COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US ACTIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06759858
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00295
• Publication Date: April 17, 1969

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Presentation Staff
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
COMMUNIST REACVONS TO CERTAIN US ACTIONS
--Tpp-Seeret-
0
TS No. 199100/69
17 April 1969
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
17 April 1969
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions
1. The North Korean attack on the US EC-121 air-
craft, like the seizure of the Pueblo, appears to have
been a unilateral action taken without advance notice
to either Moscow of Peking. This state of affairs
will condition Soviet and-Chinese Communist atti-
tudes and reactions to US courses of action in this
situation as it did in the Pueblo crisis. There is
one maior difference between these two incidents,
however, that complicates the problem of developing
effective US responses that would produce the de-
sired impact on North Korea and its Communist
neighbors. In contrast to the Pueblo affair, which
contained elements susceptible to negotiation, the
present situation does not lend itself to bargaining
or exchange. Moreover, the possible objectives of
US actions, apart from straightforward retaliation,
involve the principles of maintaining the right to
use international airspace and deterrence against
future such hostilities. Neither principle is par-
ticularly applicable to the North Korean problem
particularly in terms of securing specific responses
by Pyongyang.
2. The problem of developing,meaningful and
effective US courses of action is also complicated
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelli-
gence and coordinated with the Office of National
Estimates and the Office of Strategic Research.
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by the assumptions and motivations underlying North
Korea's action. The Kim Il-sung regime almost
certainly planned this move in advance calculating
that the potential advantages in taking this risk
far outweighed the dangers of possible US military
reprisals. This judgment, and North Korea's evaluation
of future US initiatives, probably are strongly in-
fluenced by the Korean's interpretation of the US
response to the seizure of the Pueblo. Kim I].-
sung evidently has persuaded himself that the US
is overextended in Vietnam and elsewhere and that
North Korea therefore can engage in such deliberate
acts of defiance with relative impunity. The North
Koreans probably made the decision to attack the
reconnaissance aircraft on the assumption that there
would either be no US military response or at the
most only a limited one, in the nature of a one-
time retaliatory action.
3. We believe that two main factors contributed
to North Korea's complacent appraisal of risks. Kim
Il-sung's style of rule has long been characterized
by a willingness to accept risks and by a strong
reliance on bluff and intimidation. He has taken
pride in his militant "revolutionary" stance and
has ridiculed Peking and Moscow for their caution
in dealing with US power. A major theme of North
Korean propaganda, particularly since the Pueblo
incident, is that a determined small nation can
defeat a "mighty imperialist." A more specific
motivation for the shootdown probably resides in
Kim Il-song's desire to offset the failure of his
attempts over the past two years to launch a so-
called "people's war" in the South and to undermine
and disrupt the South Korean government and economy.
Kim, moreover, evidently believes his long-term
ambitions regarding South Korea require a high level
of tension with the US. Periodic provocations, he
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hopes, will contribute to the disillusionment of the
American public with overseas burdens and bring about
a reduction and eventual withdrawal of US forces from
South Korea.
4. In view of these North Korean assumptions
and ambitions, it is doubtful that any of the US
courses of action considered below would have any
decisive or lasting effects, either in achieving
stated US objectives or in inducing Pyongyang to
modify its long-term policies. Embassy Seoul has
suggested that if the US response takes the form of
a military threat or even a limited strike, "the
benefits to North Korea will be manifold." A very
tough populace will be spurred to greater feats of
production and sacrifice, and the disputes within
the North Korean leadership that have been hinted
at in recent pronouncements may be stilled in the
face of tangible external pressure. Such gains for
the regime, in the Embassy's judgment, would out-
weigh the physical losses anticipated from a limited
US retaliatory strike.
5. Show of force: The North Koreans probably
would view actions such as demonstrative air and
naval maneuvers in proximity to North Korea essen-
tially as a repetition of the US response to the
Pueblo seizure. They would be inclined to interpret
such demonstrations as indicating US unwillingness
to resort to any direct application of force that
might carry high risks of a resumption of major hos-
tilities. The North Koreans would attempt to extract
maximum propaganda advantage from a show of force in
the Military Armistice Commission forum and elsewhere.
It is unlikely, however, that they would feel com-
pelled to challenge this US air and naval presence
by direct air or surface action.
6. Military actions not involving combat prob-
ably would not deter the North Koreans from increasing
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harassment and other forms of pressure in the Demili-
tarized Zone area. In fact, they might view an
intensification of such pressure as an effective
means of stimulating international concern over
the danger of major hostilities, thus bringing heavy
pressure to bear on the US to withdraw the show of
force. We believe that there is little prospect
that this course of action would induce the North
Koreans to apologize publicly for the shootdown
or undertake to avoid such actions in the future.
7. Military Combat Options:
We believe it is unlikely that any of these
actions would accomplish the objectives of fu-
ture deterrence or maintenance of the right to use
international airspace. The North Koreans would use
all the capabilities at their command to inflict maxi-
mum losses on any US strike forces. They would re-
spond with virulent propaganda attacks and would mobi-
lize the limited diplomatic assets available to them
to discredit the US action and build pressure for its
prompt termination. We do not believe, however, that
the North Koreans would undertake major retaliatory
military actions against US/South Korean military tar-
gets or civilian facilities in the South, although
we cannot exclude the possibility that they might
attack a target of opportunity, such as a US naval
unit engaged in hostile action against North Korea.
8. Pyongyang's initial reaction probably would
be to play for time in which to assess the nature of
US intentions. They would seek to engage the US in
protracted talks in the MAC, partly as a device to
forestall further and more dangerous US reprisals
and partly to exploit that forum for attracting in-
ternational sympathy and support.
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9. Further clues as to North Korea's probable
reaction to US combat options are provided by its
behavior in the weeks immediately following the
Pueblo seizure. There was a significant decline in
North Korean harassment activities in the DMZ area
until the late spring of 1968. A captured member
of the large North Korean infiltration team that
landed on South Korea's east coast last November
has testified that a major seaborne infiltration
operation originally scheduled for February 1968 was
canceled after the seizure of the Pueblo in late
January.
The USSR
10. Soviet reactions to US moves short of com-
bat-type actions would probably be similar to those
immediately after the Pueblo incident, when Soviet
policy was aimed at liFiarTi the scale of US reac-
tion and providing strong verbal support to North
Korea while keeping clear of involvement in the
crisis. Moscow would probably react to US actions
with some purposefully visible military preparations
at the upper end of the noncombat scale, in large
part because it could not be certain the US did
not intend to apply direct force. We believe
the USSR would be extremely careful, however, to
avoid involvement with US reconnaissance aircraft
and would limit itself to shadowing a US naval
show of force in the Sea of Japan. If Moscow con-
cluded that this was the extent of the US reaction,
it would probably be satisfied to confine its response
to a stteam of propaganda abuse.
11. Soviet reaction to US combat actions would,
of course, be stronger. The nature and extent of
the reaction would depend largely on what type of
move the US made and especially on whether or not
the Soviets felt it was a one-shot action or one
of a series of moves which would ultimately threaten
the existence of the North Korean regime. The So-
viets would probably be skeptical of any US assur-
ances that no further actions were contemplated, but
their desire to avoid involvement would probably
induce them to adopt a wait-and-see attitude.
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12. If US actions included the sinking of a
North Korean patrol craft or the downing of an air-
craft outside Korean territory, Moscow could be ex-
pected to denounce the US and press for United Na-
tions actions condemning the US and demanding that
it terminate such actions. Moscow might also feel
compelled to announce through Red Star or some simi-
lar medium the increased combat readiness of Soviet
Far Eastern forces and to make much of the fact that
the US actions occurred in proximity to Soviet bor-
ders. This would be calculated to impress on the
US the seriousness of Moscow's concern and to deter
further US actions.
13. Raids in force across the DMZ or similar
measures that threatened to lead to major hostilities
would doubtless call for a stronger Soviet response.
Moscow would probably feel it necessary to augment
naval and air units in the Sea of Japan and would
certainly increase its military readiness. The
Soviets might well provide equipment to North Korea
on a crash basis as a demonstration of their com-
mitment to the mutual assistance treaty. Moscow,
however, probably would accompany such measures
with counsels of restraint to the North Koreans, al-
though the effectiveness of Soviet influence would
be questionable.
14. An action of longer duration, such as a
naval blockade or mining of ports, would create the
greatest possibility of a US-Soviet confrontation.
Moscow would certainly feel such actions so close
to its borders would call for a significant demon-
stration of military preparedness and strength in
the area. The Soviets would probably interpret
such moves as a challenge to themselves as well as
to the Koreans. We think Moscow would still attempt
to avoid a military confrontation, but in view of
increased Soviet presence in the area, the risk of
unintended or accidental US-Soviet clashes would be
increased even if the Russians made no attempt to
challenge a blockade directly.
Communist China
15. Peking's reaction to noncombat military
actions probably would closely follow the lines set
in China's cautious treatment of the Pueblo affair.
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In view of the strained relations between Peking
and Pyongyang, the Chinese would have little in-
centive to provide more than a routine verbal dis-
play of support for North Korea and denunciation
of the US. Noncombat US actions probably would be
interpreted by Peking as confirming its over-all
view of US policy, particularly its conviction that
the US is unwilling to face the risks of major mil-
itary escalation in either Korea or Vietnam.
16. US combat type actions would reinforce
Peking's extreme caution. The Chinese leaders
almost certainly would not feel bound by their
treaty with North Korea to undertake a military
response and they probably would even be reluctant
to provide more than token military assistance.
There is no reason to believe that the Chinese
would be any less determined to avoid a direct
military confrontation with the US in this situa-
tion than they were in the Pueblo crisis. Peking,
of course, would be alert ti5�ajoioit any signs of
North Korean dissatisfaction with Moscow's reaction
and support and an opening of this kind might re-
sult in more generous material assistance than the
Chinese would otherwise be disposed to provide.
North Vietnam
17. The Hanoi leaders probably would have
ambivalent feelings regarding the implications of
US actions in Korea. Hanoi radio quickly praised
the North Koreans for their "glorious achievement"
in downing the US aircraft. The North Vietnamese
probably would interpret a noncombat response as
further evidence for their long-cherished convic-
tion that the US is overextended in Vietnam and
cannot contemplate a wider conflict. They would
also hope that the Korean incident would further
fuel the fires of American public discontent with
the Vietnam war. On the other hand, Hanoi is very
sensitive to the danger that North Korean provoca-
tions might precipitate a vigorous US military re-
action that would have the effect of deflecting
public attention from the Vietnam struggle and
enable the US administration to adopt a more de-
manding military and negotiating posture.
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South Korea
18. The Seoul government probably would dis-
play the same frustration and uneasiness regarding
noncombat actions that marked its reaction to the
US handling of the Pueblo crisis. Any public ex-
pression of this dissatisfaction, however, would be
tempered by Seoul's recognition that one of Pyong-
yang's major objectives is to shake South Korean
confidence in US protection and to drive a wedge
between South Korea and the US. Combat-type actions,
on the other hand, would be warmly welcomed by
Seoul as evidence of a major change in the US atti-
tude toward North Korean pressure and provocations.
South Korea might press the US to go beyond these
measures and undertake at least a limited joint
ground assault across the DMZ aimed at inflicting
a highly damaging military and political defeat.
General World Reaction
19. As in the case of the Pueblo, the great
majority of nations and governments will regard
this aircraft incident as largely irrelevant to
their interests and security. They will discern
no major international principle which requires
them to become involved in any significant way.
Their main preoccupation will be the danger of
some chain of events that might lead to a confron-
tation between the US and the USSR.
20. Most American allies in West Europe would
be prepared to provide public support for any US
diplomatic initiatives, on the ground that the
North Koreans had violated international law, but
they would be alarmed at any move toward military
retaliation for what they regard as a relatively
minor episode in the cold war. They would avoid
association with the use or the threat of force
and might try to bring pressure to bear on the US
if they judged such US action to be imminent.
21. In general, Latin American opinion would
follow that of Western Europe. Most of these na-
tions would be willing to support the US up to a
point, but to them, the shoot-down and its possible
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consequences would seem remote from their interests
and security. Most nations in Africa and in non-
Communist Asia would tend to adopt a plague-on-both
houses attitude, and their double-standard neutralism
would tend to make them view US reprisals as a form
of "colonial" pressure. Nationalist China, South
Vietnam and Thailand, of course, would voice support
for the US in varying degrees of firmness. Japan
would be extremely sensitive to any use of homeland
or Okinawan bases as staging areas for US retalia-
tory action. Japanese leftists have already tried
to embarrass the Sato government on these issues.
The Japanese leadership would be deeply concerned
about possible adverse effects of US actions re-
garding Korea on the sensitive questions of Okinawan
reversion and extension of the US-Japan security
treaty.
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