USSR: CHERNOBYL' AND GORBACHEV

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
06795970
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
April 23, 2025
Document Release Date: 
March 25, 2025
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
F-2016-02406
Publication Date: 
May 13, 1986
File: 
Body: 
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970 Director of Central Intelligence ret (b)(3) National Intelligence Daily Tuesday 13 May 1986 Tp.Secret CPAS NID 86-111JX 13 May 1986 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970 Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970 Contents USSR: Chernobyl' and Gorbachev Syria: Fearing Israeli Attack Canada: Tory Fortunes Declining USSR-Angola: Soviets Reaffirm Support Latin America: More Difficult Debt Negotiations 1 3 4 5 6 Notes India: Cabinet Shuffle 8 Bangladesh: Uncertain Election Aftermath 8 Iraq: Military Grumbling 9 Syria-Lebanon: Pressure on Christians 9 Eastern Europe: Hard Currency Trade Balance 10 Nigeria: Economic Policy Under Pressure 10 In Brief 11 Special Analyses Philippines: impact of Insurgent Activity 12 Cuba: A Revolution Fraying at the Edges 14 Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970 Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970 . _ USSR: Chernobyl' and Gorbachev The contamination at Chernobyl' is apparently greater than the Soviets acknowledge, Soviet media yesterday reported the death toll had risen to eight. Pravda today contains an admission that the damaged reactor still posed a serious threat 10 days after the accident on 26 April. Comment: Persons within a few miles of the plant could have received a lethal dose of radiation within the first day. If these individuals were not evacuated for a day or more�as-re orted by the Soviets earlier�many of them probably will die. Impact of Chernobyl' on Gorbachev In the 18 days since the Chernobyl' accident, General Secretary Gorbachev has avoided the limelight and allowed others to take the lead, perhaps jeopardizing his image as an accessible leader. Late last week the Politburo announced measures to provide financial compensation to individuals and enterprises evacuated from the disaster zone, but Soviet domestic media have not reported any message from Gorbachev personally to the popitlation and have not alluded to his Involvement in managing the crisis. His only known statement about the disaster has been a lefter to Italian Prime Minister Craxi pledging to keep him informed about the cleanup. Comment: Gorbachev may have distanced himself from the disaster to keep public attention focused on local officials, whom he intends to present as scapegoats. The head of Novosti news agency pointedly insisted in an interview last weekend that the General Secretary continued 1 13 May 1986 Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970 Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970 should not be implicated in the delayed So}let reaction to the accident, saying that "before he can communicate Information, he has to have it." Gorbachev may believe it inadvisable to speak until the situation is completely under control. Even if the situation at the plant is stabilizing, he may want to put off any message that could turn out to be unduly Optimistic. He may also have feared that highly visible Involvement by the General Secretary would increase public alarm. This aloofness Is undercutting the image Gorbachev has tried to cultivate as a leader willing to tackle difficult questions head on, and he may soon calculate it Is in his political interest to speak out. 2 TowSecret 13 May 1986 (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795970