maguires, Cambridge, Harvard U. Press, 1964 Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 6, 1901 Stanley Coben, A. Mitchell Palmer: Politician, New York, Columbia U. Press, 1963 Henry David, The History of the Haymarket Affair: A Study in the American Social-Revolutionary and Labor-Movements, New York, 193E3 Richard Drinnon, Rebel In Paradise: A Biography of Emma Goldman, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1961 M. Edelman and R. J. Simon, "Presidential Assassinations: Their Meaning and Impact on American Society," Ethics, April 1969 Sidney Fine, "Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley," The American Historical Review, July 1955 Emma Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays, New York, Mother Earth Publishing Company, 1911 William D. Haywood, Bill Haywood's Book, New York, International Publishers, 1929 Robert Hunter, Violence and the Labor Movement, New York, MacMillan, 1914 Max Nomad, Apostles of Revolution, New York, Collier Books, 1961 Albert R. Parsons, Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Scientific Basis, Chicago, Mrs. A. R. Parsons(Publisher), 1887 -90- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 ---SMGRET (b)(3) IRELAND--SINN FEIN (1916-1921) In 1914 the British Parliament was considering passage of a Home Rule Bill for Ireland, which would have given the Irish a united country with control of purely internal matters while the British retained control of defense, foreign policy, customs duties, the postal system and, temporarily, the police. Ulster County in the Protestant north was vehemently opposed to domination by Dublin and set up a volunteer force to oppose the bill by force if necessary. In return, the southern Irish set up their own force--the Irish Volunteers. The outbreak of World War I prompted the British to postpone passage of the bill. The question of whether or not to support the English in the war split the republican cause in the south. The more radical nationalists opposed support and, though a small minority, kept the name Irish Volunteers. The Volun- teers, while officially an independent organization, had been well infiltrated by the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), a secret organization which demanded total independence for Ireland. The IRB had been engaged in sporadic, unsyste- matic-violence since its founding in 1858 and had infiltrated numerous groups, including the Sinn Fein, a political party originally dedicated to the use of civil disobedience to gain independence. � In 1916 a small group of radical IRB members planned a rebellion dependent on the use of the Irish Volunteers. The rebels hoped the population would rally to the:cause. The result was the so-called Easter Rising of May 1916; the rising had not been well coordinated And involved only the occupation of a few public buildingsin'Dublin. The revolt was quickly smashed as it did not have popular support; it Was widely condemned in Ireland by those who felt it would set back the passage of thellome Rule Bill. However, while the leaders of the rising had been unable to gain a popular following through their actions-, the British, by their harsh reaction, aroused public:sympathyfor the-rebels_. The -91- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Sst3.11,ET (b)(3) British executed 16 of the leaders, who immediately became martyrs to the cause of independence; and they arrested some 3,000, many of whom were interned in England without trial. (Most were released by December 1916.) The Sinn Fein, led by its President, Eamon De Valera, capitalized on the martyrdom of the Easter Rising leaders; during 1917 and 1918, they also made good propaganda use of another issue--conscription. The British attempt to impose conscription was resented by many Irish, and the response to the general strike called by the Sinn Fein to protest it was impressive. In May 1918 the British appointed a new Viceroy to Ireland; a Field Marshal of some fame, Lord French,was given authority to regain con- trol of the situation. Within a week of his arrival, many leading Sinn Feiners, including De Valera, had been arrested. In the elections of December 1918, the Sinn Fein won a majority of seats in southern Ireland, although many Sinn Feiners were in jail. Those elected refused to take their seats in London and met instead in Dublin; by April 1919 most of their leaders had been released from jail and De Valera had escaped. They proclaimed Ireland a republic and set up a parliament, the Dail Eireann. They also recruited an army of volunteers, the Irish Republican Army (IRA). De Valera became President of the Dail as well as of the Sinn Fein. The violent struggle began, in uncoordinated fashion, in January 1919, when a group of young men, called the Tipperary Brigade, ambushed a wagon loaded with explosives and killed two policemen guarding it. The act evoked unanimous indignation, and the killers were denounced as criminals by the press and clergy. However, such acts gradually spread,, and in April 1919 De Valera gave a speech in which he implicitly condoned attacks on the British- administered Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC);-thus the use of terror was supported by the head of a popularly-elected parliament. During 1919, 18 policemen were killed.. The military strategy of the IRA was largely formulated by Michael Collins, a member of De Valera's cabinet, and -92- ET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 SSET (b)(3) had two main aspects--guerrilla war and terror. The former was aimed at destroying weak links in the British defense system in Ireland and consisted of raids on defense installations by 30 or more men, the so-called Flying Columns. In addition, sporadic raids on police stations were carried out by groups of young men operating on their own.* Collin's use of terror was aimed at dislocating the enemy's intelligence network. A group of some 12 men, named "The Squad", responsible directly to Collins performed most of the dramatic acts of terror so destructive to the British intelligence network in Ireland. Collins built up his own intelligence network, using informers and spies widely, to gain a deep knowledge of the British network. Then, by assassination, he proceeded to eliminate British spies and informers, as well as police and secret agents. People became afraid to testify against the Squad; those who did were liquidated. In December 1919, with the approval of Collins, the Tipperary Brigade tried to assassinate Lord French. The reasoning for this effort (unsuccessful, as were several others) was as follows: Why, we asked ourselves, should we not strike at the very heads of the British Government in Ireland? It would arouse the world more to take an interest in Ireland's case; it would strike terror into the hearts of English statesmen, and it would prove effective in helping to make British Rule in Ireland impossible. England would carry on all right *The Irish made good use of youths. The Irish Boy Scouts, founded in 1909, had a definite revolutionary purpose. The boys were given shooting practice as well as drill and took the following oath; I promise to work for the independence of Ireland, never to join England's Armed Forces and to obey my superior officers. -93- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) with a few policemen less; it would be more difficult to-carry on without a Lord Lieutenant. Besides, there are thousands of policemen; but there are only a � few who might become Lord Lieu- tenant, and they would think twice of taking the job if they had to risk being shot.* Terrorist attacks on the RIC accomplished their goal; the police force became demoralized and physically depleted.** In order to bolster their strength, the British.recruited reinforcements throughout Britain who came.to.be called the Black and Tans. According to the :Trish, these men were known criminals released from prison on condition they join the RIC; the British main- tainect.that they were carefully selected and were all men of good character. In July 1920 another group, the Auxiliaries, was added to the RIC, and given a virtually free-hand to engage in counter-terror operations. Also in July the British passed the Restoration of Order to Ireland Bill giving the military command wide powers to arrest and imprison without charge or trial anyone suspected of Sinn Fein associations, to hold witnesses in custody, and to imprison or fine witnesses for failure to produce evidence. According to Gaucher,*** the British also *Breen, Dan, My Fight Eir Irish Freedom, Dublin, Talbot Press, 1924, pp. 109-10. Cited by Gaucher, p. 181. **Demoralization on the British side was also reflected in the resignation of public servants who previously had served loyally. Even many judges refused to serve. In July 1920, the magistrates of the city and county of Cork met and "unanimously declared that they considered it their duty to renounce their appointments by British law." ***Gaucher, Roland, The Terrorists, Secker and Warburg, London, 1965. -94- .BET Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) established a "Murder Gang" composed of detectives and given the task of hunting down and killing leaders of the rebellion. British reactions to the use of terror by the republicans were frequently extreme. In November 1920, Michael Collins carried out his most spectacular terrorist operation. On what came to be known as Bloody Sunday, 14 suspected British secret agents, sent to track down Collins and his men, were assassinated, many in their homes in front of their wives and children. Subsequently, several hundred British soldiers in search of IRA members went to a soccer field where some 10,000 people were watching a game. Apparently without warning, although the British say a shot was fired first, the troops opened fire on the crowd, killing some 17 and wounding 50. The Black and Tans,and particularly the Auxiliaries, indulged in brutal reprisals for terrorist acts. They raided and pillaged towns thought to harbor Sinn Feiners, and gunned down those they suspected. People who had wished to remain outside the struggle became infuriated when British troops forced their way into their homes to carry out ruthless searches, burning and wrecking in the process. The British, aware of the growing unpopularity of their cause, felt compelled to levy new troops and inflict collective reprisals. In the fall of 1920 the British created two more martyrs for the republicans. One was an old-time leader of the Easter Rising, the Mayor of Cork, who died in prison after a 74-day hunger strike. The other was an 18-year old boy, Kevin Barry, who was hanged for his participation in an attack on British soldiers. Both of these incidents attracted world-wide attention and sympathy.* The execution of Barry *The Barry episode also brought attention to the Irish claim that as they were engaged in a war their prisoners should be treated as prisoners of war. The British insisted on treating them as criminals, as they did not wear uniforms. -95- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 . SECRE-T,_ (b)(3) was particularly counter-productive; it lost British public support and produced an increase in the number of attacks on the RIC. During late 1920 the republican cause gained more and more international support. De Valera had gone to the United States in June 1919 to raise money and mobilize moral support; he remained there until the end of 1920 and was successful in both. The rebellion struck a generally sympathetic chord in the U.S., particularly among the sizeble body of Irish immigrants. Even in England there was indignation at reports of brutal British retaliations. According to Coogan* In retrospect, one can see that the British campaign of counter-terror was doomed both as a military action and as a weakener of morale. It was indeed a campaign of half measures, for the British were fearful of the effect which a full-scale military operation...would have on world opinion. The British themselves apparently concluded that their harsher methods were ineffective and never used them again. The British made use of the carrot as well as the stick in their dealings with the Irish. In early 1920 they proposed a new approach to Home Rule according to which there would have been two parliaments (one for the South, one for the North) with a joint council to determine all- Irish questions. The British would retain control of foreign affairs, defense, post office, customs, and so forth. The Irish rejected :the offer. The first six months of 1921 were the most destructive of the struggle. The IRA at this time was having a difficult time. The British estimated its numbers at 100,000 but it *Coogan, Timothy Patrick, Ireland Since the Rising, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1966. -96 - Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 31-C-RET (b)(3) probably numbered no more than 15,000. Coogan estimates that lack of arms limited the IRA's effective strength to 3,000. The British at the time had a troop strength of 50,000 plus the RIC and Auxiliaries.* In June 1921, the British, under international pressure, suggested a truce and negotiations. The Irish accepted. Negotiations dragged on until December,. The main - problems were complete independence and the status Of Ulster. The British finally demanded Irish acceptance of their final proposal--dominion status for Ireland in exchange for a pledge of loyalty to the Crown; the partition of Ireland would be made formal. The Irish delegation was split, with Collins wavering. He finally agreed, as he felt the IRA could not resume the war. The decision split Ireland down the middle and resulted in civil war, during which many heroes of the struggle With the British, including Michael Collins, were killed. The radical IRA which opposed the treaty was finally defeated; in this struggle it did not have the support of the war,.. weary population. In the last days of the conflict the IRA engaged in almost senseless acts of terrorism against people and property. The government of the Free State in turn adopted measures more severe than those the British had employed, including the imposition of the death penalty for illegal possession of arms. *These figures are suggested by Holt, Edgar, Protest in Arms, the Irish Troubles, 1916-1923, Coward-McCann, Inc., New York, 1960. (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 PALESTINE--THE STERN GANG-LEHI (1939-1948) �The establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, a British trust territory, had long been a goal of Zionism. The British Balfour Declaration of 1917 had seemed to promise this, although its language was am- biguous. In the years after 1917, Jewish immigration to Palestine was open, providing a steady stream of Jewish settlers to what had been an overwhelmingly Arab land. The Arabs resented this influx and began pushing the British to put an end to the immigration. The British White Paper of 1939 halting the flow of Jewish immigrants reflected both the great increase in immigration resulting from the persecution of the Jews in Europe and a British desire to get Arab support for the war effort. The pathetic condition of the thousands who were turned away from Palestine and left with no place ,to go aroused tremendous indignation among the Palestine Jews and among compassionate persons all over the world. The Stern Gang was an offshoot of the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization), which itself had branched off in 1937 from the more moderate, self-defense oriented Haganah. Irgun's founder, Vladimir Jabotinskiy, argued that active measures must be taken in the battle for the establishment of a Jewish state. Irgun recruited and organized into secret cells youngsters 13 and 14 years of age. They trained them in the craft of sabotage and terror and they began by planting bombs in Arab public places in reprisal for Arab acts of terrorism against the Jewish population. Following publication of the British White Paper in May 1939, the Irgun shifted its attention from the Arabs to the British, now seen as the main enemy. The day after the announcement of the new immigration policy, there were street demonstrations and radio stations were bombed. -98- (b)(3) 'i-eLf;w3 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 ST-Cltrs�T (b)(3) British retaliation was swift*; in a Short time most of Irguns general Staff,had been jailed. When war broke out, one of the two main leadersof Irgun, David Raziel, decided that Irgun should support Britain against Hitler. The more fanatical Abraham Stern did not agree; he accused- Raziel-of collaboration.with the British and left Irgun taking with him a small minority of the organization.* Stern himself was hunted down and shot to death in February 1942, and the number of Sternists not in jail dwindled to about 25. However, late in the same month the ship Struma, which had been denied permission to land in Palestine broke apart at sea and sank; 750 Jewish refugees were drowned. A great surge in public support for activists resulted', and the followers of Stern began . to regroup and recruit: They took the name Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (FFI), but were known among them- selves by the Hebrew initials LEHI.' The members of the , group were mostly in their late teens and early twenties. They formed a very secretive organization, always armed and under orders to resist arrest at all costs. LEHI never numbered more than 200 to 300. It was too small for guerrilla war and did not have enough weapons and explosives for sabotage. Its leaders decided that assassination was the most effective tactic open to them. LEHI was responsible for the deaths of a number of British police. Its first major target was the unpopular British Commissioner in Palestine, Sir Harold MacMichael, who had made the decision not to permit the Struma to land its passengers. LEHI made six attempts on 16TITITEriael's life, but succeeded only in wounding him. British repression of the 'Sternists grew severe;. British tactics included night patrol's, house searches, curfews, arrests, tortures, hangings. In May 1944, the fifth anniversary of the White Paper, Irgunists seized the government Broadcast Station in *This split resembles that,injhe.iii-Sh_Nationalist. movement over the question of support for the British during World War I. -99- ""'EC-RET Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 SEVRET (b)(3) Ramallah and mined roads, thus ending their war-time truce with the British. The British retaliated, raiding. scores of Jewish settlements; innocent people were herded into large cages, searched, and put into prison without . trial'. In June a LEHI boy was sentenced to hang for firing atHa policeman. MacMichael announced that possession of a gun was an offense punishable by death. In 1944 LEHI chose as its new assassination target Lord Moyne, the British High Commissioner for the Near East. He was based in Cairo. According to Gerold Frank,* the reasons for his selection were 1/ Moyne pays With his life for his stand. He follows policy but policy largely reflects his recommendations 2/ The man appointed to succeed Moyne will think twice before taking the job and before following the same course. 3/ The act will demonstrate the motives and goals of LEHI to the world.** In November 1944 Lord Moyne was shot and killed in Cairo by two LEHI members, youths of 22 and 17. They were captured and hanged. The news of the assassination was received with horror almost universally; the Jewish population of Palestine was particularly concerned at what it saw as a great setback to their hopes of a negotiated establishment of a Jewish state. Repressions followed quickly. Arrests were stepped up, and a six o'clock curfew was announced. Ben Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, called for a four-point program for the repression of terrorists which included not giving terrorists shelter, firing from their jobs those who supported terrorism, not submitting to *Frank, Gerold, The Deed, Simon, and Schuster Inc., New York, 1963. **This reasoning closely parallels that of the Irish terrorists who in 1919 planned the assassination of Britain's Crown Lieutenant of Ireland. -100- ----"Pr�RET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 sEctiwaL (b)(3) terrorist threats, and .cooperation with the BO.t_ish. auttiOtities: The assassination has generally been regarded as counter-productive because it was so universally con- demned. However, as Gaucher* points..out, the .act did have "widespread repercussions" as its planners had hoped. Frank and Taber** feel that .the shock of the. assassination may have shaken the British in their deter- mination to stay and may also have helped to commit the Jews to deeper involvement. Frank states that Certainly the end for which the two (assassins of Moyne) were hanged in 1945 could not have been won in 1948 without decades of political activity in England, Europe, in.the United States, in Palestine, and elsewhere.... But there is no doubt that the deed was one of the great irritations, the great harrassments which so annoyed and confused and bedeviled the British that ultimately they gave the problem over to the UN and thus opened the door to the partition of Palestine.... Britain emerged from World War II in a weak position economically; Palestine was in a state of perpetual communal strife, with Arab and Jew fighting each other as well as the British. The moderate Jewish community in Palestine hoped that, with the election of a Labour government in Britain, British policy would become more receptive to Jewish petitions; this did not occur. The moderates who had long opposed and denounced terrorist methods and had argued that negotiation was the only approach became frustrated. The repressive measures being used by the British undermined the position of the moderates and also won the Jews world-wide sympathy. Haganah began to cooperate with the Irgun. Irgunists have claimed that Haganah gave initial approval to the bombing of *Gaucher, Roland, The Terrorists, Secker & Warburg, London, 1965. **Taber, Robert, The War of the Flea, Lyle Stuart, New York, 1965. -101- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Sae-RE-T._ (b)(3) the King: David Hotel in July 1946 but 'repudiated the act when it resulted in a massacre. The Jewish' popu- lation in general began to support a more militant position. 'Faced with these factors, the 'British had to decide whether to fight the whole Jewish population or the Whole Arab population, or to leave and let them. fight it out. In the face of many pressures, the British chose to give the problem to the UN and withdraw. -102- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 6 EL-144L: (b)(3) �103� (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SFC44,..FT (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) �104ET � (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 201/11/20 C06646360 S ET (b)(3) b)(1) b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) (b)( (b)( --1.06- SEPRZT 1) 3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 sr (b)(3) �107� (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 S `41;2.E'r (b)(3) -108- b)(1) b)(3) S Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) ALGERIA--THE F.L.N. (1954-1962) In 1954 Algeria had a population of about one million Europeans and eight and a half million Moslems. The Moslem nationalist movement had been gaining strength since the slaughter in 1945 of at least 1500 (the nationalists claimed 40,000) Moslems in retaliation for the killing by Moslems of 100 Europeans. Relations between the two communities had been tense. The FLN (National Liberation Front), which organized the initial outburst of violence in1954, was founded by nine men of no particular fame or political standing with the aim of achieving independence for Algeria under FLN leadership. Jureidini says, however, that until 1958 the goal was some form of sovereignty rather than absolute independence. (Paul A. Jureidini, Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare; Algeria, 1954-1962, American University, Washington, 1963). The FLN was initially divided into two major sections--the Internal Delegation based in Algeria had responsibility for organizing the military aspects of the struggle; the External Delegation based first in Cairo and later in Tunis �was responsible for gaining international support, for securing arms and supplies, and for generating diplomatic support. There was considerable conflict between the two sections. A .reorganization in 1956 created a military section and a political section; a further organizational change in 1958 came with the creation of the Algerian Provisional Government. The FLN placed considerable emphasis in its planning on guerrilla warfare. The first phase of its operation was marked by simultaneous attacks throughout the rural Aures region of Algeria on 31 October 1954. For the next 15 months the organization conducted raids, ambushes, and murders in the rural areas in an attempt to undermine the French administration and demonstrate its own strength. By the fall of 1955 it was fairly well established in the mountains and turned its attention to winning control of the population. -109- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 g�Zeii�RT (b)(3) According to Jureidini, the FLN planned to win the population's support first through direct terror- ist attacks on the French authorities and sympathizers and then indirectly, as the result of French repression that was sure to follow. The FLN began the systematic liquidation of those considered pro-French; particularly people in influential positions such as schoolteachers and administrators. They combined terror with propaganda designed to educate the masses and pull them toward the FLN. The FLN later expanded attacks to include other nationalists who shared the same goals, but differed as to technique and represented competition to the FLN leadership. The French moved troops into the rural areas to combat the guerrillas. By 1956 the French anti-guerrilla campaign began to be so effective in the countryside that the FLN was forced to shift the emphasis of its program to the cities. THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS Toward the end of 1955 the FLN began to win over the Moslem population of Algiers. By liquidating informers and terrorizing the population in general they gained control of the Casbah (the Moslem sector of the city). By mid-1956 they were ready to attack the European population with the intent of provoking European retaliation, which, the FLN believed, would polarize the situation and win them full support of the Moslems. Throughout 1956 the FLN conducted a full scale reign of terror in the city of 700,000, using assassination and indiscriminate bombing. In December alone there were 120 terrorist incidents. In the beginning the terrorist organization in Algiers was simple. There were two types of cells, political and military, reporting to two deputies who in turn reported to a single area chief. After reorganization in 1957 the structure was more complex. Algiers was divided into departments which in turn were subdivided into areas, then sectors, then Approved for Release 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SE-CIWT (b)(3) districts, and finally into three-man cells. The bombing activity was carried out by a separate depart- ment. It was not large, never more than 50-150.men.: The bombing department had separate units for.compounding explosives, making.casings,.assembling bombs, and, finally, for placing bombs. In January 1957 General.Massu moved into Algiers with his 10th Paratroop -Division,-numbering about 10,000. Suspicious persons were arrested and-the information exacted, often by tortures:, was acted on immediately. , Massu used informers _(their.faces, covered) to pick out terrorists. He formed small commando units including exposed terrorists to bunt down their former comrades... He used the !'ilot" system, of. surveillance, making one man responsible for a family, another for a building, and so forth; in.this,way he was able to find any wanted man , in the Casbah within hours. �Massu soon had a network of informers numbering. about 1500. The number. of patrols increased to the point where it was difficult for the terrorists even to plant their bombs. By March 1957 the terrorist network had been seriously disrupted, but the bombing group managed to carry out a spectacular series of bombings in June and July. By October, however, the remaining insurgents had either fled or been arrested or killed; in November the ALN admitted its failure in the cities. (Edgar O'Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection, Archon Books, Hamden, Conn., -7.967). The Battle of Algiers cost the FLN dearly in terms of organizational disruption and lives lost. But the battle did polarize opinion, alienate the Moslem population from the French, and bring the Moslems to the side of the FLN. The battle also brought the FLN cause and campaign the sumpathetic attention of thevorld, and the reported use of torture by Massu's forces stimulated a debate on moral issues within France itself. During 1959 and 1960 the French broke the military stalemate and gained the ascendency. For example, in 1958 the FLN had 21,000 guns; in May 1961, when the cease-fire went into effect, they had only 8,000. FLN numbers dwindled, and the only remaining hope seemed to be to wear the French -111- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) down. In this situation De Gaulle decided to negotiate; he had announced his intention to allow self,-determination for Algeria as early as the fall of 1959, but the FLN had demanded that it be the sole Algerian representative. De Gaulle finally accepted FLN terms. According to Gaucher, the reasons for De Gaulle's decision involved his overall "third world" approach to international relations. The "third world" nations, nations that De Gaulle wanted to cultivate, in general supported Algeria in its fight for independence; so long as the war in Algeria continued, De Gaulle felt, his global strategy was being frustrated. In addition, the French apparently arrived at the same decision as had the British in Cyprus--that their strategic defense position could be maintained by keeping only a base (Mers El Kebir) rather than maintaining control of the entire country. (Gaucher, Roland, The Terrorists, Secker and Warburg, London, 1965). -112- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 , Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SECRET._ (b)(3) ALGERIA--THE O.A.S. (1961-1962) As Algerian independence seemed to be drawing near, the European population of Algeria became increasingly frustrated and resentful. De Gaulle visited Algeria in December 1960 and was greeted by anti-Gaullist demonstrations staged by Europeans. In April 1961 there was an abortive attempt by high-ranking officers of the Army of Algeria to seize Algiers, rally the Franch Army, seize Paris, anddrive De Gaulle from power. The European community in Algeria was hostile to De Gaulle, but it Was not involved in the attempted coup. The French, nonetheless, arrested many of them, further antagonizing the European community in the process. By the summer of 1961 the OAS (Secret Army Organization) had become a major force. At the outset it numbered only 300, but it grew rapidly and - enjoyed great popular support from the Europeans. Central to the political program of the OAS was the concept of a French Algeria. The OAS had to work against time because the French Government and the FLN were moving toward agreement on Algerian independence. The OAS also had problems of divided leadership and difficulty in maintain- ing discipline and security among its members, many of whom were inclined toward violent outbursts and demonstrations. The OAS based its organization on that of the FLN and used many of the same methods. The Delta Commandos, its terrorist army, was composed of about 100 men. Its aim was to gain the support of the masses (both Moslem and European) and to demoralize and intimidate those working for indepen- dence. The commandos became known as the "plastiqueurs" because of their frequent use of plastic bombs. The police and army had orders to destroy the terrorist network and capture its leaders. A brutal duel began; the OAS made extensive use of assassination. In May 1961 OAS agents killed the Algiers police chief. Special units, formed -113- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 o (b)(3) by by the French administration, used torture to obtain confessions from OAS terrorists. Special troops, called Barbouzes, were charged with implementing a general campaign of repression against the OAS. They arrested or kidnapped Europeans and tortured or executed many of them. The Delta Commandos, in turn, waged merciless warfare against the special troops. In the fall of 1961 the Deltas blew up French Radio-Television and began using the wavelengths for their own broadcasts. They also used "expropriations" (bank robberies) to gain funds. During this period, the fall of 1961, the OAS reached its zenith in power and popularity. At this point the FLN resumed its terrorism, further complicating the situation; eventually the FLN and the French Army were to be the pincers which crushed the OAS. In 1962 the OAS attempted to extend its terrorist campaign to Metropolitan France in an attempt to gain French and French Army support. The effort was a total failure; one of its essential weaknesses was lack of secrecy. The arrest of one member could bring about the downfall of a whole group, and this, in fact, is what happened. Furthermore, the men involved in the operation were mostly from Algeria and their ties to Metropolitan France were tenuous; they were in effect operating in a hostile environment. By the spring of 1962 reaction to the OAS had set in and was taking its toll. Arrests were widespread and Europeans started evacuating the country. The OAS made one last desperate attempt to get the French Army to come to its aid. It began to use indiscriminate terror against the Moslem population in Algiers, hoping to provoke Moslem retaliation which in turn would force the Army to side with the Europeans. The strategy backfired; an OAS attempt to disarm some French army troops got out of hand and ended in the killing of six army soldiers. The incident did much to turn the army against the OAS, and with the army clearly against them, the cause of the OAS was lost. . -114 - (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 CIt-L (b)(3) -115- (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SE CRE�12� (b)(3) �116� (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 1-7144:1' (b)(3) (b (b 117- g14`64,E' T Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 .rtig..T (b)(3) -118- --"Vrti.R.T ( ( b)(1) b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) �119� (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) �120- --1"CfigT (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SE-CRE-T.. (b)(3) -121- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 b)(1) b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 gttitEZ_ (b)(3) �122� ThLiLQZ T (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 311`643,ZT (b)(3) -123- (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 gthetiZZT (b)(3) -124- ' "Itrs.1 (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) �125 � t SELT (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) -126- - MT ez,_II (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 OE /1.0"1����-._ (b)(3) -127- b)(1) b)(3) � "---�"ZeREZE Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SEtS431 T (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) � �128� (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) �129� "Til,ELT (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 or, (b)(3) b)(1) b)(3) -130- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 1,J .1.11 .1. (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) � 131 � -MEGEET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) -132- t'4�FtF11 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 bEt4ILE '1' (b)(3) �133 � (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Jj (b)(3) -134- (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) -135- (b) (b) (1) (3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release:.2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) �136 � --STICR ET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SJT (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) �137� Pu.sE.T (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SEZREZ (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) �138� (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) -139- (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SregET (b)(3) �140� (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) -141- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 ThET (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) -142- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 atelt.E,T_ (b)(3) -143 - -t'E*64ZET (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 SMfigT (b)(3) -144- (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) GUATEMALA (1960-1970) The guerrilla-terrorist movement in Guatemala has arisen from the limited possibilities for affecting the status quo through normal, legal ways. The political- economic structure operates almost exclusively for the aggrandizement of the small upper class, and there is little opportunity for the multitudes who live in poverty, poor health, and ignorance to break out of their condi- tion. No broad, politically articulate electorate exists to guide government practice or to enforce political responsibility. The government is elected, but it is at best unresponsive to public needs. A revolution in 1944 raised the possibility that dynamic government could undo the feudal socioeconomic system, break down the cultural and linguistic barriers entrapping nearly half the population, and in general, modernize Guatemala. Ten years of revolutionary govern- ment under Juan Jose. Arevalo and his successor, Jacobo Arbenz, over-turned the traditional power bases and began to remold Guatemalan society. The revolution fell increas-. ingly under Communist influence, however, and in 1954 Arbenz was overthrown by Carlos Castillo Armas. His restoration of the old elite to its traditional place has left a bitter heritage and an acceptance of extremism in politics. Reformers have been indiscriminately considered. Communists by the conservatives, whose inflexibility in turn makes the liberals more willing to collaborate with the extreme left. The insurgency movement has its roots in a young army officers' revolt in November 1960, following which - the dissidents established a guerrilla base in the north- eastern mountains. The guerrilla movement-vas, taken over by Communists, and guerrilla and 'terrorist attacks have. plagued Guatemala ever since. The persistent aim of, the Communist insurgents has been to provoke a military take-. over of the government, thus creating a climate of repression they believe would benefit them. They have concentrated more and more on urban terrorism because of the general ineffectiveness of rural violence as a -145- (b)(3) L Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SEU14 (b)(3) revolutionary tactic. The insurgents have never appeared to secure more than minimal support from the apathetic, culturally isolated Indian peasantry, and have found rural operations to be suicidal, as the peasantry has exposed them when under military duress. Probably the strongest argument for urban activity is that the poli- tical and psychological impact is much greater on the more informed, aware, articulate city dwellers, whose mood has a real effect on the government. There are several terrorist groups in Guatemala at any given time. The commitment to armed revolution, which is absolute among the Cuban-oriented Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), has been a source of division within the Moscow-led Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT). In contrast to the orthodox PGT, FAR members are mainly young people who are unsophisticated in world affairs, naive in their approach to national problems, and simplistic in their political thinking. The FAR considers violence the only method of undoing Guatemala's feudalistic socioeconomic structure. They believe that their persistent provocation of the security forces will lead to a bitterly harsh repressive period, which in turn will so alienate the general public that active popular support for the revolutionaries will result. The PGT's broad strategy instead calls for long- term preparation of the masses as a necessary basis for wide guerrilla and terrorist operations. Some of the PGT leaders tasted success in the classic Communist style of political penetration and semilegal acceptance when they were the principal advisers of President Arbenz and controlled the labor and agrarian reform organizations. They now have heavily penetrated the Christian Democratic Party, which won 20 percent of the vote in the election on 1 March 1970, and are fearful that the gains they have made might be lost by an all-out terrorist campaign that would provoke a harsh period of anti-Communist repression. The PGT does endorse selective assassinations, and kidnaps wealthy Guatemalans for money with some regularity. The terrorists, incapable of a direct assault on the government's authority, use hit-and-run action designed to weaken public confidence in the government's ability to � -1416 - -1-Eritts- (b)(3) � Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 gErft.t.T (b)(3) maintain -order. ;.Their. assasSination 'targetS-are either' retaliatory--seOurity- officials 'are frecihent victims--or- prominent .perscins:4hose -death Will Ivin -publicity for . the - terrorists_ teriSibn: .4n -rural .areasY they assassinate unpOpularjocal officials tip' gain the ' trust of the common; people whoare-freqUentfy Victimized- by theses fcoriluptJ-symbols;:of iaUthbrity. They alse) engage in kidnapping), sarsbn;:,,bombing, Cutting. :teledolim'unication' lines, and damaging electric power ,sources TheterrorAstS.:have been- effective An :bred frig -con:- fidence in thegO-vernment and polarizing, antagOnistic ideo- logies. s'illeyhaVe had nd -purely- vrevoiUtIonaW:gucdess, but they -keep; the'loolitiCalLatiriOsphere-disrupfecE The, rgoverninent 'has:'ben= consistently inept in it-T public relations and has been Unable on' the Whole to' win the confidence:of the:Public: It'fhas'-failed- te, create the . kind of gpsychological: atmosphere -and background- againSt which an effective counter-terror-program could ibperate: The security forces are for the most part a crude, brutish, lot with marginal. Capabilityagainst.,Clande�tine'-terroiSi organizations Their performance' in elementary police - work Is pobry and.MOtivation for' improveMent 4s� jammed' by- a corrupt!judicialSysteM,, .RiValry-among the various"'" securityorganizatiOns" makes' 'Cooperation and doordihatioh:' of effOrt: Corruption and abuse of authority' commonliv al the- foredS:thave made= the public' disrespectful and 'tearful of-them. / , - :J!! j The-intoler'ably-poor security situation led 'the governmentt:to extraordinary methods against the CoMmuists in late '19.66:; securi-ty forceS- were, in effect,-- given' - the freedom,tofigh-C with: fire.- Under the-guise. of : phantom right-wing terrorist organizations, the government conduCtedHam:assassinatiOh 'program' Of-its '43wnl'WhiCh Con- t inueth Oh t ilL March") l968:( Special orps of the Police were usethand thearmy enlisted. and armed anti:-CommuniSt civilians who rsought out 'the! guerrilla This' Method was "Of fet tive. The Communistmovement was:4s close - to destruCtion' as it has ever been. The government's terrorist campaign took hundredsDof:Ilives,including many: innocent- 'It also createct.Adomes andP international' revulsion:. Each week ; - (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 SEC (b)(3) dozens of mutilated bodies were found. The public was increasingly more terrorized by the government's clandes- tine operation than by the generally selective terror of the Communists. The method was immediately effective in heavily damaging the insurgency movement, but the longer range effect was counterproductive, badly marring the image of the government and contributing to the polariza- tion of the bitterly antagonistic left and right elements in the country. Stung by international and domestic outcries over the violence, the government put a halt to the clandestine program in early 1968. Since then, the Communist groups have regrouped, recruited, rearmed, trained, and tightened discipline, with the result that they probably have a greater capability for both action and survival than they did prior to the government's counter-terrorism. A clandestine anti-terrorist group, of the 1966-68 type, re-emerged in April 1970, and is said to have already killed several leftists. The group is reportedly led by an extreme rightist Congressman, a follower of president-elect Arana. The incoming government of Colonel Carlos Arana, scheduled to be installed on 1 July 1970, learned through the results of the balloting that a substantial portion of the Guatemalan electorate wants an end to the crime and terrorism that are now rampant. Forty-three percent of the voters chose Arana, who was in charge of the rural clandes- tine counterinsurgent campaign from 1966-68, and who will, they expect, launch a fierce anti-Communist effort after he takes office. The feeling among the center and left--which took the majority of the vote in this year's election--that Arana is a "butcher" appears to be understood by Arana, who probably will show more finesse than in the past in any extralegal undertaking he pursues to stop the Communists. There is nothing unusual in the literature sympathetic to the Communist movement. Those not under Communist disci- pline and those not particularly attracted to Marxist views focus mainly on the hopelessness of reform in Guatemala and the consequent "need" to overturn the existing system. A possibly useful politico-social analysis, focused on rural areas and the rural power structure and addressing the conditions that affect or constitute insurgency, has -148 - ME614.F.LT (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 k Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 6EL-41,ZT_ (b)(3) been made by Dr. Richard N. Adams, who headed a research group in Guatemala in the early-1960's, and who is- a long- time observer of the Guatemalan scene.* He defines the division of the social fabric into upper and lower sectors ("there is no meaning in Guatemala to a concept of a middle class, for those elements who might by income or profession be considered middle class share the identical values, style and access to power of the upper sector") and describes theyigiclity of the barrier between them and the consequent frustration inherent, in the-situation for the lower sector. He implies that the Communists, terrorists, and extremists have become conscious of these deep-lying divisions in the social fabric and have adapted their program into a conscious, planned, and.Jong-range effort to exploit the situation. Adams suggests that the Communists have learned much from both their successes and failures in the Arevalo Arbenz period; they are deter- mined not to repeat their mistakes, and they are sufficiently flexible to adapt their formerly rigid ideology to the requirements- of the new and developing situation. Their experiences have produced a hard, if small, core of pro- fessional revolutionists with some 20 years' .experiencein Guatemala. They are no longer a foreign incursion but a genuinely Guatemalan cancer in the body politic. Dr. Adams thinks that the 'revolutionaries cannot be countered by mere increase in the quantity or quality .of repressive police or military measures and_that a much more penetrating, sophisticated approach is necessary--one which will take into account the basic ills and elegwages,which he identifies in his analysis. *Adams; Richard N: 1/ Contemporary- Cultures and SocietiesofLatin America; _ a - reader in the Social Anthropology,of Middle and.South�America. and the Caribbean, 'edited-by Dwight B. Heath .and1iichard N. Adams Random House, 1965. � 2/Cultural Surveys of Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El � Salvador, Honduras. Pan American Sanitary Bureau, Washing- ton, 1957. 3/ Social Change in Latin America Today; Its Implications for United States Policy. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations, by Harper, 1960. 4/ "Guatemala's Rural Social Structure"; a debriefing of 8 October 1965, Washington, D.C. � -149- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SECT (b)(3) � 150ET � (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 �, - Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SET (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 613..Zr (b)(3) �152� (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 . Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 -76treRF.3 (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 R ELT (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) -155- (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) - b - --SEGRET (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Pa I (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) �157� (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 S/tii.ET (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) -,11.58- Th'ECZEr (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) -159- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 T -160- 1TeREZ (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) � 161 (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 STVRF.T (b)(3) -162- (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 - (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) -163- Th'EGEXT (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 , Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Elet.ILZT (b)(3) -164- l'rGEET (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Se - 165- --SEGRET_ (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 -fiFC..13 (b)(3) -166- 1-'61;;ZZL (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SECitra__ (b)(3) -167- (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Sti`613 FT (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) -168- -SET/Ha_ (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 cytp,.T_ (b)(3) -169- s''gt'�GZET (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 T (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) E. � ., � 170� Cli.r1, (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 (b)(3) -171- (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 SMUT (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) -172- (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 SE (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646360 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SECIti�ga._' _ (b)(3) -174- (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 SE'StET (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) -175- Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 S-It�FAZ (b)(3) 1967 -176Ea - (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360 (b)(3) titce44 Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 006646360