USSR: CHERNOBYL' AND GORBACHEV
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
06795970
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
April 23, 2025
Document Release Date:
March 25, 2025
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2016-02406
Publication Date:
May 13, 1986
File:
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Body:
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970
Director of
Central
Intelligence
ret
(b)(3)
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
13 May 1986
Tp.Secret
CPAS NID 86-111JX
13 May 1986
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970
Contents
USSR: Chernobyl' and Gorbachev
Syria: Fearing Israeli Attack
Canada: Tory Fortunes Declining
USSR-Angola: Soviets Reaffirm Support
Latin America: More Difficult Debt Negotiations
1
3
4
5
6
Notes
India: Cabinet Shuffle 8
Bangladesh: Uncertain Election Aftermath 8
Iraq: Military Grumbling 9
Syria-Lebanon: Pressure on Christians 9
Eastern Europe: Hard Currency Trade Balance 10
Nigeria: Economic Policy Under Pressure 10
In Brief
11
Special Analyses
Philippines: impact of Insurgent Activity 12
Cuba: A Revolution Fraying at the Edges 14
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970
. _
USSR: Chernobyl' and Gorbachev
The contamination at Chernobyl' is apparently greater than the
Soviets acknowledge,
Soviet media yesterday reported the death toll had risen to eight.
Pravda today contains an admission that the damaged reactor still
posed a serious threat 10 days after the accident on 26 April.
Comment: Persons within a few miles of the plant could have
received a lethal dose of radiation within the first day. If these
individuals were not evacuated for a day or more�as-re orted by the
Soviets earlier�many of them probably will die.
Impact of Chernobyl' on Gorbachev
In the 18 days since the Chernobyl' accident, General Secretary
Gorbachev has avoided the limelight and allowed others to take the
lead, perhaps jeopardizing his image as an accessible leader.
Late last week the Politburo announced measures to provide financial
compensation to individuals and enterprises evacuated from the
disaster zone, but Soviet domestic media have not reported any
message from Gorbachev personally to the popitlation and have not
alluded to his Involvement in managing the crisis. His only known
statement about the disaster has been a lefter to Italian Prime
Minister Craxi pledging to keep him informed about the cleanup.
Comment: Gorbachev may have distanced himself from the disaster
to keep public attention focused on local officials, whom he intends to
present as scapegoats. The head of Novosti news agency pointedly
insisted in an interview last weekend that the General Secretary
continued
1 13 May 1986
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970
should not be implicated in the delayed So}let reaction to the
accident, saying that "before he can communicate Information, he
has to have it."
Gorbachev may believe it inadvisable to speak until the situation is
completely under control. Even if the situation at the plant is
stabilizing, he may want to put off any message that could turn out to
be unduly Optimistic. He may also have feared that highly visible
Involvement by the General Secretary would increase public alarm.
This aloofness Is undercutting the image Gorbachev has tried to
cultivate as a leader willing to tackle difficult questions head on, and
he may soon calculate it Is in his political interest to speak out.
2
TowSecret
13 May 1986
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970