THE IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS: STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, AND CHALLENGES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06849475
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2020
• Case Number: F-2017-02412
• Publication Date: September 17, 1993

Approved for Release: 2020/06/23 C06849475
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17 September 1993
The Iraqi National Congress: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Challenges
The Iraqi National Congress (INC) has made more progress than any Iraqi
opposition group toward building unity and articulating a pluralistic, democratic national
agenda. The organization has succeeded in keeping key Kurdish and Shia groups in its
ranks, has weathered efforts to undermine its unity regional opposition sponsors and
rival dissidents, and has made visible progress toward organizing its leadership and policy
committees. INC unity and strong Western support have helped individual groups,
especially the Kurds, to spurn Baghdad's overtures. Kurdish control of territory in northern
Iraq gives the INC a domestic base for political and propaganda operations. INC leaders
claim contacts with a growing number of Iraqi army officers who have pledged th �
support to the opposition in the event of a serious challenge to Saddam's regime.
Recent
efforts by Baghdad to discredit, intimidate, or eliminate INC leaders suggest that Saddam
considers the group at least a nuisance and potentially a threat. If Western support
remains strong, we believe the INC !las a good chance of developing into an instrument of
pressure on Saddam.
Despite the INC's progress toward unity, the group still faces significant challenges�
including persistent internal squabbling, a lack of credibility inside Iraq, and interference
by Iraq's neighbors, who all want to shape the INC to suit their own limited agendas.
Competing interests and the geographic separation of senior leaders slows and fragments
INC decisionmaking. Alunad Chalabes aggressive leadership of the INC's Executive
Committee has been a recurring source of controversy. Inequities in ethnic and religious
representation in the organization's leadership bodies remains an underlying source of
tension between member groups. Despite increased contacts with Saudi Arabia, no
country in the region has offered tangible support to the group and Riyadh still has doubts
about the INC's credibility and prospects. Syria vehemently opposes the group, and both
Syria and Saudi Arabia sponsor rival Arab Sunni opposition groups. In our judgment,
current levels of Western support are insufficient to enable the group to achieve its goals of
overthrowing Saddam Husayn and installing a democratic, pluralistic government in
Baghdad. (S NF)
The INC includes representatives of all the major Kurdish, Shia, and Independent
groups based in northern Iraq and abroad. The participation of the Kurdish Front in the
organization gives the INC a large following among Iraq's minority Kurdish population.
Iran-based Iraqi Shia groups also participate in the INC. Support among Shias and Sunnis
in central and southern Iraq, however, is much harder to come by. INC ties to Washington,
a perceived lack of Western interest in the plight of Iraq's majority Shies, and lack of access
to southern Iraq by exiled opposition groups and international humanitarian organizations
detract from INC support in southern Iraq. Support for the INC is weakest among Iraq's
privileged minority Arab Sunnis, who still view INC policies and makeup�exiles, Kurds,
and Shias�as a threat to their continued dominance of the country. Increased Sunni
backing is needed if the INC is to appeal to key military and political figures in the regime.
Most INC members, however, have been exiled for years and have little name recognition
inside the country. Only a handful of them who already have strong support bases inside
Iraq�like the Kurds and some Shias�might have sufficient political and military clout to
play a role in a post-Saddam Iraq
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Approved for Release: 2020/06/23 C06849475