PRELIMINARY GOALS OF THE BRAZILIAN AND IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRIES FOR THE PLANNED 23 NOVEMBER 2009 VISIT OF IRANIAN PRESIDENT AHMADI-NEJAD TO BRAZIL

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06791403
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2021
• Case Number: F-2018-01850
• Publication Date: November 16, 2009

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NF) Preliminary Goals of the xrazillian and
Eranian Forei:11 Ministries for the Planned 23
November 2009 Visit of Rranian President Ahmadi-
Nejad to itrazill
Identifiers:
Document Number:
GUIDE:
Dates:
Date Published:
16-Nov-2009 15:20:00
Date Received: 16-Nov-2009 15:20-:10
Coverage:
CIA Country Code: BRA, IRN, VEN
Region: AMERICAS, MIDDLEEAST, RAZIL, IRAN, VENEZUELA
Publisher:
Agency Acronym: CIA
Office Name: NCS
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
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)2/ qF) 2. In preparation for Iranian President Mahmud ((Ahmadi-Nejad))'s
planned visit to Brazil on 23 November 2009, officials from the Brazilian Ministry of
Foreign Relations and the Iranian Embassy in Brasilia met throughout October in�
Brasilia to discuss bilateral goals for the upcoming visit. Iranian Ambassador to Brazil
Mohsen ((Shaterzadeh)) Yazdi expressed a number of expectations for economic
� cooperation on the part of Iran, while Brazil's goals focused on export financing and
a bilateral mechanism to facilitate trade between the two countries. A Brazilian
delegation planned to travel to Iran in mid-November 2009 to finalize these plans.
F) 3. As of late October 2009, one of Brazil's principal goals for the
Ahmadi-Nejad visit was to establish a bilateral export financing mechanism to facilitate
trade between the two countries. The Brazilian MRE supported a direct line of credit
agreement with Iran which would finance and facilitate Brazilian exports. From the
Brazilian perspective, Brazil would have control over the resources and flows to
Brazilian exporters, and the money would not leave the country. Brazil would also
require that all projects be approved by the Brazilian Committee on Export Financing
and Insurance (COFIG) on a case by case basis. Medium and long-term operations (over
two years) would be added-value exports, with official credit support for Brazilian
exporters through the Brazilian National Bank for Social and Economic Development
(BNDES) and the Export Guarantee Fund (FGE). Through these means, the money
would stay inside Brazil, and this mechanism would facilitate medium and long-term
Brazilian exports to Iran. Brazil would also request guarantees from Iran that if an
Iranian company could not pay on a deal, the Iranian government would then be liable
for paying those costs to Brazil. Guarantees to Brazilian financing and payment flows
from Iranian importers would be discussed in Tehran during the MRE's mid-November
delegation visit. Comment: The Brazilian government wanted to follow all
United Nations (UN) resolutions regarding Iran, and believed it possible for Brazil to
establish credit lines with Iran while having complete assurance that they were not
being used toward the Iranian nuclear program). An MOU between the Brazilian Central
Bank and the Iranian Central Bank may be signed during Ahmadi-Nejad's planned
November visit to Brazil; this MOU would establish an export financing mechanism.
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The issue would be discussed in some detail with the Iranian Central Bank, the Iranian
Ministry of Finance, and other senior Iranian officials during the Brazilian MRE's
delegation visit to Iran on 14 November.
F) 4. Shaterzadeh stipulated that the Iranian side would like to sign the
following agreements with Brazil during Ahmadi-Nejad,'s November 2009 visit: a
cultural agreement, an agreement on sports, a technical agreement with the Brazilian
Cooperation Agency (ABC) under the MRE, a consular agreement regarding visas, an
agriculture agreement on research and development with EMBRAF'A and the Brazilian
Ministry of Agriculture, a higher education agreement regarding cooperation among
universities, and an agreement on power generation with the Brazilian Ministry of Mines
�and Energy (MME).
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F) 5. As of late October 2009, Iran's other goals for the 23 November (b)(3)
Ahmadi-Nejad visit to Brazil included developing closer oil and gas ties with Brazil.
The Iranian Government sought the participation of Brazilian companies in the areas of
exploration and production. However, Brazil's parastatal oil company Petrobras was
not keen to expand its activities in Iran, as its top priorities were Brazil's pre-salt oil
exploration and developing fields in the Gulf of Mexico. Shaterzadeh mentioned the
possibility of cooperation in Venezuela, where Iranian state oil company Petropars is
already operating, including in petrochemicals. Shaterzadeh also mentioned the possible
interest of Petropars to participate in the Abreu Lima Refinery project in Pernambuco
state, Brazil, together with Petrobras and Venezuelan state oil firm Petroleos de
Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). Comment: It would be highly unlikely for Petrobras to (b)(1)
accept any of the above ideas, as they would be very difficult for Petrobras to (b)(3)
implement.)
F) 6. Another economic cooperation point that Iran was seeking for the
November Ahmadi-Nejad visit was to buy regional jets from Brazilian Aeronautics
Company ((EMBRAER)). The Brazilian company already said, however, that this was
not possible. Embraer would not even meet the Iranian delegation to discuss
possibilities. Comment: This type of agreement would be impossible, partially
razil come from the United States.)
because some aircraft parts used in
IF') 7. In agriculture, a Memorandum of understanding (MOU) may be
signed during the visit between the Brazilian Agriculture and Livestock Research
Enterprise (EMBRAPA) and its Iranian counterpart on technical cooperation in
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research and development. Iran had interest in investing in Brazil's agro-industry to
guarantee the supply of certain products to Iran, including corn, rice, sugar, and soy.
On Iran's part, there had already been some contact with Brazilian companies
regarding these issues.
F) 8. The Iranian government would like to see Brazilian companies
investing in power generation inside Iran, in the areas of hydropower and thermopower
plants. Iran also wanted to develop its capacity to refine oil and invited Brazilian
companies to assist. Comment: In both these areas, Brazilian exports of capital
goods and services to Iran would be more likely.)
F) 9. Iran offered to invest in the automobile industry in Brazil, to
manufacture low cost "popular cars." There was low interest from the Brazilian side,
however, as Brazilian officials believed that Iranian cars could probably not compete in
the local market dominated by big "transnationals." Car repairs, services, and spare
parts would also be an issue if Brazil were to acquire Iranian automobiles.
Comment: As such, it would be unlikely for Brazil to accept Iran's proposition on this
matter.)
F) 10. Iran would also like to see Brazilian companies investing in mining
�in Iran, particularly metal melting in the steel industry. Comment: This was a
very low possibility, as the Brazilian Government wants to foster and promote
investments within Brazil, such as Brazilian steel company ((Vale)).)
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F) ii. Comment: While the Brazilian MRE does not have the same (k(b)(3)
strong political motivation as Iran for strengthening bilateral relations, the Brazilian (b)(3)
MRE is desirous to not only increase economic cooperation with Iran, but also to help
intermediate between Iran and the West, particularly in the area of nuclear
negotiations. Brazilian officials believed that Brazil could be a potentially strong
stabilizing force in the Middle East, and that with Brazil's past experience with the
Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC),
Brazil was ideally situated to interact with Iran on this issue.)
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1�ISE �
(U) In preparation for Irani n President Mahmud ((Ahmadi-
Nejad))'s planned visit to Brazil on 23 November 2009,
officials from the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations and
the Iranian Embassy in Brasilia met throughout October in
Brasilia to discuss bilateral goals for the upcoming visit.
Brazil's goals focused on export financing, and Brazil's
desire to set up a bilateral mechanism to facilitate trade
between the two countries. Iranian Ambassador to Brazil
Mohsen ((Shaterzadeh)) Yazdi expressed a number of
expectations for economic cooperation on the part of Iran,
in the areas of oil and gas, purchases from Embraer,
agriculture, power generation, industry, mining, and
brokering and financing. A Brazilian delegation planned to
travel to Iran in mid-November 2009 to finalize these plans.
Language:
en
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