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December 28, 2022
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August 9, 2018
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November 18, 1981
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Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624 cj Director ta Centr:k1 � id: InEcHigence C..17-7iCC) V A; 7-1.) *:?; 1. � 3 X National Intelligence Daily Wednesday 18 November 1981 ('0 N!!) R1.7hlt 1Y / 18 November 1981 2 Copy 252 Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624 Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624 Warning Notice This Document Nut To Be Reproduced Intelligence Sources and Method5 Involved WN) National Security Unauthorized Disclosure Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624 Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624 Contents Po2and: Talks Begin 1 USSR: Brezhnev's Plenum Speech 3 Guatemala: Status of the Insurgency 4 5 Chad: Libyan Withdrawal Continues 6 Greece-NATO: Position on Spanish Membership 6 Cyprus: Intercommunal Talks Resume Special Analyses USSR - Latin America: Soviet Support for Revolution . . . 7 Top Secret 18 November 1981 44, Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624 Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624 SPECIAL ANALYSES ANALYSES' USSR - LATIN AMERICA: Soviet Support for Revolution CIA oscow's involvement with Latin American leftists continues to expand. In Central America, the Seviets see the weakening of US influence and the rise in revolutionary currents as an opportunity to install anti-US and potentially pro-Soviet regimes--especially in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In South America, Noscow's focus is mainly on establishing good bilateral relations with major governments. It has identified the Pinochet regime in nile, how- ever, as a target for armed insurrection. The USSR has continued to support Communist partici- pation in the United Revolutionary Directorate, the umbrella organization conducting the insurgency in El Salvador. Last year the Soviets promised the insur- gents that they would supply arms through third parties; they subsequently facilitated the flow of arms and mili- tary equipment from Cuba and other Soviet allies. Moscow, however, appears to be less sanguine about the insurgents' short-term prospects since their offensive in January failed. The Soviets also were surprised by the intense US reaction to the situation in El Salvador. intensified US back- ing for El Salvador's President Duarte has led Moscow to consider more circumspect channels for providing addi- tional support for the insurgents. There is no evidence of any new Soviet involvement in recent months; the Soviets may believe that the insurgents have adequate arms for the moment and could seize power following pro- longed armed struggle. The Soviets, in close cooperation with the Cubans and other allies, are urging the Communist parties in Guatemala and Honduras to join in broad revolutionary 7 --continued 18 November November 1981 Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624 Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624 fronts and participate in armed struggle. The East Ger- mans reportedly are providing the Guatemalan Communists with financial assistance to suppinment similar Soviet aid. In 1979 the Soviets began giving paramilitary train- ing in the USSR to Honduran Communists for the first time since the mid-1960s. The USSR's major priority in the region is to con- Folidate the hold of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The Soviets hope that the Sandinistas will serve as a conduit for support of revolution elsewhere. (S NF) The Caribbean In the Dominican Republic, the Soviets and Cubans have obtained a grudging agreement from the Communist party there to prepare for eventual armed struggle. Their main current emphasis, however, has been to get the party to join a united front with the leftist Dominican Liberation Party for the national elections next year--a coalition which the Communists appear de- termined to avoid. IPP Moscow also is using the Dominican Communists to channel funds to the United Party of Haitian Communists, which reportedly is trying to organize a movement of Haitian exiles for the eventual ouster of President Duvalier. In addition, the USSR evidently is sponsoring propaganda activities to enlist support for Caribbean as well as Central American revolutionaries through the Soviet front organization--the World Feeration of Demo- cratic Youth. Major Regional States The USSR's policy toward Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Mexico is keyed to building on good relations with 8 --continued pee 18 November 1981 tit Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624 Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624 Jecrct existing governments and promoting its economic interest. Nevertheless, the Soviets continue to pay attention to animating some Communist parties in order to play uoon dnmPctic vulnerabilities over the longer term. The Soviets apparently calculate that such low-key involvement in strengthening Communist parties in the existing political system poses little immediate risk to their state-to-state relationships. In Chile, however, the Soviets have adopted an openly militant line aimed at promoting a united armed struggle against the Pinochet regime. Moscow provided the chief of the Chilean Communist Party with a forum at the 26th Communist Party Congress last February to call for armed revolution and subsequently has broadcast similar messages to Chile by other Chilean and even Salvadoran Communists. Outlook Moscow seems likely to continue its discreet backing for Latin American revolutionaries, primarily through its allies. The Soviets seem to calculate that such involve- ment is unlikely in itself to lead to direct retaliation from Washington or to US military intervention in the hemisphere. While the Soviets do not seem to overesti- mate their own contribution to the region's revolutionary ferment, they are intent on maintaining revolutionary momentum in the hope that over the long run it will undermine the us presence in the region. 9 18 November November 1981 411r Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624